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Abstract 
 
The relationship of international investment law (IIL) with the rule of law is an 
increasingly important topic. There is a broad agreement that the rule of law is a guiding 
notion for IIL and investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), both in terms of their own 
operation and regarding the obligations imposed on host States. One of these 
obligations – the FET standard – has been specifically interpreted as requiring respect 
for certain fundamental rule of law principles such as predictability, non-arbitrariness 
and transparency.  
  
The principal argument of this thesis is that the FET standard should be seen, in 
addition to securing international rule of law for foreign investors, as a tool to strengthen 
the national rule of law in the host States. Progressive development of the FET sub-
principles should be complemented with a systematic taking into account the existing 
national rule of law framework in a host State. This can both enhance ex ante 
predictability of FET decision-making, and allow for other broader benefits that come 
out of rule of law improvement. 
 
The proposed approach would involve a systematic recourse to a holistic set of 
existing municipal and international obligations beyond the investment treaty so to help 
interpret and apply the FET standard. These obligations embody a specific national 
vision of the rule of law that should be given recognition and support, within limits and 
without jeopardizing the international character of the IIL norms. Furthermore, 
decision-making can be enhanced by having recourse to comparative benchmarks to 
provide persuasiveness of determinations and by limiting the role of good faith 
considerations. With a complementary focus on the national rule of law, investment 
awards can become a clearer source for suggesting needed reforms, bringing benefits to 
a wider circle of domestic stakeholders and more broadly supporting the host State 
development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
‘Indeed it is not too much to say that […] the 
role of international law is to reinforce, and on occasions 
to institute, the rule of law internally.’1 
James Crawford 
 
 
‘Thus, as the Minister of Finance of Uruguay 
explained […] when his country ratified its BIT with the 
United States, ‘‘We are not signing this treaty for them 
[i.e. the United States], we are signing it for us.’’’2 
      
           Jeswald W. Salacuse 
 
 
 
Promoting the rule of law is a goal of international investment law upon which 
different actors strongly agree.3 This is unsurprising in light of the appeal that the 
notion of the rule of law enjoys in both legal and business quarters. A strong rule of law 
has consistently been considered a key condition for growth of commerce4 and 
investment,5 as well as economic development in general.6 Both common and 
continental law jurisdictions have a long history of discussing and generally promoting 
the concept.7 While the definition and content of the notion are unsettled, its broad 
																																																						
1 Crawford 2003, 8. 
2 Salacuse 2010, 444. 
3 Jowell 2015, 9; Salacuse 2000, 386-387 and 398; Fortier 2009a, 350; Schill 2015, 81; Ranjan 2016, 116; 
Guthrie 2013, 1160; McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, 128; Calamita 2015, 122; Rogers 2015, 71; for IIA 
negotiators espousing such views see Steffens 2009, 348 and Baldi 2013, 444. See for historical aspects 
Vandevelde 2016, 66. 
4 Hale 2016, 3. 
5 Guthrie 2013, 1159 and materials cited in fn 33. 
6 Carothers 2003, 6; Santos 2006, 253; Allen 2011, 15; Wang/Xu/Zhu 2012; see similarly in political 
science Fukuyama 2011. 
7 For an overview, see primarily Tamanaha 2004. See also Loughlin 2010, 314-324. 
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appeal is hardly in question – it has even been described as a ‘charmed concept, 
essentially without critics or dissenters.’8  
 
The relationship of international investment law (hereinafter IIL) and the rule of 
law has been increasingly discussed over the past decade. The research has focused both 
on the investment protection regime in general, and more particularly on its adjudicative 
component - investor-State dispute settlement (hereinafter ISDS). Broadly speaking, 
authors focus on the rule of law characteristics and effects of substantive provisions in 
international investment agreements (hereinafter IIAs),9 the rule of law features and 
flaws of the ISDS as a dispute-settlement mechanism,10 and on the predominantly 
empirical examinations of the effect that IIL has on the rule of law in the host States.11 
The rule of law as a ‘guiding notion’12 for IIL and ISDS thus makes the concept a 
promising ‘normative perspective’13 for assessment and prescription in this field. 
 
This thesis focuses on decision-making on the merits under the claims that the 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) standard has been breached by the host State. The 
FET standard, mainly through ISDS jurisprudential developments, is now widely 
considered to embody the key rule of law requirements such as predictability, respect 
for legitimate expectations, due process and transparency.14 Due to its ubiquitous 
application in ISDS, FET can be seen as a worthy development in imposing the rule of 
law disciplines on host States. However, this thesis argues that the currently dominant 
normative underpinning of the FET standard as securing the international rule of law 
(IROL paradigm), in the sense that its rule of law requirements should be detached 
from those of the host State and should specifically offer protection to foreign 
investors, should be complemented by a national rule of law (NROL) paradigm. 
																																																						
8 Hurd 2014, 39. See prominently the UN General Assembly resolution 64/116 on the rule of law at the 
national and international levels (A/RES/64/116) and the 2005 World Summit Outcome document 
(A/RES/60/1). For regional organisations, see Aust/Nolte 2014, 57. See similarly for the universal 
appeal Watts 1993, 15; Kumm 2003, 20-21; Chesterman 2009, 67; Kanetake 2016a, 19; Ranjan 2016, 117-
118; McCorquodale 2016, 278. 
9 See generally Guthrie 2013; more specifically, for the ‘fair and equitable’ treatment standard as an 
embodiment of the rule of law see Schill 2010b; Vandevelde 2010; Angelet 2011; Diehl 2012, 335. 
10 See particularly Van Harten (2010b, 2010c, 2012) as well as Pauwelyn 2015 and Reinisch 2016; see 
more generally De Brabandere 2014 and Wälde 2010. 
11 See in that vein Ginsburg 2005; Franck 2007; Shultz 2015 and Sattorova 2015. See also Guthrie 2013, 
1167-1175. For caution about empirically measuring the rule of law see Calamita 2015, 120. 
12 Schill 2015, 85 and 98. See similarly Reinisch 2016, 292. 
13 Smits 2012, 44. 
14 See generally Schill 2010b; Vandevelde 2010; and Diehl 2012.  
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Investment arbitrators should, when interpreting and applying the FET sub-principles, 
systematically and consistently take into account and examine the international and 
national legal commitments of the host State beyond the IIA. This should be a 
conscious effort to examine if the host State decision-makers obeyed their own State’s 
vision of how legal processes should have unfolded in accordance with the rule of law, 
although the ultimate determination on the existence of a breach of the FET standard 
remains formally independent of the results of this examination.  
 
To briefly elaborate at this point, the FET standard should require, e.g. 
‘transparency’ of the host State behaviour – but the FET standard is surely not the first, 
or even the most elaborate instrument requiring transparent behaviour of the host State 
and its decision-makers. Not giving due weight to other instruments 
(domestic/international) which also mandate transparent behaviour in relevant legal 
situations fails to realise the full rule of law enhancement potential of the ISDS 
proceedings. It also risks unnecessarily isolating some ‘IIL-specific’ understandings of 
the FET sub-principles from the rich wider corpus of domestic and international 
sources. The increased ‘mutualism’15 between the FET standard and other sources 
binding the host State can help to strengthen the national rule of law and thus lead to 
other potential benefits, such as helping enhance the host State development and 
increase the legitimacy of the ISDS and IIL more generally.  
 
The remainder of this Introduction focuses briefly on the notion of the ‘rule of 
law’ for the purposes of this thesis (section 1), before focusing on the reasons for the 
focus on the FET standard (section 2). With this background in mind, section 3 
provides a more detailed overview of the arguments put forward. Section 4 deals with 
certain methodological considerations, further delineates the scope of inquiry and the 
relationship with the ongoing reform processes. Section 5 provides an outline of the 
chapters that follow. 
 
1. ‘Rule of law’ 
 
The wealth of scholarship on the rule of law and its more specific facets 
simultaneously provides a valuable source of insights and invites caution. What is meant 
																																																						
15 See for ‘complementarity’ and ‘mutualism’ Kjos 2015, 301-302. 
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by the ‘rule of law’ in terms of content? To which ‘law’ and which plane of operation it 
refers to? To ensure precision and clarity when dealing with such a ubiquitous (yet 
‘essentially contested’)16 notion, it is warranted to briefly elucidate the different relevant 
understandings,17 before making clear their import for this thesis. The two most 
important distinctions are between the ‘thin’/‘formal’ and ‘thick’/‘substantive’ 
understandings on one side, and between the ‘international rule of law’ and the ‘national 
rule of law’ on the other. These refer, respectively, to the content of the concept and to 
the level at which it operates. 
 
Formal vs. substantive rule of law 
 
Existing definitions of the rule of law are almost always positioned somewhere 
between the formal (thin) and substantive (thick) poles.18 The formal conceptions 
emphasise that legal rules should comply with certain system-internal requirements, 
without passing judgment on the substance of those rules. Substantive ones go beyond by 
linking the existence of the ‘proper’ rule of law with the protection of specific values 
and/or the existence of specific guaranteed rights. This essentially requires ‘good’ as 
opposed to just ‘general, prospective and consistent’ laws.19  
 
Formal understandings of the rule of law thus focus more on the procedural20 or 
mechanical21 aspects of the law, in particular on clarity and predictability. Oft-cited 
definitions by Joseph Raz and Lon Fuller broadly illustrate this. According to Raz, law 
must be prospective, general, clear, public and relatively stable – as well as coupled with 
a number of other features such as the independent judiciary and the possibility of 
judicial review.22 For Fuller, ‘inner morality of law’ requires 1) generality, 2) publicity, 3) 
prospective orientation, 4) clarity, 5) non-contradictory nature, 6) issuance of 
																																																						
16 Waldron 2011a, 316-317. See similarly Loughlin 2010, 312-313. 
17 See similarly Guthrie 2013, 1160-1164. 
18 See in that sense Tamanaha 2004, 91; Craig 1997, 468; Santos 2006, 258-259, Chesterman 2007, para. 
12; Hsu 2015, 131.  
19 This delineation is admittedly somewhat artificial. Formal concepts are themselves necessarily based on 
at least some substantive considerations, such as moral autonomy (Craig 1997, 482; Tamanaha 2004, 92). 
In parallel, ‘the adoption of a fully substantive conception of the rule of law has the consequence of 
robbing the concept of any function which is independent of the theory of justice which imbues such an 
account of law’ (Craig 1997, 488; similarly Calamita 2015, 106).  
20 Wacks 2014, 15; Chimni 2012, 291. 
21 Santos 2006, 260. 
22 See generally Raz 1977 and also Tamanaha 2004, 93.  
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requirements that can be obeyed, 7) stability, and 8) congruence between declared rules 
and actual practice.23 
 
Going beyond ‘just’ the formal requirements, substantive conceptions of the rule 
of law usually take them as a starting point - while adding the requirements for existence 
of particular rights or values. As argued, an underlying theory of (usually democratic) 
justice needs to infuse the formal requirements with meaning and supplement the formal 
qualities with a substantive account.24 Different substantive values can, of course, be put 
forward as dominant. Apart from those definitions that focus on a singular substantive 
aspect,25 more holistic visions usually revolve around the respect for the (broader or 
narrower) corpus of human rights.26 
 
A recent influential account in that vein was offered by Tom Bingham, for whom 
‘[t]he law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights’.27 ‘Roundly’ 
rejecting Raz’s formalistic account, Bingham argues for a thick definition, as otherwise 
the rule of law loses much of its virtue.28 While recognizing the problems of trying to 
universalise human rights,29 Bingham argues that there is a sufficiently clear core of 
rights that a rule of law system worthy of its name should embody.30  
 
International vs. national rule of law 
 
The most straightforward way to distinguish between the international and 
national rule of law for the present purposes (leaving aside for the moment the level of 
																																																						
23 Fuller 1969, 33-94.  
24 Hutchinson 1999, 199; Krygier 2012, 239; see famously Dworkin 1986, 355-399. 
25 An example is Friedrich Hayek, whose otherwise strongly formal account of the rule of law is coupled 
with an imperative of realising a free market economy (Hayek 1946). For a briefer overview, see 
Tamanaha 2004, 65-71. 
26 See for example, Venice Commission Report on the Rule of Law, 2011, available at: 
http://www.venice.coe. int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2011)003rev-e, accessed 1 February 
2017; see also Legg 2016, 249-250 and McCorquodale 2016, 280. 
27 Bingham 2011, 66 (emphasis added). See similarly McCorquodale 2016, 293-294. 
28 Bingham 2011, 67. 
29 Ibid, 67-68. 
30 This includes the right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery and forced labour, right to 
liberty and security, right to a fair trial, principles of no punishment without law, respect for private and 
family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and 
association, right to marry, non-discrimination, protection of property, and the right to education (ibid, 
68-84). 
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‘thickness’/substantive content) is the plane on which these concepts operate.31 The 
national rule of law operates at the level of domestic legal orders, essentially aiming to 
constrain the arbitrary exercise of governmental power towards those under its 
jurisdiction.32 The international rule of law operates at the level of international law. It is 
a structurally more complex notion that can be further broken down into three 
components. It is possible discuss the international rule of law as: 1) operating in State-
State relationships; 2) operating to regulate the relationship of the State and 
individuals/non-State entities under its jurisdiction and 3) directly operating between 
the level of international institutions and the individual.33  
 
It is the second (regulating State-individual relation) understanding of the 
international rule of law that is of special relevance for this thesis.34 In terms of content 
and structure, IIL is a mixture of some 3000 predominantly bilateral treaties and (far 
less significantly) customary international law and domestic statutes.35 While the 
widespread ‘treatification’ of IIL36 would suggest a State-State relationship as a primary 
one, the predominant understanding is that the IIL aims to regulate the exercise of State 
authority towards individuals and companies (eligible foreign investors) under its 
jurisdiction.37 As is often argued, the desire to remove this relationship from the 
perceived vagaries of both diplomatic protection and the domestic rule of law primarily 
inspired the creation and eventual burgeoning of IIL.38 
																																																						
31 Since the topic examined here is the international law regulation of the State-individual relationship, as 
will be elaborated shortly, there is no need to engage with arguments that State-State rule of law and 
State-individual rule of law are essentially different phenomena (see Watts 1993, 17-18 and Schill 2016, 
441). 
32 See for a brief overview Loughlin 2010, 333-337 and authors cited therein. See also in this sense 
Chimni 2012, 290; Krygier 2012, 242; Kanetake 2016a, 15; and generally Jowell 2007. For caution about 
practically realising the ideal of non-arbitrariness see however Loughlin 2010, 337-341. 
33 See Chesterman 2009, 68-69 and particularly Kanetake 2016a, 16-17. See similarly McCorquodale 2016, 
288. 
34 This is not to say that the other two understandings are not relevant. While the international law -
individual relationship is perhaps primarily manifested in international criminal law (Corell 2001, 265-266 
and 268; Cassese et al. 2013), investor as a sui generis subject of international law has aroused considerable 
doctrinal interest (see, for example, Paulsson 1995, Weil 2000 and Douglas 2004). The State-State 
relationship in IIL has been recently emphasised, for example, by Anthea Roberts (Roberts 2010 and 
Roberts 2015). 
35 See generally Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 12-27. As noted by Schill, ‘present day IIL, for all practical 
purposes, is equivalent to the law of investment treaties as interpreted and applied by investment treaty 
tribunals’ (2017b, 5). See similarly Ciurtin 2017, 29 and 33. 
36 As termed by Salacuse (2007). 
37 See generally Douglas 2004; Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 24; McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, para. 7.178; 
Van Harten 2010c, 632. See similarly Muchlinski 2011, 7; Alvarez 2005, 96l and Wälde 2008. 
38 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 235-236; Reinisch 2016, 291-292; Brower/Steven 2001, 196; Schwebel 2008, 6; 
Ranjan 2016, 128; Kanetake 2016b, 275; Kumm 2003, 26. 
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In terms of content, specifically in light of the formal/substantive distinction, the 
IIL rule of law principles seen as imposed on participating States - in particular those 
embodied in the FET standard - are generally in line with broader public international 
law. At the level of international law, rule of law principles are usually considered to be 
formal/thin.39 The attempts to universally ‘thicken’ their content with more substantive 
notions – such as human rights – are still unsettled and controversial.40 For example, a 
widely cited UN definition of the content of the rule of law includes, apart from a 
number of formal principles, consistency with human right standards.41 It has, however, 
been described as ‘almost certainly go[ing] beyond what states would actually 
implement.’42 
 
‘Rule of law’ for the purposes of this thesis 
 
While there are multiple ways to relate both the formal/substantive and 
international/national rule of law understandings to different IIL standards, the focus 
on the FET standard narrows the relevant aspects. Firstly, and as will be revisited in the 
chapters that follow, the FET standard predominantly deals with the formal aspects of 
the rule of law.43 In an oft-cited summary, Stephan Schill identified how jurisprudence 
disaggregated the FET standard into seven sub-clusters of requirements, all of which 
‘also figure prominently as sub-elements or expressions of the broader concept of the 
rule of law in domestic legal systems’:  
(1) the requirement of stability, predictability, and consistency of the legal 
framework; (2) the principle of legality; (3) the protection of legitimate 
expectations; (4) procedural due process and denial of justice; (5) substantive 
due process and protection against discrimination and arbitrariness; (6) 
transparency; and (7) the principle of reasonableness and proportionality.44  
 
To be sure, some of these requirements may require engaging with the 
																																																						
39 Chesterman 2009, 69; Kanetake 2016a, 20 and 23. 
40 Kanetake 2016a, 21; Ranjan 2016, 117-118. See also McCorquodale 2016, 282 and Nollkaemper 2011, 
4-5. 
41 UN Secretary-General Report ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict 
societies’ (S/2004/616), para. 6. 
42 Chesterman 2009, 68. See also Aust/Nolte 2014, 51. 
43 McLachlan 2009, 119. 
44 Schill 2010b, 159-160 and 171. 
 
19 
substantive, value choices made by the host State. But leaving that aside for the 
moment, the requirements set above are the coordinates which are relevant for 
examining IROL and NROL paradigms in this thesis. Each of these requirements can 
have meaning and content imbued to it by the IIAs and the FET standard 
jurisprudence, whilst being enforced by investment tribunals. In doing so, as Chapter 1 
will elaborate, the agreement in doctrine and practice seems to be that the tribunals are 
enforcing international rule of law discipline on the host State, and should not as a matter 
of principle be obliged to relate to rule of law concepts and requirements existing in the 
host State (as these might well be deficient and thus require existence of IIAs in the first 
place). Such a normative understanding of the role of the FET standard and the 
investment tribunals themselves is herein dubbed the international rule of law/IROL 
paradigm.  
At the same time, in a particular legal situation which involves the foreign 
investors, each of the FET standard requirements can have meaning and content 
imbued to it by the national legal provisions (such as constitutional norms, 
administrative codes, civil and criminal procedure statutes) and international 
commitments of the host State beyond the IIA in question (e.g. human rights treaties). 
This meaning and content, derived to the extent possible from the interplay of these 
instruments, present a case-specific legal framework in which the domestic decision-
makers should have operated regardless of and looking beyond any obligation contained 
in the relevant IIA. Exploring to what extent the host State behaviour was in line with 
such a legal framework is here dubbed the national rule of law/NROL paradigm. Thus, 
the national or domestic rule of law here refers to how a specific host State in question 
would understand the meaning and compliance with each of these FET-imposed rule of 
law requirements, when all relevant sources binding it are taken into account. This does 
not encompass the entirety of domestic law, but particular parts that are of relevance 
for a particular requirement (e.g. ‘due process’, ‘transparency’) in a specific legal 
situation that involved a foreign investor. The summary of these relevant sources, 
constructed on a case-by-case basis, is termed the ideal-type model of the domestic rule of law 
and is the main topic of Chapter 4. 
As the case may be, ‘due process’ (e.g) may end up meaning different things in the 
IROL context and in the NROL context. Crucially, the NROL meaning might 
eventually have minimal or no influence whatsoever on the ultimate determination of 
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the FET breach. The disconnect between the two can thus lead to the creation of 
‘bubbles’ or ‘enclaves’ for foreign investors – something that is sometimes lauded as 
desirable or at least seen as inevitable.45 However, while in some situations such 
isolation may indeed be necessary to protect the foreign investors from the vicissitudes 
of domestic law and practice (and the FET standard allows this) as a more general 
normative orientation it leaves much to be desired.46 It is the principal argument of this 
thesis that conscious and thorough balancing between IROL and NROL paradigms and 
bridging the gap between them can have tangible benefits for all involved stakeholders. 
 
2. The reasons for focusing on the FET standard   
 
IIL (and in particular the FET standard) as well as ISDS can be and often are 
perceived as an international rule of law success story. While the efficiency of 
enforcement of international obligations is generally strongly debated and criticised,47 
the IIL regime exhibits a massive acceptance of international arbitral jurisdiction (with 
claims lodged by non-State entities directly)48 and a high rate of compliance with 
award.49 Similarly, in light of the still globally unsettled list of rule of law principles, the 
widespread binding adoption of those contained in IIAs is an important development.50  
 
Yet, IIL and ISDS continue to face criticism from different quarters and have 
been witnessing an increasing number of reform proposals.51 The contrast with the 
success narrative presented above is clearly noticeable, and understanding (at this point 
briefly) its causes is important for explaining the focus on the FET standard. While 
acknowledging the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to locate some of the most 
pertinent causes of discontent in the interplay of the specific rule of law principles (as 
exemplified by the FET standard) and the structural/adjudicative features of the 
																																																						
45 See, for example, Dolzer 2005, 955. 
46 See on this, for example, Hepburn 2017, 195.	
47 See, for example, Shaw 2014, 800-801; Corell 2001, 264; Llamzon 2007; Watts 1993, 36-37 and 43-44; 
Conforti 1993, 5; Fikfak 2016, 48-49; Nollkaemper 2011, 5-6 and in particular fn 29. 
48 Schwebel noted the emergence of ISDS as one of the ‘most progressive developments in the procedure 
of international law in the last fifty years’ (2008, 4). 
49 See primarily Mistelis/Baltag 2008; see also Alexandroff/Laird 2008, Reed/Martinez 2009, Gerlich 
2015; Sepúlveda-Amor/Lawry-White 2016 and Carvalho 2016, 23; notably, instances of opposition to 
enforcement (see Bjorklund 2009 and Gerlich 2015) are those that often capture the attention of 
academics and the public, perhaps skewing the perception of compliance. 
50 Reinisch 2008, 111-114. 
51 For an overview see Schill 2015, 98-100. 
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regime.52 Generally, IIL is characterised by a challenging combination of: 1) superficial 
accordance on the rule of law principles that actually masks a deeply seated lack of 
agreement on their content; 2) the almost unprecedented level of overlap with the 
domestic rule of law and vertical State-individual relations; 3) a powerful enforcement 
mechanism which often foregoes the need to exhaust domestic remedies and aims to 
shape domestic law and practice; and 4) the lack of an in-built mechanism for either 
ensuring the consistency of the ISDS output or for securing a level of 
subsidiarity/deference towards the national (rule of) law.53 
 
The FET standard is at the forefront of these issues. It has emerged as both the 
preeminent standard invoked by foreign investors,54 the one bringing most success to 
them,55 and the one most often directly connected to rule of law considerations.56 In 
that sense, the FET standard and its sub-principles are very likely to be found in almost 
all existing (and prospective) ISDS disputes.57 If there can be a reasonable prediction 
about a standard that is likely to feature in any hypothetical future ISDS claim, the odds 
are certainly in favour of the FET standard. It has emerged as a core concept of IIL 
with a potential to reach deeper into the regulatory sphere of States than any other 
standard.58 Without disregarding the importance of other standards and provisions 
(primarily the prohibition of expropriation without compensation), this consideration 
itself strongly warrants focusing one’s lens on the FET standard to discuss the interplay 
with the national rule of law. 
 
Two further remarks are in order. Firstly, for purposes of this thesis, the 
sometimes separate prohibition of ‘arbitrary’ and ‘unreasonable’ measures found in IIAs 
is discussed jointly with the FET as its part.59 This prohibition in relevant respects 
largely overlaps with the FET standard, thereby justifying their joint discussion.60 As 
																																																						
52 See similarly Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 793-795. 
53 See similarly Landau 2009, 194-196. 
54 Bonnitcha 2014, 144; Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 130; Draguiev 2014, 273-274. 
55 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 98, 101 and 130. 
56 See on this the discussion in the earlier parts of this Introduction, and specifically Schill 2010b. 
57 See generally Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 133-134. 
58 Dolzer 2005, 964; Schill 2010b, 151. 
59 This does not ignore that the wording of these provisions differs in IIAs. However, as noted, there is a 
high level of convergence among tribunals in assuming that FET embodies a common set of legal 
elements regardless of the differences in drafting (see, among many, Tudor 2008, 154; Dolzer/Schreuer 
2012, 145; Kläger 2011, 117–18; Schill 2010b, 152). The issue will thus not be further explored here.  
60 See on this Hepburn 2017, 31 and materials cited therein and also, for example, Lemire v. Ukraine – 
Jurisdiction and Liability, para. 284. 
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noted, tribunals do not attach much weight to the difference between arbitrary and 
unreasonable, and these concepts overlap with FET in the sense that arbitrary and 
unreasonable behaviour will also breach FET and vice versa.61 
 
Secondly, the focus on FET means that the arguments made here are not claimed 
to be necessarily relevant for other substantive provisions in IIAs, most importantly the 
prohibition of expropriation and the requirement of providing full protection and 
security to foreign investors. At occasions when these other provisions (and their 
jurisprudence) are relevant for the present discussion, this is made clear in the text. 
Although the FET and full protection and security provisions are sometimes equated in 
practice,62 and same sets of facts are often being put forward to support both the FET 
standard and expropriation claims,63 the normative arguments made here would likely 
need to be adapted to the specificities of these provisions and their accompanying 
jurisprudence. Whilst the proposed complementarity of the NROL paradigm and the 
suggested elements of decision-making may potentially have a fruitful application in 
these different contexts, this is something that the author will at this point leave for 
future research.  
 
3. A complementary normative paradigm – a summary of thesis arguments 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that pursuing the international rule of law 
discipline on host States through the FET standard in a manner which is detached from 
national legal systems (IROL paradigm) should be systematically complemented with a 
national rule of law paradigm (or NROL paradigm). The NROL paradigm would 
suggest that FET decision-making should be consistently used to help strengthen the 
domestic, national rule of law in addition to providing a case-by-case piecemeal 
protection of claimants. This would aim to benefit a wider range of stakeholders than 
just eligible foreign investors, pursue the goal of domestic economic development more 
holistically, and ultimately enhance the legitimacy of the IIL regime. The FET and its 
sub-components can be used more actively as tools to illuminate and sanction the 
national rule of law failings when these occur. This should, in addition to providing 
redress to an investor in a specific case, incentivise and support the host State efforts to 
																																																						
61 See for example Henckels 2015, 71 and materials cited therein. 
62 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 161. 
63 ibid, 133-134. 
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remedy these failings more systematically, ultimately helping provide different additional 
benefits. 
 
As has been noted above, IIL and general and the FET standard in particular 
have become an important tool in promoting the rule of law principles as 
(internationally) binding on host States. Through the ubiquitous IIAs which contain the 
FET standard and the body of jurisprudence interpreting and applying it, there is a wide 
understanding that this standard requires the host State to respect critical rule of law 
requirements in their behaviour towards the foreign investor.64  
 
While its sub-principles have cognates at the domestic level, the FET remains an 
autonomous, international standard, that is not to be formally equated or tied to the 
host State’s or any other domestic understanding of the rule of law requirements.65 In 
that way, it can guarantee a common international level of protection to foreign 
investors by serving as a detached benchmarking tool for assessing host State 
behaviour.66 It is this understanding that is dubbed the IROL paradigm in this thesis, 
and (as Chapter 1 will elaborate in more detail) it is this understanding that can be 
considered as firmly entrenched in the current ISDS jurisprudence and literature. 
 
 ISDS as an international dispute settlement mechanism has proved potent in 
‘giving teeth’ to the IROL paradigm. Application of the FET standard as an emanation 
of the rule of law requirements can be seen at the vanguard of putting into practice the 
broad commitment of States to promote the rule of law at both ‘the international and 
domestic level’.67 It is thus a worthy development that should be preserved in future 
jurisprudence. But this does not mean that, from a normative perspective, new 
qualitative leaps forward are not possible. Rather, this thesis argues that to utilise the 
power of IIL more fully and to lessen the impact of the problems arising out of the 
particular features of both the FET standard and ISDS more generally (as noted above 
in section 2) there should be a conscious and systematic effort in decision-making to complement 
the IROL paradigm understanding with what is here dubbed the NROL paradigm.  
																																																						
64 See in particular Schill 2010b and numerous materials cited therein; see also McLachlan 2009, 119. 
65 Schill 2010b, 163; Hepburn 2017, 16. 
66 Schill 2010b, 154; McLachlan 2009, 106 and 119.	
67 See generally UN General Assembly resolution 64/116 on the rule of law at the national and 
international levels (A/RES/64/116). 
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Whilst fully embracing their position as international dispute settlers applying 
international instruments (IIAs) and provisions (the FET standard), arbitrators should 
from a normative viewpoint be fully aware of the special and deep-reaching type of rule 
of law assessment that they are often performing upon domestic legislators, 
administrators and judicial organs. This requires that the rule of law requirements 
(rightly) refined from the FET standard are further interpreted and applied in a way that 
duly and systematically recognises and takes into account the multitude of national and 
international legal commitments binding upon the host State decision-makers. In 
further interpreting and applying the requirement that the host State acted e.g. in a ‘non-
arbitrary’, ‘transparent’, ‘predictable’ manner, a conscious and thorough effort should be 
put to relate, to the extent possible, the understanding of these requirements to 
international obligations of the host State beyond the FET standard and the IIA in 
question (such as human rights obligations) and to national law provisions (broadly 
understood to encompass constitutional law and other relevant sources).  
 
In all likelihood, and with the exceptions that can be remedied through residual 
discretion remaining in the hand of arbitrators applying the FET standard, the domestic 
legal framework of the host States and their existing international commitments already 
formally requires the host State to act in a way that respects rule of law principles – being 
therefore rather clearly potentially relevant for the interpretation and application of the 
FET standard. Certainly, the autonomous nature of the FET obligation does not allow 
simply equating the requirements of the standard with other national or international 
obligations. But normatively it makes little sense to isolate the FET sub-principles from 
their cognates in national and international law68 – in particular if these cognates were 
already accepted and internalized by the host State, and foreign investor could have 
expected them to be respected regardless of any IIA commitment. In the end, the 
reality of investor-State disputes is that despite the attempts to ‘insulate’ them, they 
‘nevertheless take place within a wider set of legal relationships between investor and 
host state’.69 
 
																																																						
68 McLachlan 2009, 119 and 122. 
69 ibid, 102-103; see similarly Igbokwe 2006, 298. 
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Therefore, to fully embrace this reality, help enhance the respect that host State 
decision-makers have for pre-existing national and international obligations, as well as 
to provide a rich source of ex ante discoverable reference points for interpretation and 
application, investment arbitrators should to the extent possible interpret and apply the 
FET and its sub-components with systematic reference to these international and 
national commitments. Such an approach should be in full accordance with the fact 
that, as Campbell McLachlan notes:   
 
The function of the international law standards enshrined in investment treaties 
is not to replace host state law. Rather it is to provide the fundamental protections of 
international law, in cases where the host state legal system has failed to secure such 
protections itself.70 
 
To reiterate, this does no extinguish separate normativity of FET – it is rather a 
way to partially shape and relate it to other relevant sources binding upon the host State 
and strive to strengthen the national rule of law. It certainly remains true that (as per 
VCLT Art. 27) national law cannot justify a breach of an international obligation by the 
host State,71 as well as that the breach of national law cannot per se entail a breach of the 
FET standard.72 Rather, the point is to be fully aware of the challenging mix of the 
open-textured nature of the FET standard and its rule of law-based sub-components 
with the institutional and legal framework of ISDS - which leaves much to be desired in 
terms of securing consistency of jurisprudence. Thus, one aspect of complementing the 
IROL paradigm with an NROL one is the attempt to lessen the impact of this mix and 
help provide more ex ante predictability. This is particularly important as discretion and 
lack of predictability could lead to FET being seen as ‘a malleable tool of ex post facto 
control of host states’ measures based on the arbitrators’ personal conviction and 
understanding about what is fair and equitable.’73 Both investor and host State should 
be reasonably certain that the examination of the holistically understood domestic law 
will prominently feature in tribunals’ application of the FET sub-principles.  
 
The second aspect is that the thorough and systematic examination of the 
national law and other international obligation, with a clear normative orientation to 
																																																						
70 McLachlan 2009, 107 (emphasis added). 
71 See in the ISDS context Igbokwe 2006, 299; McLachlan 2009, 114-115 and materials cited therein. 
72 Schill 2010b, 163 and 167; Hepburn 2017, 32-33 and materials cited therein. 
73 Schill 2010b, 157. 
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identify the rule of law failings, has considerable potential to strengthen the rule of law 
in the host State and enhance the legitimacy of IIL.74 With their detached international 
status and powerful enforcement mechanisms at hand, investment tribunals have an 
almost unique position to realize the goal of strengthening the national rule of law. 
 
It should be made clear that it is not argued that investment tribunals do not 
already engage with the host State domestic law or other international obligations. 
Leaving aside situations not examined in this thesis (such as jurisdictional issues of 
existence of a property right and illegality of an investment),75 investment tribunals have 
to varying degrees examined and engaged with domestic and (non-IIL) international law 
in interpreting and applying the FET standard.76 However, the extent of this 
engagement is (sometimes drastically) unequal among cases and there seems to be no 
clear normative agreement among the tribunals on the role of these extra-IIA sources.77 
This thesis thus proposes an outline of such an agreement – one suggesting that 
national and international sources of rules relating to the rule of law principles refined 
in FET should systematically and consistently be taken into account in decision-making, with 
a clearly recognised goal to complement the protection of an individual investor with 
elucidating the rule of law problems in the host State and providing potential guidelines 
for their elimination.78  
 
The proposals laid out in this thesis are normative in the sense that they entail 
prescriptive choices in interpreting and applying the law, choices that are allowed, but 
not mandated by the legal framework. There is little disagreement that the open-
textured nature of the FET standard allows for considerable and wide-ranging 
discretion of arbitrators, something that remains the case (although arguably less) even 
with the refinement of the standard into sub-clusters mentioned above. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, the legal framework of IIL and ISDS allows for considerably 
different choices to be made in the sense of how FET standard is interpreted, what role 
is given to non-investment obligations of the host State stemming from other 
																																																						
74 See on overcoming legitimacy issues through moving the focus away from just the investor protection 
Douglas 2006, 51 and Hepburn 2017, 197. 
75 See on these Igbokwe 2006, 286-287; Hanotiau 2009, 148. 
76 See, above all, the recent thorough treatment of this issue in Hepburn 2017, 13-40.	
77 ibid, 14-15 and 17 and materials cited there, in particular International Thunderbird v. Mexico – Separate 
Opinion Wälde, paras. 12 and 33 and Quasar v. Russia, paras. 21-23.  
78 See generally for a similar position regarding the relevance of national law Igbokwe 2006, in particular 
286-287 and 298. 
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(international) sources, and how the role and importance of national law is perceived. 
These choices, at the same time, remain within the boundaries of rules on interpretation 
of treaties and of the IIA provisions on the law applicable to the merits of the dispute. 
It is therefore not argued that complementing ISDS decision-making with an NROL 
paradigm is the only, black-law mandated way of interpreting and applying the FET 
standard. Rather, a proposal is made for a normative ought, among a number of perhaps 
equally legitimate alternatives. The normative arguments why this particular path is 
preferable, already hinted at in the previous discussion, are specifically engaged with in 
more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
To translate these normative considerations into more practical insights for the 
decision-making process, and recognising that there are certainly other ways in which 
strengthening the national rule of law can be pursued through ISDS, this thesis suggests 
three specific elements that should be a regular feature of investment tribunals’ 
deliberations on the FET standard claims. Firstly, in Chapter 4, it is argued that 
tribunals should, when examining the existence of a breach of a particular element of 
the FET standard, construct and take into account an ideal-type model of the domestic rule of 
law, as an overview of pre-existing obligations relating to specific rule of law 
requirements contained in the FET standard. Put briefly, in examining what was the 
behaviour expected from a host State organs so to act (e.g.) ‘transparently’, ‘with due 
process’ or ‘reasonably’, the tribunals should identify all relevant (domestic and 
international) sources of rules that impinged on a particular legal situation and take 
them into account in assessing the existence of a breach.  
 
Importantly, the ideal-type model should not only include the most obviously 
applicable domestic legal instruments (which is often meant by the requirement of 
legality) but also other international commitments, national constitutional provisions and 
hierarchically superordinate legislation.79 Examination of these instruments, so to 
																																																						
79 This is also a recognition of the fact that the substantive interactions between the international and 
national level have ‘rendered the formal dualistic perspective […] increasingly mismatched with the reality 
of inter-order interfaces.’ (Kanetake 2016a, 37; see similarly Kumm 2004, 913-915; Schill 2016, 419; De 
Wet 2012, 1211-1212; Nollkaemper 2011, 11) and that practically all States have already through different 
international instruments acknowledged their commitment to the domestic rule of law (Watts 1993, 19-
21; Aust/Nolte 2014, 57). 
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achieve the necessary persuasiveness of arbitrators’ reasoning,80 should be 
supplemented by secondary sources such as relevant judicial practice and doctrine. Such 
an approach would strive to strengthen the national rule of law vision by examining if 
the broadly understood national ‘law on the books’ was, in a concrete case, reflected 
within the ‘law in action’.81 The cause of action remains undisputedly international, and 
the FET remains the basis of review of State actions,82 but this should not prevent the 
systematic interaction with the multitude of pre- and parallel existing rule of law 
commitments in the host State. 
 
The autonomy of the FET standard certainly allows the arbitrators to reach 
solutions based on ‘justice and fairness’83 in appropriate situations. One of these is 
certainly where the examination of the holistic national framework relating to the FET 
sub-principles shows that the existing non-IIL obligations, even if fully fulfilled, would 
still be unsatisfactory - and that ‘something more’ (secured by the FET standard and IIL 
more generally) is and was required. But a thorough engagement and persuasive 
explanation of how even these commitments were not fulfilled, or why the full 
compliance would still not have prevented a FET standard breach, are critical in helping 
the host State potentially reform and (among other benefits) avoid future ISDS claims 
in a similar context. 
 
Providing persuasive accounts and making calls on whether the host State acted 
in accordance with the FET sub-standards, other international obligations and domestic 
law are often difficult and sensitive issues. Chapter 5 thus proposes and discusses two 
elements that could offer distinct benefits to the exercise of scrutiny by the tribunals. 
First element are the comparative benchmarks, consisting of comparative law, policy and 
practice. These – apart from their potential roles in ascertaining the general principles of 
law or their use within the comparative public law approach in IIL – can provide a 
further source of persuasive arguments for whether particular host State behaviour was 
																																																						
80 As noted, the process of reasoning is the core of legal activity and the reason why something was decided 
matters more than the outcome (Smits 2012, 62-64). As Paulsson notes, the reference to both 
international and domestic law enhances the persuasiveness and legitimacy of awards (2008a, 230). 
81 The congruence of ‘books’ and ‘action’ has been perceived as critical, yet challenging to achieve (Fuller 
1969, 81-91). As Stephan Schill (2015, 93-94) argues, even well-developed legal systems can and do 
experience unfortunate omissions and flaws in the rule of law processes. See also Baetens 2015, 2-3 and 
earlier seminal work of Diver (1984). 
82 McLachlan 2009, 117. 
83 Douglas 2006, 27 and 51. 
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acceptable.84 Briefly put, finding that a measure was (e.g.) reasonable or not can strongly 
benefit from a finding that other countries in sufficiently similar situations resorted to 
same or sufficiently similar measures. While there are some hints of such practice in 
existing jurisprudence, more reliance on comparative materials from sufficiently 
comparable States and regimes can considerably enhance the reasoning process and 
legitimacy of findings, and also provide clearer guideposts for potential rule of law-
oriented reforms in the host State.  
 
The final suggested element are the corrective good faith factors. These would 
represent the shift from a more rule-generative role of good faith in IIL towards a more 
corrective one. Instead of relying on the principle of good faith and its specific 
emanations as sometimes critical providers of meaning and content to FET and its sub-
principles, good faith considerations should rather be circumscribed to specific factors 
so to allow the NROL paradigm and the domestic legal framework to assume a more 
important place. These factors would be fact patterns which, if sufficiently intense, 
could in some situations change a more tentative conclusion on host State liability 
arising out of the ideal-type model scrutiny. At the same time, a caveat for a more direct 
role of good faith can be left for situations of relatively obvious mala fides and also for 
good faith obligations which arise within the ideal-type model of a particular host State. 
Such an approach would arguably help ex ante predictability and legitimacy of the 
reasoning process overall by reducing the reliance on the inevitably discretion-laden 
good faith concepts.  
 
One final general remark is in order. It is by no means claimed that the infusion 
of the NROL paradigm considerations and a systematic engagement with the 
holistically understood legal obligations of the host State would yield some form of 
panacea to issues arising from the indeterminacy of the FET standard and/or guarantee 
success in enhancing the national rule of law. Taking into account the multitude of 
instruments that existed and (should have) shaped the behaviour of host State decision-
makers does not mean that these instruments necessarily provide clear, unambiguous, 
mutually harmonious answers. Eventually, the investment arbitrators need to preserve a 
																																																						
84 Persuasiveness is particularly needed in light of discretion that relevant instruments are likely to leave to 
domestic officials - discretion which is not itself necessarily problematic. As noted by Rubin (1989, 399-
402), legislative vagueness and accompanying administrative discretion are not per se contrary to the 
(formal) rule of law. See similarly McCorquodale 2016, 281-282. 
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significant degree of discretion to finally make a (perhaps close) call on whether a 
behaviour was, e.g., arbitrary or not. This is arguably an inevitability of any dispute 
settlement process, and investment arbitration is no different in that sense. Nor is it 
certain that a host State, winning or losing, will necessarily take away the (hopefully) 
well-elaborated points on which it can improve its rule of law. Many factors outside the 
strict realm of ISDS can influence such developments. But this does not mean that the 
decision-making process should not strive to balance the IROL and NROL paradigms, 
the piecemeal protection and a more lasting rule of law impact. The normative reasons 
for it advocate it nevertheless. While results may not always follow, best efforts should 
still be exercised towards reaching them. 
 
4. Methodological considerations, contribution to the existing literature and the scope of inquiry  
 
Normative approach and methodological considerations 
 
A common delineation of methodological approaches to legal research, for the 
present purposes summarized by Jan Smits,85 identifies four groups of questions that 
can be asked about law.86 These questions are ‘how does the law read?’ 
(descriptive/dogmatic approach); ‘how ought the law to read? (normative approach); 
‘what are the consequences to society of applying a certain legal rule?’ (empirical approach); 
and ‘what is law? how does it develop in light of historical/social/economic factors?’ 
(explanatory theoretical/legal philosophy approach).87 
 
At the core of this thesis is the normative approach and the question of how the 
IIL ought to read, sometimes seen as the essence of legal research.88 Normative is thus 
understood as the way something ought to be done according to a value position 
and/or policy justification. It is contrasted to a ‘merely’ objective, value-neutral and 
descriptive exposition of what the law is.89 This also implies that IIL development so far 
																																																						
85 See generally Smits 2012. 
86 See also for an overview Siems 2008. 
87 Smits 2012, 9. 
88 As Edward Rubin noted, the legal discipline is ‘a practice whose discourse consists largely of 
prescriptions that scholars address to public decision-makers for the purpose of persuading those 
decision-makers to adopt specified courses of action’ (Rubin 1988, 1881). 
89 Of course, the link between descriptive and normative, is and ought is never completely severed 
(Greenwalt 2004, 270-271; Smits 2012, 9 and 43). 
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is not exclusively mandated and thus suitable only for dogmatic exposition and/or 
‘internal coherence’ arguments.90  
 
However, the normative discussion should not take place in an abstract vacuum. 
There are well-recognised benefits which come from drawing upon insights from other 
approaches.91 This thesis thus also relies upon the wealth of materials provided by other 
fields of research. 
 
The normative discussion is hardly imaginable without the immense amount of 
doctrinal work on the mass of IIAs, case law and other materials in the IIL sphere.92 
Importantly, as Jeremy Waldron suggests, the sphere of the rule of law is one where the 
back-and-forth between descriptive and normative is particularly desirable (if not 
outright necessary).93 Similarly, theoretical explanations and particularly historical 
analysis of economic and social factors shaping the origins of foreign investment 
protection is of importance for providing both the context and normative arguments 
for the role of IIL.94 Finally, empirical insights into the creation and operation of the IIL 
regime both problematize the often-held assumptions and provide further normative 
arguments, especially regarding the effect that IIL has on the expectations and 
behaviour of domestic decision-makers and investors.95 In that sense, the proposals 
made in this thesis aim to engage and draw upon existing knowledge and avoid the risk 
of proposing ‘better law’ completely detached from the one that shapes the everyday 
reality of investor-State relations. 
 
Relationship to existing literature 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to existing debates regarding the IIL and the rule of 
law in a number of ways. It differs from the predominant part of existing doctrine in 
																																																						
90 For Jan Smits, if ‘pure’ doctrinal exposition ever actually existed, those days are largely over (2012, 29). 
As noted, there is hardly ever just one answer as to what legally ought to be (Rubin 1988, 1893; similarly 
Kraus 2004, 694-696 and Coleman 2004, 316-320). 
91 Some authors note that the ‘true realm and métier of legal scholarship […] is the world of ideas’ 
(Collier 1991, 271), but this should not exclude the different (empirical and other) sources of influence on 
these ideas. See Smits 2012, 31, 34, 41 and 73 and materials cited therein. 
92 What exists is thus used as a foundation for a normative exercise, as explained by Waldron 2004, 370. 
93 ibid, 372-373. 
94 Although the topic is too complex to be comprehensively addressed, the aspects of it feature in 
Chapter 1. 
95 Empirical research is especially relevant for normative arguments in Chapters 1 and 3. 
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that it aims to consistently problematize the often implicit idea that the FET standard 
and its rule of law (sub-) principles should a priori be interpreted, applied and developed 
in an autonomous manner that does not (have to) thoroughly take into account the legal 
framework of a particular host State at hand. It furthermore differs from the remaining 
part of the doctrine in that the proposals herein do not lead to some form of IIL 
deconstruction, but a different approach to the rule of law function and the related 
decision-making methodology.96  
 
The discussions on the proper role of national law in ISDS decision-making are 
certainly present in doctrine and practice and deserve careful examination.97 But the 
holistic interlinking of international and domestic host State obligations through the 
ideal-type model adds further perspectives on the relevance of national law. Perhaps 
going against the ‘deformation profesionelle of the international lawyer’ to constantly 
contribute to the development of international law,98 the aim is to show that sometimes 
less can be more. A change of attitude from primarily aiming at prospective 
(international) law development to focusing on what already exists should by no means 
be an ‘inferior’ choice.99 Opportunity to persuasively contribute to further ‘regime 
development’ and refinement of FET can and should be taken when warranted. But it 
should be balanced with the case-to-case national rule of law considerations, bearing 
again in mind the ‘exceptionally close connection’ of IIL to the domestic laws of host 
States.100  
 
 Lex lata, lex ferenda and other reform processes in IIL 
 
In light of the different ongoing reform processes, it is warranted to note the 
relationship of arguments set out in this thesis to the potential future shifts in the 
substantive, procedural and institutional aspects of IIL. The thesis argues that the 
NROL paradigm can and should be systematically introduced in the decision-making 
process concerning the FET and its rule of law sub-principles as they currently exist in IIAs 
																																																						
96 As sometimes relevantly noted, the aim of all legal scholarship is to ‘challenge existing knowledge and 
offer new perspectives’ (Smits 2012, 103). 
97 For some examples see Reisman 2000; Igbokwe 2006 and recently Hepburn 2017. 
98 Kumm 2006, 260; similarly Kennedy 1994, 335.  
99 As noted by Sureda ‘[r]estraint would seem the wiser choice for ad hoc tribunals of limited jurisdiction. 
Avoidance of unnecessary pronouncements on contentious issues would help reduce the perception of a 
ruptured international investment legal regime and the resulting uncertainty.’ (2012, 19). 
100 Picker 2013, 55. See somewhat similarly in the expropriation context Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 104. 
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and accompanying jurisprudence (with the cut-off date of 26 September 2017, when this 
thesis was submitted). Importantly, however, the proposed systematic introduction of 
an NROL paradigm should in no way be understood as an either/or alternative to the 
ongoing reform processes in IIL.  
 
It is possible, although not explored further, that the approach and elements 
suggested in this thesis can also be a part of renegotiation/‘re-calibration’ efforts 
concerning existing and future IIAs. Likewise, as Chapter 4 will also touch upon, at least 
some of the current ‘new generation’ IIAs and their provisions do not by themselves 
seem to negate the need for supplementing the decision-making with an NROL 
paradigm as set out here. The need to continue thinking about the normative 
underpinning of FET decision-making is highlighted, however, by the fact that the 
success of some important reform efforts is in no way guaranteed. For example, the 
attempts to renegotiate/‘recalibrate’ existing IIAs through clarifying the open-textured 
standards such as FET101 so far produce rather modest results. These results arguably 
leave the door open for suggesting rethinking of the reasoning process and the 
interrelationship with other sources of rules.102 This, of course, if ‘new model’ IIAs 
become binding at all, something which is not always the case.103 Notably, the 
predominant number of ISDS claims continues to be lodged under the ‘old generation’ 
IIAs of the 1990s and before.104  
 
The rule of law aspects of the ISDS as an adjudicative mechanism - such as 
arbitrators’ impartiality, transparency of proceedings and attempts at 
structural/institutional changes – are not the topic of discussion in this thesis. The 
proposed structural reforms to the IIL regime, primarily in terms of introducing an 
appellate level of review,105 or substituting the existing arbitration mechanisms with an 
																																																						
101 See generally Kurtz 2012 and Titi 2015, as well as Kleinheisterkamp/Poulsen 2014 and Schill 2017a 
for the specific context of ‘mega-regional’ agreements. 
102 See on this also Chapter 4, section 4.3. and Ortino 2013b, 158-160; Paparinskis 2015a, 668-670; Miles 
2013, 305-307 and Kläger 2011, 87-88. 
103 See on the limited success of the Indian efforts at recalibrating their IIAs Ray 2016 and Patnaik 2016; 
Similarly, a new Norwegian model BIT, touted as progressive in many regards (Stern 2011, 190-191) has 
not yet even been adopted as a template. See on the earlier discontinued iteration Vis-Dunbar 2009, and 
for the more recent 2015 draft Usynin 2015. See for some other recalibration efforts Trakman/Sharma 
2015. 
104 See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia, accessed 10 February 2017. 
105 See on the unsuccessful attempts in mid-2000s Kalb 2005; Legum 2008 and Appleton 2013. 
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Investment Court System as advocated by the EU,106 have certainly gained in 
prominence recently. It suffices to note, however, that regardless of the likelihood of 
their success (which is at this point arguably rather uncertain)107 these reforms still leave 
open the question of how substantive decision-making should look like. The possible 
decision-making of the (e.g.) Investment Court System could and should be used to 
secure and enhance the national rule of law along the lines proposed here – especially as 
the claims for the breach of the FET treatment are very likely to often come before it. 
 
Finally, this thesis does not engage with the equally complex area of jurisdictional 
issues in IIL – an area which itself can also have implications for the national rule of 
law. This is perhaps most obvious regarding the potential existence of corruption 
during the investment realisation/admission process. These situations, as confirmed in 
practice, critically affect the decision on whether an eligible protected investment 
exists.108 Such matters cannot be addressed within the scope of this thesis, but certainly 
represent an intriguing field for further research into the role which ISDS can play as a 
national rule of law enhancer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
106 See for the details of the Investment Court System proposal 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf, accessed 1 February 2017. 
On appellate mechanism see most recently Calamita 2017. See also generally Reinisch 2008, 119-122 on 
these and similar proposals. 
107 For a sceptical assessment see Schreuer 2013, 399-400; Bjorklund 2013, 196-197 and Baetens 2015, 10.  
For example, while the opposition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement has 
already been vocal in the EU, the uncertainty has been vastly amplified by the new US administration of 
President Trump. See generally, among many others, Schill 2017a, Novotna 2017 and Buonanno/Dudek 
2015. Similarly, the conclusion process of the Transpacific Trade Partnership has been effectively 
terminated. See on this Solis 2016. The most recent advance in that sphere are the conclusions of the 
Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-Vietnam FTA, which both contain provisions on a 
new self-contained ISDS regime that includes an appeals mechanism.  But even assuming the ratification 
of these instruments occurs without further problems, the envisioned dispute-settlement system is 
interrelated with ICSID in a novel way – which, at least for some authors, is also legally questionable (see 
Calamita 2017). See also on most recent challenges Chapter 1, section 1.4.1. 
108 See, for example, Cremades 2009 and decisions in World Duty Free v. Kenya and Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan. 
 
35 
5. The outline of chapters 
 
Chapter 1 - The IIL regime and the international rule of law paradigm 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the issue if complementing the IROL paradigm in the 
FET standard decision-making with an NROL one is possible and needed. In that context, 
Chapter 1 focuses on the foundations and Chapter 2 on the operation of the arguably 
currently dominant IROL paradigm. Taken together, these Chapters suggest that a 
normative approach that suggests the complementarity of IROL and NROL 
considerations is both possible and warranted within the existing framework. 
 
Chapter 1 presents first the overview of the dominant understanding that IIL is a 
regime that is there to provide the international rule of law, with particular reference to the 
FET standard as its preeminent tool for that goal. International rule of law would here 
entail a supranational and substantively uniform understanding of the rule of law 
requirements contained in the FET standard and enforced against host States through 
ISDS. This is problematized by arguing firstly that the predominantly bilateral nature of 
the regime’s building blocks brings into question the vision of multilateral substantive 
uniformity; and secondly, it is problematized by the peculiar process of IIA conclusion. 
In many instances, it is unclear if the participating States were aware of the possibility 
that an IROL paradigm would emerge - or even of the possibility that IIL was to 
coalesce into a regime. While these issues do not formally bar the de facto 
multilateralization that occurred after the rise of ISDS, they represent important 
normative factors that do not seem to have duly and sufficiently influenced the regime-
building process or the interpretation and application of the FET standard. 
 
The remainder of the chapter sketches the IIL regime-building process and 
illustrates how - mainly due to the specific features of the arbitration community and 
the widespread recourse to de facto precedents - the normatively problematic issues did 
not prevent the emergence and dominance of the IROL paradigm. The overall 
conclusion is that the foundations of the IIL regime did not make it inevitable that the 
IROL paradigm should be the only relevant one. From both formal and normative 
perspectives, the FET standard remains open to different understandings of the aims of 
decision-making, while still being broadly oriented towards the rule of law promotion.  
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Chapter 2 - The IROL paradigm challenges and the tools for tackling them 
 
The broader normative possibility of adding complementing paradigms to FET 
decision-making does not necessarily imply a need for them, nor does it guarantee formal 
feasibility. Chapter 2 therefore goes further to examine and problematize certain aspects 
of the IROL paradigm as operating in practice, as well as to illustrate that NROL 
paradigm complementation is a possibility under the formal legal framework. Thus, 
before further normative discussion (in Chapter 3) of why the FET sub-principles 
should be interpreted and applied with national rule of law in mind, this Chapter will set 
out three propositions as a relevant background.  
 
Firstly, the FET jurisprudence does indicate an unequal and divergent approach 
to the interpretation and application of the FET sub-principles, both in terms of the 
autonomous understanding of what the FET standard specifically entails and in terms 
of the relationship towards national law and international obligations of the host State. 
Secondly, and relatedly, there are examples in jurisprudence that clearly demonstrate the 
readiness of tribunals to duly take into account the parallel obligations of the host State 
and incorporate them into the FET decision-making. This shows that the NROL 
paradigm as such is not a groundless proposal even when considering the existing 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, and thirdly, this Chapter argues that both in terms of rules 
of interpretation and through choice and weighing of relevant facts, investment 
tribunals do have at their disposal the necessary formal tools to make the suggested 
NROL paradigm a regular complementary feature of deciding the FET claims.  
 
Conclusion to this chapter also offers an overview of certain common points 
arising from the first two chapters, points that should sketch a normative way forward 
towards a complementary NROL paradigm. The general normative desirability and 
potential benefits of introducing a focus on the national rule of law are then the main 
topic of Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 - A normative case for strengthening the national rule of law 
through FET decision-making 
 
Chapter 3 sets out the key arguments for added benefits accruing from a 
complementary focus on the national rule of law in FET decision-making. As it is 
possible to imagine different answers to IROL paradigm challenges discussed in 
Chapter 2, the case is made as to why the complementary NROL paradigm should be 
seen as a preferable path, in addition to being formally feasible. 
 
To offer a foundation for the normative discussion, Chapter 3 first discusses 
certain aspects of Genin v. Estonia award as a suitable example from practice. The 
analysis and findings of the tribunal in that case are (perhaps necessarily) of limited 
value for establishing any system-wide international rule of law requirements for a 
specific State-investor situation. However, those same findings also show much promise 
as a tool to strengthen the rule of law in a specific host State – provided that this goal is 
embraced and the reasoning accordingly enhanced. 
 
The Chapter primarily discusses four key reasons for the complementary focus on 
the national rule of law. Firstly, this focus is warranted as it recognises the far more 
elaborate nature of domestic rule of law frameworks in comparison with the still 
developing FET jurisprudence. Secondly, respect for the national visions of the rule of 
law finds support in the concepts of sovereignty, subsidiarity and plurality in 
international law. Thirdly, the emphasis on the domestic rule of law framework is also 
more in accordance with the ex ante expectations of foreign investors and domestic 
decision-makers – with the FET protections in that sense rather being ultima ratio 
considerations. Finally, the focus on the national rule of law is a way of more effectively 
pursuing the ultimate expectation that the host States have from the IIL regime more 
broadly – economic development. The strength of the domestic rule of law framework 
critically contributes to host State development. This should thus be given due weight 
by the tribunals. 
 
Chapter 3 provides both the conclusion to the normative discussion on the 
complementation of the IROL paradigm with an NROL one, and a background to 
discussing further practical implications of such complementation. These implications 
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are topics of Chapters 4 and 5. Specifically, these chapters focus on three proposed 
elements that should feature in substantive decision-making. 
 
Chapter 4 - The ideal-type model of the domestic rule of law 
 
If the focus on the national rule of law is accepted as normatively preferable, and 
NROL paradigm complementation is desirable, it is important to deduce the practical 
implications for the FET decision-making process. Chapter 4 elaborates upon the ideal-
type model of the domestic rule of law as an element of decision-making that concretizes the 
NROL paradigm. The ideal-type model would be an overview or a summary of existing 
international and municipal obligations of the host State relating to the specific legal 
situation that is being assessed. In interpreting and applying the relevant sub-principle 
of the FET standard, the investment tribunal should duly and meaningfully take into 
account this ideal-type model in its deliberations – while still retaining the power to take 
into account other facts and circumstances relating to the case at hand. After that step, 
the final determination on the existence of a breach also depends on the relevant 
standard and method of review employed, with the adoption of these remaining a 
distinct interpretive exercise from the use of the ideal-type model. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the method of constructing the ideal-type model, its 
potential elements, and a number of associated concerns and challenges. It also 
provides a hypothetical example to illustrate how the NROL paradigm 
complementation could look in practice. Specifically regarding potential challenges, the 
chapter discusses the importance of new treaty-making in refining IIA content; the 
relationship with the standards and methods of review; and potential conceptual and 
practical obstacles to ascertaining the content of instruments comprising the model.  
 
Finally, to translate this discussion into illustrations, the chapter offers a case 
study (Dan Cake v. Hungary) as a support to the plausibility of elaborating ideal-type 
models. This should demonstrate that, providing there is a will, there is nothing 
inherently problematic for the tribunals to make persuasive holistic assessments of the 
host State rule of law obligations beyond the FET standard. 
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Chapter 5 – Comparative benchmarks and corrective good faith factors 
 
The final chapter discusses two additional elements that should feature in 
decision-making processes that aim to combine the IROL and NROL paradigms - 
comparative benchmarks and the corrective good faith factors. Respectively, these suggest the 
roles for the comparative recourse and good faith considerations that potentially 
enhance the persuasiveness of the tribunal’s reasoning, offer firmer guidelines for the 
future conduct of the host State and/or ultimately secure a fairness of outcome that 
perhaps cannot be achieved otherwise. 
 
The first part of the chapter examines comparative benchmarks – law, policy and 
practice – which should primarily serve to add persuasiveness and gravitas to the 
tribunals deliberations of how the host State fared under the combination of the FET 
sub-principle requirements and the ideal-type model. This should help enhance the 
tribunal’s assessment if (e.g.) a particular measure was necessary or suitable, or if a delay 
was ‘undue’. The benchmarks, ideally derived from comparable States or other regimes, 
would thus both serve to limit the appearance of impressionistic determinations in 
issues with potentially very serious consequences, and to potentially provide the host 
State with (comparative) guidelines as to how to avoid similar problems in the future. 
 
The second part of the chapter deals with the corrective good faith factors which 
have a different, but potentially very important role. These factors would represent 
specific circumstances or fact-patterns existing on either the host State’s or the 
investor’s side. Their existence and intensity could lead to a different conclusion about 
the existence of a breach of the FET standard than the one tentatively reached through 
the ideal-type model scrutiny. While reserving a special role for the clear instances of 
bad faith behaviour (mala fides) and the concretisations of good faith existing within the 
ideal-type model, this element should represent a shift of the role of the good faith in 
IIL from a rule-generative to a corrective one. Corrective good faith factors could thus 
be of the main manifestations of the residual power of arbitrators under the FET sub-
principles to achieve the fairness of outcome and to potentially counter-balance the 
overemphasis on considerations relating to specific national law. 
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Conclusion 
The conclusion provides a summary of the arguments and discusses potential 
avenues of further research. These can particularly focus on examining the jurisdictional 
and/or procedural aspects of IIL and ISDS which bear relevance to securing and 
enhancing the rule of law at the domestic level. In areas such as uncovering corruption, 
effective efforts to promote the national rule of law may in many ways require 
imaginative use of the procedural, jurisdictional and substantive decision-making tools 
at the arbitrators’ disposal. The shift towards the national rule of law can and should 
have a broader meaning for IIL. It is thus the author’s hope that this PhD is but a first 
step in uncovering that meaning. 
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Chapter 1 – The IIL regime and the international rule of law paradigm 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Should protecting foreign investments lead to completely autonomous 
substantive rules, a globally equal legal ‘playing field’? Can the requirements contained 
in the FET standard be meaningfully translated into uniform and sufficiently specific 
rules and exceptions, so as to provide unambiguous guidance and benchmarks for host 
State behaviour? Can and should the decision involving a US investor in Canada be 
indistinguishable from the one involving a South African investor in Lebanon - in terms 
of sufficiently specific substance of applied rules? As suggested in the Introduction, 
there are normative reasons for complementing the quest for supranational and 
substantively uniform rule of law requirements with a systematic and case-specific focus 
on the national rule of law and the way it operated regarding a foreign investor. This 
and the following chapter focus on the existence of the possibility and the need for such 
complementing. Chapter 1 focuses on the foundations and Chapter 2 on the operation 
of the arguably currently dominant decision-making paradigm concerning FET (and IIL 
more generally), here dubbed the international rule of law (IROL) paradigm. Taken 
together, these Chapters suggest that a normative approach that suggests the 
complementarity of IROL and NROL considerations is both possible and warranted 
within the existing legal and normative framework. 
 
This chapter first presents (in section 1.2.) the overview of the dominant 
understanding that IIL is a regime that is there to provide the international rule of law, 
with particular reference to the FET standard as its preeminent tool for that goal. 
International rule of law would here entail a supranational and substantively uniform 
understanding of the rule of law requirements contained in the FET standard, which are 
then enforced through ISDS. Section 1.3. to an extent problematizes such an 
understanding by arguing firstly that the predominantly bilateral nature of the regime’s 
building blocks brings into question the vision of multilateral substantive uniformity 
(1.3.1.). Secondly, the IROL paradigm is further questioned (in section 1.3.2.) in light of 
the peculiar process of IIA conclusion. In many instances, this casts doubts if the 
participating States were aware of the possibility of the IROL paradigm becoming 
dominant - or even of the possibility that IIL was to coalesce into a regime. While these 
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issues do not formally bar de facto multilateralization that occurred after the rise of ISDS, 
they represent important normative factors that do not seem to have duly and 
sufficiently influenced the regime-building process or the interpretation and application 
of the FET standard. 
 
Section 1.4. presents an overview of that regime-building process. It aims to 
illustrate how, mainly due to the specific features of the arbitration community and the 
widespread recourse to de facto precedents - the normatively problematic issues did not 
prevent the emergence and dominance of the IROL paradigm over other 
considerations. Section 1.5. concludes by noting that the foundations of the IIL regime 
did not make it inevitable that the IROL paradigm should be the only relevant one. 
From both formal and normative perspectives, the FET standard remains open to 
different understandings of the totality of aims in decision-making, while still being 
broadly oriented towards the rule of law promotion.  
 
1.2. The IIL regime and the IROL paradigm 
Securing the rule of law for foreign investors through IIL more broadly, and FET 
more specifically, arguably presupposes two elements. One is that IIL is perceived as a 
‘regime’ that is more than simply a sum of IIAs as its parts, each of which might be 
alternatively seen as completely independent in its function and purpose. The second 
element, if IIL is thus perceived as a sufficiently homogenous whole, is clarity as to 
what this regime-inherent vision of rule of law entails for both the host States and 
foreign investors. Sections below discuss these elements. Section 1.2.1. briefly deals with 
the widespread and relatively uncontroversial view of IIL as a regime, while section 
1.2.2. elaborates on the predominant understanding that the IIL regime should provide 
what can be termed the international rule of law, largely detached from potentially 
specific or idiosyncratic national understandings of that term – thereby providing the 
foundation for interpreting the FET standard in the same way. It is warranted to note 
that the discussion below touches upon the IIL regime more broadly, and can thus be 
relevant for other IIA standards as well. However, the purpose here is to provide the 
broader background which led to the FET standard being seen as perhaps the most 
prominent IROL-promoting tool in the arsenal of international investment law.  
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1.2.1. International investment law as a regime 
The characterisation of IIL as a ‘regime’ is common in literature.1 Discussing the 
actual meaning of the term, on the other hand, is not as common.2 It is possible, of 
course, to perceive ‘regime’ as a mere catch-all phrase for the whole undifferentiated 
mass of IIAs and the ever-growing ISDS case law. But that would hardly be the usually 
desired meaning. Without going further into ‘regime theory’,3 for the present purposes it 
suffices to note that both practice and doctrine do consider IIL to be more than just a 
sum of its parts. As the ISDS jurisprudence will be discussed more in section 1.4.3., the 
focus here is on the common doctrinal views. These retain their distinct focuses, but 
largely agree on the IIL operating as a greater and sufficiently homogenous whole.4 
 
IIL is sometimes portrayed in the sense of a system of IIAs,5 with an emphasis on 
IIL’s sub-field status within international law as a ‘specialized area of the legal 
profession.’6 McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger note the ‘patchwork quilt of interlocking 
but separate bilateral treaties’7 which eventually lead to a ‘common law of investment 
protection, with a substantially shared understanding of its general tenets.’8 David 
Schneiderman portrays IIL as a ‘transnational regime’ attempting to ‘fashion a global 
tapestry of economic policy, property rights, and constitutionalism.’9 It is a form of 
‘supraconstitution’ which supersedes, disciplines and reshapes constitutional laws of the 
																																																						
1 For a very brief selection of examples see Salacuse 2010, Reisman 2013, Sauvant 2014, Sornarajah 2013 
and Alvarez 2005. It should be noted that the distinction between IIL and ISDS is not always clear cut, 
thus leading some authors to describe ISDS as a system or regime of its own (see remarks of Banifatemi 
in Secreto/Teitelbaum 2009, 323-324).  
2 Schill 2009, 17. The exception to this is, for example, Salacuse 2010. 
3 In this context, for example, see Reisman 2013, 139 fn 26 on the notion of ‘system’ in the works of 
Parsons, Habermas and Giddens. See more generally the seminal work of Krasner 1983, as well as 
Keohane 1984; Levy/Young/Zürn 1995; Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 1997 and 
Breitmeier/Young/Zürn 2006. 
4 But see also Peter Muchlinski, suggesting that IIL is not a system of law, but ‘more a process of 
practitioner-led treaty interpretation that allows for a creative approach to investor and investment 
protection’ (2011, 3). ISDS would thus be ‘more accurately described as just a method of delocalised 
dispute settlement based on the specific rights of claim and procedures contained in each treaty’ (2011, 8). 
Yet, as is also argued in this context, fact that actors themselves might not fully agree on the regime’s 
contours, values, or ‘degree of coherency’ (see Simma/Pulkowski 2006, 500), does not necessarily detract 
from regime being such (Reisman 2013, 142 and 150). 
5 Newcombe/Paradell 2009, 1-3 and 57-61. See similarly Alvarez 2005, 94. 
6 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 19; see generally and similarly also De Brabandere 2014; Wälde/Kolo 2001; 
Schill 2009, 17. M. Sornarajah identifies IIL overall as ‘a branch of international law […] in the process of 
development and [which] can be isolated for separate study’ (2010, 32). 
7 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, para. 1.08. 
8 ibid, para. 1.50 and more generally 1.48-1.56 and 3.83-3.103. See also Newcombe/Paradell 2009, 59-61; 
Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 33. 
9 Schneiderman 2008, 2. 
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states across the globe.10 Stephan Schill notes the multilateralization process of IIL, in 
which (mostly through the operation of ISDS) myriad BITs become a ‘treaty-
overarching framework with uniform standards of investment protection’11 with ‘only 
limited room for insular deviation by individual states’.12  
 
The investment regime is also sometimes described as a ‘structure of global 
governance’,13 within the broader phenomenon of Global Administrative Law (GAL).14 
GAL is a part of the vision of global governance as administrative action, with 
rulemaking, administrative adjudication and other forms of regulatory and 
administrative decision-making.15 Within that conceptual structure, IIL regime is seen as 
defining specific GAL principles and setting standards for State-internal administrative 
processes,16 creating a new body of constitution-trumping laws,17 and simply ‘filling’ the 
normative content of GAL as its most prominent example.18 
 
Largely regardless of what exact understanding is adopted, the perception of IIL 
as a regime opens the issue of its general normative underpinning, or more simply the 
question of what is the regime there to do. As the following section will argue, there are 
widespread arguments in doctrine that IIL is a tool to secure the rule of law for foreign 
investors, through constraining the host States according to the particular international 
rule of law precepts largely shaped within the regime itself. In that context, the FET 
standard often acts as the spearhead. 
 
1.2.2. The international rule of law (IROL) paradigm and the FET standard 
As noted in the Introduction, the IROL paradigm in this thesis presupposes that 
the FET standard contains uniform rule of law requirements detached from those at the 
level of the host State, that are then given practical effect through ISDS. This is in 
accordance with the understanding of the international rule of law as mandating specific 
																																																						
10 ibid, 3. See somewhat similarly Schill 2009, 373. 
11 Schill 2009, 367. 
12 ibid, 17. 
13 Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 1. See also generally Stone Sweet/Grisel 2014, 46-47. 
14 Kingsbury/Krisch/Stewart 2005, 17. 
15 ibid. 
16 Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 1. 
17 Montt 2012, 12. 
18 Loughlin/Van Harten 2006, 122; Montt 2012, 296; Kulick 2012, 83. 
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behaviour from a State towards entities under its jurisdiction.19 The IROL paradigm would 
thus imply a globally level playing field – where IIA-protected investors operate in 
different States while receiving consistent treatment in accordance with the critical 
precepts such as ‘fair’, ‘equitable’, ‘non-arbitrary’, ‘transparent’.20 These precepts thus 
presume their sufficiently consistent understanding in ISDS practice so to make this 
possible.21 If nothing else, this should at least limit the role of inadequacy of the 
domestic legal framework as a cause of legal and political risk.22 
 
The IROL paradigm regarding the FET standard (and other aspects) is arguably 
dominant in the IIL doctrine, and in different ways also manifests itself in practice of 
investment tribunals. There is a widespread agreement among authors that the IIL 
provisions, as given ‘teeth’ by ISDS, are there to secure the rule of law for foreign 
investors.23 The key concepts such as the FET standard largely reflect the common 
formal precepts of the rule of law, however with the more specific content here 
retaining an international (sometimes also dubbed transnational) character. Critical 
feature is the avoidance of unnecessary interaction with the domestic understandings of 
what the rule of law means and how it is secured in the concrete host State,24 therefore 
also preserving the apparent neutrality of the rule of law precepts.25 An IIA containing 
at least an FET provision is ‘necessary’ as the pre-existing legal framework is mostly 
																																																						
19 As discussed in the Introduction, this understanding is distinct from international rule of law as between 
States and as between international law and the individual directly (as in case of international criminal law). 
See Chesterman 2009, 68-69 and particularly elaboration in Kanetake 2016a, 16-17.  
20 See in that sense Ortino 2013a, 444 and Paulsson 2008b, 251-252. 
21 As Yackee notes, ISDS is ‘often justified as functionally necessary to […] ensure investors access to 
stable, predictable and favourable legal rules’ (2012, 421). 
22 It is, however, also noted that IIAs are not meant to completely replace the actual foreign investment 
insurance. See for an overview of arguments and empirical research in this sphere Poulsen 2010 and more 
generally also Rubins/Kinsella 2005. 
23 As Van Harten notes, ‘rule of law-based advocacy is widespread in academic, practitioner, policy, and 
popular literature on investment arbitration’ (2010c, 627 and materials cited therein). See also, among 
many others, Guthrie 2013, 1160 (‘[…] BIT’s are a method of ensuring that foreign investment is treated 
in accordance with the rule of law’); Ortino 2013a, 443 (‘the principle of the rule of law [provides] a 
normative justification for investment treaties’); McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, 128; Alvarez 2016, 
227 (‘of course, the investment regime is intended to compel governments to respect the rule of law […]); 
Bonnitcha 2014, 31. See also generally Mitchell/Sheargold/Voon 2016. 
24 As Alvarez notes, a conflict between an IIL understanding of the rule of law and the national one ‘is 
not only likely but inevitable’ (2008, 974). IIL community this sees its norms as ‘higher law’, providing 
‘objective criteria’ detached from domestic understandings (Schneiderman 2017, 1). See similarly 
Spiermann 2008, 95 and Carvalho 2016, 1. 
25 Hirsch 2015, 151. See also Simma 2011, 576. 
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seen as insufficient and securing the rule of law is thus a primary function of an 
investment treaty.26    
   
For James Crawford, the role of IIL is on occasion not just to reinforce but 
actually institute the rule of law - absence of arbitrary conduct, judicial independence and 
non-retrospectivity are all ‘standards’ of the rule of law present in IIAs so to potentially 
discipline a host State.27 If a State fails to respect the rule of law, financial liability will 
likely come its way.28 As David Rivkin summarized with specific reference to the FET 
standard, ‘[a]rbitrators have developed a supranational rule of law that has helped to create 
uniform standards for acceptable sovereign behavior.’29  
 
To reiterate, in the context of FET, Stephan Schill has argued that this standard 
should be seen as having a genuine and independent normative content, united under 
the concept of the rule of law.30 Schill further identifies 7 specific recurring clusters of 
its sub-elements in ISDS practice: 1) stability, predictability and consistency; 2) principle 
of legality; 3) protection of legitimate expectations; 4) procedural due process and denial 
of justice; 5) substantive due process and protection against discrimination and 
arbitrariness; 6) transparency and 7) reasonableness and proportionality.31 A number of 
authors argue along similar lines.32 
 
What does this mean for the host State? More generally, it suggests that the host 
States should bring their practice and law in line with the expectations which are 
considered inherent to IIA provisions.33 In the oft-cited separate opinion in International 
																																																						
26 Guthrie 2013, 1166. See similarly Calamita 2015, 122 (‘a frequently recited aspect […] is that a principal 
purpose of international investment treaties is to serve as an internationalised substitute for the domestic 
legal systems of host states in which the place of the rule of law […] may be unreliable or uncertain.’); and 
also Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 25; Hsu 2015, 137; Yackee 2012, 421; Hepburn 2017, 15; Brower/Blanchard 
2014, 756. 
27 Crawford 2003, 7-8. See similarly Dolzer 2005, 953-954 and Kotuby/Sobota 2013, 454 and 464. 
28 Alvarez 2016, 227 (‘Investor-state arbitrations impose financial liability for states that fail to respect the 
rule of law.’) 
29 Rivkin 2012, 2 (and similarly at 14) (emphasis added). See similarly Guthrie 2013, 1167 and authors 
cited in Shultz/Dupont 2014, 1164. 
30 Schill 2010b, 154. It is also further seen as a part of the emerging global regime, something developed 
in more detail by Kingsbury/Schill 2009a. See also Gallus 2005, 712 and Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 133-134 
(‘There is no doubt that the FET standard is meant as a rule of international law and is not determined by 
the laws of the host state.’) 
31 Schill 2010b, 159-60. Analysis of these sub-elements is provided at 160-170. 
32 See in particular Vandevelde 2010, as well as Behrens 2007, 175; Guthrie 2013, 1165; Montt 2012, 76 
and Mitchell/Sheargold/Voon 2016, 19. 
33 As Mavluda Sattorova notes, ‘[t]he proliferation of references to good governance in arbitral 
jurisprudence and investment treaty texts has coincided with a new wave of scholarship where 
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Thunderbird Gaming, the late Thomas Wälde suggested, concerning in particular the 
requirement of legitimate expectations, that preventing the ‘[a]buse of governmental 
powers […] is at the core of the good-governance standards embodied in investment protection 
treaties.’34 An award concerning this FET sub-principle should thus have a ‘good-
governance signal’ as its ultimate goal - essentially a guidance for Mexico to observe in 
the future.35 Numerous investment awards make sometimes less explicit, but 
nevertheless clear suggestions of the embedded rule of law requirements. To stay with 
Schill’s delineation, awards for example require the host States to provide stability and 
consistency,36 respect domestic legality,37 provide procedural due process38 and behave 
transparently.39 Taken together, these requirements – joined together within the FET 
standard - could form a sui generis rule-of-law rulebook, specifically for dealing with 
foreign investors. 
 
Indeed, specifically on the topic of the (common) interplay between IIL and 
domestic administration, Rudolph Dolzer concludes that the effect of IIL is the 
(necessary and unavoidable) creation of ‘bubbles’ of separate administrative law for 
foreign investors. As he notes, the ‘impact […] on the domestic law of host states 
remains real; […] domestic rules applicable to foreign investors must be adjusted to accord with the 
obligations imposed by the international treaty’40 - with the FET standard being one of the 
provisions with the ‘most severe impact on the domestic legal systems.’41 The 
																																																						
considerable emphasis is made on the importance of the investment treaty regime in transforming 
governance culture and practices in host States’ (2015, 165). 
34 International Thunderbird v. Mexico – Separate Opinion Wälde, para. 13 (emphasis added). See also paras. 14-
15. See similarly Muchlinski 2006, 535-536. 
35 ibid, para. 123. See also for example the Parkerings v. Lithuania conclusions on the rule of law aspects of 
the behaviour of the Lithuanian Prime minister (para. 358) and of Lithuanian courts (para. 360).  
36 Often cited examples are CMS v. Argentina – Award (para. 274: ‘stable legal and business environment is 
an essential element’ of FET, followed almost ad verbatim in Occidental v. Ecuador, para. 183 and LG&E v. 
Argentina – Liability, para. 124) and the PSEG v. Turkey award description of the unacceptable ‘roller-
coaster’ of legislative changes (para. 250).  
37 An influential early case in that sense was Gami v. Mexico, para. 91 (‘a government's failure to implement 
or abide by its own law in a manner adversely affecting a foreign investor may but will not necessarily 
lead to a violation’. Similarly, but more pointing towards potential bad faith abus de droit is Tecmed v. Mexico, 
para. 154 – host States must use ‘the legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the 
investment in conformity with the function usually assigned to such instruments’ and similarly Noble 
Ventures v. Romania, para. 178). See also Lauder v. Czech Republic, para 207; Plama v. Bulgaria, paras. 291 and 
267; Genin v. Estonia, para 365; MCI v. Ecuador, para 154. See also for comment Bonnitcha 2014, 203-204. 
38 Rumeli v. Kazakhstan – Award concluded that ‘a court procedure which does not comply with due 
process is in breach of the duty [to provide FET]’ (para. 653). 
39 Tecmed v. Mexico, para. 154; Saluka v. Czech Republic, para. 309; Metalclad v. Mexico, para. 99. 
40 Dolzer 2005, 955 (emphasis added). Somewhat similarly, Kulick argues that the pressure is put on the 
executive and legislature to conform administrative practice and legislative acts to IIA provisions, which 
he compares to ECHR effect in member States (2012, 126-127). 
41 Dolzer 2005, 957-958. 
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adjustment of host State behaviour takes form in limiting, defining and narrowing 
administrative regulations to which foreign investors are to be subjected,42 and is 
inherently indifferent to issues relating to the host State nationals.43 Dolzer surmised 
that this is ‘normally perceived as a necessary consequence of an investment friendly 
climate rather than a negative aspect which should be avoided in principle. […].’44  
 
In a similar vein, UNCTAD noted that the increased number of arbitrations, 
almost always involving the FET standard, may motivate host States to ‘improve 
domestic administrative practices and laws in order to avoid future disputes.’45 For some 
authors, both IIL and administrative law have the same major concern – conduct of the 
State – and can benefit and reinforce each other,46 while for others the provisions such 
as the FET standard aspire to establish a ‘system of international administrative law for 
foreign investment’47 or a ‘body of international rules of administrative law’.48 But the 
‘shaping’ effect is not confined to administrative issues.49 More generally, the States are 
required to ‘conform their behaviour to rule of law standards that enable market forces to 
unfold’50 and should not be allowed to ‘misregulate’.51 As the ADC v. Hungary tribunal 
emphasised ‘a sovereign State possesses the inherent right to regulate its domestic 
affairs, the exercise of such right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries. […] the 
rule of law, which includes [IIA] obligations, provides such boundaries.’52 The legitimate 
expectation of a ‘fair treatment’ plays a particularly important role in that sense.53 
 
In summary, the host State and its decision-makers should ideally face a set of 
sufficiently clear, IROL-defined concepts within the FET standard. These should also 
preferably be internalised so to avoid the conflicts with foreign investors arising in the 
																																																						
42 ibid 2005, 953. 
43 ibid, 954. 
44 ibid, 955. 
45 UNCTAD 2007a, ix. 
46 Pérez Loose 2010, 404-405. 
47 Dolzer 2005, 970. See similarly Kalderimis 2012, 159. 
48 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 24. See in that sense also the discussion of the relationship with Global 
Administrative Law in Van Harten/Loughlin 2006. 
49 More generally, as Guthrie notes, domestic legal systems are generally shaped to conform to 
‘international standards embodied in a BIT’ (2013, 1194). 
50 Schill 2009, 364 (emphasis added). See also Wälde 2007, 104 stating that ‘the role of investment treaties 
is to provide an external anchor for economic policies that are in the long term sensible for national 
economies and the global economy.’ (emphasis added). 
51 Carvalho 2016, 20. 
52 ADC v. Hungary, para. 423. 
53 ibid, para. 424.	
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first place. Conversely, foreign investors should have recourse to these IROL-defined 
concepts in calculating their risks before investing and during the life of their 
investment. They should be able to, for example, warn the host State about what they 
perceive as the behaviour falling below their requirements. Should the relationship still 
break down, the precepts provided should also serve to pre-judge the comparative 
strengths of each party’s positions and potentially help reach a solution that does not 
involve arbitration. Finally, these IROL-defined concepts should provide the ‘objective 
criteria’ according to which neutral arbitrators - regardless of the connection with the 
domestic legal system - can nevertheless persuasively settle the dispute and hopefully 
provide future guidance for other investors and host States.54  
 
1.3. The IROL paradigm as exclusive – some foundational problems 
The understanding of IIL as a uniform regime and the widespread presence of 
the IROL paradigm for substantive decision-making in the FET may be dominant 
without necessarily being inevitable or preclusive to thinking about other normative 
possibilities. Whether a global, multilateralised foreign investment protection regime 
exists, and what its normative orientation is, are more than academic issues. Briefly put, 
IROL-oriented multilateralism implies a number of assumptions that should not be 
taken for granted without a degree of scepticism. For example, as is noted, investment 
protection has a politically and ideologically turbulent past.55 Proclaiming a substantively 
uniform regime and supranational rule of law standards would suggests that ideological 
and legal struggles over investment protection have been conclusively settled.56  
 
This does not seem so straightforward. In the early 1990s, it might have seemed 
plausible that entering into IIAs was seen by (at least some) of those involved as a ticket 
to join the neo-liberal Washington Consensus.57 But what happens if that (or any other) 
																																																						
54 ‘[S]tate may take notice when others are found to have violated BIT obligations, and act pre-emptively 
to avoid a similar fate’ (Guthrie 2013, 1194). Otherwise, it may appear that ISDS would produce 
something akin to a ‘legal casino’ (Werner 2003, 782). 
55 Muchlinski 2008, 5. 
56 See for earlier work suggesting this Gunawardana/Alvarez 1992, and more recently Hindelang 2004; 
and Alvarez 2008, 962-963. See also for discussion Schneiderman 2008, 62 and more generally on the 
spread of neo-liberalism Simmons/Dobbin/Garrett 2006. 
57 Jandhyala/Henisz/Mansfield 2011, 1054; Ruiz Fabri 2012, 353. See also more generally 
Simmons/Dobbin/Garrett 2006. On the Washington Consensus, see Salacuse 2007, 160 and also 
Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 25. 
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consensus stops being accepted as such?58 How can, in other words, IIAs cope with the 
need to interpret the provisions such as the FET standard in an evolutionary manner?59 
Saying that IIAs are somehow excluded from evolving interpretation would not only be 
doctrinally questionable, but also begs the question when and how was the canon of 
their (more ideological) interpretation irrevocably entrenched.60 As is sometimes noted, 
even the developed Western capitalist democracies which are rightfully seen as the 
progenitors of the IIL foundations for most of its history,61 differ so significantly in 
their approaches to market economy that it would be difficult to believe that the IIAs 
concluded by them implied a single, uniform model of ‘free market capitalism’.62 This 
brings into question to what extent the rule of law requirements in the FET can truly be 
autonomous and supranational. 
 
The appealing appearance of the FET standard and its sub-principles makes them 
almost impossible to disagree with in general.63 A State announcing beforehand that it 
will not treat investors fairly would indeed be hard to find. This does not, however, 
mean that a broad commitment to fair and equitable treatment of investments 
necessarily implies an agreement on the content and the exceptions to this treatment.64 
This is particularly so regarding the ‘older generation’ IIAs (characterised by cursory 
provisions) which still form an immense part of the existing network.65 
																																																						
58 As is argued, the policy shift away from the Washington Consensus puts the whole rationale of IIL into 
question. See in that sense Garcia-Bolivar 2009b, 469-470; Van Harten 2010a, 899 and Salacuse 2010, 
470. 
59 Muchlinski 2013, 413-414.  
60 As Vid Prislan concludes, ‘there is nothing to suggest that the parties to an IIA shall have intended its 
terms always to have a fixed meaning’ (2013, 472).  
61 See in that sense Schneiderman 2008, 45. 
62 As Fritz Scharpf has noted in the EU context, a uniform model simply does not exist as economic and 
institutional heterogeneity of European states is ‘extreme’ – models of capitalism and the welfare state 
simply cannot be generalized (Scharpf 2015, 395). 
63 On how this helped secure an ‘easy passage into treaty practice’ see McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, 
para. 7.181. See also more generally Smits 2012, 91. 
64 As UNCTAD has noted in the property protection context, there exists ‘the ever increasing and 
changing conception of property rights and, in particular, of the social function of property’ (UNCTAD 
2013, 111). For Jansen Calamita, ‘[IIAs] in the main did a poor job of creating or articulating a political 
settlement on the underlying debate with respect to the appropriate standard of treatment of foreign 
investors.’ (Calamita 2015, 110). See also in a similar vein Muchlinski 2008, 17 and Waibel et al. 2010, 
xlvii. 
65 As Vandevelde noted, these IIAs are almost universally silent on numerous important issues (1998, 
640-641). 
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Proclaiming the existence of globally uniform and sufficiently clear rule of law 
requirements contained in the FET standard is thus certainly an appealing prospect, but 
is also a considerably tall order. Writing as early as 1960, Paul Proehl states: 
[…] the capital-importing nations are unwilling to go along with an agreement 
which commits them to an ‘open-end’ investment system and puts ultimate control 
over any segment of national economic life beyond governmental reach by reason 
of treaty right. Our sound and stable way of doing business cannot simply be 
extended by fiat to the underdeveloped countries. It cannot be unilaterally imposed 
nor less than freely accepted.66	
 
As argued in the sections below, there are at least two features connected to the 
foundations of the IIL regime – the network of IIAs – which bring into question the 
today dominant understandings of the regime as a form of Proehl’s ‘open-end’ system. 
Firstly, as discussed in section 1.3.1. the predominantly bilateral nature of the IIAs 
should both formally and normatively cause considerable pause before proclaiming a 
substantively uniform and coherent – multilateralised -- international regime of foreign 
investment protection that should avoid systematic engagement with other aspects of 
the legal framework binding the host State. Secondly (as discussed in section 1.3.2.), 
empirical work on the process of IIA conclusion casts further doubts whether at least a 
considerable number of participating States actually desired the IROL-oriented 
interpretation of the provisions such as the FET standard – or were in some cases even 
aware that any particular paradigm will or should form. These considerations should 
both indicate the still open field for different thinking about the operation of the FET 
standard, and also serve as a background for discussing the process through which 
dominance of the IROL paradigm was achieved (as elaborated in section 1.4.). 
 
1.3.1. Problematic regime symmetry - multilateralism via bilateral treaties 
The dense network of IIAs that undergirds the IIL regime is bilateral to a vast 
extent.67 The number of multilateral, or rather plurilateral agreements is statistically 
negligible when compared to the total number of IIAs. This, of course, does not 
undermine the importance of these agreements otherwise. Agreements such as NAFTA 
(Chapter 11) and Energy Charter Treaty (Part III) have, for example, played a very 
																																																						
66 Proehl 1960, 364 (footnotes omitted). See also generally Vandevelde 1998. 
67 Schill 2009, 364. 
 
52 
prominent role in the development of IIL in terms of generating ISDS jurisprudence on 
issues such as the FET standard.68 
 
If IIL is compared, for example, to the intentionally multilateral edifice of WTO, 
can such a fundamental difference in basic building blocks be waived away in terms of 
legal consequences?69 That is, can both regimes be seen as ‘equally multilateral’ 
regardless of their different treaty bases? For some authors, there is little doubt in this 
regard - IIL is seen as an even stronger regime than WTO law.70 For Stephan Schill, a 
legal ‘glue’ for the whole regime can be found in the operation of the ‘most favoured 
nation’ (MFN) clauses. As Schill suggests: 
MFN clauses not only multilateralize the level of substantive investment protection, 
but also have a multilateralizing impact on dispute settlement procedures available 
to foreign investors. […] MFN clauses, therefore, create a uniform regime for the 
protection of foreign investors in any given host State independent of the investor’s 
nationality.71 
 
Another common argument for overcoming bilateralism is the sufficient similarity 
of wording of substantive provisions, making differing interpretations unacceptable 
from the viewpoint of consistency and predictability. The wording which is so similar, 
the argument goes, points toward an implicit striving for multilateral interpretation and 
regime-building.72  
 
Some of this issues, namely the similarity of wording, will be revisited also in 
section 1.4.3. below. At this point it suffices to note that both arguments certainly have 
merit, and provide reasonable grounds for a form of multilateralization to take place. 
The issue is rather that even those arguments already presuppose to an extent a form of 
an IROL paradigm understanding – as in that the substance of an IIA provision is 
deemed to be substantively autonomous from the individual BIT and the specific host 
States which concluded it. If these clauses should have or do have universal meaning, 
then both the operation of the MFN clauses (in substantive issues) and insistence on 
																																																						
68 See generally on this Schreuer/Weiniger 2008 and also Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 28. 
69 See on this also Kurtz 2014, 271. 
70 Sauvant 2014, xxxv. See similarly Alvarez 2008, 960-965. 
71 Schill 2009, 366. 
72 See in this sense Schill 2009, 372 (‘the standards […]in any of the more than 2,500 BITs have to be 
understood as referring to the identical principles that impose identical obligations on the State parties 
involved.’) 
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the similarity of wording display the multilateralization potential. But if the content of 
the IIA provisions would be seen as depending at least to an extent on the identity of 
IIA parties, that potential arguably diminishes.  
 
Even assuming that all the FET provisions were absolutely identical, it would not 
be settled that their supranational and ‘multilateralized’ interpretation and application 
was the only available path. As is claimed, these treaties are leges speciales aimed at 
differing from the pre-existing and mostly customary ‘universal’ law on the topic - 
whatever its content and merits/demerits might be.73 A reversal towards complete and 
exclusive universalism would have to be more than lightly justified. The ‘autonomous 
legal system’74 of each IIA would be ignored to a significant extent by aiming to 
disregard the role of the legal systems and other obligations of the treaty parties.  
 
Another point of note is the lack of potential analogies for such regime-building. 
The ‘de jure bilateral-turning- de facto multilateral’ dynamic of IIL does not seem to have 
clear counterparts elsewhere in public international law. A somewhat analogous 
situation might exist with the bilateral double taxation treaties – yet the lack of any de-
localised dispute settlement seems to prevent the emergence of a transnational regime 
of ‘double taxation law’.75 This adds weight to the sui generis character of IIL 
development, and further questions if its developmental path was inevitable and/or is 
irreversible. 
 
The normative concerns with promoting an exclusively IROL-oriented 
understandings arguably further increase in light of the failure to formally multilateralise 
the IIL rules, despite such attempts. Most prominently, the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI), an OECD-led attempt to formulate a multilateral agreement that 
would build upon the common denominators of existing IIAs ended without an 
agreement in 1996. This, as noted, was caused by the whirlpool of NGO protests, poor 
political management of the process, lukewarm business support and lack of definite 
will among participating States.76 For some, it was ‘doomed’ as it was an effort to 
																																																						
73 See generally on this Kishoiyian 1993 and Gunawardana/Alvarez 1992, 548-550. 
74 Stone Sweet/Grisel 2014, 30. 
75 See generally Baistrocchi 2017 on the limited and necessarily court-led attempt to provide the uniform 
meaning of terms found in tax treaties. 
76 Geiger 2011, 159-160 and Schneiderman 2008, 174-175; Ruiz Fabri 2012, 367-368; See also generally 
Kurtz 2002 and Miles 2013, 116-119. 
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‘replace the regulatory sovereignty of governments with absolute standards of investor 
protection’.77 Somewhat surprisingly, the resistance to MAI was coming even from key 
countries that would have been expected to push vigorously for it within OECD and 
beyond.78 
 
It would be wrong to assume MAI efforts demonstrated a complete lack of 
agreement among the OECD countries involved. Many issues were successfully 
negotiated before the collapse.79 But it seems implausible to suggest that a failure to 
fully agree even between the largely like-minded OECD countries, followed by a similar 
failure of WTO efforts,80 plays no role in normatively assessing the practice of IIL 
regime-building. The failure to specifically agree should be accounted for as it is arguably 
more meaningful than if the attempt had never even occurred.81 This is further 
accentuated by the doubtful prospects for new multilateralization efforts.82 
 
The predominantly bilateral nature of IIAs and failed multilateralisation efforts 
both cast doubt on a completely IROL-oriented understanding of the provisions such 
as the FET standard. They also enhance the importance of deducing what the host 
States actually desired when concluding the IIAs. Determining what at least some States 
(could have) wanted and were aware of seems warranted when discussing the relevant 
normative underpinnings. Clear indication that the States, despite the problems 
mentioned above, did want an exclusive IROL-oriented approach to the FET standard 
would go a long way in eradicating the normative concerns. However, as the following 
section will illustrate, such indications do not seem forthcoming from the existing 
empirical research. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
77 Geiger 2011, 160. 
78 On the situation in Canada, see Schneiderman 2008, 196-197. 
79 See Schneiderman 2008, 174-175 and generally Stumberg 1998. 
80 See generally Amarasinha/Kokott 2008 and also Mouyal 2016, 74-75. 
81 See in this sense, for example, Saulino/Kallmer 2014, 2. 
82 Bjorklund 2013, 189-190 and Schreuer 2013, 397. 
 
55 
1.3.2. Conclusion of IIAs – controversies and normatively problematic aspects  
 
To add further light to the issue of whether complementing the IROL paradigm 
with an NROL one should be seen as normatively plausible, it would be helpful to 
ascertain what where the attitudes of States during the conclusion of investment 
treaties. Clear indication that the IIA conclusion was accompanied by acceptance and 
expectation of imposing a distinct supranational set of rule of law principles through (at 
least) the FET standard could make arguments about complementing these with NROL 
considerations rather misguided. 
 
It is warranted to first distinguish between the States’ expectations relating to the 
operation of IIA standards and the ISDS, from the expectations that IIAs will translate 
into increased FDI flows – something that remains empirically controversial.83 The key 
question is if the developed and developing States concluding the IIAs, primarily during 
the pre-ISDS explosion era of 2000s, could have expected and thus rationally consented 
to the IROL paradigm as it stands today? Could a relatively homogenous, self-
referencing, strongly enforced regime of foreign investment protection through the 
FET (and some other) standards have been legitimately expected by the participating 
States?  
 
This matters as every regime institutionalises new priorities and new biases of 
those actors and experts (such as arbitrators) operating within it.84 As long as bias is 
‘well established, widely known, and resonates in the community to which the 
institution speaks’85 this is generally not an issue. If this is not the case, potential 
redeeming quality is a level of political control over the regime. This is, however, largely 
absent in public international law sub-regimes and tends to strengthen the role of 
functional experts.86 As Buchanan and Keohane state, ‘[i]t is not enough that that the 
relevant actors agree that some institution is needed; they must agree that this is the 
institution that is worthy of support.’87  
 
																																																						
83 This will also be further addressed in Chapter 3, section 3.6.2.  
84 Koskenniemi 2007, 5-6. See also Shalakany 2000, 465-468. 
85 Koskenniemi 2007, 6. 
86 ibid, 9. 
87 Buchanan/Keohane 2008, 29. 
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It is, with a degree of simplification, possible to broadly identify two schools of 
thought about the process of IIA conclusion. One can be described as the ‘rational 
choice’ approach. It presents a narrative of a generally rational approach of States 
towards the IIAs, with a sufficiently clear understanding of aims, potential benefits and 
arising liabilities. A different view is the ‘bounded rationality’ narrative, which seriously 
problematizes such assumptions.  
 
‘Rational choice’ 
 
Allowing for certain differences, the point of agreement of the authors within the 
‘rational choice’ camp is that the IIA conclusion was a rational response to the 
unsatisfactory state of international law regulating investor-State relations before 1959. 
It was a response which aimed at ensuring clarity and consistency, which was put into 
place with a general awareness of States of the cost-benefit calculus.88 Portraying the 
process of IIA conclusion as a response to uncertainty is certainly plausible. As noted 
by Jeswald Salacuse, it was an attempt to provide rules which were ‘complete, clear, 
specific, uncontestable, and enforceable’.89 But it can also be legitimately seen as a 
political choice. According to Jansen Calamita, the added goal was ‘reducing the 
likelihood of renewed disagreement with respect to the content or existence of 
protections in customary international law’,90 an important goal in the age of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) battles.91 
 
The stated goal of clarity and specificity is not necessarily marred by the open-
textured nature of the substantive provisions. Such provisions can be a rational choice 
in face of uncertainty about future developments, and they are relatively widespread in 
international treaty-making.92 As is sometimes remarked, a treaty is a ‘disagreement 
reduced to writing’.93 This potentially indicates that States were not necessarily any less 
rational about IIAs than about other treaties – further implying that they could perhaps 
																																																						
88 Influental works in this general vein are Guzman 1998, Guzman/Elkins/Simmons 2006, Salacuse 2010 
and Vandevelde 2009. 
89 Salacuse 2010, 439. 
90 Calamita 2015, 111. 
91 See on this Newcombe/Paradell 2009, 18-19; Vagts 2010; and Miles 2013, 9-11. 
92 See on this in particular Lim/Elias 1997, 3-11. 
93 Allot 1999, 43. See also in similar vein Koskenniemi 2007, 11. 
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rationally expect the development of an IROL-dominated application of the FET 
standard. 
 
The said rationality is arguably most emphasised in the work of Elkins, Guzman 
and Simmons.94 According to them, the proliferation of BITs (as most representative 
examples of investment treaties) was propelled in good part by a competition among 
potential host countries for credible property rights protections that investments 
require.95 BITs were therefore viewed by hosts and investors as devices that raise 
expected returns on investment by assuming that government is making a credible 
commitment to treat foreign investment ‘fairly’ – thereby providing a ‘competitive edge’ 
in attracting capital.96 BITs raise ex post cost of reneging on contracts by reducing the 
ambiguity of the host government obligations and making a clear statement with much 
greater reputational costs if later reneging.97  
 
Perhaps the most important assumption is that a decision to sign a BIT always 
involves a host State assessment whether the expected benefits of attracting FDI 
outweigh the sovereignty costs.98 Simply put, this presupposes that sovereignty costs could 
be known in advance, and that the operation of the IIA enforcement mechanism in that 
sense could have been rationally foreseen. 
 
While there are certainly other aspects of rational behaviour that can explain the 
IIA ‘explosion’,99 the focus on rational and informed competitiveness with other capital-
importing States is argued to provide best explanations concerning developing 
countries.100 It can also explain, according to Guzman, the collective resistance 
portrayed by the NIEO activity and the parallel piecemeal acceptance of IIAs.101 As for 
the position of the developed countries, the rationality seems clear enough – it was a 
																																																						
94 Elkins/Guzman/Simmons 2006. Salacuse 2007 158-161 and Salacuse 2010, 434-435 follow the same 
basic idea of rationality, although not necessarily with the similarly strong emphasis on the 
competitiveness aspect. 
95 Elkins/Guzman/Simmons 2006, 812. 
96 ibid, 822-823. 
97 ibid, 823. 
98 ibid, 825. Similar assumption of availability of full information for ‘hard-nosed’ negotiations seems to 
be present, for example, in Saulino/Kallmer 2014, 5. 
99 Elkins/Guzman/ Simmons 2006, 819. 
100 ibid, 841-842 suggests that such explanation has strong theoretical foundation and is most consistently 
supported by data. For a more nuanced, but important look on competitiveness and emulation, see also 
Jandyala/Henisz/Mansfield 1049-1052 and 1065. See also Ranjan 2010, 68-70. 
101 See generally Guzman 1998 and more briefly the conclusion at 687-688. 
 
58 
response to the emerging and unpredictable behaviour of the newly independent 
developing countries. While the existing public international law rules were still unclear, 
in comparison to the newly proposed NIEO concepts, IIAs were likely to be a far more 
protection-friendly set of provisions.102 In that sense, ‘rational choice’ theorists also 
suggest that the developing host States were ‘price-takers’ with respect to treaty terms – 
they realized that they must compete with others and therefore cannot demand changes 
to the core provisions of the treaties.103 Whether or not the developed states could have 
from their side be more aware how the protection regime will operate does not seem to 
be specifically addressed. However, if the assumption of knowing sovereignty costs 
applies to developing states, the same assumption would presumably apply equally (if 
not more) to the developed ones. 
  
Questioning the rationality of choices 
	
The ‘rational choice’ of States when concluding IIAs can be questioned at both 
the theoretical and the empirical level. This extends to both the expectations of 
increased FDI and to how IIL will function in practice. A closer scrutiny of several 
tenets of the ‘rational choice’ approach rather leads to a conclusion that a considerable 
number of States engaged in wishful thinking more than in some form of cost-benefit 
analysis where the anticipated ‘sovereignty costs’ were fully accounted for.104 
 
The expectation of increased FDI coming from IIAs would arguably be rational 
in face of consistent and convincing evidence of causation, or at least some form of 
correlation between the two events. It has been already mentioned that such conclusive 
evidence is not present. But more importantly, one should not fall into a trap of 
anachronism. When the tidal waves of IIA conclusion were the strongest, those same 
studies were not actually available. Measuring of these correlations seems to be a 
relatively recent phenomenon, arguably inspired to a considerable extent by the 
backlash against IIL, and the need to set the record straight if IIAs are actually ‘doing 
anything’.105  
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Two other factors seem to have been more relevant for at least a significant 
number of capital-importing countries. One is a form of confirmation bias, as in the 
readiness to believe in anecdotal evidence that IIAs will indeed increase FDI.106 The 
second one is emulation – the strive to ‘compete’ with other capital-importing countries 
by concluding IIAs seems to have been more alike to herd-like emulation out of fear 
that they will somehow be left behind, regardless of whether or not IIAs indeed prove 
beneficial.107 Whether selective belief, fear and peer pressure lead to ‘rational choice’ is 
indeed highly debatable.108 
 
Ex ante rational understanding of legal and regime-building implications of IIAs is 
likewise theoretically problematic. When considering the wording of the IIAs 
themselves, the legal situation preceding and surrounding their conclusion, it is unclear 
if either developed or developing countries could have predicted their interpretation, 
application and practical effects.109 For example, one could suggest that States would 
have ex ante relied on other (more general) rules of public international law to help in 
interpreting the IIAs. However, the ‘ephemeral’ nature of the law preceding IIAs,110 and 
the (lack of) concurrent international law developments contravene such a suggestion. 
The ICJ noted in 1970 that regarding investor-State relations ‘no generally accepted 
rules […] have crystallized on the international plane.’111 Even 13 years later, (then) 
Judge Rosalyn Higgins commented that State liability in the context of the regulatory 
state is a newer theme.112 Arguably, only after the US-Iran Tribunal output there were 
truly new developments within the international law sphere,113 but these occurred 
roughly quarter of a century after the first IIAs. 
 
Even if there were concurrent public international law developments, seeing their 
effect would require some form of ISDS test cases. IIAs did not start including 
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arbitration-based ISDS provisions until roughly 10 years after the first BIT,114 and 
ICSID registered its first case (non-BIT based, to be clear) only in 1972.115 As some 
authors suggest, up until the first BIT-based arbitration – AAPL v Sri Lanka (occurring 
in 1990, 31 year after the first investment treaty) it was questionable if these treaty-based 
tribunals were truly envisioned to be investor-state (as opposed to state-state) dispute 
settlers at all.116 IIAs and ISDS languished in obscurity for many years, spatially and 
temporally dispersing the arrival of important information about the potential costs of 
investment agreements.117  
 
‘Bounded rationality’ 
 
Both the more general research on treaty conclusion, and that aimed particularly 
at BITs, seem to point to conclusions of limited or ‘bounded’ rationality of 
governments when concluding IIAs. This can be argued at least (but certainly not 
exclusively) on the capital-importing States’ side. Generally, it is empirically doubtful if 
States speak with one voice in concluding a treaty, and that rigorous cost-benefit 
analysis precedes such a conclusion.118 As Marti Koskenniemi puts it succinctly, ‘[t]ry to 
find out the national position on a matter and you will hear different answer depending 
on whom you ask’.119 The reality of treaty-making is a heterogeneous picture, with 
different ministries, conflicting motives and often spontaneous reactions to events.120 In 
developing countries, the additional problem is the often-present lack of expertise in 
international (investment) law in general.121 Furthermore, the turnover of bureaucratic 
staff is often excessively high, which obstructs learning and specialization.122 
 
On top of these constraints, the various subtle and less subtle forms of pressure 
aimed at IIA conclusion hardly helped the (often hypothetical) rational cost-benefit 
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analysis by the capital-importing States.123 The promotion of IIAs (especially during the 
1990’s boom) was a coordinated effort of international organizations, multilateral 
agencies, Western governments and the private arbitration industry.124 Examples varied 
from ‘speed-dating’ IIA conclusion sessions organised by UNCTAD to different 
pressures on States with balance-of-payments problems in need of loans.125 An example 
of an arguably unequal bargaining position regarding IIAs is the effective mirroring of 
developed countries templates, despite the availability of less stringent models.126 The 
negotiation process was often reduced to a ‘take it or leave it’ type of deal – described 
sometimes as an ‘intensive training seminar’ for the representatives of the other party.127 
As Alvarez noted as early as 1992, these relationships reflect ‘hardly a voluntary, 
uncoerced transaction’.128 
	
Perhaps the most informative empirical look at IIA conclusion is offered by the 
research conducted by Lauge Poulsen, individually and in cooperation with Emma 
Aisbett. In short, Poulsen and Aisbett lay out the theoretical framework of the 
‘bounded rationality’ hypothesis, where State actually conduct a cost-benefit analysis (or 
even merely become aware of IIAs they allegedly ‘rationally’ concluded) only after being 
subject to an investment claim.129 The empirical testing of this proposition was 
conducted through 30 interviews with officials from 13 countries worldwide.130 While 
taking into account the limits of such a study, and potentially different learning 
processes for certain developed countries,131 what has been revealed is a clear lack of 
actual understanding on the side of key IIA negotiators regarding the potential effects 
of these agreements.  
 
While the States had a genuine desire for economic improvement through FDI, 
this was coupled with overly optimistic views on IIAs which were not supported by 
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corrective data of any sort.132 Coupled with the system’s dormancy, the effect was that 
potential risks of IIAs were largely ignored until the State experienced an ISDS claim.133 
The interviews with the negotiators confirmed a prevailing opinion that the IIA 
conclusion would not lead to practical implications, as these have been perceived as 
merely diplomatic gestures.134 Importantly, the countries included were not from the 
least developed or even developing list – they included South Korea, Czech Republic 
and Chile.135  
 
To illustrate with one example among a number of others, the Advocate-General 
of Pakistan, the country which signed the very first BIT, upon receiving the Swiss 
investor’s BIT claim in 2001 (starting the SGS v Pakistan case) had to Google what a 
BIT was.136 There was practically no trace of Pakistan-Switzerland BIT negotiations or 
of the ratification process, coupled with a fact that there was no copy of the BIT in 
Pakistan’s possession - a copy had to be procured from the Swiss government.137 The 
fact that by 2001 there have been a number of claims initiated globally, making Pakistan 
potentially aware about the potency of the treaties, made little difference for the 
appreciation of their importance. Another striking example of the dismal level of 
attention given to IIA conclusion is Mali. In the process of concluding a BIT with 
South Africa, Mali returned the signed template of the proposed BIT by email without 
even putting the name of the country in the required blank field.138  
 
Similar points have been raised, for example, by Christoph Schreuer in his 
capacity as an expert witness in the Wintershall case. When asked about the level of 
awareness about the contents of BITs by the States concluding them, Professor 
Schreuer stated that: 
[...] many times, in fact in the majority of times, BITs are among clauses of treaties 
that are not properly negotiated. BITs are very often pulled out of a drawer, often 
on the basis of some sort of a model, and are put forward on the occasion of state 
visits when the heads of states need something to sign […]. In other words, they 
are very often not negotiated at all, they are just being put on the table, and I have 
heard several representatives who have actually been active in this Treaty-making 
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process, if you can call it that, say that, ‘We had no idea that this would have real 
consequences in the real world’139 
 
The actual learning about what IIA provisions meant often came only after a 
State was subject to a claim. This is confirmed by South African,140 Indian141 and 
Pakistani142 experiences – they generally resulted in moratoriums and halting of further 
IIA conclusion, at least before a systematic review and analysis was conducted. But even 
more generally, analysis of the behaviour of 138 countries shows strong support for the 
hypothesis that when a country is subject to at least one BIT claim it considerably 
reduces the BIT conclusion process, and that this effect is over and above any effect 
that might exist from observing claims against other countries.143 These findings thus 
provide robust evidence of ‘highly narcissistic’ learning about the risk of treaty claims,144 
something that seems increasingly recognized in literature.145 For some authors, no 
language seems off limits in explaining the full impact of bounded rationality: 
[i]n far too many cases, those negotiating the treaties had little idea of the monster 
they were creating in the form of unclear provisions that could be molded by 
international arbitral tribunals set up pursuant to the treaties’ arbitration provisions 
into a set of state obligations far beyond what the negotiators intended.146 
 
1.3.3. Foundational problems – some concluding remarks 
Discussing the foundations of IIL necessarily implies important caveats. The 
sheer number of IIAs, the often fundamentally asymmetrical power of the parties 
involved, and the specific circumstances of each IIA conclusion prevent a ‘single cause’ 
explanation for the diffusion of treaties, wording, bilateral nature, or underlying 
economic ideology.147 It would be hard to claim that factors influencing a conclusion of 
an IIA in 1959 and 2009 were identical. 
 
Regardless, some general remarks seem pertinent. The largely bilateral 
foundations of the IIL edifice should provide a form of a cautionary restraint, an 
additional reason to justify and legitimize the approach that suggest the exclusivity or 
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over-reliance on the IROL-oriented interpretations of the FET standard. The lack of a 
multilateral framework, and a sound failure in agreeing one, should at both legal and 
normative levels provide an incentive for thorough and transparent reasoning by 
arbitrators as to what can and should be expected from an ‘treaty-overarching 
framework’148 in terms of balancing international and national rule of law 
considerations. 
 
Furthermore, regarding at least a considerable number of participating States, 
there is a questionable rationality of consent to IIAs and to IIL as a regime in general. 
This should arguably result in a further significant pause before proclaiming offered 
substantive interpretations and ways on application of the FET standard as self-evident 
or inevitable. Justifying these interpretations as expected by the States through the very 
fact of entering the regime should at least be seriously questioned.149 To be sure, the 
argument is not that there are grounds for invalidity of international treaties such as 
fraud and duress (as contained in VCLT Arts. 46-53). No State has so far attempted to 
do either. Rather, the broader normative aspect of these issues gains in importance. For 
the IIL to retain and enhance its legitimacy, it would have been important for these 
considerations to be taken into account. 
 
The specific foundations of the IIL regime opened the path for its dispute-
settling element - ISDS - to provide (for better or worse) the key shaping force of its 
normative development. Before engaging with the operation of the IROL paradigm in 
more detail in the next chapter, the final section will offer a sketch of how ISDS forged 
the structure of IIL as is known today, and some indication to what extent the issues 
and concerns discussed in this section featured in that process. These should serve as a 
further background to examining the possibilities and the need for a normative 
rethinking of substantive decision-making regarding the FET standard. 
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1.4. ISDS as the regime’s engine and the role of normative concerns 
 
1.4.1. ISDS in general 
The dispute settlement provisions in IIAs are not uniform.150 However, the vast 
majority of treaties concluded after 1970 contains at least one avenue for the investor to 
have the IIA dispute settled by investor-State arbitration.151 The revolutionary character 
of ‘arbitration without privity’152 in the context of international law has been recognised 
for a considerable time now. A short overview should thus suffice to show why the 
choice of arbitration crucially helped transform ISDS into the IIL’s engine of growth – 
and in turn of the IROL paradigm as well. 
 
Leaving aside national courts,153 most IIAs offer the prospective claimants a 
choice between initiating disputes through a number of arbitral institutions and/or 
through ad hoc arbitral proceedings. The choice of ad hoc arbitration rules is fairly 
uniform in IIAs, these usually being the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976.154 On the 
institutional arbitration side, a widely present option is ICSID, although often coupled 
with other renowned arbitral institutions such as the International Court of Arbitration 
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.155 In broad terms, investor-State arbitration is 
procedurally generally akin to international commercial arbitration, from which it drew 
heavily in many ways.156 With the exception of ICSID Convention and ICSID 
Arbitration Rules discussed below, both ad hoc and institutional rules (with some recent 
and limited exceptions)157 do not generally distinguish between commercial (B2B) and 
investor-State arbitrations.  
 
The ICSID Convention is unique in the sense of a truly delocalised arbitration 
regime, one specifically geared towards investor-State dispute settlement.158 The most 
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pertinent features for this delocalisation are the provisions on recognition and 
enforcement of ICSID awards and the rather limited possibilities of recourse against the 
awards within the ICSID framework.159 The ICSID Convention dispenses with the 
possibility for national courts to review the ICSID awards.160 The possibility of rejecting 
to comply with an award always remains, but by virtue of Article 27(1) of the ICSID 
Convention such rejection allows for the re-launch of diplomatic protection by the 
investor’s home State. As the Argentinian experience shows, such non-compliance can 
be both costly and ultimately unsuccessful.161  
 
The recourse against awards is thus possible only on the narrow grounds 
provided in the Convention itself.162 Such limited possibilities for review have led 
authors not just to question the credibility of the system163 but also to describe it as 
‘quick and dirty justice’ which ‘shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness’ and is 
unsuitable when sovereignty and hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake.164 
Unsurprisingly, a lot of interest was raised by the 2004 proposal on the introduction of 
a fully-fledged appellate system within ICSID, an effort which failed to get traction at 
that point.165 As suggested in the Introduction, a new wave of activity in a similar 
direction exists today, with the prospects still hanging in the balance.166 
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The features of a strongly autonomous IIL regime persist even outside the ICSID 
framework.167 Almost universally, the recognition, enforcement, and recourse against 
investment awards is governed by the New York Convention 1958 and the almost 
identically worded nationally adopted versions of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
1985/2006.168 In practice, the oversight conducted by the national courts is largely non-
intrusive. As Van Harten and Loughlin note, the ‘piggybacking of investment treaties on 
the enforcement structure of international commercial arbitration both fragments and 
restricts judicial supervision of investment arbitration.’169 The closer look at 
enforcement of awards under NYC 1958 shows that it is indeed a largely automatic 
process in most situations.170 Whether under ICSID or otherwise, the recognition and 
enforcement has been described as practically compulsory.171 In the words of Thomas 
Wälde: 
[I]t is the ability to access a tribunal outside the sway of the host State which is the 
principle advantage of a modern investment treaty. This advantage is much more 
significant than the applicability to the dispute of substantive international law 
rules.172 
 
The role of dispute settlement is critical for IIL as a whole.173 While for some 
authors the IIAs on their own do enough to create a regime,174 IIL as it stands today is 
unimaginable from just the text of the treaties. The fact that arbitration in general is ‘not 
in fact a system, but rather is a framework’ potentially presented great challenges for 
building any sort of ordering within ISDS.175 And yet, the confluence of legal aspects of 
the employed framework and the sociological features of the arbitral community 
resulted in a perfect storm for creating a new regime.176 Especially in the ICSID context 
(but essentially within other arbitral frameworks as well) this was made possible by the 
limited review avenues, a powerful enforcement regime, basically a commercial 
arbitration procedure and remarkable vagueness of the standards such as the FET.177  
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Building on the legal features of the ISDS framework, the socio-legal aspects of 
the arbitration community are another critical factor in shaping the IROL-oriented 
interpretations. The synergy of the legal features and the sociological ones eventually 
played a major role in the understanding of the rule of law ‘mission’ of the FET and IIL 
more generally, and particularly so through the master tool of de facto precedent. The 
following section will thus focus on these two aspects. 
 
1.4.2. The ‘epistemic community’ of ISDS arbitration 
To lay out the key points of the discussion below, the characteristic sociological 
features of international arbitration scene fostered the IIL regime-building that leaned 
towards strong emphasis on their international rule of law role and detachment from 
the engagement with domestic legal systems. This was done through homogenising the 
legal and ideological background of arbitrators, a domination of a number of law firms 
as ubiquitous repeat players and capitalizing on the reality of governments being 
disparate bodies with intriguingly low capacity for institutional learning in the context of 
BITs (as also discussed in the IIA conclusion context in section 1.3.2. above). In such 
surroundings, some of the normative challenges to the IROL paradigm arising out of 
IIL foundations were effectively overcome in regime-building, although in a way that 
arguably still leaves both considerable legitimacy issues and normative alternatives open. 
To be sure, the ‘arbitration community’ can encompass a large number of actors 
in a sociological sense.178 Within the limited scope of this section, however, the aim is to 
focus on those actors who critically contributed to the IIL regime growth through 
investment arbitration – arbitrators and law firms, as well as (arguably much more side-
lined) States. 
The arbitral community in ISDS is in many ways an offshoot of the broader 
commercial arbitration community.179 In particular, as ISDS emerged from its virtual 
multi-decade slumber in mid-1990’s, it seemed a logical choice to have (prestigious) 
commercial arbitrators filling the roles. As mentioned, ISDS heavily borrowed from 
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commercial arbitration in the procedural sense, and choosing those versed in that area is 
in that sense understandable.  
The arbitrators are generally the category that attracts by far the most attention 
from a sociological standpoint, particularly in the light of the transformation of 
arbitrating from an occasional activity into a ticket for the social category of 
professional arbitrators.180 And it is within that social category that arguably the most 
high-profile members get the opportunity to get involved with the ISDS cases. As 
recently supported by meticulous empirical research, temporal aspect of ISDS 
‘explosion’ is of great importance. Sergio Puig concludes that ‘[…] the deluge of cases in 
the last 10 years has skewed the results towards specific arbitrators who were appointed 
early in this stage and whose careers had been consolidated by or ripened around the 
end of last century.’181 Once ‘entrenched’, those arbitrators remain central, and can use 
their social and professional standing to receive further appointments, influence the 
doctrine and general political/ideological orientation of IIL.182 
While the extent of the phenomena is sometimes overstated and is prone to 
gradual change, the world of ISDS arbitrators is still relatively small.183 It is an own 
universe, in some ways detached from both commercial arbitration and public 
international law.184 The arbitrators’ network is dominated by a dense and 
interconnected group of mostly male, European and Anglo-American professionals.185 
This leads to intertwining of professional affiliations, relationships and friendships and 
can in turn be a breeding ground for new legitimacy and credibility challenges.186  
At the same time, the small world of investment arbitrators becomes an epistemic 
community as well. 187 As noted, the line between a scholar and a practitioner is blurred 
																																																						
180 Gaillard 2015, 4. 
181 Puig 2014, 420-421. 
182 ibid, 421-422. Another temporal aspect is that the ISDS explosion started before the big crises of the 
2000’s, and before IIAs became more truly two-way ‘swords’. The early and immensely influential 
precedents were thus open to the understanding that a ‘deluge of state practice’ buried any ‘socialist 
alternative’ to liberal capitalism of the Thomas Friedman variety (Alvarez 2005, 94) or even just a rights-
based (as opposed to market-based) approach to the organization of the economic system (Schill 2009, 
377; Van Harten 2010c, 635; Ruiz Fabri 2012, 357). 
183 See generally Puig 2014. It can be said to resemble international commercial arbitration field of several 
decades ago (as presented by Gaillard 2015, 13-14, who does however also make an argument of the 
ISDS field increasingly growing and ‘polarizing’ into specific roles).  
184 Schneider 2015, 8. See however also discussion at Gaillard 2015, 15-16. 
185 Puig 2014, 418-419. 
186 See generally Miles 2013, 342-346 and Park 2010. See also Waibel et al. 2010, xli-xlii. 
187 See for example Miles 2013, 342-346 and Van Harten 2010c 649-650 and materials cited therein. It 
should be noted, however, that a number of authors emphasise the ISDS epistemic community as being 
 
70 
in investment arbitration, perhaps more than in any other field of law.188 Those involved 
insist that the field requires specialist knowledge, provided and supported by an 
epistemic community - with its own networks, conferences, journals, newsletters and 
mailing lists. Such a development is sometimes taken as a mark of technical 
sophistication which signifies the progressive evolution of IIL.189 
The relatively low number of involved arbitrators corresponds somewhat to the 
low number of involved law firms.190 The repetition of involved law firms is also 
conducive to entrenching particular features of ISDS, such as the reliance on 
precedent.191 This is furthered by the predominantly common law legal culture of the 
leading firms. In that regard, Picker notes that: 
[r]eflecting these and other factors, a recent survey of the top hundred law firms of 
the world identified only two that were not from a common law country, and only 
seven that were not from the United States or Britain. This dominance by Anglo-
American law firms has and will continue to have a long-term impact on the 
development of the legal culture of international investment law.192 
 
The crystallization of leading law firms also leads to increased intertwining with 
the world of investment arbitrators.193 Not only do law firms garner sufficient 
‘intelligence’ about particular arbitrators so as to make their reappointment sensible 
from a strategic viewpoint,194 but these two communities start to intertwine in 
membership terms. As the vocal debates about ‘wearing two hats’ show, the role of the 
counsel and the arbitrator is not kept distinct.195 Therefore, it becomes the prerogative 
of international investment lawyers, arbitrators and scholars (categories often 
intermingled) to decide to a great extent on the substantive developments.196  
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What is the role of States in all these processes? Legally, the routes to shaping the 
IIAs and their interpretation (including both procedural and substantive aspects) remain 
in their hands, but in practice the ‘epistemic community’ arguably plays a more 
dominant role for several reasons. The process of IIA modification or interpretation 
can be slow and uncertain,197 and the deferral of States to law firms is of considerable 
importance. Predominantly, host States do not field their own legal teams that could 
potentially offer different visions of IIL in terms of substance or procedure.198 States are 
often represented by the same law firms that generally dominate the field.199 The lack of 
own resources sometimes makes this necessary, but it can also be seen as a logical 
choice if the primary aim is to defeat an investment claim. It makes sense to go to those 
who have the expertise, even (or especially so) if they are those defining what expertise 
is in the first place.200 As Schneiderman notes, ‘we should not […] overstate the capacity 
of states to depart from the expert advice given to them by international investment 
norm-entrepreneurs who have the ear of those having authority over this dossier.’201 
IIAs become treated as another ‘layer’ of regulation on which experts need to be 
consulted daily.202 
 
The interaction of the relevant factors – small numbers and a characteristic 
culture in the first place - leads to repetitive appointments and, eventually, the perhaps 
unexpectedly high importance of the ‘human factor’ in ISDS decision-making.203 This is, 
of course, nothing strictly limited to ISDS or to arbitration in general.204 But the extent 
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198 Schreuer 2016, 737. 
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in ISDS. See for example http://www.steptoe.com/publications-10464.html, accessed 12 June 2016. 
204 A related discussion, which is not the topic here, is the one of ‘pro-investor’ or ‘pro-state’ bias of the 
arbitral epistemic community. It suffices to note that some authors insist on the ‘pro-investor’ bias of 
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disputed topic, it is however somewhat tangential to the aims of this thesis. Whether investors or States 
fare better under the current IIL rules is a separate issue from the one if these rules can actually be 
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of the phenomenon should be noted. Experienced practitioners, it is claimed, can often 
predict the outcome of an investor-state arbitration based upon the composition of the 
tribunal, as opposed to just merits of the case.205 The track record, outlook and 
experience become the key considerations, something that militates against the 
diversification of the arbitrators’ pool.206 
 
As Jeffery Commission noted in his seminal study, the tribunal members are 
simply not ever-changing – their backgrounds and regular interactions have contributed 
to an ‘esprit de corps’ among ICSID and other ISDS arbitrators.207 Arbitrators are in a 
‘constant dialogue’ that likely results in a form of peer pressure that serves to keep 
errant arbitrators in line to a certain extent.208 With this general framework in mind, it is 
possible to take a closer look at the instrument of de facto precedent through which the 
mentioned arbitral dialogue primarily takes place. 
 
1.4.3. De facto precedent as a master tool of regime-building 
While the issue of de facto precedents will also be examined in Chapter 2, it is 
useful to note here an interesting mismatch between the formally suggested cautious 
approach and the actual prodigious use of previous awards.209 There is universal 
acknowledgment in practice and doctrine that there is no doctrine of stare decisis in 
investment arbitration, regardless of the institution under whose auspices the 
proceedings are taking place.210 The rules of arbitral institutions dealing primarily with 
international commercial arbitration do not need to reiterate the lack of precedential 
value of arbitral awards,211 while the ICSID Convention arguably deals with the issue in 
its Article 53(1) when mandating that the award is ‘binding on the parties’.212 This 
approach is not different from the public international law in general. At least formally, 
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there is no binding precedent in international law dispute settlement.213 As is sometimes 
argued specifically in the context of ISDS, the precedential force of awards is 
conceptually impossible.214 
 
Yet, as suggested by empirical research, the recourse to previous decisions of 
investment tribunals is widespread.215 In an oft-cited study by Fauchald, results show 
that out of 98 decisions analysed, 92 decisions (94%) used case law as an interpretive 
argument.216 The importance of these precedents varied from being a purely supportive 
argument to being decisive for a conclusion, but it was in general quite common for 
tribunals to use case law as a means of establishing a presumption in favour of one 
result.217 In general, the same importance was attached to obiter dicta as to ratio decidendi.218 
Authors generally recognize that a ‘system of precedent’,219 ‘precedent-based 
discourse’,220 de facto stare decisis,221 ‘jurisprudence constante’222 or a ‘tool of shorthand’223 now 
exists in IIL and ISDS. Fuelled by the ready availability of published awards and 
susceptible IIA norms,224 a system is put in place in which re-visiting the nominally used 
sources of law itself is abandoned and heavy reliance is placed on the arbitral decisions 
themselves.225 
Tribunals do usually take special care to distinguish the practice of persuasive 
precedent from a potentially contra legem practice of binding precedent. The line between 
the two, however, is sometimes blurry indeed. An oft-cited passage of Saipem v. 
Bangladesh illustrates this: 
[t]he Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions.(10) At the same 
time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of 
international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it 
has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also 
believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of 
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74 
the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development 
of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the 
community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law (11).226 
 
The quoted paragraph is interesting for a number of reasons, not the least for its 
use of the arguably strong term of ‘duty’. Almost paradoxically, the first footnote in the 
passage - offered as a support for the position that the tribunal is not bound by 
previous decisions - itself refers to a previous decision, in AES v. Argentina. The second 
footnote offers support for the progressive development of IIL, and refers to an 
academic piece of writing by a fellow ISDS arbitrator, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 
demonstrating in one swoop both the extent of the arbitrator/academic overlap and the 
strong bonds of the ISDS epistemic community. 
It is not the argument here that a persuasive precedent is either unique to ISDS (it 
certainly is not) or that it is intrinsically unacceptable. For example, Valentina Vadi 
argues that persuasive precedent particularly fits with investment arbitration, offering 
the option of not following unconvincing decisions, promoting meritorious ones and 
gradually developing a coherent IIL.227 Equally importantly, examples from ISDS 
practice include decisions which rather explicitly reject the mandate that the Saipem 
tribunal sees as imposed on arbitrators, including the reliance on previous decisions.228 
What causes concern is the possibility that (over-)reliance on precedent is another 
ultimate expression of the socio-legal aspects of ISDS community, and not necessarily 
of careful appraisal of IIL foundations and related normative tenets. The dense citation 
of previous awards in submissions of the parties has a feedback effect which pressures 
arbitrators in seeing those awards as evolving law.229 As D’Aspremont notes concerning 
dispute-settlement more generally ‘[…] there is a natural loyalty among judges who 
inevitably rely on one another […][as] a result of the constant and abiding quest […] for 
the preservation of the authority of their pronouncements.’ 230 
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As has also been noted in the Introduction, the way in which the FET standard 
has been gradually solidified into rule of law requirements is a positive development, 
and in that sense the reliance on precedents has certainly proved beneficial. But seen 
against the background of normative issues regarding IIL foundations, and the features 
of the ISDS arbitral community, it is possible to mark as at least controversial the 
manner in which these normative issues were dealt with. The remainder of this section 
will examine how the specific issues were engaged with (if at all) and ultimately 
overcome in the process of creating IIL as it stands today. This process, importantly, 
led to the dominance of the IROL paradigm, but should not be seen as excluding the 
potential for complementing NROL considerations. 
Overcoming the bilateral ‘hurdle’ 
Duly apart from the pressure and/or desire to conform to the common 
understanding that precedents should be followed, there arguably still had to be a 
sufficiently cogent formal justification to go beyond the clearly bilateral, or at best 
plurilateral framework of IIAs. There needed to be an explanation why the arbitrators 
were effectively making the ‘rules for every bilateral investment treaty relation, not only 
the one that governs the specific dispute at hand’231 even if such practice runs counter 
to the foundational principles of essentially one-off investment arbitration.232 
Furthermore, there should arguably be a clear explanation why the bilateral character of 
the treaties does not by itself lead towards putting special emphasis on the national legal 
systems of the contracting States. 
The critical lifeline was found in the undisputable fact that IIA provisions are a 
part of international law. Thus, as touched upon above in section 1.3.1., if a FET 
provision in an IIA between States A and B is an international law provision, and 
similarly worded provision in IIA between States X and Z is also of the same character, 
a mandate is given to arbitrators to aim at both consistent interpretation and, if 
necessary, further development of the actual international law norm that lies beneath 
the wording of ‘fair and equitable treatment’. International law seemingly cannot be 
substantively pluralistic in the face of identical or basically identical wording. The 
dominant paradigm becomes the ‘deeply-rooted perception of the unity of international 
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investment law and of the need for consistency’.233  
Once such a premise is entrenched, numerous other developments become 
possible. Recourse to precedent is expected, as it is ‘natural that arbitrators will want to 
know what other in similar situations have done’.234 The self-reinforcing effect takes 
hold – the need for consistency and certainty by recourse to precedent is seen as 
expected by the parties,235 and the parties themselves have recourse to previous 
decisions as this becomes customary.236 The ‘mountains’ of previous decisions are 
addressed and put forward ‘because they are there’.237 Also, the strong attachment to 
public international law seemingly helps the awards to profit in legitimacy terms from 
the oft-proclaimed ‘neutrality’ of this law and its implied unbiased, apolitical 
determinations.238  
A further consequence is a perceived licence for ‘progressive development’ of IIL 
that is granted to arbitrators.239 National specificities might matter little if the goal is to 
further international law in general and break beyond the confines of just the treaty at 
hand. This is further incentivised if the field is seen as undeveloped and scarcely 
populated by norms240 - helping international law to grow becomes not just a possibility, 
but the duty of a conscientious arbitrator.241  
While the task of juggling correct decision-making in an individual case with the 
broader implications has been described as no less than ‘schizophrenic’,242 this does not 
generally detract from the enthusiasm of many arbitrators and scholars in the field. The 
elastic legal concepts in IIAs, it is argued, ‘beg to be illuminated with reasoned findings 
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by tribunals.’243 The belief that accumulation of jurisprudence will ‘cure’ the lack of rules 
runs deep. As Weil notes: 
[a]s to the argument that international law incorporates only few rules on foreign 
investment, this is the case with most new branches of international law. It is a 
temporary deficiency which, like youth, vanishes with the passage of time.244  
	
The bilateral nature of most IIAs is thus overcome by a particular understanding 
of the consequences arising from the international law character of their provisions. 
The once adopted (but by no means inevitable) understanding of the need for 
multilateral uniformity and substantive consistency becomes embedded more deeply 
with every passing decision that does not question the starting premise. The normative 
expectations of investors and States thus become increasingly formed on that premise, 
and potential criticism that earlier decisions have themselves perhaps been 
problematic245 is simply swamped in the sheer volume of awards. In many ways, the 
uniform structure of substantive IIL thus lifts itself from the ground by pulling its own 
shoelaces. Yet, the consistent identification of the rule of law requirements in the FET 
standard still does not answer the question of how are these further interpreted and 
applied, and what is the overall normative orientation in that exercise.  
 
The side-lining of issues concerning the conclusion of IIAs 
The fact that States themselves seemingly had little to say on this orientation did 
not seem to overly impact the development of the IROL paradigm. The controversies 
surrounding the empirical aspect of IIA conclusion hardly featured as a relevant point 
for tribunals, and were sometimes actively dismissed in doctrine. That is to some extent 
not surprising – as previously mentioned, these controversies are unlikely to affect the 
validity of IIAs, even if such arguments were brought to the fore. A State arguing 
ignorance of what the IIA provisions meant would likely find little understanding from 
a tribunal. Ignorantia legis nocet. 
Still, if the leges were not quite capable of being known in the first place, a 
formalistic approach would seem unduly harsh. In this regard, it is sometimes argued in 
doctrine (in addition to the discussion in section 1.3.2. above) that the normative issue 
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does not actually exist since the States knew or could have known how the IIA provisions 
such as the FET standard will affect them. Francisco Orrego-Vicuña has perhaps most 
vocally dismissed allegations of (particularly developing States’) ignorance as nothing 
other than ‘paternalistic’.246  
Furthermore, as also touched upon above, it is claimed that the parties ‘expect 
that tribunals […] [embed] their interpretation into the discursive framework created by 
earlier investment treaty awards’.247 According to King and Moloo, the parties to a treaty 
either signed up only to have their own disputes decided, without regard to prior (much 
less subsequent) jurisprudence; or the parties consented with an awareness and 
expectation of their dispute being decided within the context of, and with reference to, 
a system of prior awards.248 According to them, most parties’ expectations likely fall 
somewhere in the middle, with their dispute being the central focus of the tribunal’s 
decision, but with prior case law functioning as a guidepost for the arbitrators where there is a 
large body of public decisions and ‘common understanding’ of the meaning.249  
Yet, this simply begs the question of the ‘zero hour’ – what could have the States 
expected before the first decisions started appearing? The existence of the ‘body’ of 
public decisions, or of ‘common understanding’ of IIA provision meaning would be 
hard to demonstrate for the period when the IIAs were concluded en masse and even 
when the ISDS rise began. Their existence is uncertain even today. The Romak tribunal 
highlighted the difficulties: 
Even presuming that relevant principles could be distilled from prior arbitral 
awards (which has proven difficult […]), they cannot be deemed to constitute the expression 
of a general consensus of the international community, and much less a formal source of 
international law. Arbitral awards remain mere sources of inspiration, comfort or 
reference to arbitrators.250 
 
The question of what each individual State could have expected from IIL and 
ISDS in terms of their operation is one that cannot be ultimately resolved without a 
truly unimaginable mountain of empirical research, if even then. But that does not mean 
that existing arguments should not be put to closer scrutiny when bearing in mind what 
is indeed available in terms of empirical research. The explanation that States agreeing 
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to IIAs (or staying bound by them) accept the whole of ISDS jurisprudence that came 
afterwards is, at worst, misleading as it arguably avoids a ‘chicken and egg’ problem or 
is, at best, overly simplistic. Remaining open to different normative visions of decision-
making in areas such as the FET standard - that can also spring from the same IIA 
foundations - would seem a preferable way to proceed in both practice and doctrine. 
1.5. Conclusion 
The IIL regime is in many ways a strange, yet certainly powerful animal. It is 
based on a dense network of treaties that suggest the existence of substantial content –
content that was, however, almost impossible to truly ascertain in advance. Further (and 
inevitably decentralized) ‘progressive development’ was necessary to establish the 
multilateral substantive edifice of the regime. Still, as Joost Pauwelyn suggests, the 
development of IIL was in many ways haphazard, fraught with accidents and akin to an 
organic evolution involving independent actors.251 To take the analogy one step further 
- there was hardly an all-knowing, intelligent ‘watchmaker’ of IIL - the one existing 
would rather be, to use the famous title of Richard Dawkins’ 1986 book, of the ‘blind’ 
variety. 
 
The features of the IIL regime development at the same time also imply that 
alternative normative visions of interpreting and applying its key standards, such as the 
FET, were and still are possible. The legal, empirical and ideological issues surrounding 
the IIA network conclusion also suggest that no ‘legitimate expectation’ existed on the 
side of at least a considerable number of States that this standard will necessarily be 
dominated by the IROL paradigm. The bilateral character of IIAs, broadness of the 
standard, the at least sometimes present en passant character of their conclusion and 
arguably the never completely settled ideological background for their interpretation do 
not seem to offer as strong a basis for the complete dominance of substantive 
international multilateralism as is the case with other regimes, such as the WTO.  
 
It is not just that it is possible in abstract to imagine a more pluralistic and 
national rule of law-oriented idea of the FET standard. All these factors arguably also 
demanded more practical justification from arbitrators when engaging in the regime-
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building exercise. There was from a legitimacy viewpoint, if nothing else, a clear need 
for caution, circumspection and additional efforts in providing an explanation what the 
States - the nominal IIA ‘masters’ - could have reasonably expect from the FET 
standard and ISDS after decades of dormancy,252 and how the awards corresponded to 
these expectations. 
 
The case-law in general does not seem to indicate particular concern for these 
foundational normative issues. The ISDS mechanism, providing the main engine of 
growth for the quasi-legislative interpretations of the FET standard, was in many ways 
fuelled by the idiosyncratic legal and sociological features of international arbitration. 
The relatively low number of actors (arbitrators/counsel/law firms); the overlap of 
those deciding and those commenting the decisions; the strong protective ‘cocoon’ of 
the arbitration regime in terms of possibilities for review; strong proclivity for relying 
on precedent; perceived mandate for ‘progressive development’ of the law; and the 
relative homogeneity of the ideological outlook, all allowed for a vision of coherent, 
multilateral IIL regime and of its provisions that does not a priori leave room for 
national, case-specific legal variations. Still, those variations can - should the relevant 
normative orientation exist – be given effect within the broad wording of IIA provision, 
and are also arguably suggested by the predominantly bilateral nature of investment 
treaties. 
 
The normative changes remain possible in the IIL regime as it exists now. The 
reliance on persuasive precedent, for example, indicates that dislodging a particular 
strand of reasoning in jurisprudence might not be easy or quick, but also shows that 
new awards can eventually launch broader trends. As Koskenniemi notes, ‘[a] regime is 
as indeterminate as the nation - its founding principles contradictory and amenable for 
conflicting interpretations and its boundaries constantly penetrated by adjoining 
rationales.’253 The IIL regime is not closed to new influences, it is just that response to 
them might be seen as determined exclusively by its own principal players - arbitrators, 
lawyers and academics.254 
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If the normative change is still possible when bearing in mind the foundations of 
the IIL regime and the IROL paradigm, this would still not necessarily mean it is needed. 
The following chapter will thus focus on the operation of the IROL paradigm in 
practice, and suggest the reasons why a normative shift towards complementing the 
FET decision-making with the NROL paradigm is further warranted. The conclusions 
of this and the following Chapter should thus provide a more complete background for 
the discussion of the national rule of law orientation in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2 – The IROL paradigm challenges and the tools for tackling them 
 
 
	
2.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 presented the foundations of the IROL paradigm concerning the FET 
standard. This paradigm entails understanding the FET standard as embodying 
international rule of law precepts to guide the host State behaviour. These precepts or 
sub-standards should thus ideally be: a) of supranational character detached from the 
national specificities; b) with a de facto multilateralised and uniform substantive content; 
and c) embodying mostly a formal, de-politicized understanding of the rule of law. 
Chapter 1 also problematized the idea of the uniform regime of IIL as a precondition 
for the IROL paradigm. It is questionable if the idea of a mulitlateralised, uniform 
regime was an inevitable result or even an anticipated development by at least some of 
the participating States. The unsettled expectations and specific legal foundations thus 
still make different normative paradigms possible concerning both the FET standard 
and IIL more broadly. 
 
However, the fact that the IROL paradigm understanding is not inevitable or that 
it is open to enhancements does not suggest its abandonment.1 On the contrary, as the 
Introduction to this thesis emphasised, insistence on the rule of law requirements 
enforced through an international mechanism is a worthy development that accords 
well with general efforts to enhance the international rule of law. This Chapter rather 
seeks to point out that there should be no room for self-congratulatory narratives or 
complacency in practice just because the FET has come to be seen and applied as 
embodying the rule of law requirements. Even if the opaque ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ is 
distilled into perhaps less opaque ‘predictable’, ‘non-arbitrary’, ‘transparent’, ‘with due 
process’ this should by no means indicate that tasks of further interpretation and 
application are made straightforward.  
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The combination of the still considerably open-textured FET sub-principles and 
the decentralised nature of ISDS immediately poses challenges to predictability of 
decision-making and coherence of jurisprudence more generally. As this Chapter 
illustrates with some pertinent examples, these challenges have materialised into tangible 
issues in practice, issues that can jeopardize the valuable IROL mission of the FET 
standard. As will be shown, approaches to interpretation and application of 
requirements such as the respect for ‘legitimate expectations’ have been markedly 
different in practice, as has the issue of what should be the role of parallel non-
investment obligations of the host State more generally. These issues impinging on legal 
certainty have their legitimacy costs, which should be taken seriously. 
 
To be sure, clear and prospective rules and certainty in their application lie at the 
core of the formal understanding of the rule of law – and are also a foundation for all 
other (cumulatively more demanding/substantive) rule of law understandings properly 
so called.2 If the ‘supranational rule of law […] [and] […] uniform standards for 
acceptable sovereign behaviour’3 are to be realised, seeking paths towards enhancing 
certainty and predictability (in addition to structural reforms not here discussed) 
remains an ever-important task. This is even more so when potentially considerable 
practical effects of ISDS on the host States and their populations are taken into 
account.4 Hachez and Wouters observe in the context of IIL predictability that ‘in view 
of the requirements of the rule of law and in light of the public interest, ‘‘working well 
most of the time’’ is not enough.’5 What ‘working well’ means is certainly open to 
disagreement. Yet, sufficiently clear deficiencies related to certainty and predictability 
should in any case serve as a strong indicator that preserving the worthy developments 
might require constant adjustments based on the accumulated experience. 
 
																																																						
2 Tamanaha 2004, 91-92 and 102; see similarly Calamita 2013, 170 and Summers 1999, 1693-1695. An 
exception in that sense is what Tamanaha terms ‘Rule-by-Law’ – where everything that government does 
is consistent with the rule of law if given a legal form (ibid, 92). As he observes, ‘understood in this way, 
the rule of law has no real meaning’ and excludes any sort of potential for external review and assessment 
(ibid, 92; see similarly Reynolds 1989, 3 and Raz 1979, 212-213). Such an understanding would have little 
value for IIL if it is to constrain the host States at all. 
3 Rivkin 2012, 2. See similarly Carvalho’s contention that ISDS offers ‘legal predictability and equality 
among disputing parties who do not necessarily share the same domestic legal values and customs’ (2016, 
15) and also Van Harten 2010c, 628-629. 
4 As noted by Tamanaha, any determination of moral legitimacy of the law must also consider the effect 
of the rules (2004, 94). 
5 Hachez/Wouters 2013, 434. 
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As indicated in the Introduction, and as will be further explored in particular in 
Chapters 3 and 4, this thesis argues that the introduction of the NROL paradigm as a 
regular complement to the IROL one is a normatively desirable development that can 
help tackle some of the critical challenges and bring about additional benefits. But 
before discussing further why the FET sub-principles should be interpreted and applied 
with systematic reference towards pre-existing international and domestic commitments 
of the host State, this Chapter will set out three propositions as a relevant background.  
 
Firstly (as elaborated in section 2.2.) the FET jurisprudence does indicate a 
divergent approach to the interpretation and application of the FET sub-principles, 
both in terms of the autonomous understanding what the FET standard specifically 
entails and in terms of the relationship towards national law and international 
obligations of the host State.  
 
Secondly, and relatedly (as also discussed in section 2.2.) there are examples in 
jurisprudence that clearly demonstrate the readiness of tribunals to duly take into 
account the parallel obligations of the host State and incorporate them into FET 
decision-making. This shows that the NROL paradigm as such is not a groundless 
proposal even when considering the existing jurisprudence.  
 
Furthermore, and thirdly, this Chapter argues in section 2.3. that both in terms of 
rules of interpretation (primarily the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
hereinafter VCLT) and through choice and weighing of relevant facts, investment 
tribunals do have at their disposal the necessary formal tools to make the suggested 
NROL paradigm a permanently-present complementary feature of deciding the FET 
claims.  
 
Section 2.4. will offer concluding remarks and a proposal for certain common 
points arising from the first two chapters, points that should sketch a normative way 
forward towards a complementary NROL paradigm. The general normative desirability 
and potential benefits of introducing a focus on the national rule of law are then the 
main topic of Chapter 3. 
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2.2. The limits of the IROL paradigm - different approaches to the meaning    
and requirements of the FET standard 
 
The text of the FET standard whose breach is alleged is an uncontroversial 
starting point for assessing the liability of the host State.6 Ideally, how the process of 
that assessment unfolds further should be sufficiently similar in all cases involving the 
FET standard. If the IROL paradigm is to (exclusively) play its rule of law securement 
role, the very broad ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ language should be consistently distilled into 
more exact sub-principles, and these should then further be interpreted and applied in a 
sufficiently consistent manner. But challenges to such an ideal picture can be observed 
at almost every point. While the distilling of ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ into the common rule 
of law requirements is the predominant trend, there are also cases in which ‘fair’ and 
‘equitable’ requirements were not found to require further interpretation before being 
applied (section 2.2.1). Perhaps even more importantly, even in a much more common 
situation where the rule of law sub-principles are taken as a starting point for further 
assessment, the understanding of these sub-principles and the actual process of 
determining the relevant reference points for their further interpretation and application 
also exhibit divergences that cannot be ignored. This can be illustrated by the now 
ubiquitous doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’ (section 2.2.2.) and the more general 
attitude towards the role and relevance of parallel host State obligations in interpreting 
and applying the FET standard (section 2.2.3). 
 
2.2.1. The (un)tenability of ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ as a beginning and an end 
 
There can certainly be an argument for the text of the FET standard being not 
just a start but also an end point in interpretation and application. Andreas Kulick, for 
example, asserts that ‘[...] a BIT sets out the investor rights in an express, clear and 
detailed manner [...] [and] is a more or less comprehensive body of rules, comparable 
to-or sometimes even more elaborate than-domestic law on investment.’7 This could 
suggest that further interpretation might not be by itself necessary.  
																																																						
6 ‘The question of liability for a breach of the investment treaty must be resolved by the application of the 
legal standard encapsulated in the investment treaty obligation forming the basis of the claim. This […] 
has never generated difficulties in practice.’ (Douglas 2009, 81). See similarly McLachlan 2005, 287; 
Spiermann 2008, 107; Schreuer et al. 2009, 578. 
7 Kulick 2012, 31. See also generally Schreuer et al. 2009, 605. 
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This understanding has occasionally surfaced in the awards. Sometimes the 
reasoning process consisted of the elaboration of facts, followed by a simple conclusion 
on whether (on the balance) host State behaviour was in breach of the FET.8 As Toby 
Landau picturesquely noted, sometimes ‘the award suddenly peters out, and ends, not 
with a bang but a whimper.’9  
 
One example is Achmea v. Slovakia – Final Award.10 After summarizing the parties’ 
positions on the merits and the relevant IIA provisions,11 the tribunal essentially 
dispensed with the critical issue of whether the FET breach existed within one 
paragraph: 
[…] the imposition of the ban on profits and the ban on transfer of the portfolio 
were measures that self-evidently and unequivocally put Eureko’s investment into a 
situation that was incompatible with the most basic notions of what an investment 
is meant to be, and that the imposition of those measures upon the investment 
after it had been made was incompatible with the obligation to accord the investment fair and 
equitable treatment under the Treaty. […]12 
 
Several potentially important issues, such as Respondent’s arguments about the 
existence and importance of regulatory autonomy,13 essentially went unaddressed. 
Regardless of the recourse to the preamble of the IIA and the VCLT when discussing 
jurisdictional issues,14 there was no similar attempt in elucidating the content of the 
relevant substantive standards. In a somewhat similar vein, although focusing primarily 
on expropriation, the Tribunal in ADC v. Hungary found no difficulty in establishing a 
breach of host of other relevant standards in a single paragraph by concluding that: 
the meaning of “fair and equitable treatment”, “unreasonable or discriminatory measures” 
and “full security and protection” are to be determined under the specific circumstances 
of each specific case. However, in the light of the facts established in this case […], 
																																																						
8 As Landau notes, sometimes ‘conclusions are given, instead of any reasons at all’ (2009, 202). At least 
for early cases, this might be attributed to the presence of commercial arbitrators, as their ‘culture brings a 
strong focus on facts rather than the law’ (Laird 2009, 153). 
9 Landau 2009, 202. 
10 A somewhat similar example can be found in Eureko v. Poland, paras. 231-235 and also RFCC v. Morocco 
(for which see also Tudor 2008, 129). 
11 Achmea v. Slovakia – Final Award, paras. 220-277. 
12 ibid, para. 281. 
13 ibid, para. 269. 
14 ibid, paras. 169-170. 
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the Tribunal is satisfied to conclude that these requirements […] have all been 
breached by the Respondent.15  
Somewhat puzzlingly, the ADC tribunal indicated it was to turn to VCLT Article 
31 and 32 for interpretative purposes,16 yet after this single mention, these provisions 
were not later referred to in any way.17  
 
Such a (perhaps deceptively) straightforward application of the FET standard is 
not, however, the predominant trend. The open-textured nature makes hard-and-fast 
decision-making problematic.18 Whether welcomed or rued, there is wide 
acknowledgment in practice and doctrine that the FET and other IIA standards exhibit 
considerable broadness and even vagueness of language.19 The FET standard has been 
described as intentionally vague, designed to give ‘quasi-legislative’ authority to 
arbitrators in order to articulate a variety of rules.20 It has also been considered to be 
broad ‘as of its nature’ and ‘not to be cut down or over-refined.’21 The appealing 
language of fairness and equity, as was touched upon in Chapter 1, certainly contributed 
greatly to its ‘easy passage into treaty practice’22 but has also masked ‘an absence of any 
kind of settled agreement over [its] content.’23  
 
The risks of over-reliance on the vagueness of the standards are sometimes 
specifically acknowledged, as they could suggest subjectivity and damage the legitimacy 
of decision-making.24 Thus, unless a meaning of a given provision is clear, there is a 
need to go further so to concretise its meaning.25 One of the primary topics of 
																																																						
15 ADC v. Hungary, para. 445 (emphases added) 
16 ibid, para. 290. 
17 It is sometimes argued that ignoring VCLT is caused by the (commercial arbitration-oriented) counsel 
and arbitrators being unaware of the different nature of investment arbitration (Ascension 2016, 369). 
18 Grisel 2014, 218-219. 
19 CMS v. Argentina - Award, para 273; Sempra v. Argentina - Award, para 296; Rumeli v. Kazakhstan - Award, 
para. 610; Suez v. Argentina – Liability, paras 196 and 202; Total v. Argentina - Liability, paras 106–9. See 
more generally Vasciannie 1999, 145; Tudor 2008, 155; Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 133-134; Trinh 2014, 17 
and authors cited therein. 
20 Brower 2001, 56. 
21 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, para. 7.181. 
22 ibid, para. 7.03. 
23 ibid, para. 7.08. See similarly Douglas 2009, 81. One of the rare universally acknowledged limits is that 
FET should not be conflated with decision-making eq aequo et bono (Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 133-134; ADF 
v. United States, para. 184) 
24 ibid, 7.14-7.15; See also D’Argent 2012, 1-3 and McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2017, paras. 1.86-1.91. 
25 See for such an understanding Globex v. Ukraine, para. 50 and Murphy v. Ecuador, para. 71. See also 
Weeramantry 2012, para. 3.142; Trinh 2014, 12; Vadi 2016, 111 and Ascensio 2016, 369-371.  
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contention concerning the FET standard and IIL more generally is how the tribunals 
are to perform this exercise.  
 
It must be said that the state of jurisprudence (after some decades of 
development) does not necessarily entice optimism. Subsequent tribunals can engage in 
their own further refining of (often themselves relatively vague) doctrines espoused 
through a line of previous cases, which can sometimes lead to a situation in which a 
nominal reference to a same doctrine can actually mask different and incompatible 
understandings. Staying with the FET standard, although similar claims can also be 
made about expropriation,26 Jason Bonnitcha relatively recently concluded that ‘a close 
examination of existing arbitral decisions reveals very different understandings of the 
legal content of the FET standard. These differences entail divergent patterns of legal 
reasoning and would lead to different decisions on an identical set of facts.’27  
 
Such divergence risks creating an impression of the IROL paradigm goals being 
achieved (as in ‘all tribunals are using the same doctrines’ or ‘all tribunals recognize the 
role of VCLT’) while masking the actual heterogeneity. Bearing in mind the importance 
of this challenge for the existing IROL thinking, it is warranted to examine two 
prominent and somewhat interrelated examples. These relate to the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations (section 2.2.2.) and the role given to parallel treaty obligations (in 
particular human rights ones) in interpreting and applying the FET standard (section 
2.2.3.). 
 
2.2.2. The doctrine of legitimate expectations 
 
The importance and origin 
 
The doctrine of legitimate expectations is described as having a central role in 
interpreting the FET standard.28 Its origins, development and the current state, 
																																																						
26 This is particularly so regarding the differing interpretation whether intention of the host State (as 
opposed to just the effect on investment) is a relevant factor for establishing the existence of 
expropriation. For an overview of diverging practice and doctrine, see Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 114-115. 
See also Cotula 2015b, 120 and in particular Calamita 2013, 172-174. 
27 Bonnitcha 2014, 166; See also similarly Kläger 2011, 317-320; Diehl 2012, 550-551; UNCTAD 2012a, 
80-91; Stone 2012, 93-97 and 105-107; See also for an early indication in same vein Tudor 2008, 180-181. 
28 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 145; Potestà 2013, 88-89; Radi 2013, 9-10. 
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however, illustrate well the challenges in providing a set of clear, prospective and 
consistently interpreted rules. The origin of the doctrine is often said to be the Tecmed v. 
Mexico award. Faced with the interpretation of the FET provision in the Spain-Mexico 
BIT (as a part of the minimum standard of treatment)29 the tribunal stated in an oft-
quoted passage that: 
[…] this provision […], in light of the good faith principle established by 
international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international 
investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken 
into account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor 
expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know 
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well 
as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be 
able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. […]30 
 
This important concretisation of the FET standard was reached through a 
somewhat puzzling interpretive process. The tribunal clarified that the above 
understanding of the FET requirements: 
[results] from an autonomous interpretation, taking into account the text of Article 
4(1) of the Agreement according to its ordinary meaning (Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention), or from international law and the good faith principle, on the 
basis of which the scope of the obligation assumed under the Agreement and the 
actions related to compliance therewith are to be assessed.31 
 
The following paragraph of the award also relies on the preamble of the 
applicable BIT for supporting a proposition that FET is there to ‘strengthen and 
increase the security and trust of foreign investors’, suggesting (although not explicitly) 
the interpretation in light of the object and purpose of the applicable BIT as per VCLT 
Article 31(1).32  
 
To begin with, it can be noted that this interpretive process leaves doubts about 
the origin of the legitimate expectations doctrine. The tribunals seem to suggest that it 
stems from both the ‘ordinary’ meaning and the principle of good faith in international 
																																																						
29 See Spain-Mexico BIT, article IV (1), available at: 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/laws/italaw6182%282%29.pdf, accessed 15 April 2015. The 
applicable law provision of the BIT (Article XV) also designates the provisions of the BIT and principles 
of international law as exclusively applicable. 
30 Tecmed v. Mexico, para. 154. 
31 ibid, para. 155 (emphasis added). 
32 ibid, para. 156. 
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law. The ‘ordinary’ meaning of IIA standards in general - and ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ in 
particular – is quite opaque, as noted above. While the principle of good faith certainly 
can be invoked as an interpretive tool by the tribunal through VCLT Article 31(3)(c) 
(although this was not made explicit), it is doubtful if it can serve as a source of 
obligation in itself.33 The doctrine was not further grounded in any other source of 
international law or authority,34 as would be possible (although perhaps not successful) 
through the general principles of law and a consequential examination of national 
orders.35  
 
But apart from the interpretive process, its outcome in terms of substance can 
also demonstrate the practical problems associated with the generally desirable creation 
of IROL requirements, which however remain disentangled from national practices. 
One significant risk is to set unrealistically ambitious thresholds of good administration. 
The Tecmed award suggests an exacting and unqualified test,36 and one that objectively 
might be too strict to pass. As noted by Behrens, ‘[t]he award defined the principle of 
transparency in such an ambitious way that one must wonder whether any government 
anywhere in the world may be living up to this definition of the principle.’37 Zachary 
Douglas similarly observed that this test or standard ‘is rather a description of perfect 
public regulation in a perfect world, to which all states should aspire but very few (if 
any) will ever attain.’38  
 
Further developments 
 
An equally important element for understanding the IROL paradigm challenges is 
the path which the doctrine took in jurisprudence. Arguably, the problematic 
interpretative process could have been enhanced in future awards, potentially leading to 
a different understanding which is more suited to the realities of everyday 
administration. The reliance on precedent is not in itself an unqualified good, as the 
																																																						
33 See the ICJ decision in Nicaragua v. Honduras, para. 94 and Potestà 2013, 92. 
34 See also Roberts 2010, 214-215. 
35 As is argued, the inspiration for the doctrine was found in national legal orders (see Potestà 2013, 93-
98) although the exercise might not be particularly successful as it is not recognized in a significant 
number of them (Roberts 2010, 214-215). 
36 Bonnitcha 2014, 207. 
37 Behrens 2007, 177. 
38 Douglas 2006, 28. See also for similar criticism White Industries v. India, para. 10.3.5. 
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original decision can be ‘wrong’.39 What initially occurred, however, was a ‘cascade 
effect’,40 in which the subsequent tribunals were happy to embrace and apply the 
doctrine – sometimes ad verbatim - on the simple basis of it being previously decided and 
without revisiting the process of interpretation.41 As more decisions referred to the 
doctrine, the more it became a useful interpretive short-cut for deducing a large part of 
the meaning of the FET standard.42  
 
If indeed the process resulted only in ad verbatim translation of the doctrine 
(despite the problematic nature of that process VCLT-wise) an argument could be made 
that, for all the potential rigidity of requirements, there at least existed sufficient 
certainty. This would, regardless of the substance, comply with the basic formal rule of 
law expectations and potentially sufficiently orient the host States’ behaviour. Dura lex, 
sed lex. What followed, however, were further disparate attempts to refine the content of 
the doctrine, leading to a broader umbrella term of ‘legitimate expectations’ covering 
different understandings.  
 
Generally, there is an agreement that the investor should be able to legitimately 
rely on expectations induced by host State behaviour (primarily through representations 
to the said investor), and that a breach of such expectations could entail the breach of 
the FET standard.43 But eventual developments lead to different understandings of 
what sort of ‘representations’ justify the creation of legitimate - as opposed to 
unfounded - expectations.44 It has been argued that there are at least four different 
approaches to the question of what expectations are legitimate.45 As Bonnitcha sets out: 
i) Expectations can only rest on specific rights that the investor has acquired under 
domestic law. 
ii) In addition to i), expectations may rest on specific representations made to the 
investor by government officials. 
iii) In addition to ii) expectations may rest on the regulatory framework in force in 
the host state at the time the investor made the investment. 
																																																						
39 See in this sense above all Ten Cate 2013 and Schultz 2014b, as well as Newcombe/Paradell 2009, 104-
105. 
40 Potestà 2013, 90. 
41 See in particular MTD v. Chile – Award, paras. 114-115 and LG&E v. Argentina – Liability, para. 131; see 
also Saluka v. Czech Republic, para. 302. See also Potestà 2013, 91. 
42 Although there are arguable exceptions, where the doctrine has been largely and explicitly ignored as 
not contributing much – see TECO v. Guatemala – Award, paras. 617-622. 
43 Dolzer/Schreuer, 145-149. 
44 Potestà 2013, 121-122; Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 615. 
45 See similarly Potestà 2013, 100–119. 
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iv) In addition to iii), expectations may rest on the business plans of the 
investor.46	
 
Critically, the differences between these approaches are not easily reconcilable. 
Each of these views is a different, distinct and per se coherent interpretation of this 
specific facet of the FET standard - and could lead to different outcomes on a same set 
of facts.47 Yet, the adoption of a particular understanding or a decision to break from 
even a long line of existing case law, is not a ground for annulling the award.48 
 
To summarise, an increasingly accepted ‘core’ obligation under the FET standard 
can leave both the investors and host States in considerable uncertainty as to how to 
proceed in their mutual relations. The possibility that a same set of representations will 
be qualified differently – with a direct effect on the outcome – in many ways can 
question the ability of the host State to deduce the meaning of the rule of law as 
mandated by the FET standard.  
 
An important further aspect of the uncertainty is also the extent to which parallel 
host State obligations in international and domestic law affect the legitimacy and 
frustration of investors’ expectations and the interpretation process more generally. 
This is the topic of the next section. 
 
2.2.3. The role of parallel host State obligations for the FET standard  
 
 A related important issue is whether and to what extent the parallel, non-IIA, 
obligations of the host State should play a role in interpreting and applying specific sub-
principles of the FET standard. This includes, but is certainly not limited to, the 
legitimate expectations and transparency issues mentioned above. This is directly 
relevant for the NROL paradigm as discussed in this thesis. Limiting the discussion 
largely at this point to international obligations, the responses that the investment 
tribunals have given to how these affect the assessment of host State behaviour can 
																																																						
46 Bonnitcha 2014, 169. For an example of i), see LG&E v. Argentina – Liability; for ii) see Duke Energy v. 
Ecuador; for iii) see Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic and for iv) see MTD v. Chile - Award. For a 
commentary, see generally Bonnitcha 2014, 167-194. 
47 Bonnitcha 2014, 194. 
48 Weeramantry 2012, 5.20; see also Ortino 2012, 38-41 and 51-52. However, for a proposal to incentivise 
jurisprudence constante by making the departure from consistent line of case-law a ground for annulment see 
in particular Wälde 2007, 105-106. 
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significantly clarify if the existing jurisprudence provides any support for advocating an 
NROL paradigm or if its introduction would require a largely unlikely U-turn in 
decision-making. Focusing on the particularly contentious issue of host State’s human 
rights obligations, it is possible to demonstrate that there has, on the one hand, been a 
degree of reticence towards engaging with other international obligations too closely.  
Yet, on the other hand, there is also a number of recent examples where this has been 
done in a considerably thorough manner. Therefore, although the IROL paradigm 
would still in this sense be dominant, its exclusivity by no means monopolises the 
jurisprudence – and offers support for realistically thinking about complementing it 
with NROL considerations. 
 
Human rights obligations as the focal point 
 
The interplay between investment obligations and human rights obligations is one 
of the most contentious topics in IIL.49 Relatively common invocations of human rights 
obligations by the host States in cases involving FET claims generally garnered limited 
success so far.50 The existing jurisprudence, however, again demonstrates considerable 
heterogeneity. The arguments put forward by both the tribunals and parties sometimes 
do suggest the relevance of human rights obligations, while not necessarily elaborating 
on it within the context of interpretation instruments such as the VCLT.  
 
In some situations, the consideration of human rights by the tribunals have been 
eschewed due to allegedly insufficient elaboration - such as in Siemens v. Argentina, where 
the argument was introduced through international human rights obligations 
internalised in the Argentinian constitution.51 Azurix v. Argentina tribunal reached a 
similar conclusion, in a situation where the human rights treaties were specifically 
invoked, but not in an ‘understandable’ way.52 A somewhat different approach was 
taken in Suez v. Argentina – Liability. The tribunal recognized that Argentina was subject 
to both investment protection and human rights obligations, which were ‘not mutually 
																																																						
49 See generally Dupuy 2009; Simma 2011 as well as Tulip Real Estate v. Turkey, para. 86. Area is also 
contested as IIAs themselves only exceptionally point to relevance of human rights in their texts 
(Dumberry/Dumas-Aubin 2012, 359). See also Knoll-Tudor 2009, 339-340. 
50 Ascensio 2016, 381-382. See also Schreuer et al. 2009, 605. For an argument that these spheres should 
remain separate on determining the merits of the FET claim, see Knoll-Tudor 2009, 342. 
51 Siemens v. Argentina, paras. 74-75 and 79.  
52 Azurix v. Argentina, paras. 254 and 261. 
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exclusive’ and could be fulfilled simultaneously.53 The human rights considerations 
ultimately were not relevant to the outcome, but more importantly, such an 
understanding supports the view that investment protections have an autonomous 
meaning that should not per se be influenced by human rights obligations. 
 
An oft-discussed indication in that regard is also the von Pezold v. Zimbabwe – 
Procedural Order 2, which replied to an amicus submission requesting the consideration of 
human rights of indigenous peoples in a dispute at hand. The tribunal(s) noted, inter alia, 
that the reference to general international law ‘in the BITs does not incorporate the 
universe of international law into the BITs or into disputes arising under the BITs.’54 
Furthermore, no support was found that ‘any decision of these Arbitral Tribunals which 
did not consider the content of international human rights norms would be legally 
incomplete’55 and furthermore was not persuaded that consideration of the invoked 
human rights was ‘part of their mandate under either the ICSID Convention or the 
applicable BITs.’56 
 
To be sure, there are warnings in both case-law and doctrine that a wholesale 
incorporation of the international law universe, even if the formal requirements would 
be met, would hardly be justified.57 Another concern is the risk of oversimplification 
between the differences in similar but not identical standards used in different areas of 
public international law.58 Overall, it has been noted that the attitude of investment 
arbitrators towards interaction with other areas of international law is cautious, and the 
record is still not particularly abundant.59  
 
A more positive attitude towards parallel obligations 
 
It is of special importance, however, that case-law also exhibits a strand of cases 
increasingly recognising the relevance of human rights obligations for interpreting the 
																																																						
53 Suez v. Argentina – Liability, para. 262. 
54 von Pezold v. Zimbabwe – Procedural Order 2, para. 57. 
55 ibid, para. 58. 
56 ibid. para. 59. 
57 See, for example, Dupuy 2009, 59 and also von Pezold v. Zimbabwe – Procedural Order 2, para. 57. 
58 McLachlan 2005, 311; Kurtz 2014, 281; Ascensio 2016, 383. 
59 Hirsch 2008, 179; Schreuer et al. 2009, 605; Roberts 2013, 75; De Brabandere 2014, 136-137 and 147. 
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FET standard and some other IIA obligations.60 While sometimes relying on human 
rights jurisprudence more incidentally,61 and sometimes recognising human rights 
considerations rather implicitly,62 newer awards such as El Paso v. Argentina – Award 
relied on the provisions and case-law under human rights treaties to add support to 
important interpretive findings.63 An important recognition was the Frontier Petroleum v. 
Czech Republic tribunal finding that rights granted under the ECHR (specifically the right 
to expeditious proceedings) accrued to all persons under the jurisdiction of the Czech 
Republic (including the foreign investor), but declined to discuss the breach of ECHR 
standards in concreto as no party pleaded them specifically.64  
 
Two recent decisions have particularly clearly set out the increasingly direct 
relevance of the obligations imposed by non-IIA conventional law for interpreting the 
FET requirements, with the extraneous rules having a direct impact on the outcome. In 
Al Warraq v. Indonesia, for the purposes of interpreting the FET standard (‘imported’ 
into the relevant IIA through an MFN clause) and in particular the requirements for the 
denial of justice, the tribunal extensively examined the provisions and case law on the 
right to a fair trial in international human rights instruments, in particular the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).65 The tribunal 
unambiguously confirmed the universal binding character of ICCPR in treating all 
subjects under Indonesia’s jurisdiction,66 as well as the obligation to obey its provisions 
in good faith.67 In addition, the tribunal invoked a number of other treaties, and at 
relevant points found Respondent’s behaviour in breach of not only the ICCPR,68 but 
also the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime,69 UN Convention against 
																																																						
60 See for a brief overview Tulip Real Estate – Annulment, para. 91. Interestingly, this tribunal also used 
human rights treaties and case law in interpreting the ‘fundamental rule of procedure’ as a ground for 
annulment in Article 52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention (paras. 86-92, 146 and 152). See however for a 
cautionary comment Ascensio 2016, 383. 
61 For example, Mondev v. United States relied on ECtHR jurisprudence for inspiration-providing ‘analogy’ 
(para. 144, and specifically in paras. 1381, 141 and 143. The 2001 Lauder v. Czech Republic, para. 200 relied 
on ECHR jurisprudence in delineating formal and de facto expropriation while the 2006 ADC v. Hungary, 
para. 497 did so for clarifying the issues relating to compensation due for the established breach. IBM v. 
Ecuador – Jurisdiction, para. 72 relied on Inter-American Court of Human Rights jurisprudence to add 
support to it finding of supremacy of international law over domestic provisions. 
62 LG&E v. Argentina – Liability, paras. 226 and 234; Continental Casualty v. Argentina – Award, para. 180. 
63 El Paso v. Argentina – Award, para. 598 which used relevant ECHR provisions and case law to add 
support to the finding of emergency clauses not being self-judging. 
64 Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic, para. 338. 
65 Al Warraq v. Indonesia, paras. 556-621. See for doctrinal support in that sense also McLachlan 2008, 376. 
66 ibid, para. 559. 
67 ibid, para. 560. 
68 ibid, paras. 588-589, 601, 604. 
69 ibid, para. 590. 
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Corruption,70 and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.71 Basing its 
conclusions directly on the breaches of these instruments, the tribunal found a breach of 
the FET standard, which to it was enshrined in the ICCPR.72 
 
Another recent example is Urbaser v. Argentina – Award. The tribunal made several 
important general pronouncements before focusing on the right to water, in the context 
of deciding on the host State’s counterclaim. While staying broadly within the context 
of the doctrine of legitimate expectations within the FET standard, the tribunal stated 
that investor’s expectations ‘are placed in a legal framework embracing the rights and 
obligations of the host State and of its authorities, subject to the protections provided in 
the BIT.’73 Importantly, ‘the host State is bound by obligations under international and 
constitutional laws […][and] is legitimately expected to act in furtherance of rules of law 
of a fundamental character.’74 Measures conducted in such furtherance ‘cannot hurt the fair 
and equitable treatment standard because their occurrence must have been deemed to be accepted 
by the investor when entering into the investment.’75 But the tribunal retains the right to 
assess whether the manner in which the measures were taken still comports with the 
FET standard, so not to exclude the standard’s relevance.76 
 
In the context of the right to water, the Urbaser tribunal examined a number of 
relevant instruments, including the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.77 While the focus of the discussion was on whether investors also 
bear obligations under international human rights law (in the light of Argentina’s 
counterclaim), the tribunal reiterated that ‘[t]he BIT has to be construed in harmony 
with other rules of international law of which it forms part, including those relating to 
human rights.’78 Likewise, the tribunal stated that ‘[t]he human right to water entails an 
obligation of compliance on the part of the State’79 and that there is a ‘State’s obligation 
[…] to enforce the human right to water of all individuals under its jurisdiction.’80 These 
																																																						
70 ibid, para. 591. 
71 ibid, para. 605. 
72 ibid, para. 621. 
73 Urbaser v. Argentina – Award, para. 619. 
74 ibid, para. 621. Similarly ibid, para. 624. 
75 ibid, para. 622 (emphasis added). 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid, paras. 1195-1198. 
78 ibid, para. 1200 
79 ibid, para. 1208. 
80 ibid, para. 1210. 
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deliberations resulted in a conclusion with a direct impact on the output of the case – 
‘[i]t was therefore the State’s primary responsibility to exercise its authority over the 
[Claimant] in such a way that the population’s basic right for water and sanitation was 
ensured and preserved.’81 Respondent’s failure to exercise its authority in that way 
eventually, inter alia, led to the dismissal of the counterclaim.82 
 
To conclude, extraneous treaty obligations can become a prominent part of the 
framework of rules used to assess host State compliance with the IIA standards. The 
potential benefits of their inclusion are considerable. One is the possibility to use the 
wealth of secondary materials to assist tribunals in clarifying the exact scope of 
commitments and behaviour expected from the host State. The legitimacy advantages 
lie in recognising the role for parallel non-investment concerns, and doing so in 
accordance with provisions that the host State itself adopted and could expect to be 
taken into account as relevant. 
 
2.2.4. Some concluding remarks on the limits and challenges of the IROL 
paradigm 
 
The above examples suggest that the autonomous, international nature of the rule 
of law requirements imposed by the FET standard should not hide the problems 
relating to predictability and certainty, which if unaddressed have the potential to 
adversely affect the generally worthy development of the IROL paradigm. Different 
tribunals applying the same sub-principles of the FET standard can and did sometimes 
pronounce mutually incompatible understandings of the further requirements and of 
the role that existing non-investment obligations of the host State (can) play in fulfilling 
them. Looking at that aspect, it should be relatively uncontroversial that enhancement 
of predictability is both possible and desirable. 
 
Focusing specifically on the NROL paradigm as here discussed, it can be said that 
the enhancement of predictability can also be theoretically achieved by its complete 
negation. That is, tribunals might actively disregard other relevant sources of obligations in 
an effort to create a sufficiently precise, consistent and IIL-specific understanding of the 
																																																						
81 ibid, para. 1213. 
82 ibid, para. 1219. 
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FET rule of law sub-principles. But as both Chapter 1 and the discussion in Chapter 2 
so far aimed to show, feasibility of such a path is severely undermined by the 
decentralised nature of ISDS. Likewise, opting instead for due account of other national 
and international sources of rules in deciding the FET standard claims is by no means 
an exotic occurrence. What the cases demonstrate (and doctrine often supports) is that 
obligations of the host State stemming from other treaties can be and have been taken 
into account, sometimes to the extent that was determinative.83  
 
This is the path that this thesis, though the vehicle of the NROL paradigm, finds 
as normatively preferable for reasons relating to both predictability enhancement and 
achievement of additional benefits further discussed in the following Chapter. But 
before moving on to the more prescriptive discussion, it is warranted to delineate what 
are the formal tools that can allow (and have allowed) the tribunals to take due account 
of the international obligations beyond the IIA, as well as of the national legal 
framework. Elucidating the formal feasibility of such an endeavour is in many ways a 
necessary precondition for further discussing its normative desirability. 
 
2.3. The tools for introducing the NROL paradigm – applicable law, 
interpretation, and the choice of relevant facts 
 
 How non-investment international obligations of the host State, as well as 
national law, can systematically be taken into account is a question that first requires 
clarity on the applicable law. Depending on that law, the focus is then put on the ways 
in which the NROL paradigm can be legally feasible. Specifically, this part of the 
Chapter argues that (despite some potential complexities) the law applicable to State 
liability under the FET standard is international law (section 2.3.1.) Based on that, the 
ways in which other international legal obligations and national law can become relevant 
are twofold. Firstly, the process of interpretation of the FET standard and its-sub 
principles under international law can (relying primarily on systemic integration through 
VCLT Article 31) can make non-investment international obligations relevant for 
decision-making (section 2.3.2). Secondly, the importance of both these obligations and 
national law can be secured through the process of selecting the relevant facts which are 
to be taken into account in the process of applying the sub-principle that serves as a 
																																																						
83 Hirsch 2008, 174. 
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basis for review (section 2.3.3.) In combination, these two paths should allow the 
tribunals that are willing to do so to thoroughly consider the relevant spectrum of 
existing rule of law obligations of the host State and make that a regular feature of the 
FET decision-making. 
 
2.3.1. International law as applicable law to FET claims 
 
Generally, the IROL paradigm could be seen as almost necessarily entailing the 
primary or even exclusive role for international law in situating, interpreting and 
applying the FET standard. Unlike the patchwork of around 200 municipal laws, 
international law is (at least conceptually) a single entity – which is a strong precondition 
for substantive uniformity.84 Secondly, international law can prevail over municipal laws 
in the case of conflict, at least when applied in international adjudication.85 As Schill 
notes, ‘[t]hat conduct that is legal under domestic law, suddenly becomes illegal under 
international law is the most normal of consequences the acceptance of, and submission 
to, international law by states can have.’86 In some ways, achieving the international rule 
of law while retaining a key role for national legal systems would seem almost an 
oxymoron.  
 
There is broad agreement in practice and theory that in deciding on the host State 
compliance with the IIA standards, including the FET standard, the governing law is or 
even has to be international law. Zachary Douglas, in his rigorous systematisation of 
applicable laws, summarizes thus:  
Rule 10: The law applicable to the issue of liability for a claim founded upon an 
investment treaty obligation is the investment treaty as supplemented by general 
international law.87  
As Florian Grisel has noted, most authors tend to analyse investment arbitration 
decision-making exclusively through the prism of public international law.88 This 
																																																						
84 ‘The standards set for investor treatment in investment treaties exist on the plane of international law. 
Their content is therefore determined by international law, and not by the national legal systems of either 
the host State or any other State.’ (McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, para. 7.172). 
85 In general terms both international and national law perceive themselves as autonomous and 
irreducible, leading to domestic judges admitting international rules through the lens of municipal law 
(Dupuy 2010, 174). See generally also Nollkaemper 2011 and von Bogdandy 2008b, 402-403. 
86 Schill 2016b, 332. 
87 Douglas 2009, 39. See in that sense MTD v. Chile – Annulment, para. 74 (‘the lex causae […] based on a 
breach of the BIT is international law’) and also Spiermann 2008, 107 and De Brabandere 2014, 9. 
88 Grisel 2014, 215. 
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‘analytical bias’ tends to stem from the often-stressed quality of investment tribunals as 
public international law tribunals.89 This is hardly contentious as a starting point. IIAs 
are indeed international, State-to-State instruments governed by international law even 
if the IIA is silent on the applicable law provisions.90 For some authors, national law 
cannot ever truly apply on its own in this context. Even in cases of express invocation 
of national law, ‘domestic law does not apply proprio motu: it only applies because the 
treaty designates it.’91  
 
To note, the applicable law clauses in IIAs and default choice of law provisions in 
the relevant arbitral rules might suggest that the matter is not so straightforward.92 
Formally, the law to be applied to any and all issues arising in the investment dispute – 
including liability under the IIA standards such as the FET – can generally either be 
chosen by the parties or determined using a default rule.93 As for the law chosen by the 
parties, the variety of potentially applicable arbitral rules shows a remarkable uniformity 
in allowing party autonomy.94 Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides:  
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be 
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the 
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict 
of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable. (emphasis added) 
 
Other widely used arbitral rules for resolving investor-state disputes, as well as 
national laws relevant for non-ICSID arbitrations, are also largely in agreement on this 
point.95  
As for realising this autonomy of choice, the content and even the presence of 
																																																						
89 ibid, 215 and 222. Some particular examples in that sense include Alvarez 2011 and De Brabandere 
2014. See also Schreuer et al. 2009, 583. 
90 ADC v. Hungary, para. 290; LG&E v. Argentina, para. 85; Spiermann 2008, 107; Schreuer et al. 2009, 
578; Gazzini 2012, 106. 
91 Reisman 2013, 135-136. 
92 See also similarly Igbokwe 2006. 
93 Kjos 2013, 296; See for ICSID Convention context Schreuer et al. 2009, 554. As noted by the authors, 
however, this has not been followed constantly by the tribunals, resulting in methodological blurring of 
the exercise (ibid). 
94 Kjos 2013, 295; Schreuer et al. 2009, 557. To be clear, in arbitrations based on IIAs the ‘parties’ are 
Contracting States and the investor is deemed to have accepted the choice of law made by them by 
initiating arbitration (Spiermann 2008, 107; Schreuer et al. 2009, 558). 
95 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in the first sentence of Article 35(1), ICC Rules in the first sentence of 
Article 21(1) and SCC Rules in the first sentence of Article 22(1) all provide the essentially same rules 
regarding party autonomy. See generally on this Capper 2014, 32-34. 
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choice of law clauses in IIAs varies very considerably.96 Where choice of law clauses 
exist, they commonly include references to the law of the Contracting State in addition 
to the IIA itself, rules and principles of international law and sometimes rules of a 
particular contract.97 A frequently used formula lists host State law, the IIA itself and 
other treaties, any contract and general international law.98 Some notable exceptions 
include the multilateral IIAs, such as ECT and NAFTA Chapter 11, which refer to 
international law as the only applicable law.99 However, while there are certainly a 
number of IIAs that exclude domestic law from consideration, there are also IIAs that 
also exclude international law as well.100 UNCTAD has advised against the exclusive 
selection of international law, as that law can lack both clarity and technical detail.101  
IIAs also frequently do not contain a clause on applicable law.102 The default 
provisions contained in relevant arbitral rules therefore come into play. Focusing on 
perhaps the most discussed provision in ISDS practice and doctrine, the second 
sentence of the above cited ICSID Convention Article 42(1) makes it clear that 
domestic and international law both have a role to play – ‘In the absence of […] 
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute 
[…]  and such rules of international law as may be applicable.’103 
However, there seems to be little doubt that as the FET and other IIA standards 
are international standards, determining their breach requires application of 
international law. Article 42(1) provision grants discretion to arbitrators, rather than 
mandating the examination of both sources of law. Zachary Douglas summarizes this 
position by stating that 
this provision does not provide any guidance as to the circumstances in which 
national law or international law should be applied by the tribunal. […]. It simply 
recognises the competence of the tribunal to apply both national and international 
																																																						
96 Schreuer et al. 2009, 558. 
97 UNCTAD 2003b, 11. See similarly Schreuer et al. 2009, 562. 
98 Schreuer et al. 2009, 576; Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 290; Gazzini 2012, 112. 
99 See ECT Articles 10(1) and 26(6); NAFTA Articles 1105 and 1131. 
100 See Gaillard/Banifatemi 2003, 377-378 and examples listed there. 
101 UNCTAD 2003b, 92. 
102 Gaillard/Banifatemi 2003, 379; Schreuer et al. 2009, 578; Gazzini 2012, 112. 
103 As for other arbitral institutions and rules, the predominant solution is the one which allows 
arbitrators considerable leeway in selection of applicable rules. See in that sense the second sentence of 
UNCITRAL Rules Article 35(1); second sentence of ICC Rules 21(1) and the second sentence of SCC 
Rules 22(1) all essentially allowing reaching the same result as in Article 42(1) second sentence.  
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law. It is for ICSID tribunals to adopt a coherent set of principles to guide the 
choice of either of these laws with respect to the particular issues […].104 
 
The arbitrators thus retain considerable discretion.105 It has been (especially since 
the decision in Wena v. Egypt – Annulment)106 generally held that the international law 
nature of claims and adjudication allowed, if not always necessarily mandated, the 
supremacy of international law in determining host State liability.107 As put in strongest 
terms by Prosper Weil: 
[…] no matter how domestic law and international law are combined […] 
international law always gains the upper hand and ultimately prevails. […] The 
reference to the domestic law of the host State, even if designed only to ascertain 
whether it is, or is not, compatible with international law, is indeed a pointless 
exercise, the sole raison d'etre of which is to avoid offending the sensibilities of the 
host State.108 
 
 So while there may be situations in which broadly worded dispute settlement 
clauses in an IIA may lead to application of national law even to determine international 
liability,109 for the purposes of the FET standard and this thesis the situation is rather 
straightforward. If a claim is put forward that a treaty standard was breached, the claim 
is of an international nature and requires the application of international law.110 
 
2.3.2. Interpretation as a path towards other international rule of law obligations 
of the host State 
 
 To make non-investment international obligations of the host State relevant for 
ascertaining the meaning of the FET standard and its requirements, one potential path 
is through interpreting them in a way that takes these obligations into account in 
accordance with the VCLT Article 31(3)(c). As has been suggested in Chapter 1 and will 
be revisited below, tribunals have so far heavily relied on previous decisions to ascertain 
the meaning and sub-principles of the FET standard – something that is arguably not in 
																																																						
104 Douglas 2009, 129 and similarly 133; see also similarly Schreuer et al. 2009, 630; Dolzer and Schreuer 
2012, 293. See in that sense also MTD v. Chile – Annulment, paras. 59 and 74-75. 
105 See also in that sense Kjos 2013, 296 and 301-302; Kurtz 2014, 258. 
106 Wena v. Egypt – Annulment, paras. 40-41. 
107 See primarily Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, para. 64 and also Wena v. Egypt – Award, para. 79; Wena. v. Egypt 
– Annulment, paras. 39-40; Siemens v. Argentina, paras. 76-78; CME v. Czech Republic – Final Award, paras. 
398-413; CMS v. Argentina – Award, para. 116; Vivendi v. Argentina – Annulment 1, paras. 60 and 102. See 
also on this topic Gaillard/Banifatemi 2003 and more recently Kjos 2013, 224-235.  
108 Weil 2000, 409. 
109 See on this Schreuer 2014b, 7-10. 
110 See, above all, Kjos 2013, 128. 
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itself contrary to VCLT, and that has allowed for IROL paradigm to take hold. But 
VCLT offers much more possibilities, which should be consistently and systematically 
used. Through interpretation, a host of international obligations that have a bearing on 
a particular legal situation involving a foreign investor can be given a proper role in 
ascertaining if particular rule of law requirements were complied with. 
 
The formal importance of VCLT for interpretation 
 
Formally, the ‘embededness’ of IIAs in public international law111 makes the 
relevant provisions of the VCLT a starting point in infusing the content and meaning 
through interpretation.112 For the purposes of this discussion, it is warranted to focus on 
the VCLT Article 31, and specifically on sections (1) and (3)(c) which often feature (at 
least nominally) in jurisprudence and doctrinal discussions.113 The relevant portions of 
VCLT Article 31 read: 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose. 
[…] 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
[…] 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
 
																																																						
111 ‘As a general class, investment treaties are deeply and often explicitly embedded in the fabric of public 
international law’ (Kurtz 2014, 280). See similarly Douglas 2009, 85; Grisel 2014, 217; Cordero-Moss 
2009, 785; See more generally McLachlan 2005, 287. 
112 Gazzini 2012, 119 and materials cited therein; Saldarriaga 2013, 166-167; Ascensio 2016, 369. These 
provisions are also considered to restate the customary law on the topic, as confirmed by Canadian 
Cattlemen v. US, para. 46 and Noble Ventures v. Romania, para. 50. See also Trinh 2014, 36-39 and 
Weeramantry 2012, 7.04. 
113 Article 31(2) also contains additional interpretative tools, which are strongly case-specific – any 
agreements made/accepted as made in connection to the conclusion of the treaty. These are, of course, 
very important in situations where they exist, but in light of their scarce availability regarding by far the 
most IIAs, they do not require further discussion in this context. As Douglas notes, 31(2) elements are 
‘seldom relevant in the [IIA] context for the simple reason that such agreements and instruments are not 
a feature of state practice in relation to the conclusion of investment treaties’ (2009, 82; similarly Ascensio 
2016, 371 and Weeramantry 2012, 7.04). The situation with Article 32 is somewhat similar in that sense 
(McLachlan 2008, 372; Trinh 2014, 67 and 106; Ascensio 2016, 368; Calamita 2013, 176 and materials 
cited therein). Similarly to Article 31(2) mentioned above, 31(3) also contains additional potential 
interpretive tools, namely subsequent agreement of the parties on its interpretation/application or 
subsequent practice in application which establishes an agreement regarding interpretation. Again 
similarly to 31(2), where existing, these are very important factors (most famously in the case of the 
NAFTA FTC interpretation of the NAFTA Article 1105), but as they are also more generally rare (see 
Trinh 2014, 54-55) they also do not require further discussion for the purposes of this chapter. 
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These two sections, at least in theory, offer considerable possibilities to 
investment tribunals in interpreting the meaning of the FET standard. It is commonly 
noted that the ‘ordinary’ meanings of concepts such as ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’, derived 
from dictionary definitions, are unlikely to provide much assistance.114 Therefore, the 
determination of context can (and in practice sometimes did) provide a considerable 
number of reference points.115 Similarly, the recourse to the ‘object and purpose’ of 
investment treaties can both provide guidance and limit the overly impressionistic 
arbitrators’ conclusions on what IIA provisions are meant to achieve.116  
 
VCLT Article 31(3)(c) can also provide a large number of other reference points 
for interpretation through putting the FET standard into a harmonious relationship 
with the broader corpus of international law.117 As the International Law Commission 
concluded, ‘[n]o rule, treaty, or custom, however special its subject-matter or limited the 
number of the States concerned by it, applies in a vacuum.’118 As noted by Zachary 
Douglas, ‘the tribunal must inevitably have recourse to general international law and 
conventional international law for otherwise it would be interpreting the legal standards 
in a void.’119 VCLT Article 31(3)(c) allows recourse to the sources listed in Article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute120 - customary international law, conventional international law, and 
general principles of law as primary sources, as well as to jurisprudence and doctrine as 
subsidiary means in determining the law.121  
 
It is important to note that customary international law and general principles of 
law (generally unlike conventional law extraneous to an IIA) can also be directly 
applicable in an investment dispute.122 While customary law and general principles can 
																																																						
114 Douglas 2009, 82; Weeramantry 2012, 3.41-3.43; Roberts 2013, 50; Vadi 2016, 113; Trinh 2014, 47-50. 
115 See generally Weeramantry 2012, 3.52-3.69. 
116 See also ibid, 3.70-3.82. 
117 See for discussion generally McLachlan 2005, Simma/Kill 2009; Simma 2011; Ascensio 2016; Vadi 
2016, 110-119. 
118 ILC 2006, para. 120; see also similarly McLachlan 2005, 311;  
119 Douglas 2009, 81; Dupuy 2009, 53. See also Schreuer et al. 2009, 578 and materials cited therein and in 
the VCLT context Sinclair 1984, 139. A similar statement in ISDS jurisprudence can be found in Phoenix 
v. Czech Republic, para. 78. 
120 McLachlan 2005, 290; Douglas 2009, 86 and public international law cases cited therein; Trinh 2014, 
55. 
121 See also recently Tulip Real Estate v. Turkey – Annulment, para. 87; see also Gaillard/Banifatemi 2003, 
397; De Brabandere 2012, 246; Tams 2012, 319; Cole 2012, 311-312; Vadi 2016, 86; Schreuer et al. 2009, 
604 and in particular materials in fn 266; Ascensio 2016, 375. 
122 There is also the rather undisputed possibility to directly apply ius cogens norms of international law, 
which always prevails in any case (Article 53 VCLT; see also Schreuer et al. 2009, 638; Donovan 2007, 
208-209; Kjos 2013, 101; see also recently Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 203). While certain undisputed 
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and have been used explicitly so as to help with interpretation of IIA provisions, they 
can also be directly applied in questions so deserving.123 Customary international law is 
in general seen as ‘offering important guidance’ to investment tribunals, and has found 
its place in numerous awards, where the line between direct application and 
interpretation was not always clear.124 In some situations, the tribunals expressly stated 
that customary law will be directly applied as the IIA was ‘silent’ on a particular issue.125 
General principles of law have also been considered to be directly applicable in 
international adjudication,126 such as in situations where gaps are left by treaty and 
customary law, and have been applied in a number of investment awards.127 
 
Going back to interpretation, there is no dearth of sources to which the tribunals 
can - or as is also argued - are mandated to turn to for interpretation in every case.128 As 
a matter of practice, references to the VCLT rules, and Article 31 in particular, are 
certainly not lacking in jurisprudence, although they are not universal.129 But a closer 
look at jurisprudence also reveals a recurring pattern in which a selective and even 
somewhat superficial application of certain elements of Article 31 in certain early 
awards leads to concretising obligations stemming from the FET standard. As touched 
upon in the previous Chapter, these understandings then become entrenched through 
reliance on previous decisions (and academic commentary) to such an extent that de facto 
precedent often becomes the predominant interpretive device.  
The practical importance of de facto precedent for interpretation 
The investment tribunals commonly used nominal (if any)130 reference to VCLT 
Article 31 to fashion new doctrines on what the IIA standards including the FET 
																																																						
prohibitions under ius cogens (such as genocide and piracy) are unlikely to become relevant in investment 
disputes, some relatively plausible scenarios in which these norms are relevant can exist (see Donovan 
2007, 209).  
123 See, for example, McLachlan 2005, 282-283; Schreuer et al. 2009, 587; Trinh 2014, 57. 
124 See primarily Schreuer et al. 2009, 606-607 and materials cited therein. 
125 See for example Accession Mezzanine v. Hungary – Decision on Objection, paras. 67-68, 72 and 77. See also 
D’Aspremont 2012, 29. It is important to distinguish this issue from the one of whether the accumulation 
of similar IIA provisions leads to creation of new customary law for all States, on which see more 
generally Dumberry 2010 and D’Aspremont 2012. For direct application of customary law in practice of 
other court and tribunals in international law see also McLachlan 2005, 312 and ICJ Oil Platforms decision, 
as well as WTO decisions in Shrimp-Turtle and Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement. 
126 McLachlan 2005, 313. 
127 Schreuer et al. 2009, 608-609 and materials cited therein; Vadi 2016, 120. 
128 McLachlan 2005, 290; Ascensio 2016, 369. See also generally Arsanjani/Reisman 2010. 
129 See for an overview Trinh 2014, 8-31. 
130 See in that sense also Saldarriaga 2013, 172-175 and Fauchald 2008, 358-359.
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standard would require, and have also been to an extent helped in that free-flowing 
exercise by the requirement to interpret treaty provisions ‘in good faith’.131 These new 
doctrines could then be relied upon by subsequent tribunals, sometimes being 
recognized as potentially supplementary means of ascertaining law under VCLT Article 
32, but sometimes without any clear justification in terms of the VCLT at all.132 
Importantly, a failure to apply VCLT Article 31 correctly or at all has not emerged as an 
effective ground for annulment of investment awards.133 As Anthea Roberts noted, this 
resembles ‘a house of cards built largely by reference to other tribunal awards and 
academic opinions, with little consideration of the view and practices of states in general 
or the treaty parties in particular.’134  
The specific dynamic of rule-generation in ISDS puts emphasis on previous 
decisions far more than would be expected from the usually espoused theory of sources 
in international law.135 While some authors are cautious regarding the relationship of 
such practice with the VCLT rules,136 there are also sterner objections in doctrine.137 As 
Trinh concludes: 
Overreliance on judicial decision in investment treaty arbitrations demonstrates an 
oversimplified approach to treaty interpretation, which jeopardizes international 
legislation process by rules created among private adjudicators without states’ 
consent.138 
 
This could, on the other hand, also be seen as a normatively acceptable if it was to 
actually provide the desirable clarity of and ex ante predictability.139 The potentially 
problematic application of the VCLT could be (normatively at least) offset by the actual 
achievement of the IROL paradigm goals.140 The best-argued solutions would form the 
basis of future practice141 as ‘perplexing outliers’ are isolated,142 and this would provide 
sufficient guidance to States so as to make the standards of investment protection an 
																																																						
131 See on this Weeramantry 2012, 3.22-3.31. 
132 Orakhelashvili 2009, 167-169; Weeramantry 2012, para. 5.25-5.29. 
133 See generally Saldarriaga 2013 and also Ascensio 2016, 369. For an example in practice see MCI v. 
Ecuador – Annulment, para. 54. 
134 Roberts 2010, 179. 
135 See generally Weeramantry 2012, paras. 5.04-5.31; Trinh 2014, 83-91. 
136 Weeramantry, paras. 5.29-5.31. 
137 See, for example, Orakhelashvili 2009, 168-169. 
138 Trinh 2014, 91. 
139 So to respect the ‘expectations investors and states develop regarding the future application of the 
standard principles’ (Schill 2010b, 156-157).  
140 See in that sense Weeramantry, para. 5.30-5.31. and materials cited therein. See also Potestà 2013, 91. 
141 See generally for the idea of jurisprudence constante in ISDS Bjorklund 2008. 
142 Paulsson 2008b, 253. 
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example of the international rule of law.143 Simply, if somewhat in a social Darwinist 
fashion, the ‘fittest’ decisions would survive.144  
 
While this, as noted in the Introduction, has allowed the crystallization of the 
FET standard as a tool for imposing rule of law requirements, the challenges are 
obvious and have been discussed in part 2.2.  There is no institutional mechanism in 
place to oversee the use of VCLT, nor do such mechanisms exist to secure adherence to 
previous decisions even if such (sometimes doctrinally questioned) practice is indeed 
seen as beneficial.145 Thus, in many ways, the realization of the IROL paradigm remains 
critically dependent on the homogenous views of arbitrators, and their desire to 
promote the jurisprudence constante along the lines most prominently advocated in the 
Saipem v. Bangladesh award.146 Yet, even allowing for their relatively small numbers and an 
arguably shared adherence to the IROL paradigm, the pool of ISDS arbitrators is in 
many ways not homogenous to start with.147 The consistent growth in the number of 
new claims, as well as the introduction of new arbitrators to the pool, do not seem to 
increase the chances of consistent interpretations and the homogeneous decision-
making process.148 
 
Furthermore, there are sometimes reasons to be cautious about embracing 
substantive consistency within the IROL paradigm - as when the ‘substance’ is itself 
problematic. As exemplified by Tecmed, there are considerable objections to formulating 
obligations in a manner detached from the realities of actual host State operation and 
their legal framework. This ties in with the broader point that taking into account non-
investment concerns and parallel existing obligations might be necessary to recognise 
these realities and preserve the legitimacy of the ISDS regime.149 But the increasing 
recognition of the need to do so does not equal certainty of how this will materialise in 
an individual case. As Hachez and Wouters conclude: 
																																																						
143 Crawford makes a point that national systems founded on the rule of law cannot in the long run 
‘tolerate review by international systems not so founded’ (Crawford 2003, 9). 
144 See for example discussion in Rivkin 2012, 16; Kaufmann-Kohler 2007, 376-378; Stern 2011, 186-187; 
Paulsson 2008b, 247-248. 
145 See similarly Calamita 2013, 167. 
146 To reiterate from Chapter 1, the tribunal stated that ‘subject to compelling contrary grounds, [tribunal] 
has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases’ (para. 90, emphasis added). 
147 See primarily Roberts 2013; see also Hirsch 2015, 143-146 and Radi 2013, 21. 
148 Hirsch 2015, 154-155. 
149 See, for example, Calamita 2013, 171 on the need to find a ‘politically legitimised normative value set’. 
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[r]egardless of how many awards are well balanced, apply the law sensibly and take 
the public interest into account, the arbitral system cannot hide the fact that real 
chances also exist for an award that contradicts other awards and that is supported 
by odd legal reasoning, with dire consequences for the host state’s budget.150 
 
As indicated above, customary international law and general principles of law (as 
found in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute) can be directly applicable in an investment 
dispute, in addition to their interpretive role.151 In that sense, it is certainly possible to 
make the host State obligations stemming from these two sources of international law 
relevant. However, the practical significance of these sources is more debatable. Both 
display a ‘very great level of generality’ and an ‘inchoate’ character.152 This makes them 
of limited use in, for example, playing a corrective role upon host State’s law or 
providing certain minimum standards to comply with.153  
 
As Florian Grisel argues, customary international law provides ‘weak guidance’ to 
investment arbitrators, and its lack of clarity and precision might even deprive it of its 
status as a formal source of IIL.154 Similar conclusions can be drawn about general 
principles of law, as indicated by both their wording and the relative infrequency of use 
in international adjudication.155 This of course relates to general principles in their 
current form. A different conclusion might be reached if a more dedicated comparative 
approach to general principles of (public) law is taken, as suggested by the increasingly 
discussed comparative public law approach.156 
 
The feasibility and prospects of relying on extraneous treaty law  
 
Leaving aside at this point the potential for future development, the limited 
practical guidance currently provided by these sources suggests an enhanced role for 
																																																						
150 Hachez/Wouters 2013, 434. See also similarly Yackee 2008a, 809 and 812 and Calamita 2015, 112. 
151 This is also generally supported by the International Law Commission conclusions, themselves based 
on long-standing ICJ decisions, that all questions not resolved expressly in a treaty should be governed by 
general public international law and the parties ‘entering into treaty obligations’ do not intend to ‘act 
inconsistently with generally recognized principles of international law’ (ILC 2006, 204). See also 
Ascensio 2016, 384. 
152 McLachlan 2005, 282-283 and 313. 
153 Schreuer et al. 2009, 620; similarly Mendelson 2009, 490. 
154 Grisel 2014, 221-222. See also D’Aspremont 2012, 30-31 and materials cited therein. 
155 See for limited helpfulness and use of general principles Cassese 2005, 190-194 and in the ISDS 
context Fauchald 2008, 312 and Gazzini 2009, 104. 
156 See primarily Schill 2010a, Kingbury/Schill 2010 and also support in Douglas 2009, 89-90 ([t]he 
comparative method for extracting general principles of law would replace the impressionistic assessment 
of the relative equities of the parties’ positions’). See also Chapter 5, section 5.2.1. 
 
109 
conventional law. As treaties have a pervasive reach in international law,157 and with a 
wealth of generated secondary materials, a recourse to relevant conventional law can 
prove beneficial. Yet, it is well recognized that (with rare exceptions)158 direct 
applicability of extraneous treaty norms is not generally permissible in the decision-
making of investment tribunals.159 Even if the legal process is couched in terms of 
VCLT Article 31(3)(c), applying a legal source for which there is no jurisdictional basis 
can lead to possible annulment,160 not to mention the potential effects on the legitimacy 
of ISDS.161 Therefore the main path through which extraneous treaty obligations of the 
host States can be taken into account is through their role in potentially concretising the 
FET standard requirements in the interpretive process. This is particularly so in light of 
the increasing agreement that interpreting the IIA provisions generally requires a 
balance between the interests and concerns of investors and host States – the latter’s 
interests often being related to implementing parallel existing obligations.162 
 
Still, the formulation of VCLT Article 31(3)(c) has often been described as lacking 
sufficient guidance for adjudicators, especially in the field of overlapping treaty 
obligations.163 As Rosalyn Higgins noted, this ‘entails harder work in identifying sources 
and applying norms, as nothing is mechanistic and context is always important.’164 The 
difficulties with having recourse to other treaties in investment arbitration via VCLT 
Article 31(3)(c) are twofold, as there is a need for rules contained in an extraneous treaty 
to be both applicable and relevant between the parties.  
 
																																																						
157 McLachlan 2005, 283. 
158 This would include situations where IIAs directly indicate another treaty as applicable, which is 
uncommon (Salacuse 2015, 165-167). 
159 See in particular Channel Tunnel – Partial Award, paras. 151-153 and also McLachlan 2005, 301; Gazzini 
2012, 122; Kurtz 2014, 280-281; Mendelson 2009, 492. 
160 Knoll-Tudor 2009, 336; Mendelson 2009, 492; Hirsch 2008, 174. 
161 See also more generally McLachlan 2005, 288 and 2008, 370; Dupuy 2009, 57. 
162 Certain early awards, including to some extent the Tecmed v. Mexico (see para. 156, mentioned above) 
insisted on interpreting uncertainties in IIAs in investors’ favour (see primarily SGS v. Philippines, para. 
116, and approval in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, para. 181; Continental Casualty v. Argentina – Jurisdiction, para. 
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competing interests of the investor and the host State and recognise the right to regulate domestic 
matters in the public interest (see Total v. Argenitna – Liability, paras. 124, 162, 309, 333 and 429. See 
similarly Lemire v. Ukraine – Jurisdiction and Liability, para. 500; Feldman v. Mexico, para. 103; Plama v. Bulgaria 
- Award, para 177; EDF v. Romania, para 299; El Paso v. Argentina - Award, para 358.) See also 
Kingsbury/Schill 2010, 103; Kläger 2011, 151. Bonnitcha 2014, 46-47; McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, 
paras. 1.62. and 7.188. 
163 McLachlan 2005, 281; Mendelson 2009, 490; Ascensio 2016, 371. 
164 Higgins 1994, 8. 
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As for applicability, the VCLT is silent on the criteria for applicability of a rule, 
specifically in terms of establishing the identity of the parties and the actual need for a 
treaty to be in force between them.165 An often controversial issue of the identity of the 
parties in dispute, does not seem to be a critical problem regarding IIAs, and in 
particular BITs.166 As Tarcisio Gazzini noted, this question ‘does not arise in the context 
of BITs due to the bilateral character of these treaties.’167 Thereby, conventional law 
applicable between the parties to the applicable IIA can be used for interpretive 
purposes.168 Likewise, while it would generally be necessary for relevant conventional 
law to be in force between the parties, there is also a possibility to use treaties not 
fulfilling that condition as an ‘evidence of the common understanding of the parties as 
to the meaning of the term used.’169   
 
As for the relevance requirement, there is certainly a case to be made for the 
relevance of extraneous treaties, such as those on human rights in investment disputes. 
The examples in practice discussed above show that ultimately the decision on 
relevancy might largely rest on the normative viewpoints of arbitrators. This also 
suggests that the apparent ‘neutral’ formality of the FET rule of law precepts might not 
be completely sustainable in the light of substantive considerations that the tribunals 
can perceive as integral to investment relationships.170  
 
As Martins Paparinskis has suggested, public international law practice exhibits 
both narrow and broad readings of what is ‘relevant’ for interpreting particular 
international norms.171 Importantly, the ‘factual reality for most states […] is that they 
hold various different international obligations in parallel which they are to be 
understood as seeking to respect simultaneously, in good faith.’172 The willingness to 
recognize this particular overlap from the perspective of the host State is thus crucial.173 
																																																						
165 McLachlan 2005, 291 and 313. 
166 See in this sense the refusal of Wintershall v. Argentina tribunal to consider treaties concluded between 
the Respondent and third states for interpreting the IIA at hand (para. 128). 
167 Gazzini 2012, 122. See also McLachlan 2005, 315. 
168 The situation is less straightforward in the context of plurilateral/regional agreements, although in 
those situations a widespread acceptance of many potentially relevant treaties (such as those on human 
rights) would still leave the option open (see in that sense Simma 2011, 579). 
169 See in that sense arguments of Gavin Griffith in his Mox Plant dissent, as discussed and supported by 
Campbell McLachlan (McLachlan 2005, 301 and 315). 
170 See in that sense also Calamita 2013, 168 and Simma 2011, 586. 
171 Paparinskis 2012a, 71. 
172 Krommendijk and Morijn 2009, 424. See similarly Freeman 2004, 214. 
173 Simma 2011, 578. 
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The norms bearing on a single issue should be, to the greatest extent possible, 
interpreted as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations,174 as is sometimes 
also manifested by giving extraneous treaties an arguably central role in cases not 
involving human rights.175 A particularly pointed argument regarding the relevancy of 
human rights treaties has been put forward by Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill, who 
extensively examined and argued for these treaties as proper interpretive reference 
points for tribunals in cases involving parallel human rights obligations.176 
 
 To conclude, and as the examples of Al Warraq and Urbaser show, the 
obligations imposed by treaties extraneous to the IIA can be taken into account in 
interpreting what the FET standard or its sub-principles (such as denial of justice) 
require. In that way, through the vehicle of these sub-principles, pre-existing 
international obligations of the host State stemming from treaties common between the 
IIA parties and that relate to the rule of law can be given ‘bite’ in the FET decision-
making process. In addition to the added benefit of supporting systemic integration and 
tackling fragmentation of international law, in this specific context this opens one path 
towards the ‘international’ element of the plethora of rule of law obligations that usually 
bind the host State. But as the next section will aim to show, it is not the only path – 
and also it is not the path that can necessarily lead to due recognition and influence of 
‘purely’ domestic law. To open a different path for relevance of international obligations 
and also of the ‘domestic’ element of rule of law framework, investment tribunals can 
rely on their choice and assessment of facts they deem relevant. 
 
																																																						
174 Hirsch 2008, 178-179; McLachlan 2008, 396-397; D’Aspremont 2012, 42 (who also notes that VLCT 
offers a ‘sweeping’ power to arbitrators to harmonize); Kurtz 2014, 281; Dupuy 2009, 55; 
Dumberry/Dumas-Aubin 2012, 360. Writing in the context of international trade law, Joost Pauwelyn 
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Annulment, para. 90). See similarly Dumberry/Dumas-Aubin 2012, 359-360. See also Ascensio 2016, 
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2.3.3. The choice and assessment of facts as a path towards both international 
and domestic rule of law obligations of the host State 
 
 The combination of the international nature of the FET standard and the 
applicability of international law to assessing liability under this standard can also move 
the search for ways to secure due regard to other sources of rules towards other points 
in the decision-making process. More specifically, the relevance of these sources and 
rule of law obligations contained therein can also be secured by their systematic and 
thorough inclusion as relevant facts for assessment under the FET sub-principles in 
question. The still open-textured nature of these sub-principles should allow for the 
tribunals to take these sources as relevant indicators to what extent particular behaviour 
was e.g. ‘non-arbitrary’, in accordance with ‘due process’, ‘transparent’ etc.  
 
 To be sure, this is a possible alternative or complementary path for taking due 
account of international obligations. Interpretation in accordance with VCLT Article 
31(3)(c) might, for example, exclude international obligations stemming from a treaty to 
which both BIT parties are not a party. In those situations, a particular international 
obligation that binds only the host State in question (and not the BIT partner) can be 
taken into account as a relevant fact. Likewise, even for tribunals not wishing to engage 
in the interpretation process but instead being satisfied with relying on the existing 
jurisprudence to distil FET sub-principles, the phase of application of these sub-
principles can offer the gateway towards other international obligations.  
  
 As also held in Wena v. Egypt – Annulment, resort to rules of international law is 
particularly justified when ‘the rules in question have been expressly accepted by the 
host State.’177 This, the tribunal noted, ‘amounts to a kind of renvoi to international law 
by the very law of the host State’178 - ‘when a tribunal applies the law embodied in a 
treaty to which Egypt is a party it is not applying rules alien to the domestic legal system 
of this country.’179 The fact, for example, that the Argentine Constitution gives 
supremacy to the incorporated international commitments has also been noted in many 
																																																						
177 Wena v. Egypt – Annulment, paras. 41-42. 
178 ibid, para. 42. 
179 ibid, para. 44. See also similarly LETCO v. Liberia, paras. 64 and 215. 
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decisions arising from the 2001-2002 Argentine crisis.180 While this path towards 
international instruments may be unpredictable due to the different approaches of 
domestic systems towards the incorporation of international commitments,181 it is 
certainly an important possibility. 
 
 Without negating the importance of this path for international obligations, it is 
worthy in particular to elaborate further on how national legal obligations can become 
part of the decision-making process. The interpretation path discussed in the previous 
section is generally not available for reaching national law, and therefore it is important 
to approach to dedicate due space to the sometimes thorny relationship of IIL (and 
international law more generally) and the national, municipal law in host States. 
  
The subordinate role of national law more generally 
 
A qualitatively different – fact-like – character of municipal law provisions builds 
on a considerable pedigree in international law.182 The PCIJ in Certain German Interests in 
Polish Upper Silesia famously held that ‘[…] municipal laws are merely facts which 
express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the same manner as do legal 
decisions or administrative measures.’183 The national (il)legality of a behaviour does not 
determine the outcome at the international level. As Dupuy notes, this is also ‘one of 
the most solidly-anchored rules of customary international law.’184 As such, it has also 
found its place in Article 3 of the influential 2001 ILC Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.185 Numerous ISDS cases confirm such an 
understanding.186 
To clarify, there is also a trend of parallel application of national law as law within 
																																																						
180 For example, CMS v. Argentina – Award, paras. 119-120; LG&E v. Argentina – Liability, paras. 90-91; 
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181 Schreuer et al. 2009, 582. 
182 Grisel 2014, 222. 
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184 Dupuy 2010, 173. 
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international investment arbitration.187 But this is not usually considered to 
determinatively affect the host State compliance with IIA provisions, including the rule 
of law precepts of the FET standard. The formal role of the national law remains largely 
confined to other issues. Most prominently, these are the nationality of the investor,188 
the existence of actual property rights necessary to create an investment or a 
precondition to expropriation189 and the attribution of acts to the host State.190 
Domestic law can thus play a key formal role in deciding if there is an eligible investor 
and/or investment, or if the actor whose behaviour is examined is part of the State 
apparatus - but the behaviour itself would remain subject to examination under 
international law.191 As is sometimes put, ‘[w]hen the issue becomes the international 
validity of certain acts of the host state that have prejudiced the investor’s legal 
entitlements under municipal law, then international law applies exclusively.’192   
 Applicable law in IIL and national law 
 
Interestingly enough, the plain reading of the numerous IIA clauses on applicable 
law and default choice of law provisions would not necessarily and per se support the 
limited or fact-like nature of municipal law. In many situations, a legitimate conclusion 
can be drawn that international and national law have an equal status even regarding the 
breach of the relevant IIA standards.  
 
Section 2.2 above already touched upon the relevant provisions on applicable law. 
As mentioned, many IIAs have provisions that call for the simultaneous application of 
international and national law. Where the relevant IIA provisions are lacking, the default 
provisions in arbitral rules do lead or can lead to the same result. Particularly regarding 
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, the currently predominant trend has been to 
																																																						
187 Kjos 20013, 298; Some of the scenarios include renvoi of a BIT to domestic law, implicit renvoi of 
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191 See in that sense Vivendi v. Argentina – Annulment 1, paras. 96 and 101; EnCana v. Ecuador, para. 184; 
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interpret it as granting discretion to arbitrators as to what issues will be governed by 
which law. The resulting discretion largely resulted in the supremacy of international law 
for determining the breach of the IIA standards, sometimes to the extent that the 
municipal law was not examined at all.193 
 
To problematize this, Article 42(1) can be used as a proxy for the situations of 
explicitly possible parallel application of international and domestic law. The 
interpretation of this provision has been called ‘central to ICSID arbitration’,194 and its 
drafting history, while largely outside the scope of this discussion, provides some 
interesting indications. To briefly summarize, the ICSID Convention’s travaux indicates 
a compromise that granted a primary role to domestic law, while reserving a role for 
international law as a concession to developed countries worried about 
nationalizations.195 As Ibrahim Shihata noted in 1986, the ICSID Convention ‘takes into 
account specific concerns which, in an earlier era, prompted the formulation of the 
Calvo Doctrine’ in particular by proper recognition of the role of the domestic law.’196 
 
However, there is also a common argument that the primary role of national law 
is the result of the contract-based investor-State arbitrations dominating the scene at the 
time of the ICSID Convention’s conclusion and up to the 1990’s.197 Ole Spiermann 
argues that, ‘as Article 42 of the ICSID Convention has been designed for purposes of 
contract claims, applying the provision directly and unreservedly to treaty claims 
involves a strong element of absurdity.’198 The jurisprudential developments are broadly 
in line with such a position. The tribunals largely ascribed the primary role to domestic 
law in early ISDS cases stemming from investment contracts, and international law was 
largely given a supplementary and corrective function.199 The rise of treaty-based 
investment arbitrations during the 1990’s changed this position considerably. The oft-
cited Wena v. Egypt – Annulment decision was critical in abandoning the sequential 
national/corrective international law application. It affirmed the autonomous scope of 
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application for international law in situations so deserving, and largely confirmed the 
right of arbitrators to apply it independently from national law.200 While even previously 
there was a degree of reluctance to abandon international law in favour of municipal 
law,201 subsequent awards instituted a strong ‘internationalisation’ in the sphere of 
determining liability.202 The resulting attention given to national law has been described 
as ‘scarce’, and caused by the widespread belief in the ultimate primacy of international 
law due to the international origin of ISDS.203  
 
Be that as it may, and without arguing that national law should formally apply,204 
the relevance of national law should remain obvious and lend support to its special 
position even in the sphere of facts. Discussing the choice of law in investment contracts, 
Schreuer et al. note that: 
[t]he investor’s activities will be so closely linked to the administrative law, labour 
law, tax law, foreign exchange regulations, real property legislation and many 
other areas of the host State’s legal system that it would be impractical to choose 
the law of another country.205  
 
But the very same considerations are present in treaty-based claims as well. The 
switch to treaty-based as opposed to contractual claims does not automatically lead to 
downplaying the importance of national law. The investor’s activities remain closely 
linked to the domestic laws mentioned above.206 It should not come as a surprise that 
the host State’s law is of relevance for the dispute – it should actually be considered a 
given.207 As Viñuales argues:  
[...] if foreign investment regulation relies heavily on a variety of domestic laws, the 
analysis of its sources cannot be limited to mere treaties, customary law and, 
subsidiarily, general principles of law. A conceptual understanding of the sources 
of international investment law limited to such ‘formal sources’ would be too 
narrow or simply inaccurate, as it would not account for an important part of the 
phenomenon it is expected to illuminate.208 
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Perhaps more symbolically, Santiago Montt has noted that the ‘regrettable 
tendency’ of ignoring domestic constitutional and administrative law cannot be done 
without compromising the legitimacy of IIL.209 Preserving such legitimacy would 
arguably mandate the tribunals to regularly engage with the domestic law and the 
obligations it imposes on the host State, and provide sufficiently thorough and 
persuasive reasoning for establishing its potential conflict with relevant international 
norms.210  
 
 National law as a ‘qualitatively different’ fact 
 
Would it be justified to treat national law as any other fact even in situations 
where international law was exclusively applicable? The reasons mentioned in the 
previous section suggest a negative answer and a recognition of the qualitatively 
different status of national law.211 Bearing in mind the importance of the national law 
framework for the host State decision-makers, it is arguable that its examination should 
form an unavoidable (and sometimes determinative) part of assessing the compliance 
with the obligations stemming from the FET standard.   
 
A useful starting point in further elaborating this position can be the provision on 
applicable law found in the recently adopted CETA agreement, as commented upon by 
Jarrod Hepburn.212 Article 8.31 (2) of CETA, after paragraph (1) affirmed the exclusive 
applicability of international law to investor-state disputes, states that: 
[t]he Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of a measure, 
alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic law of the 
disputing Party. For greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a measure 
with this Agreement, the Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law 
of the disputing Party as a matter of fact. […].213  
As noted, this provision is actually aligned with the public international law 
position going back as far as the above mentioned PCIJ decision in Certain German 
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Interests in Polish Upper Silesia.214 But, as stated as early as 1938 by Wilfred Jenks, it is a 
‘mistake to attach undue importance’ to the ‘factual’ character of municipal law.215 As 
noted, ‘[i]nvestment tribunals […] have often interpreted and applied domestic law 
when necessary, and it is not clear that treating this domestic law as fact has made or would 
make much difference to the tribunal’s reasoning process.’216 As ISDS often practically 
demands examining domestic law when determining the merits of a dispute,217 ‘it is not 
entirely natural to treat this process instead as an instance of applying facts to facts.’218  
Jurisprudence shows that even when international law was established as 
exclusively applicable, tribunals took positions that vary from treating domestic law as 
essentially irrelevant to it being a very important factor. As Hepburn, dealing specifically 
with FET, concludes: 
[…] cases such as Cargill, Sempra, and Enron have explicitly denied the relevance of 
domestic law at all in FET or arbitrariness analyses. Moreover, many cases 
involving claims of FET breach have not even addressed the question of the host 
state’s compliance with domestic law, thus implying that domestic legality is not 
relevant. However, […] tribunals in fact do often examine the domestic legality of 
the respondent state’s conduct. Certainly, domestic legality has not become an 
outcome-determinative feature in FET analyses […] [but] consideration of 
domestic law plays an important contributory role for tribunals attempting to give 
content to the often nebulous FET standard. […].219 
 
The above-mentioned Al Warraq v. Indonesia award can also provide an example in 
that sense. Despite the relevant IIA being silent on applicable law, and the tribunal 
making no explicit statement itself, its deliberations clearly suggest that it saw 
international law as applicable in this case.220 However, this did not prevent the tribunal 
from determining that the violation of domestic law caused a breach of the FET 
standard (as interpreted in line with extraneous treaties), specifically the Indonesian 
Code of Criminal Procedure by the host State.221 For all intents and purposes, the 
domestic law (arguably a fact in this context) was of determinative impact. While the 
specific context of the case – denial of proper criminal procedure – makes the 
																																																						
214 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 19.  
215 Hepburn 2016; See Jenks 1938, 68 and similarly Douglas 2009, 69. 
216 Hepburn 2016 (emphasis added). 
217 See in this sense also Stephan 2014, 365-368. 
218 Hepburn 2016 (emphasis added). 
219 Hepburn 2017, 39-40 (references omitted). See somewhat similarly regarding expropriation ibid, 58 
and 67-68. 
220 Al Warraq v. Indonesia, para. 188, 203 and 243. 
221 ibid, paras. 584-588. 
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circumstances somewhat unique, it can still serve as an indicator of the artificiality of 
perceiving domestic law as just another fact.  
 
2.3.4. Concluding remarks on the tools for introducing the NROL paradigm 
 
There is little doubt that international law is applicable to claims that an FET 
standard provision contained in an IIA has been breached. But that does not rigidly 
limit the scope of both international and national legal sources and rules that can and 
should be relevant. By using the rules of interpretation – for these purposes codified in 
the VCLT – the investment tribunals can interpret the FET provision and the sub-
principles refined through de facto precedent in a way that incorporates other non-
investment, rule of law related obligations of the host State. The situation in this 
scenario can actually make these obligations for all intents and purposes equal to 
applicable law through the vehicle of the FET standard.  
 
There is also another path for taking due account of both international and 
national legal obligations, in the latter case being often the only available one. These 
obligations can also be taken account as facts, and (as suggested above) of qualitatively 
higher character that warrants their regular, systematic and thorough examination and 
enhanced importance for the assessment of host State behaviour. As is sometimes 
noted in doctrine, ‘the question of whether a state has acted in a manner inconsistent 
with the obligations it assumed under a treaty cannot be decided without an 
investigation into the national law of that state.’222 The realities of the foreign 
investment processes in many ways make a formal ‘wall’ between IIA and other 
obligations both normatively undesirable and practically unachievable. 
	
2.4. Conclusion 
 
The challenges of the IROL paradigm 
 
Chapter 1 problematized the perception of IIL as inevitably leading to a de facto 
multilateral regime that imposes substantively uniform international rule of law 
standards on host States. The IIL was in many ways both formally and normatively a 
																																																						
222 Igbokwe 2006, 286. 
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tabula rasa, subsequently written upon by ISDS jurisprudence and (perhaps equally 
importantly) doctrine. This largely allowed for the emergence of a dominant IROL 
paradigm in the FET standard interpretation and application.  
 
This chapter moved away from the foundations of the IIL regime and focused on 
the operation and limits of the IROL paradigm. It first examined how well the 
requirement of consistent interpretation and application of the FET sub-principles 
works in practice. As examples sought to illustrate, there are rather obvious challenges 
to such consistency. In several important areas, the jurisprudence shows worrying 
heterogeneity. Awards exhibit a spectrum from the straightforward application of the 
top-level ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ requirement to concrete facts toward the examination and 
even determinative role of the parallel existing international obligations of the host State 
in making the determination if a breach existed. 
 
Jurisprudence certainly exhibits widespread attempts to pursue consistency by 
relying on previous awards, as already touched upon in Chapter 1. This could be 
normatively (if not strictly formally) defensible if it practically led to a high degree of ex 
ante predictability and reasonable certainty that a similar set of facts would result in a 
similar outcome of a case. Yet, concretising the obligations stemming from the FET 
standards through (over-) reliance on previous decisions can also exhibits considerable 
deficiencies.223 Even in situations of a clear agreement on a sub-principle, such as 
legitimate expectations, there are persisting differences in concretisation. Furthermore, 
these concretisations themselves sometimes remain open to questioning. The attempt to 
fashion a purely IROL understanding of a concept such as transparency can lead to it 
becoming unrealistically demanding, further invoking legitimacy concerns. 
 
Inconsistent and/or unrealistic concretisations of IIA standards can be tackled by 
the regular complementing with an NROL paradigm – practically manifested by due 
account of the spectrum of existing and ex ante discoverable provisions related to 
securing the rule of law that already bind the host States. VCLT Article 31(3)(c) in that 
sense allows taking into account the rules of international law existing between the State 
																																																						
223 For example, the principles/canons of interpreting IIAs established by tribunals are contradictory and 
‘unhelpful as a guide for future tribunals’ (McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2017, para. 3.146.) It is not 
possible to ‘discount the effect of arbitrators’ personal perspectives in formulating the canons of 
construction they have individually developed’ (ibid, para. 3.149). 
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parties for the purpose of interpreting and concretising the meaning of IIA standards. 
Likewise, for both international and national legal obligations, the choice and 
examination of relevant facts by the tribunals can secure a similar NROL-oriented 
outcome. In particular, the applicability and supremacy of international law should not 
lead to ignoring the important role of national law, which in many cases can and should 
have a determinative influence. National law should not, from a normative perspective, 
be equated to others fact. As Jarrod Hepburn has recently argued, national law has (and 
should have) a different qualitative status, regardless of the potential formal supremacy 
of international law.224 
 
More generally, the IIL’s problems and possibilities – well exemplified in the FET 
context - are summarized by Susan Franck: 
The challenge, however, is that the investment treaty arbitration may not be an 
appropriate example of a rule of law, particularly where tribunals articulate vague and 
contradictory decisions on basic points of law. […] Nevertheless, to the extent that 
arbitrators and commentators develop a reliable, consistent, and reasoned doctrine, 
this model could encourage adherence to the rule of law by domestic [institutions].225 
 
The generally narrow possibilities for the review of investment awards allow for 
the differing approaches on various issues to persist.226 The currently still predominant 
atomized structure of ISDS lowers the possibility to institutionally tackle some of these 
challenges, and grants the critical role of doing so to arbitrators. With the generally 
increasing number of ISDS cases and the potentially expanding pool of arbitrators, the 
likelihood of divergent jurisprudence hardly decreases. As the Introduction to this thesis 
touched upon, a common theme in reform-minded scholarship are thus the proposals 
for different system-internal and system-external ways of achieving consistent rulings 
and increasing legal predictability.227 For many international lawyers, the lack of 
consistency simply seems ‘perverse or pathological.’228 However, as recently argued, the 
promise of the rule of law instead of the rule of lawyers still has a long way to go in 
																																																						
224 Hepburn 2018, 195-197. 
225 Franck 2007, 367 fn 147 (emphasis added). See similarly Crivellaro 2014, 128. 
226 As Kurtz observes, ‘there is a distinct and peculiar ‘’moving target’’ quality to the hermeneutics of 
investment arbitration with arbitral tribunals often paying simple lip service to the customary rules on 
treaty interpretation’ (2014, 275). 
227 See, apart from the discussion in the previous Chapter, also Fortier 2009b, 12-17; Franck 2005; Dolzer 
2013; Kaufmann-Kohler 2005a and 2007. 
228 Alvarez 2016, 178. European Commissioner Malstrom, for example, made it clear in this context that 
‘[w]e want the rule of law, not the rule of lawyers’ (Pauwelyn 2015, 763). 
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ISDS.229 As Jansen Calamita noted on the clarity of rules, ‘the content of the standards 
of protection afforded under [IIAs] remains almost as uncertain and as controversial as 
it ever was under customary international law.’230 Whilst on can certainly disagree with 
such propositions, the possibility and desirability of enhancement would seem to be 
largely beyond doubt. 
  
A normative path forward 
 
To borrow a question from a (then) aspiring political theorist - ‘what is to be 
done?’ This and the previous chapter indicate both the need and the possibility to 
suggest a complementing NROL paradigm when assessing the host State compliance 
with the FET requirements. The critical features in that sense would be to retain the 
orientation towards the rule of law and the IROL paradigm as a starting point, whilst 
fully accepting the reality of parallel obligations and concerns of the host States. At the 
same time, there is a need to further the efforts to overcome the practical institutional 
limits imposed by the decentralized dispute settlement. 
 
To reiterate, the appealing normative features of the IROL paradigm are hardly in 
dispute. There is little to object to in envisioning the mission of the FET standard and 
of IIL more generally as one striving to enhance the rule of law. The FET standard as 
interpreted in jurisprudence largely embodies the precepts that the vast majority of 
States would surely find as reflecting the critical rule of law requirements, and would 
likely see as desirable within their own municipal legal framework.231 The question is 
rather how to react to the challenges of the IROL paradigm in the face of concrete 
formal and practical obstacles – and also to enhance the potential benefits. There is 
likewise certainly little to be said against the reform attempts aimed at centralization of 
decision-making and re-calibration of IIAs. These can therefore be supported to the 
extent that they reflect the now (hopefully) more informed desires of States as ultimate 
masters of the IIL regime. Yet, these processes are still ongoing, and their future 
outcomes are objectively uncertain to a considerable degree.232 With all the ‘re-
calibration’ efforts, the IIL regime will, for the foreseeable future, likely continue to be 
																																																						
229 See generally Pauwelyn 2015. 
230 Calamita 2013, 167. 
231 As also suggested by the wide adherence to rule of law instruments, touched upon in the Introduction 
to this thesis. 
232 See Kurtz 2014, 272. 
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dominated by IIA treaties containing relatively broad standards such as the FET. In 
such circumstances, and with the legitimacy of IIL and potential consequences for host 
States in mind, the system-internal, ‘from within’233 paths of reform through decision-
making remain worthy of exploration. 
 
By pulling together the various threads explored in the previous discussion it is 
possible to construct certain common points:  
 
Firstly, the ‘rule of law mission’ of the FET standard retains its appeal and offers 
a strong legitimacy enhancement factor. As the Introduction to this thesis touched 
upon, the almost undisputed commitment of practically all States towards the realisation 
of this ideal makes it a valuable focal point for decision-making. 
 
Secondly, the strong enforcement, limited review possibilities, and potentially 
costly awards, for all their risks, also offer the possibility to powerfully influence the rule 
of law in host States. This is an influence in some aspects unmatched by other regimes 
in international law. Normatively, the possibility to address rule of law deficiencies in 
the host State that (for various reasons) may be out of reach of domestic or other 
international actors should be utilised. 
 
Thirdly, the resulting discretion of arbitrators in shaping many aspects of the 
regime, apart from risks,234 offers the potential to incorporate new paradigms without 
the potentially lengthy and unpredictable formal reform processes. The open-textured 
nature of the FET standard can therefore in this way be an advantage for the rule of law 
promotion. 
 
Fourthly, the existing legal framework, as also evidenced in practice, offers the 
possibility to have recourse to a large number of sources from both international law 
and municipal law. This allows securing the realisation of the rule of law without 
necessarily engaging in the, e.g., formulation of new doctrines – this potentially being 
formally and legitimacy-wise problematic.  
 
																																																						
233 See in that sense Schill 2014. 
234 See discussion, for example, in Roberts 2013, 76-77. See in the same vein Van Harten 2010c, 628-629 
and Landau 2009, 194-195. 
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Fifthly, both the predominantly open-textured nature of the FET standard and 
institutional deficiencies suggest the need to enhance ex ante predictability. There is a 
possibility to suggest decision-making paradigms that at least limit the problems arising 
out of the fact that a subsequent tribunal is not bound to agree with or follow a decision 
of a previous one. 
 
Sixthly, and finally, there is also a need to fully embrace the nature of investment 
decision-making as often involving substantive choices and the interplay of many non-
investment considerations. How are the substantive choices to be made and who should 
be ultimately making them? As Calamita notes, with reference to Dworkin, ‘[t]he 
reference to core normative values in the interpretation and application of standards is 
essential in order to give such standards a principled juridical meaning.’235 In the 
absence of normative underpinning, the process of interpretation faces serious danger 
of being arbitrary and illegitimate.236 
 
The following chapters will make a normative case and more practical suggestions 
for introducing the NROL paradigm as a complement to the IROL one, in accordance 
with these common positions. It will argue for substantive decision-making that 
combines formulating the substantively uniform international rule of law with a focus on 
strengthening the national rule of law. This should be done in a way that respects, to the 
extent possible, the existing framework of international and domestic legal 
commitments of the host State. It should aim to hold the host State also to account in 
accordance with the holistic set of norms that it adopted and could have (alongside the 
investor) ex ante expect to be relevant. At the same time, the systematic focus on the 
constellation of existing legal commitments should limit the problems arising from the 
inability to secure consistent jurisprudence in an atomized ISDS system. It is therefore a 
vision, further elaborated in the coming chapter, where the FET claims can help enhance 
the rule of law case by case, State by State. 
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Chapter 3 – A normative case for strengthening the national rule of law through 
FET decision-making 
  
 
3.1. Introductory remarks 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 focused on the foundations and the operation of the IROL 
paradigm. As noted, the idea of a consistently enforced ‘global’ set of rule of law 
precepts is a worthy development, but one which holds specific challenges and is open 
to further normative enhancements. The de-centralised dispute settlement structure 
without a formal doctrine of binding precedent, persistently enduring open-textured 
provisions, and the objectively limited scope for their further ISDS-led refinement are 
still the dominant features of IIL.1 There is thus room for continuing contemplation on 
the IROL paradigm and its potential improvements. Some of the critical questions are if 
and how ISDS can provide the ‘real currency’ of IIL2 – legal certainty, but at the same 
time further utilize its power towards the desirable goals of rule of law enhancement in 
the host States. 
 
To focus on the first aspect, legal certainty is admittedly a matter of degree. The 
very nature of law as an ‘argumentative discipline’3 seems to negate the possibility of 
absolute certainty. In the FET context, however, there is a lot to be gained by shifting 
the more abstract discussions of ‘certainty’ and ‘predictability’ of the rules to a 
somewhat more pragmatic perspective. It can be beneficial in that sense to adopt the 
viewpoints of the ‘users’ of the system which in practical terms might have the most at 
stake. Symmetry, coherence and consistent repetition of rules and principles in case law 
are desirable from a more abstract viewpoint of a ‘system’. Yet, this is ultimately of 
limited importance if it does not lead to a host State or an investor being able to predict, 
with sufficiently high degree of probability, whether a particular host State act is a 
(potentially very costly) breach of an IIA. In the end, it is the behaviour of ‘subjects’ that 
the law should be capable of guiding if the rule of law is to be a reality.4 Orienting the 
																																																						
1 Bearing in mind, of course, the recent reform efforts that have been touched upon in the Introduction 
to this thesis and the previous chapters. 
2 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 825. 
3 MacCormick 1999, 163-165. 
4 Raz 1979, 214. 
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normative perspective towards these subjects can thus offer important insights as to 
how to better achieve both certainty and other goals. 
 
The certainty of investment protection and the everyday realities of investment processes 
 
A government official facing an investor’s representative who is threatening an 
FET claim over a refusal to issue a permit might be pleased that the relevant sub-
principles are becoming more certain over decades.5 She might, however, be far more 
interested if (e.g.) the fact that the domestic regulations have been followed honestly 
and to the letter will be sufficient to avert a multi-million dollar encumbrance on the 
State budget. The investor’s representative would also likely be interested to know if the 
metaphorical gun of the ISDS claim is actually loaded. 
 
The challenges of pursuing only the IROL paradigm become clear in the context 
of these everyday encounters. Fruitful ex ante decision-making and the assessment of 
legal prospects arguably calls for a clear indication of sufficiently precise rules (as 
opposed to principles) that can be applied to the existing facts. To the detriment of the 
hapless government official and her litigious visitor, it is sometimes asserted that ‘as a 
practical matter, it is currently almost impossible to provide useful advice to disputing 
parties since, ultimately, so much will depend upon the identity and tastes of the 
particular arbitrators appointed.’6 As the previous chapter has to an extent sought to 
elaborate, the jurisprudence on the FET standard exhibits a double problem in that 
sense. 
 
Firstly, beyond a general agreement on rule of law principles as sub-elements, 
there is a limited possibility to ascertain for which further specific refinements the 
hypothetical tribunal would opt for. Which of the (at least) four different 
understandings of what ‘legitimate expectations’ entail will be at play?7 Certainly, the 
efforts that tribunals put in refining (e.g.) the FET standard are laudable and add new 
layers of certainty – to the extent that this is not potentially undermined by the very 
choice that a future tribunal will now have in adopting a ‘conservative’ or a ‘progressive’ 
																																																						
5 Sometimes expressed as ‘we know much better what fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, or full 
protection and security mean than we did ten of fifteen years ago’ (Reinisch 2008, 125). 
6 Landau 2009, 199. 
7 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
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understanding. A possibility exists that the said future tribunal will also perhaps decide 
that both of these seem unsatisfactory and that interpretive innovation is in order.  
 
Secondly, and relatedly, even a complete agreement on the ‘sub-principles’ of the 
FET standard (and on further interpretive refinements) arguably still leaves the matters 
half-way as far as the government official and investor are concerned.8 Understandably, 
even the refined, ‘2.0’ version of the FET aims to leave enough flexibility for the myriad 
potential facts to be assessed under them. It is questionable if much can be different if 
the standard is expected to deal with immensely diverse legal areas.9 As Joseph Raz 
argues, flexibility is not in itself contrary to the rule of law - it is both inescapable and 
beneficial if reasonably used.10 As in (e.g.) domestic systems of judicial review, there 
needs to be sufficient discretion so as to accommodate the specificities of individual 
cases.11 
 
In doctrine, the discussion of FET and ISDS as rule of law providers often ends 
here. Simply put, international rule of law à la IIL will have to be discretionary to a 
considerable degree and this is likely to stay so.12 Limiting the degree of discretion and 
tackling the most troubling instances of divergence regarding relevant principles are to 
an extent addressed through various reform initiatives touched upon in the 
Introduction to this thesis. If a State is unhappy, the argument often goes, there is 
always the prospect of ‘re-calibrating’ the IIAs, offering binding interpretations and, 
ultimately, exiting the regime.13 But the prospect of ‘condensing’ IIL into an exhaustive, 
detailed and annotated code of behaviour for the host States and investors alike remains 
dubious.14 As Richardson points out, a parenthesis in a statute can translate into 
thousands of pages of detailed rules for administrative procedure.15 How many 
																																																						
8 As Michael Ewing-Chow notes, the satisfaction with the emergence of ISDS jurisprudence constante largely 
depends on the level of scrutiny – ‘macro level’ seems promising, but the divergence at the ‘micro level’ 
persists (2013, 232). 
9 See on this diversity Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 288; Schill 2011b, 1085; Maupin 2014b. 
10 Raz 1979, 222. See also generally Jowell 2015, 5; Bradley/Ewing 2006, 726; McCorquodale 2016, 281-
282 and similarly Richardson 1999, 318. It is also argued that purposive-oriented discretion is inevitably 
gaining in prominence and intensity in the contemporary context (Craig 1997, 476 and Shklar 1987, 9-10). 
11 See in particular Cane 2004, 185 and Goldsworthy 2012, 693 as well as Bell 2006, 1263, 1272, 1281-
1282; Van Harten 2010c, 630-631 and 633; Brewer-Carías 1989, 110; Southey/Weston/Bunting 2012, v. 
12 See for example Crivellaro 2014, 138, and discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
13 See generally Brower/Blanchard 2013 and also Crivellaro 2014, 138. 
14 See for caution on codification efforts Bjorklund/Reinisch 2012 and Bjorklund 2012, as well as the 
ultimate abandonment of the codification effort by the International Law Association at http://www.ila-
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thousands of pages would be required for a three-word phrase such as ‘fair and 
equitable’ is open to imagination.  
 
The inevitable discretion and the reasoning process 
 
In normative terms, however, this perhaps inevitable acceptance of considerable 
decision-making discretion should result in the renewed and rigorous focus on how this 
discretion is exercised. The more an agreement is reached on the existence and 
extensive scope of arbitrators’ discretion, the more critical their legal reasoning process 
becomes.16 As famously observed by Wendell Holmes, ‘general principles do not decide 
concrete cases’ – much of the key work must be done through case-by-case judgments 
to specify the abstraction at the point of application.17 
 
If the prospect for a hard-and-fast codification of what FET means remains 
unclear, a sufficiently consistent, systematic and persuasiveness-oriented reasoning 
process should allow to at least ‘reverse engineer’ something akin to it.18 If the 
government official can reasonably know in advance that the hypothetical factors A, B 
and C shall be taken into account by the arbitrators, and some indication of the weight 
to be given to them, that is arguably already a considerable improvement. As discussed 
previously, the existing ISDS jurisprudence unfortunately sometimes leaves much to be 
desired regarding the reasoning process, not the least in relation to the approach to 
interpretation, recourse to non-IIA international obligations, and the role of domestic 
law.19 Bearing in mind the context and the potential consequences of ISDS awards, this 
is certainly unfortunate. 
 
As Toby Landau notes on this topic, the ‘reason for reasons’ in ISDS goes well 
beyond that in commercial arbitration and must take into account the unique position 
of investment tribunals.20 Especially in the light of the ‘unprecedented responsibility’ 
																																																						
16 See in that sense Smits 2012, 64 (‘[i]n law, it is not only (or even primarily) the result that counts, but it 
is the reason why this result was chosen that matters’). 
17 Sunstein 2007, 11. 
18 See in this sense also Alvarez/Reisman 2008, 1. 
19 See Chapter 2, sections 2.2. and 2.3.; sometimes even ‘the most careful reading of the award failed to 
reveal key factual findings, major or minor syllogistic premises, or normative judgments that were 
necessary to reach a conclusion’ (Alvarez/Reisman 2008, 1). 
20 See generally Landau 2009 and similarly Grigera Naón 2014, 105; Kotuby/Sobota 2013, 455-456 and 
Alvarez/Reisman 2008, 2 and 29. On recent trends regarding the reasoning requirement see Infantino 
2014 and Ortino 2012, 34-35. 
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that is on the shoulders of ISDS arbitrators, it is the nature and quality of an award itself 
(as opposed to mere outcome) that will frequently decide the success of the arbitration 
as a whole.21 What should be expected is persuasiveness that goes beyond the 
rudimentary or formal fulfilment of the requirement for a decision to be ‘reasoned’.22 A 
broad range of interested entities, including both the host State population and those 
governing them, have a legitimate interest in a decision rendered with sufficiently 
detailed reasoning.23 For some authors, facilitating the acceptance of the award by the 
broader audience also becomes the key function of the tribunals’ decision-making.24 
 
Towards the complementing paradigms 
 
To pull the threads together – how can substantive decision-making in FET 
claims reconcile the parallel existence of the large degree of discretion available to 
arbitrators, the expectations of firm(er) guidance by host States and investors, and the 
rule of law ‘mission’ of ISDS? The previous Chapter has sought to elaborate some 
starting points in devising a possible answer.25 This and the following chapters will 
argue that, normatively, the substantive decision-making process in FET claims and its 
accompanying legal reasoning ought to be an exercise in complementing the international 
rule of law paradigm with a national rule of law one. To the extent possible, in 
interpreting and applying the FET sub-principles, due account needs to be taken of the 
vision of the rule of law that a host State has chosen for itself through its domestic and 
international commitments beyond the IIA. It is this vision that is arguably primarily 
anticipated by both States and investors as likely to govern the life of an investment. 
Substitution of the domestic dispute settlement institutions and/or assessment of their 
																																																						
21 ibid, 187-188. See similarly Lalive 2010, 57 and 64-65; Giovannini 2011, 79 and 90; Kotuby/Sobota 
2013, 455. See for a somewhat different distinction between clarity for ‘internal functioning’ of ISDS and 
external legitimacy Ortino 2012, 33-34.. 
22 As required, for example, in ICSID Convention, Art. 48 (3); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, Art. 
34 (3); SCC Rules 2010, Art. 36 (1) and ICC Rules 2012, Art. 31 (2). See also on the formal obligation on 
reasons Alvarez/Reisman 2008, 2-27 and Ortino 2012, 35-38. For importance of reasoning regarding 
jurisdictional issues, see the dissenting opinion of Sir Franklin Berman in Luchetti v. Peru – Annlment (also 
discussed by Lalive 2010, 59-61). 
23 Landau 2009, 193-194 and 197. Similarly Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 43-44; Schill 2010d, 413; Ortino 
2012, 32 and Infantino 2014, 183. Another potential benefit, not discussed here, is the possibility that a 
clear and detailed award on liability enhances the prospect of (cost/time-saving) settlement (see Infantino 
2014, 188). Likewise, there is an important concern in avoiding a potential annulment (see on this Lalive 
2010, 57-61; Ortino 2012, 36-38 and Kotuby/Sobota 2013, 458-460). 
24 Infantino 2014, 185; see similarly Kingsbury/Schill 2009b, 52-53; Alvarez/Reisman 2008, 29 and 
Ortino 2012, 32-33. 
25 See Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
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operation in a specific case should not automatically mean a wholesale displacement of 
the substantive legal framework of the host State. 
 
To offer a very preliminary sketch, that will be elaborated in the following 
chapters, the arbitrators should, to the extent that the FET standard as so far refined in 
jurisprudence does not provide sufficiently clear guidance, focus on what else, in substantive 
terms, is already there. Instead of a simple exercise of discretion and/or attempting 
‘progressive development’ they should turn their attention to the constellation of 
domestic instruments and international obligations of the host State (the ideal-type model of 
the domestic rule of law) as either relevant interpretive reference points (in accordance with 
VCLT) or qualitatively crucial facts so to help ‘fill’ the considerable substantive 
hollowness of IIL principles.26 By using these instruments and obligations, as well as 
comparative insights, a tribunal should (if necessary) point to what it perceived as 
deficient in the provision of the rule of law to the foreign investor, and offer potential 
reform guidelines.27 Finally, to preserve the need for case-specific equity, good faith 
considerations can be (carefully) used as a form of a corrective. This is to the extent that 
the analysis through the lens of the domestic rule of law vision and comparative 
indicators still fails to produce what the tribunal would consider a just outcome. 
Overall, the most normatively satisfying achievement for the ISDS in the FET context 
should be to prevent the need for its own recurrence, and to do so in a more engaging 
way than by relying on damages as a sufficient ‘incentive’.28  
 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on answering further the questions why the 
complementary focus on national, country-specific rule of law is warranted. Four key 
interconnected reasons are examined. Firstly (as addressed in section 3.3.) the focus on 
the national rule of law framework is warranted as it recognizes its far more elaborate 
nature in comparison with the still developing FET jurisprudence. Secondly, section 3.4. 
will argue that the desirability of taking due cognisance of the domestic framework finds 
support in the concepts of sovereignty, subsidiarity and plurality in international law. 
Thirdly, it will be argued in section 3.5. that the importance of the national rule of law 
																																																						
26 This also accords with the understanding that host States are more likely to follow the rules which they 
‘internalized’ themselves and thus perceive as legitimate (Hirsch 2009b, 873 and materials cited therein). 
27 As Infantino remarks, ‘it is not rare that international investment arbitrators appear to be acutely 
conscious of the pedagogical elements involved in the arbitration process.’ (2014, 195, emphasis added; 
similarly Lalive 2010, 56 and Draguiev 2014, 302). 
28 Schill 2015, 96. 
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framework is also more in accordance with the ex ante expectations of foreign investors 
and domestic decision-makers. The FET standard and IIL more generally should in that 
sense be seen as remaining an ultima ratio consideration. Finally, as section 3.6 will argue, 
the focus on the domestic rule of law is a way of more effectively pursuing the ultimate 
expectation that the host States have from the IIL regime – economic development. 
The domestic rule of law framework whose strength, regardless of and beyond the IIAs, 
critically contributes to host State development, and this should be given due weight. 
 
To offer a better foundation for discussing these reasons, the following section 
will present an example from existing ISDS practice - Genin v. Estonia award. Focusing 
on just a few aspects of this case should sufficiently illustrate the potentials and pitfalls 
of the reasoning process in FET claims, and its interrelationship with the rule of law. 
To note, Genin award is not chosen as a landmark case, but rather as containing a set of 
elements that serve well for illustrative purposes. As addressed in the previous Chapter 
and in the following ones, there are other awards which contain similar elements and 
could serve as equally useful case studies (such as MTD v. Chile - Award, Toto v. Lebanon 
– Award, Bogdanov v. Moldova, Al Warraq v. Indonesia, Maffezini v. Spain – Award, Dan Cake 
v. Hungary, Saluka v. Czech Republic, Funekkotter v. Zimbabwe). In that sense, Genin v. 
Estonia is representative of a broader group of cases which gave domestic rule of law 
considerations significant weight, and provide a good basis for elaborating on NROL 
paradigm more generally. While not representative of the whole FET jurisprudence (it 
would indeed be hard to find one single case to fulfil such role), it offers a good 
window into a large part of existing ISDS decision-making.  
 
3.2. Illustrating the issues – Genin v. Estonia 
 
The facts 
 
The relevant facts of the case can be briefly summarized for present purposes.29 
They revolve around a revocation of a banking license of a foreign-owned Estonian 
Innovation Bank (EIB) by the Central Bank of Estonia. This was a culmination of 
increasingly hostile relations between the two entities, and encompassed several events 
																																																						
29 Genin v. Estonia, paras. 30-61. 
 
132 
which are not of central concern here. The two critical aspects of the case relate to two 
(out of 8) Claimants’ claims.30  
 
The first is the formal act of revocation of the EIB’s license by the Central Bank. 
A series of inspections and audits, according to the Central Bank, revealed a large 
number of breaches of relevant laws by the EIB. After a meeting of the Council of the 
Central Bank, the EIB’s license was revoked on 9 September 1997 with immediate 
effect.31 For the Claimant, the revocation was conducted in breach of due process, 
without any prior notice and on grounds that were a pretext for actual motives.32 This, 
as claimed, resulted in a breach of a number of provisions of the applicable 1994 US-
Estonia BIT.33  The Claimants made a rather broad sweep as to which standards where 
actually breached, resulting in a claim for a simultaneous breach of the FET standard, 
full protection and security standard, prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory 
measures, as well as expropriation.34  
 
Two days after the revocation, EIB challenged it on various grounds before a 
competent administrative court.35 While these proceedings were pending, a non-related 
shareholder in the EIB initiated separate proceedings on 18 November 1998 to have the 
EIB liquidated on account of its license revocation.36 On 12 January 1999, an 
application to stay the liquidation proceedings pending the outcome of the licence 
revocation challenge was rejected, and this rejection was subsequently confirmed on 
appeal.37 On 6 October 1999, EIB’s challenge to the revocation was dismissed on the 
grounds that the bank was by then already in liquidation.38 According to Claimant, such 
sequence of events which ultimately led to EIB’s liquidation, amounted to no less than a 
‘travesty of justice’ and breached a number of BIT provisions, including again the FET 
standard and prohibition of unlawful expropriation, but also adding the requirement to 
provide effective domestic means for pursuing investment claims.39 
 
																																																						
30 See summary in ibid, paras. 66-97. 
31 ibid, para. 57. 
32 ibid, paras. 90-91. 
33 ibid, para. 91. 
34 See ibid, in conjunction with paras. 13-18 reiterating the relevant provisions of the US-Estonia BIT. 
35 ibid, para. 58. 
36 ibid, para. 59. 
37 ibid, para. 60. 
38 ibid, para. 61. 
39 ibid, para. 94 in conjunction with paras. 13-18. 
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The reasoning of the tribunal 
 
The legal reasoning for deciding these claims offers several interesting points. The 
Tribunal eventually decided to frame all of its investigations under the interrelated 
standards of FET and non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary treatment.40 What the 
decision illustrates, however, is that in determining the breach of these standards the 
critical role of domestic law is quite possible even if the applied standards are 
unquestionably international and the BIT itself at relevant points only mentions 
international law as applicable.41 Basing its decision on ICSID Article 42(1), the 
Tribunal decided to apply Estonian law in assessing the merits of the claims.42 Added to 
this decision was a cursory statement that there is no basis to believe that the 
application of international law would lead to a different outcome.43  
 
As for the act of license revocation, the Tribunal noted that the Central Bank 
reasoning on the revocation decision was ‘superficial’, yet it lead to a correct outcome.44 
On the key question of whether the denial of justice occurred during the revocation 
process, the tribunal answered negatively, yet ‘not without some hesitation’.45 The main 
concerns of the tribunal were, in essence, that: 
[…] [n]o notice was ever transmitted to EIB to warn that its license was in danger 
of revocation unless certain corrective measures were taken, and no opportunity 
was provided to EIB to make representations in that regard. When the Council of 
the Bank of Estonia was convened on 9 September 1997 to discuss the revocation 
of EIB’s license, no representative of EIB was invited to respond to the submission 
made […] as to why revocation of EIB’s license was necessary or appropriate in 
the circumstances.46 
 
Despite the Tribunal’s demonstrated readiness to meaningfully engage with the 
various provisions of Estonian law,47 at this critical point the tribunal did not provide an 
analysis of the question if there was a legally mandated requirement for either the said 
notice, possibility of making representations, or the possibility for an EIB representative 
																																																						
40 ibid, para. 316. 
41 See 1994 US-Estonia BIT, Article II (3) (a) and III (2). 
42 Genin v. Estonia., para. 350. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid, para. 352. 
45 ibid, para. 357. 
46 ibid, para. 358. 
47 See, for example, ibid, para. 62 and paras. 352-356. 
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to attend the Council meeting. The tribunal also did not ascertain the previous and/or 
subsequent practice of the Central Bank in these situations.48 Paragraphs that follow in 
the award are focused on the substantive correctness of the Central Bank’s decision,49 and 
end with a positive assessment that (indicatively) concludes: ‘[t]he decision, as it turns 
out, was further justified by subsequent revelations and appears even more 
understandable with hindsight.’50 
 
Despite not engaging with the procedural provisions of the potentially relevant 
Estonian laws, the Tribunal reached a following conclusion: 
The Tribunal considers, however, that certain procedures followed by the Estonian 
authorities in the present instance, while they do conform to Estonian law and do not 
amount to a denial of due process, can be characterized as being contrary to generally accepted 
banking and regulatory practice. They include the following: 
(1) No formal notice was given to EIB that its license would be revoked unless it 
complied with the Bank of Estonia’s demands within a reasonable time; 
(2) no representative of EIB was invited to the session of the Bank of Estonia’s 
Council that dealt with the revocation to respond to the charges brought by the 
Governor; 
(3) the revocation of the license was made immediately effective, giving EIB no 
opportunity to challenge it in court before it was publicly announced.51 
 
Eventually concluding on this matter, the Tribunal’s stated that ‘[i]t is to be 
hoped, however, that Bank of Estonia will exercise its regulatory and supervisory 
functions with greater caution regarding procedure in the future.’52  
 
The fate of the second claim, regarding the behaviour of Estonian courts, is quite 
puzzling. The Tribunal did not in the end substantively address the matter. Rather, the 
Tribunal implicitly reached a (rather peculiar) conclusion that the Claimant, as 
proceedings developed, essentially stopped pursuing this claim. While the Tribunal 
announces that it will deal with all the issues regarding license revocation (thus including 
behaviour of Estonian courts)53, the question that Tribunal eventually puts before itself 
as determinative makes no mention of the judicial proceedings - ‘[d]id Respondent, in 
																																																						
48 Despite a later claim that there is no indication of discrimination regarding the treatment that Estonian 
investors received – para. 369. 
49 ibid, paras. 359-363. 
50 ibid, para. 363 (emphasis added). 
51 ibid, para. 364 (emphasis added). 
52 ibid, para. 372. 
53 ibid, para. 313. 
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the person of its agency, the Bank of Estonia, violate the BIT or Estonian law by 
revoking EIB’s license (and if so, what damages are owed as a result)?’54 By analysing 
the preceding discussion, and admittedly adding some unstated assumptions in the mix, 
it could be argued that the Tribunal implied the renouncing of the claim from 
Claimant’s reiteration that Bank of Estonia board license revocation was the ‘core’ of its 
claim.55 The alleged and at least prima facie controversial ‘travesty of justice’ thus 
remained unexplored. 
 
Commentary – international or national rule of law? 
 
Reasoning of the tribunal allows for some preliminary comments on international 
vs national rule of law realization, and their complementation. Can the FET 
jurisprudence be considered a sufficiently reliable exclusive provider of uniform rule of 
law principles for foreign investors engaged in the banking sector? Will the investor 
contemplating an IIA-protected investment in a bank in (e.g.) Finland or Israel be able 
to fully ascertain how it will be treated in case of licence revocation? Equally 
importantly, will the central banks of these countries be able to prospectively adjust 
their behaviour so to stay on the ‘safe side’ of a potential FET claim? 
 
Unambiguously positive answers to these questions are hardly possible, and this 
sheds light on the limits of the IROL paradigm. The Tribunal impliedly suggested that 
neither IIL nor the broader corpus of international law have much to offer on the issue 
of banking licences. But the FET standard’s role in protecting the rule of law, in the 
vein of IROL exclusivity, would arguably require something (preferably clear and 
persuasive) to exist. The tribunal’s brief assertion that the application of international 
law would likely lead to a ‘similar outcome’ arguably seems more like a veiled admission 
of the substantive hollowness of international law than as an actual conclusion on the 
content of some (hypothetical) provisions. 
 
The previously discussed availability of discretion could have led the tribunal to 
either a more impressionistic ‘facts and then a conclusion’ reasoning process or towards 
suggesting a more elaborate set of rules56 that could be then prospectively used as 
																																																						
54 ibid, para. 315. 
55 ibid, paras. 242, 319, 348. 
56 Sometimes described as ‘inevitable interpretative ‘‘law-making’’’ (Crivellaro 2014, 137). 
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international/transnational benchmarks on the banking licence revocation procedures.57 
Both paths would however suggest the weaknesses of the IROL paradigm. The first 
option would do little to enhance legal certainty, as it would largely negate the 
possibility of ex ante predictability. But the latter option, with its ‘refinement’ 
orientation, would still face at least two normative and practical problems. Firstly, the 
tribunal would face a challenge not to appear to be engaged in overly vibrant arbitral 
activism, as its related potential legitimacy costs are considerable.58 Secondly, the 
structural ‘handicap’ of the decentralized ISDS makes uncertain the prospects for 
adopting these hypothetical new benchmarks in future cases. 
 
Perhaps considering this, the tribunal eventually made a choice to primarily focus 
on the already existing and sufficiently elaborate domestic legal framework. This shows 
that the assessment of the Central bank of Estonia’s behaviour might not mean much in 
substantive terms for (e.g.) the Israeli Central bank. What it rather could mean is that the 
legal reasoning process in further applying relatively uncontroversial rule of law 
principles such as transparency and denial of justice will put a strong focus on taking 
due account of the pre-existing legal framework, and thereby that the respect for that 
framework should be an important, if not primary, ex ante concern for any Central bank. 
As Hepburn notes, domestic law might be significant for individual disputes, but is not 
necessarily significant for the ‘system’ of investment arbitration.59 
 
From the perspective of NROL paradigm complementation, the reasoning 
process in Genin exhibits both the considerable potential for national rule of law 
strengthening and the risks of not realizing that potential in full. On one side, the 
tribunal did engage rather thoroughly with certain aspects of Estonian law. In light of 
the facts, the ultimate outcome (no host State liability) is also arguably correct. At the 
same time, the Tribunal hinted at the significant deficiencies of the host State rule of 
law, but gave rather vague and questionable suggestions for improvement. Also, the 
tribunal failed to address the behaviour of Estonian courts, a highly relevant issue in the 
national rule of law context. 
																																																						
57 See, for example, Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 818 on arbitrators’ not infrequently feeling overwhelmed and 
resorting to ‘simplistic’ transnational solutions. See also similarly Kotuby/Sobota 2013, 455 and Hepburn 
2017, 62. 
58 ‘A single incidence of an adventurist arbitrator going beyond the proper scope of his jurisdiction in a 
sensitive case may be sufficient to generate a [political] backlash.’ (Paulsson 1995, 257). 
59 Hepburn 2017, 4. 
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First point is thus the Tribunal’s finding that the Bank of Estonia’s procedures 
did not amount to denial of justice, but were still not beyond significant reproach. The 
Tribunal’s reference to the ‘generally accepted banking and regulatory practice’ as a 
benchmark in that sense might suggest comparative insights as guidelines for the host 
State, something that will be discussed more in Chapter 5. Leaving aside the mentioned 
lack of engagement with Estonian law on these points, could the tribunal’s suggestions 
in general be utilized for reforming the relevant procedural aspects? Bearing in mind the 
tribunal’s marked hesitation to immediately confirm the full respect of due process – 
something that could be interpreted more strictly by a hypothetical future tribunal – 
there are strong reasons for a heightened effort to provide guidance in that sense. 
 
This is also desirable because the actions of the Central Bank were not without 
their own merits. For example, secrecy and expeditiousness can be justified by the need 
to prevent the EIB’s shareholders and directors (a rather suspect group, as the tribunal 
determined) from detrimentally influencing the EIB’s assets in the light of an 
impending revocation decision. Similar justification can be found in the need to prevent 
a sudden ‘rush to the bank’ by the bank’s depositors. In this light, there is certainly a 
case to be made for a more persuasive and systematic elaboration of the ‘generally 
accepted’ standards that the tribunal had in mind. The eventual finding in favour of the 
State arguably does not detract from this need – the Tribunal should see its role above 
and beyond the ‘correct’ ultimate outcome. 
 
Even more questionable is the lack of engagement with at least prima facie 
problematic behaviour of Estonian courts. The Tribunal’s relatively muted conclusion 
that this claim was dropped is rather dubious, not the least when contrasted to the 
‘travesty of justice’ rhetoric employed by the Claimant. But even if the Claimant did put 
more emphasis elsewhere, this should not be determinative when an apparently glaring 
rule of law issue is at stake.60 The matter of what is ‘relevant’ in dispensing with an ISDS 
claim must not be overly narrow – and should include concern about the interests of 
the wider group of stakeholders in resolving a particular issue.61 
 
																																																						
60 See also on properly addressing all claims of the losing side Giovaninni 2011. 
61 Landau 2009, 203. This might confront with a narrower ‘dispute-settling’ focus, as explained for 
example by Alvarez 2013, 161. 
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Was the Tribunal influenced by the rather strong case that the Bank of Estonia 
decision was correct,62 and that the courts would presumably confirm license revocation 
and liquidation anyway, even without the problems with parallel and pending 
proceedings?63 Perhaps, even if this is nowhere explicitly put forward. But this still 
results in a missed opportunity to provide a thorough assessment regarding a situation 
(revocation/liquidation/parallel pending proceedings) which is certainly not uncommon 
and which is likely to be encountered by both the foreign and domestic investors in 
Estonia.  
 
It is with these (certainly non-exhaustive) considerations in mind that it is now 
possible to explore in more detail the reasons for the proposed complementing of the 
IROL paradigm with an NROL one. The focus will first (3.3.) be on the richness of 
national law as a source of case-specific rules, as well as on the broader reasons why this 
source should be given special attention (3.4.). The discussion will then proceed to 
reasons specifically concerning the expectations of investors and States in terms of the 
legal framework (3.5) and the broader relevance of the approach for the economic 
development as the telos of IIL (3.6.). 
 
3.3. Substantive richness of the national (rule of) law  
 
A key aspect of the tribunal’s reasoning in Genin was focusing on the national law 
in assessing the Central Bank’s actions. Leaving aside the thoroughness of the tribunal’s 
assessment, this should be seen as a normatively justified choice as national laws 
generally contain a more elaborate set of legal rules with important mechanisms for self-
correction. Systematically taking due account of these rules and mechanisms as (usually) 
facts in applying the FET standard is normatively justified as it can insert a considerable 
dose of predictability, certainty and associated legitimacy to the decision-making process 
– even if the ultimate finding of a breach remains formally distinct from this exercise. 
Oft-discussed arguments concerning the richness of national laws have been put 
forward by Jan Paulsson.64 Paulsson mainly discusses the full extent of the arbitrator’s 
																																																						
62 See again Genin v. Estonia para. 363 on the decision’s correctness ‘in hindsight’. 
63 See in that sense a comment in Hepburn 2017, 34-35. 
64 See primarily Paulsson 2008a, and similarly Paulsson 2013, 231-255. For similar earlier arguments, see 
Gaillard/Banifatemi 2003, 394. See also for objections to Paulsson’s arguments Mayer 2011. 
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duty to apply national law in both commercial and investment arbitration.65 He argues 
that this duty includes the possibility to ignore ‘unlawful’ laws, i.e. those enacted in 
conflict with the foundational and constitutional norms of the domestic legal system, as 
they are simply ‘not law’.66 Leaving for the moment certain differences to the broader 
normative approach discussed above, it is useful to focus on several Paulsson’s ideas 
that resonate well with it. 
Summing much of the discussion to come, Paulsson states that: 
[n]ational laws themselves contain corrective norms, and they may be formidable. 
An international court or tribunal charged with applying a national law has both 
the duty and the authority to apply it as a whole. If it does so, there may be no need 
to determine whether international law trumps national law. In this way a 
confrontation of legal orders is avoided.67 
 
The focus on law ‘as a whole’ means that individual laws (and Paulsson remains 
focused on laws in the meaning of statutes, or les lois) must be seen as dominated by the 
broader legal system, or ‘law’ (le droit).68 In practice, the legal system ‘in the books’ and 
the written constitution at its summit may be largely unrelated to the everyday exercise 
of power, as exemplified by what Paulsson calls the ‘lofty eloquence of the constitutions 
of banana republics of yore’.69 This, however, should not be a critical hampering point. 
As Paulsson further notes:  
[a] purported mandatory law—like any law—is not necessarily effective even on 
the national level. In all legal systems worthy of the name, courts may annul or 
disregard laws which violate the rule of law—often by their constitutional 
irregularity. International courts and tribunals must have at least equally great authority if their 
duty to apply the national law is to have its full meaning.70 
 
The points about the (at least nominal) richness of corrective national norms 
aimed at the preservation of the rule of law can be supported more generally. Where a 
more predictable and grounded domestic law exists, there is little reason for tribunals to 
ignore it in favour of more abstract FET principles.71 The FET provisions are certainly 
not the most developed set of commitments that oblige the host States to respect the 
																																																						
65 Paulsson 2008a, 218. 
66 ibid, 221-225. 
67 ibid, 215. 
68 ibid, 217. 
69 ibid, 219-220. 
70 ibid, 224 (emphasis in the original). See also in this context Grigera Naón 2014, 99. 
71 Hepburn 2017, 56. 
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rule of law.72 Combined obligations existing beyond the IIAs are almost in every case 
more developed and detailed in terms of obligations imposed upon the host State 
decision-makers, arguably even with all of the FET jurisprudence considered.73 An 
additional matter in that sense are also the ‘hierarchical’ considerations, where (for 
example) the position of the ICJ expressed in the Barcelona Traction judgment is that 
human rights considerations embody a higher value than investment disciplines.74 
 
It is thus normatively questionable if the decision-making process should avoid 
‘juxtaposing’ the FET sub-principles with at least some of the crucial commitments that 
bind the host State decision-makers in parallel.75 This also allows to temper the 
considerable normative and analytical problems associated with the investment tribunals 
saying what the ‘good’ law should be.76 As Paul Stephan notes:  
[s]uperficially, investment treaties […] [specify] legal duties that host states have 
with regard to foreign investors. […] But all of them refer to the content of 
municipal law. Each invites a reviewing body […]to compare the host state’s 
behaviour to the legitimate expectations that its municipal law created. The 
enforcement of the international legal duty thus requires a review of municipal 
law.77 
 
To reiterate, the promulgated form of domestic commitments is not usually 
problematic – as far as ‘law in books’ is concerned, it is hard to globally find a 
																																																						
72 As Echandi notes, ‘IIAs rarely include standards of treatment and protection that are not already 
provided by the host countries’ domestic laws and regulations at the time of the negotiation’ (2011, 14). 
See similarly for FET sub-components as common core principles of domestic administrative law 
McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, 7.99-7.100; on the ‘elusive’ character of due process obligations in 
international law see Hepburn 2017, 56.  
73  See in that sense Watts 1993, 16 (arguing that the domestic rule of law notions and mechanisms are far 
more developed than international ones in any case) and somewhat similarly Waldron 2011b, 390 and 
Hepburn 2012 as well as Hepburn 2017, 16 fn 21. For the discussion of ISDS jurisprudence, see generally 
Chapter 2. 
74 Barcelona Traction, para. 33. See also similarly Human rights, trade and investment - Report of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, 3-4; Viñuales 2014, 323-324 and Maupin 
2014b, 491-492. For a view that investors cannot legitimately ignore host State human rights obligations 
see Suez v. Argentina – Separate Opinion Nikken. 
75 Recognising thus again, as Tamanaha notes, that all general ideals are contestable in meaning and reach 
(Tamanaha 103-104). See also Vandevelde 2010, 53 on high level of generality of the identified 
requirements. For similar ‘juxtaposing’ exercises of the US Supreme Court see Chang/Yeh 2012, 1181 
and materials cited therein; for some other jurisdictions see Shelton 2011a, 17-18. For similar 
considerations in constitutional law context more generally see Stone Sweet 2010a, 203. These bear 
particular relevance if ISDS is indeed ‘the closest we have come to an international constitutional or 
administrative court’ (Van Harten 2010c, 632). 
76 See on this Calamita 2015, 106 and more generally McCorquodale 2016, 282. 
77 Stephan 2014, 358. See somewhat similarly Kotuby/Sobota 2013, 464. 
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jurisdiction that does not seem to be strongly committed to the rule of law.78 It is the 
rule of law operation at the ‘most granular level of human affairs’ that is the crucial 
challenge, not the formal proclamation of the concept’s often supreme status.79  
 
To return to Paulsson’s arguments, the utilization of the domestic self-correcting 
rule of law mechanisms for ‘unlawful laws’ would thus: remain distinct from 
international law intervention;80 would not be conditional upon waiting for domestic 
judiciary to act regarding the same issue;81 nor limited by the fact that there are perhaps 
no practical avenues for remedies in domestic law.82 While the opportunities for 
international arbitrators to pronounce domestic laws unlawful/unconstitutional are 
unlikely to come often, ignoring them when they come would present ‘une forfaiture—a 
dereliction of duty on the part of the international decision-maker’.83 
 
Some of Paulsson’s concluding remarks also strongly resonate with the ratio of the 
NROL paradigm. Paulsson argues that, in the end, the value of his approach lies in that 
‘the outcome is shown not to be an international imposition on national law, but a 
vibrant affirmation of that same law.’84 In the long run, in cases of governmental abuses, 
‘even citizens of the country whose law is in question may come to see the international 
tribunal as a defender of enduring national values’.85 Directly referencing the FET 
standard, Paulsson concludes that:  
[…] one should have faith that a fully and judiciously motivated decision, reached 
after a painstaking ascertainment of the sources of national law, will be accepted by 
thoughtful nationals as wholly legitimate. If that is not so, why should one have 
higher hopes for perceptions of the way an international tribunal applies 
international norms, like “fair and equitable treatment,” which, in the view of 
detractors, are nebulous and therefore ultimately arbitrary?86 
																																																						
78 The need for clear laws that are fairly implemented on a consistent and predictable basis is almost 
universally present (Stephens 2015, 31). As Carvalho notes, ‘there is nothing in ISDS material protection 
that is nor covered – or should not be covered – by a civilised society respectful of the rule of law’ (2016, 
22). See for global human rights commitments McCorquodale 2016, 293-294 and also Duan 2008, 509-
510; for the global trend of enhancement of the rule of law in administrative affairs Pérez Loose 2010, 
405; and for general investment-friendly legal reforms primarily Wälde/Gunderson 1994 and Salacuse 
2000, 387-388 and 396-398. 
79 Stephens 2015, 31. See also Barber 2003, 452 and Salacuse 2000, 391-392 and 395-396. 
80 Paulsson 2008a, 222 and 225. 
81 ibid, 224.  
82 ibid, 226. See similarly to this and the previous point Grigera Naón 2014, 100-101. 
83 Paulsson 2008a, 229. 
84 ibid, 230. 
85 ibid, 232. 
86 ibid. See in similar vein Grigera Naón 2014, 103-104. 
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Richness of national laws and strengthening the national rule of law through ISDS 
 
While Paulsson’s arguments bear clear relevance to the approach discussed here, 
it is important to note some differences.87 Firstly, his discussion largely focuses on a 
hierarchical conflict between the State’s constitution (broadly understood) and a statute 
that is to be applied in a dispute.88 This, while certainly important, leaves out a host of 
other potentially relevant conflicts.89 Examining an individual statute is but one of many 
scenarios. As Genin award shows, the constitutionality of the relevant Estonian statutes 
was not an issue – the issue was rather the exercise of discretion under them.  
 
Secondly, Paulsson’s insistence on operation within national law and without 
international law90 can potentially leave out the possibilities for rule of law strengthening 
stemming from both the IROL paradigm in the FET standard and other international 
commitments of the host State more generally. For example, there is nothing to 
guarantee that careful examination of the ‘purely’ domestic legal framework will either 
yield a conclusive result in terms of unlawfulness nor that that result, even if conclusive, 
would still not be open for discussion from a rule of law viewpoint. Keeping open the 
possibility for some form of an international law ‘intervention’ arguably remains crucial 
if the IIA provisions are to keep their role in limiting unbridled host State sovereignty.  
 
This is also in line with a normative understanding that not ‘anything goes’ – a 
principled right for autonomous shaping of the domestic legal order cannot be an 
excuse for an unhindered fiat of the host State.91 As has been noted, the interpretation, 
at least in some cases, cannot both begin and end with just the domestic law 
																																																						
87 One point not addressed here is whether the approach in commercial arbitration should normatively be 
the same as in ISDS (see generally Infantino 2014, 186-196). For some examples supporting that see 
Grigera Naón 2014, but see also caution in Mayer 2011. 
88 See similarly Grigera Naón 2014. 
89 For example those listed by Mayer 2011, 364 (‘entre un traité et une loi, entre une loi et un re ̀glement 
administratif, entre une disposition d'origine communautaire (re ̀glement ou directive) et une loi ou un 
re ̀glement administratif, ou encore (sous re ́serve de discussion) entre une loi et une re ̀gle 
jurisprudentielle…’) 
90 See also for distinction in this regard Grigera Naón 2014, 105. 
91 As noted by Jowell, ‘[a]cknowledgment that there may be different ways of achieving the rule of law 
does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the rule of law is an entirely relative and shifting concept 
and therefore may be readily excused by the standard of national convenience.’ (2015, 8; see also Bell 
2006, 1278 and Schill 2017a). See similarly ADC v. Hungary, paras. 423-424. 
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considerations.92 There is, however, a strong case for any sort of intervention to be 
exercised with caution, rigorousness and judicial ‘modesty’.93 If for nothing else, there 
will almost inevitably exist (however tempered) a distinct ex post facto character of 
imposing requirements in matters that can rip into the ‘social fabric’94 of the host State 
or cause economic damages that might be ‘impossible to bear’.95 The focus should thus 
be on trying to shape the ‘international’ intervention in a more predictable way (e.g. 
through using the already existing international commitments) rather than forsaking it 
altogether.  
 
Thirdly, Paulsson (and several other authors on this topic)96 for the purposes of 
their discussion assume the legally mandated application of national law.97 Although this 
can also sometimes (although rarely) occur in the FET context, depending on an 
individual IIA, the focus of arguments here is on the more prevalent situation where 
national law is a fact for the purposes of decision-making.98 
 
To briefly summarise, the substantive ‘richness’ of domestic law as a source of 
(more) predictable ex ante rules certainly holds considerable practical appeal for 
investors, host State officials and investment arbitrators. The focus on domestic law can 
offer a legitimacy-enhancing way out of the difficulties caused by the open-textured 
nature of the FET sub-principles. However, further support for focusing on the 
national rule of law framework, particularly in a more holistic sense, can also be found 
in international law itself. The following section will argue that the concepts of 
sovereignty, subsidiarity and pluralism in international law can also support the 
complementation of international rule of law considerations with national ones. 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
92 Van Harten 2010c, 632-633. 
93 See for an appeal for more ‘modesty’ in ISDS decision making also Montt 2012, 22. 
94 Schill 2010a, 16.  
95 Fabri 2012, 361. See similarly to this and the previous point Ortino 2012, 32. 
96 See similarly Mayer 2011 and Grigera Naón 2014. 
97 Paulsson remarks that his discussion refers to the applicability of national law resulting from any 
scenario, including both the ICSID Convention Article 42 and the ‘garden-variety applicable-law clause 
found in a commercial contract.’ (2008, 218).  
98 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.3. 
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3.4. Sovereignty, subsidiarity and plurality  
 
The concepts of sovereignty, subsidiarity and the respect for plurality in 
international law certainly entail complexities that go beyond this chapter. But it is 
possible to link these concepts in a way which shows normative insights for both the 
FET standard and IIL more broadly. Put briefly, the persisting relevance of sovereignty 
correlates with the respect for plurality in international law. Both concepts are further 
interrelated with subsidiarity in decision-making, which aims to limit the extent of 
substantive choices made for States at non-State levels. 
 
The relevance of sovereignty 
 
Raising sovereignty as a normative argument can appear problematic. The 
concept has been increasingly criticized as either unclear (and therefore unhelpful)99 
and/or obsolete in the modern globalizing world.100 It might also seem misplaced to 
attach normative importance to arguments of State sovereignty in the FET standard 
context. IIAs were, as is often repeated, envisioned as limitations of sovereignty as a part 
of the investment-attracting ‘grand bargain’.101 Re-importing sovereignty concerns might 
be construed as an (unjustifiable) desire of States to have the sovereignty cake and eat it 
too. 
 
Duly taking this into account, it still does not seem normatively defensible to 
interpret the limitations imposed by (among others) the FET standard without seriously 
considering the starting position upon which these limitations are imposed.102 As James 
Crawford noted, ‘[d]espite repeated suggestions of the obsolescence or death of 
sovereignty as an idea, its normative basis remains’103 and it is still a ‘standard operating 
assumption’104 in international law.105 There is little doubt that the shape and relevance 
of the concept is changing.106 But this rather indicates that ‘sovereignty’ might not be 
																																																						
99 See, for example, Henkin 1994 and an overview in Kalmo/Skinner 2010. 
100 See above all Kingsbury 1998 and Crawford 2012, 127-129. 
101 See Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 795 and 804-805. The idea of the ‘grand bargain’ comes from 
Salacuse/Sullivan 2005. 
102 See particularly Chung 2007 and Sornarajah 2013. 
103 Crawford 2012, 129. 
104 ibid, 132. 
105 See also in that sense Alvarez 2012. 
106 For a selection of discussions on the topic in the ISDS-related context, see Stumberg 1998, Viñuales 
2014, Kleinheisterkamp 2015 and Sasson 2011. See also for a briefer overview Bonnitcha 2014, 31-32. 
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overly helpful as a grand proclamation or an undifferentiated conceptual ‘mass’. A look 
at its more specific aspects can prove more beneficial. 
 
As is sometimes argued, sovereignty should be seen not as a brooding presence in 
international law, but rather as a ‘bundle’ of particular specific rights and obligations.107 
One particularly relevant aspect is the right of States to make their own choices in 
dealing with economic, social and political affairs within their jurisdiction.108 This 
principled allowance comes clearly through several international instruments as well as 
international jurisprudence,109 and is summarized by Michael Reisman: 
[a] basic postulate of public international law is that every territorial community 
may organize itself as a State and, within certain basic limits prescribed by 
international law, organize its social and economic affairs in ways consistent with 
its own national values.110  
 
Legislative expressions of variations in the law of different states that result from 
value differences are thus internationally lawful and entitled to respect.111  The idea that 
States have the inherent legal authority to regulate has also been a constant feature in 
international jurisprudence.112 As Viñuales remarks, the essentially exceptional nature of 
the IIL/ISDS inroad into national sovereignty should thus not be mistaken to ‘be the 
rule, or even the entire picture’.113 
 
But the inroad does exist. It is clear that the scope of obligations of the host State 
cannot remain the same as before the IIA conclusion.114 However, a less clear-cut 
																																																						
107 See generally Viñuales 2014. 
108 As Kjos notes, this can provide support for the arguments on the need to apply national law in ISDS 
cases (2013, 163). 
109 Such as the Article 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (1974) and the UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly relations and Co-operation Among States (G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. 
Doc. A/8028 (1970). For a well-known ICJ pronouncement, see Nicaragua v. United States, para. 258. See 
also Shaw 2014, 32 and 153-156; Lowe 2015a, 8. 
110 Reisman 2000, 366. Similarly in the WTO context, see Howse 2002, 519. For member States’ 
entitlement to regulate their respective economies in the ECHR context, see Emberland 2006, 19. On 
how this right to regulate manifested itself in widely varying ways during the EU financial crisis, see 
Kilpatrick 2015. 
111 Reisman 2000, 367. See also Mann 2016, 290-291 and Picker 2013, 50-51. 
112 The examples from ICJ jurisprudence range from those as early as 1926 Certain German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia (Merits), p. 22 to more recent 2012 Territorial and maritime dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), para. 
80. See also Viñuales 2014, 327 and 337. 
113 Viñuales 2014, 360. See similarly Muchlinski 2008. 
114 Bonnitcha 2014, 32. This is further supported by VCLT Articles 31(1) and 32(b) VCLT which militate 
against treaty interpretations that render provisions redundant or meaningless. See particularly for the 
VCLT context Linderfalk 2007, 110 and materials cited therein. 
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question is how the fact that the IIA conclusion is also an expression of sovereignty 
(therefore including the right to autonomously shape the domestic economic and other 
affairs) should influence the interpretation of these sovereignty limitations.115 Should 
there be, to put matters differently, a ‘nationally-flavoured’ interpretation of IIA 
provisions such as the FET standard?  
 
The interplay with plurality and subsidiarity in global governance 
 
A positive answer is suggested by the combined calls for plurality in international 
law and subsidiarity in global governance more generally. Their joint impact, combined 
with the rule of law ‘mission’ of IIL, supports the NROL paradigm importance for the 
FET standard. It invites the ISDS tribunals to recognize their subsidiary role in securing 
the investors’ rights, while according a more profound recognition to the existing social, 
political, economic, and cultural plurality of host States. It is also a recognition of a 
legitimate and desirable degree of plurality in understanding the rule of law notions.116  
The goal should thus be to offer international protection to investors and also sanction 
the domestic rule of law deficiencies in a persuasive way – but not to constrain 
pluralistic ‘innovation, experimentation, and the capacity to imagine alternative futures 
for managing the relationship between politics and markets’.117  
 
The concepts of subsidiarity and plurality are themselves recognized as 
interrelated in important ways. Within the scope of this chapter it is certainly not 
possible to give the fully deserved space to the importance of the concept of 
subsidiarity,118 so the discussion must be limited to the most important points in this 
normative context. While not uniform in meaning,119 the principle of subsidiarity is in 
essence a (rebuttable) presumption for decision-making to be made at a lower level, 
closer to the affairs/citizens in question.120 One of the critical reasons for subsidiarity is 
the recognition that the social and economic plurality is better respected by subsidiary 
																																																						
115 As Crawford notes, ‘sovereignty does not mean freedom from law but freedom within the law’ (2012, 
122; emphasis added). 
116 See in that sense Kläger 2011, 125-127; Ranjan 2016, 121 and 142; Kanetake/Nollkaemper 2016, 458; 
Chesterman 2009, 69. For the ECHR context see generally Dothan 2014 and Legg 2016, 262-264. 
117 Schneiderman 2008, 8. 
118 Subsidiarity, for example, is a general principle of EU law and one of the primary notions for 
organising the functioning of the EU. See particularly Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union and 
discussion in Chalmers/Davies/Monti 2014, 204-214 and 393-405.   
119 See Jachtenfuchs/Krisch 2016, 5 and particularly fns 17 and 18. 
120 Jachtenfuchs/Krisch 2016, 6-7 and 9; Kumm 2004, 921-922. 
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decision-making, as lower level organs are presumed to be more ‘in touch’ with relevant 
considerations.121 In the issues of judicial review (or similar processes) beyond the state, 
the sensitivity to the question of what level within multilevel governance is most 
suitable for making a particular decision assumes critical importance.122  
 
As Jachtenfuchs and Krisch note, there is a plausible case for strong subsidiarity 
in global governance, as reasons that stem from culturalism and value pluralism 
converge with the democratic legitimacy concerns.123 Shifting the decision-making to 
‘higher’ (ISDS) levels requires ‘good reasons’124 and implies the importance of 
reasonable deference, modesty and well-argued persuasion in decision-making for those 
to whom the decision-making power is granted.125 In particular, the ‘demand for 
subsidiarity […] rises when acts are highly intrusive and concern specific cases’.126 In the 
same vein, Urueña argues that the more public nature of ISDS decision-making implies 
a higher need for subsidiarity.127 As is also argued, the need for national authorities to 
generally have a ‘first say’, and for due respect towards them, are critical for ISDS 
operation.128 While subsidiarity cannot be used to justify State behaviour that goes 
against the best interests of individuals, it can still play a useful role in guarding against 
overly centralistic visions of global governance.129 
 
Going back to the IROL paradigm, the calls for plurality and subsidiarity in 
international law also indicate the limits of how much an ‘internationalized’ vision of 
																																																						
121 Kumm 2004, 921-922. Practical reasons are also important, on which see Warbrick 2000, 449-450. 
122 Von Staden 2012, 1034. For a discussion of the issue in the WTO context, see Lang 2011, 316 and 
343-346, as well as Montt 2012, 22 and 347. See also support in Shany 2005, 909-910 and Mahmood 
2013, 103. 
123 Jachtenfuchs/Krisch 2016, 22-23.  
124 Kumm 2004, 921; Jachtenfuchs/Krisch 2016, 6-7. 
125 For a similar argument regarding the subsidiarity of ICJ decision-making, see Nollkaemper 2006, 318. 
In the EU context, there is an increasing reliance on ‘process review’ aimed at assessing if existing 
procedures were followed, as opposed to suggesting new ones. See Chalmers/Davies/Monti 2014, 922-
925 as well as Lenaerts 2012, 3-4. See particularly Unibet as a good example of how extensively the Court 
is ready to accommodate existing national procedures as compliant with the Treaties. Concerning the 
ECtHR, the 2012 Brighton declaration of all member States strongly reiterated the use of ECHR as a last 
resort, that should come after a careful analysis of national laws and procedures. See also Warbrick 2000, 
449-450. 
126 Jachtenfuchs/Krisch 2016, 15. 
127 Urueña 2016, 100-102. See also Jachtenfuchs/Krisch 2016, 16 and 20. See in, a somewhat different 
context, the support for ‘asymmetrical’ ISDS decision making in Maupin 2014b, 495. 
128 Von Staden 2012 and Burke-White/von Staden 2010a and 2010b; see also Urueña 2016, 116. 
129 Follesdal 2013, 60-62. 
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the rule of law can achieve.130 The ‘depth and scope of reasonable disagreement’131 
about approaches to the rule of law issues militates against too ambitious attempts to 
proclaim State autonomy a thing of the past.132 A warning is also often put against the 
overly Westernized understandings of the rule of law. As Chimni notes, ‘to ignore the 
enormous diversity of human experience is to have an unwarranted epistemological 
confidence that has its roots in hegemonic aspirations.’133 There are indeed ‘multiple 
worlds of international law’ and ‘[t]he legitimacy of an international rule of law is a 
function of its journey towards becoming a more plural construct, taking cognisance of 
cognate narratives in other cultures and civilisations.’134 
 
In some ways, a throwback can also be made to the early days of IIL. As Ibrahim 
Shihata argued in 1986, apart from very key formal characteristics, rule of law principles 
will ‘of course’ be based on own choices and convictions of States.135 Elements of the 
rule of law can be ‘satisfied in different ways in different systems’.136 IIAs, as argued 
more recently by Alvarez, ‘do not assume that their treaty parties share the Western rule 
of law tradition, nor do they seek to re-make states to conform to that tradition’.137  
 
In summary, there is support in some of the basic concepts of international law 
and their doctrinal interpretations for a careful and thorough balancing of the 
‘substitution’ and ‘subsidiarity’ imperatives in FET decision-making. A normatively 
desirable path should be combining the detached dispute settlement role (‘substitution’ 
of the domestic institutions) with a principled respect for substantive domestic legal 
choices. If the ‘vast’138 discretion remains at the disposal of arbitrators, it should not 
																																																						
130 See, for example, Watts 1993, 21; Kumm 2003, 27; Chimni 2012, 306-307; Nollkaemper 2016, 4-6; 
Kanetake 2016a, 38-39. For the ECtHR context see Spano 2014. 
131 Kumm 2004, 927. See also Sunstein, for whom the incompletely theorized agreements are well suited 
to the (legal) world containing social disagreement on large scale issues (2007, 13). 
132 See in that sense Besson 2011, 380. See similarly in the private law codification context Smits 2012, 99; 
and for administrative law Bell 2006, 1261 and 1266-1267. 
133 Chimni 2012, 291. See similarly in the ISDS context Picker 2013, 41; and more generally Trubek 2006, 
87. 
134 Chimni 2012, 306-307. 
135 See elaboration in Santos 2006, 271. 
136 Crawford 2003, 5. Similarly, for Petersmann, ‘[t]he rule of law, therefore, may legitimately differ in 
domestic and international jurisdictions depending on their often diverse constitutional and international 
legal obligations and the democratic and judicial conceptions of the rule of law prevailing in that 
jurisdiction’ (Petersmann 2009b, 518.) 
137 Alvarez 2016, 220. See relatedly Tamanaha 2004, 4-5. Likewise, ISDS tribunals are not particularly well 
positioned to pass value judgments and draw legal inferences from issues such as (non-)democratic 
domestic political set-up (see Schill 2012a, 23 and materials cited therein). 
138 Landau 2009, 195 and similarly Ortino 2012, 35. 
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result in dispute-settlement substitution transforming into wholesale substantive rules 
substitution. In other words, procedure should not profoundly dominate the substance. 
The future of IIL might be in question without a careful engagement with the domestic 
law as the expression of state sovereignty.139 
 
The following two sections will deal more specifically with additional support for 
such a position that can be gauged from the expectations of host States and investors that 
should be accorded respect. The following section will first argue that the thorough 
cognisance of the domestic legal framework is also normatively desirable as it accords 
with the expectations of host States and investors. Section 3.6. will then examine an 
expectation of a different type – that participating in IIL and subjecting to, inter alia, the 
FET standard will allow for the economic development of the host State. 
  
3.5. Expectations of investors and States 
 
Introductory remarks 
 
There is little debatable in requiring that the parties involved in an investment 
endeavour know the law that will be applied to them, in accordance with the age-old 
maxim of ignorantia legis nocet. However, a question arising in the foreign investment 
context is what law is expected to be known. Will an investor coming into the host State 
primarily consult the IIA on what to expect in legal terms, or host State laws? Will the 
domestic official primarily have a look at the FET provision when confronted with a 
procedure involving a foreign investor, or the otherwise applicable domestic law? Could 
the EIB investors in Genin initially expect anything else but that relevant Estonian laws 
will be applied fully and correctly? 
 
There are strong reasons to believe that host States and investors primarily expect 
that in their mutual relationship they will have to comply with the domestic law beyond 
the IIA, and that the IIAs – with the FET standard being here particularly prominent -
are not expected to be the key instruments to secure the rule of law throughout the life 
of an investment. While duly accounting for potential overgeneralization, these 
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expectations should still be given proper weight by investment tribunals.140 The 
tribunals should avoid deciding as if the host States and investors used (or should have 
used) the FET standard as a primary guidepost for their behaviour, as it is questionable 
if that corresponds with reality. In many ways, a normative preference for respecting the 
realistic perspective of these key actors – State and investors - should complement the 
fact that the mandate of the tribunal stems from an IIA and that the applicable standard 
is international.141 The source of the mandate should still not result in some peculiar 
‘IIA/FET worldview’ that ignores the realities of business and administrative 
operations. 
 
The expectation of domestic law applicability is certainly not the same as the 
expectation of its importance for tribunal’s deliberations. From a formal viewpoint, at 
least the host State is expected to be aware of the existence of the FET standard 
obligation and its content as an international standard. In many situations it is certainly 
practically aware of these as well, as are many foreign investors.142 But this awareness 
alone detracts little from a normative position that even in those situations the parties 
will likely first and foremost strive to comply with domestic law – if for nothing else 
because the FET sub-principles are often simply too open-textured (and sometimes 
unequally interpreted) so as to provide guidance. 
 
Expectations discussed here, to be clear, are not the same issue as just the 
operation of the doctrine of legitimate expectations, although they certainly affect this 
issue.143 What is at play here is a broader question of the initial approach to the relevant 
legal framework in light of the actual or at least presumed expectations of the involved 
parties. This is also independent of the existence of a specific investment contract with 
the host State. The existence of such a contract certainly has a large (or sometimes 
determinative) influence on the resolution of a dispute. However, it does not in itself 
answer the question if for matters not regulated by the contract, an investor and 
																																																						
140 See also Grigera Naón 2014, 105 for the importance of parties’ expectations for the decision-making 
process. 
141 As Alvarez notes, there is a viewpoint in doctrine in international adjudication suggesting that 
investment dispute settlers should keep to their regime-specific law that they are ‘licensed’ to apply (2013, 
161). 
142 See in that sense remarks of Mark Kantor in Orr 2007, 2. 
143 See also Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
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domestic decision-makers are to look to IIL as a primary guidepost or to the national 
legal system, with the IIA being just one (and admittedly, rather small) part of it.144  
 
The aim here is to make a more abstract normative point - one that deals with an 
arguably more common scenario where the FET standard protection becomes relevant 
ex post facto only.145 To show the reasons why it is warranted to ascribe an important 
complementing role to the domestic rule of law framework, the following sections will 
examine some existing empirical research on the actual expectations of investors and 
host States before engaging in a more general normative discussion.    
 
The expectations of investors 
 
Empirical research aimed at determining specifically investors’ attitudes towards 
the IIAs and standards contained therein is still relatively scarce. However, the existing 
empirical research, as well as anecdotal experience, shows that at least for a large 
number of foreign investors the knowledge of rules, jurisprudence and even existence 
of IIL is not a priori a given.146 With the immense variety of foreign investors today,147 it 
would be rather optimistic to presume that all will have specialised legal assistance in 
this area, let alone to such a degree that investment protection becomes a predominant 
factor in assessing legal and/or political risks.148 But perhaps more importantly, even 
when the knowledge about this protection exists (as will be shortly addressed), the 
belief in its ability to secure the rule of law is far from entrenched. 
 
For example, a 2007 survey of 602 MNCs operating worldwide,149 showed that 
about a quarter were not influenced by IIAs at all, nearly half saw their importance as 
																																																						
144 This is also not a question that can be resolved by simple examination the applicable law clause of the 
investment contract. As extensively discussed in doctrine, the relationship between contracts and IIAs is 
far more complex (see for example Dumberry 2012). 
145 See remarks of Krishan in Orr 2007, 6 and also Wälde 2007, 64. 
146 See Yackee 2011, 427 and particularly fn 125. See generally also Wälde 2008 (‘Investment protection 
perhaps should be high on the priority of the negotiators and drafters, both in government and with the 
investor, but it is often not the chief concern’). 
147 See on the rising importance of small and medium enterprises as foreign investors OECD 2004 and 
Pu/Zheng 2015. 
148 To note, this section is not mainly focused on expertise that the major law firms in this field might 
have, as they are, as Picker notes, crucial players in forming the legal culture of IIL in general (Picker 
2013, 45-47). Socio-legal research in any case tends to indicate that the influence of law on business 
behaviour is far from unambiguous, and that the attenuated link is even more present regarding 
international law (Yackee 2008a, 807; Yackee 2011, 431-433). 
149 See generally Kekic/Sauvant 2007 and in particular Shinkman 2007. 
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limited and only 19% considered that IIAs influence their investment decision to a great 
extent.150 A more recent British Institute of International and Comparative Law/Hogan 
Lovells survey of 301 senior executives of multinational corporations focused on their 
investment decisions, and in particular the role of the rule of law in the process.151 It 
showed that 95% of respondents felt national laws were ‘essential’ (66% of 
respondents) or ‘very important’ (29% respondents) in securing rights, property and 
security. The BITs were still ranked high, as expected, at 76% respondents considering 
them ‘essential’ or ‘very important’ but, as the survey notes, the ‘intensity of feeling is 
lower’.152 Only 9% of respondents saw BITs as ‘essential’.  
 
As concluded, ‘the treatment of investments by a host country’s national legal system 
remain a key factor influencing FDI decisions.’153 Many companies invested in relevant 
markets even without IIAs in force (despite claiming they were ‘essential’)154 and actual 
research into IIA existence was far from a regular occurrence with determinative 
results.155 Likewise, despite a generally cautious view on the rule of law levels in the 
region, answers on Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate that significant number of 
respondents indicated that the existence of IIAs was not of particular importance for 
investment, with only 20% of respondents feeling that BITs would be effective in 
securing the rule of law.156 
 
Somewhat relatedly, Jason Yackee investigated the attitude towards the IIAs of 
for-profit business consultants, political risk insurance providers and general counsel of 
large US corporations.157 Briefly, Yackee concluded that evidence suggest that ‘BITs do 
not meaningfully influence FDI decisions.’158 The impact of IIAs on political risk ratings 
																																																						
150 Shinkman 2007, 96. 
151 However, for caution on using multinational corporations as proxies for foreign investors generally see 
remarks of Schill in Orr 2007, 2 and 6-7 and Baetens 2015, 3. 
152 ibid, 7. See relatedly UNCTAD 2009, 7-9. 
153 BIICL 2015, 10 (emphasis added). The concerns about the domestic legal system are, if possible, 
addressed by investment contracts and not left to the IIAs (see generally Dumberry 2012 and also Yackee 
2008a, 811-812). Somewhat similar conclusions can also be derived from the survey of 96 CEOs of 
affiliate firms seated in South Eastern Europe and CIS, where the predominant number confirmed that 
the enhanced legal environment, and domestic rule of law more broadly, were critical factors for their 
operation (see UNCTAD 2009, 13-14 for the summary). 
154 BIICL 2015, 10. 
155 ibid. 
156 ibid, 10-11. 
157 See Yackee 2011, 399-400. 
158 ibid, 400. 
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was not statistically significant or was, at best, minuscule.159 Concerning political risk 
insurers, the data indicated largely non-existent or at best slight influence of the BIT 
existence on the insurance cover or premium.160 Finally, responses from 75 general 
counsel respondents from US Fortune 500 companies indicated a ‘low level of 
familiarity with BITs, a pessimistic view of their ability to protect against adverse host 
state actions, and a low level of influence over FDI decisions.’161 Summarizing the 
existing research in 2009, UNCTAD concluded that within their ‘limited role’ as foreign 
investment determinants IIAs can influence a company’s decision where to invest 
(although less than broader free trade and investment agreements).162 
 
More anecdotal evidence provides some interesting insights as well.163 
Experienced practitioners expressed a view that the existence of a BIT played a 
negligible, if any, role in a decision to commit capital – being rather a ‘footnote’ in a 
report for the Board.164 At the same time, however, Thomas Wälde expressed a view 
that not taking investment treaty protection/arbitration into account when planning 
investments would be no less than ‘a sign of negligent management and counsel’.165  
 
The above should suggest a cautious approach to considering the ubiquitously 
present FET standard as some sort of primary rule of law securer in the eyes of foreign 
investors.166 This coincides with the caution about the idea that host States themselves 
create (or are aware they should create) some forms of IIA-based ‘enclaves of justice’167 
for foreign investors in their everyday operation. 
 
The expectations of host States 
 
If the host States are expected to respond to obligations such as the FET 
standard by adjusting their legal order and ensuring ex ante compliance, then 
																																																						
159 ibid, 421. 
160 ibid, 425-426. 
161 ibid, 429. 
162 UNCTAD 2009, xii and xiv. See also Joubin-Bret/Rey/Weber 2011, 22-23. 
163 See generally Orr 2007. 
164 See contributions of Krishan and Dundas in Orr 2007, 2 and 6. 
165 Wälde in Orr 2007, 10. 
166 See also UNCTAD 2009, xi-xii; Garcia-Bolivar 2009b, 474 and Baetens 2015, 2 for views that IIAs 
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governments ought to understand the scope and meaning of required guarantees.168 Very 
relevant empirical research recently conducted by Mavluda Sattorova, which includes 
several case-studies in countries already exposed to ISDS claims, does not seem to 
indicate that this understanding occurred. Government officials at central, regional and 
local level all seem to be equally ‘rarely if at all aware of the fact that their behaviour 
may lead to host State liability’.169 While it is certainly hard to generalize these 
conclusions, and much more empirical work is required in this field, there is reason for 
caution in considering IIL as being able to clearly steer host States towards what the 
‘international rule of law’ would require from them. This can also cast doubt as to its 
potential to transform domestic governance,170 and further indicate the need to have 
recourse to the domestic rule of law framework.171 
 
The reaction of host States to ISDS would rather seem to encompass either a 
cessation in IIA conclusion,172 or the switch towards (over-)cautious behaviour due to 
uncertainty. The uncertainty that the operation of ISDS brings to the domestic 
decision-making is not just an abstract concern.173 While admittedly still limited, there is 
empirical evidence of the doctrinally espoused decision-makers’ ‘fear’ of review that 
results in ‘defensive’ practices aimed at minimizing risk instead of improving quality of 
decisions made.174 It should be noted that in general obtaining empirical evidence on 
events that did not occur (e.g. the non-adoption of a measure due to ISDS claim fears) is 
difficult.175 With that in mind, and the caution about overgeneralizations,176 it is indeed 
possible to identify situations in which the ‘mere risk of liability under an investment 
treaty has been sufficient to dissuade states from maintaining measures that may well 
have been investment treaty compliant.’177  
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To the extent that empirical record exists, it thus does not indicate that there is a 
clear picture as to what the FET and other standards do or are meant to do for the 
content and quality of the rule of law that is to be provided to the foreign investor. 
Rather, there seems to exists a varying level of awareness about the existence of 
obligations, definite uncertainty about the actual requirements that their content entails, 
and a relatively sceptical assessment of their ability to secure the rule of law in some 
‘internationalized’ form. It is thus not much of a surprise that IIL does not seem to be 
‘the’ factor host State decision makers and foreign investors turn to, despite potentially 
costly consequences.178 
 
Normative considerations 
 
The empirical insights above suggest the strong importance of the domestic (rule 
of) law considerations for expectations and behaviour of both host State organs and 
foreign investors. This should suggest the tribunals to put themselves, to the extent 
possible and leaving aside here the issues of deference, in the position of the domestic 
decision-makers facing the (holistically understood) national legal framework.179 The 
actions of these actors are likely to be guided by the FET standard obligations only to a 
limited (if any) extent – making it normatively questionable to use such a provisions as 
an exclusive ex post facto examination prism. As Salacuse notes, the principal issue in 
investment protection is mostly whether domestic decision-makers ‘really function in 
accordance with the [domestic] legislative scheme […] efficiently, effectively, and 
fairly?’180 
 
It is admittedly not a given that domestic decision-makers should be shown 
leniency regarding the extent to which they should account for the FET and other 
obligations in addition to just the domestic ‘legislative scheme’. Having a two-track 
model of requirements imposed on a domestic actor by international and national law is 
																																																						
178 See in that sense also Wälde 2008. 
179 This can in a way also be compared to the constitutional adjudication as described by Alex Stone 
Sweet – ‘constitutional judges will evaluate the decision-making processes of that legislature or that judge. 
They will put themselves in the latter’s shoes, and walk through these processes, step-by-step basis. The 
judges will, in effect, expect those whose decision-making is being controlled to have reasoned through 
the constitutional norms as the constitutional court has, and to have acted in accordance with the dictates 
of the law’ (2010a, 204). 
180 Salacuse 2000, 395-396. 
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certainly nothing unusual. However, the specificities discussed in this and previous 
chapters warrant caution. Here is how the process of obeying international law is 
sometimes described in a more classical model of two-track obligations: 
[…] all around the world […] public officials routinely conduct their business 
within the framework of international law, and corporate officers and individuals, 
to the fast-increasing extent that they engage with international law, also do so. […] 
the rules of international law largely spell out the normal way in which international 
transactions are conducted-the rules and principles that are tacitly accepted as the 
grammar of international bureaucracies, both public and private-so that in most 
cases it would require a conscious effort to act contrary to international law.181 
 
Furthermore, when international law rules are to be applied within a State, in 
many (or even most) cases they are translated into ‘purely’ domestic law.182 Thereby 
most international rules cannot work without the constant help and support of national 
legal systems,183 and the national implementation of international rules is of crucial 
importance.184  
 
However, neither the ‘effortless’ compliance with the international rules nor the 
reliance on domestic transposition are a given in the case of the FET standard. As for 
the transposition, there are scarcely any attempts in comparative practice to institute 
specific codes of (e.g.) administrative behaviour to deal with foreign investors.185 What 
Lowe calls above an ‘account of international law as it is applicable within [a] State’ for 
the purposes of the public administration186 would seem to be a very daunting prospect 
concerning the FET standard, let alone IIL more generally. The conclusion that host 
States need to ensure that their national laws do in fact secure the rights granted under 
IIAs187 is without a doubt correct in principle, just very elusive in practice.  
 
																																																						
181 Lowe 2015a, 19 (emphasis added). 
182 Cassese 2005, 29. 
183 ibid.  
184 ibid, 217. There are also claims in doctrine of a general duty to bring national law into conformity with 
international law, but this is questionable. See ibid, 218 and Nollkaemper 2011, 11. 
185 Leaving aside national laws on protection of foreign investors which largely follow the wording of 
IIAs (see generally https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/foreign_direct_investment, accessed 1 February 
2017), the only developments in that regard have been attempts to institute internal processes of sharing 
information about IIA obligations between government branches and agencies. However, this is limited 
to only a handful of examples and there is little empirical information on the effect of such mechanisms 
(see UNCTAD 2010a, 66-74 and Bonnitcha 2014, 71).  
186 Lowe 2015a, 37. It is similar to ‘judge over your shoulder’ guidance documents as existing for example 
in the UK (see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/judge-over-your-shoulder, accessed 1 
February 2017). 
187 Lowe 2015a, 54. See similarly Echandi 2011, 19 and 21-22. 
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Could perhaps a way out be found if a decision-maker, well informed of State’s 
obligations, attempts to directly ‘conform’ to ISDS jurisprudence regarding the FET 
standard? As Chapter 2 sought to illustrate, while this would be desirable, the task 
would still be a somewhat unenviable one. Especially bearing in mind the often-
emphasised need for ‘administrative workability’,188 the existing jurisprudence often 
leaves much to be desired. As the Genin award indicates, there might be little in terms of 
‘international’ to try and comply with in the first place.189 
 
This is hardly beneficial for foreign investors either, regardless of how their 
position might be seen as enhanced by having the ISDS option as a form of leverage.190 
This leverage might indeed be a sub-par replacement for achieving more ex ante 
certainty in dealing with domestic administration. As Bonnitcha notes: 
[r]espect for the rule of law requires that discretionary power should only be 
exercised to the extent that it is conferred by law and that it be constrained by open, 
stable and general rules governing its exercise. The fact that a foreign investor does 
not know how a future discretion will be exercised is entirely consistent with the 
rule of law, so long as the investor is capable of knowing the rules and procedures 
that will govern its exercise.191 
 
Thinking of the FET standard as a reliance-worthy provision illuminated with 
sufficiently detailed rules is not only an empirically dubious proposition, but to a certain 
extent turns on its head the regular process of reasoning in risk assessment.192 Both the 
investor and the host State decision-makers would seemingly be expected to base their 
assessments of legal risks on the (considerably vague) principles and rules that would be 
applied in case that: a) there is a dispute; that b) escalates to the costly level of 
investment arbitration.193 It is not only problematic that in practice parties to any 
																																																						
188 See for the administrative workability Breyer 2000, 140-142, noting that constitutional judges 
‘recognize that their decisions will have to be understood and applied by thousands of judges and lawyers 
and public officials to hundreds of different laws.’ (142). See also for a call for improved reasoning of 
ISDS awards so to better guide the behaviour of States and investors Ortino 2012, 34. 
189 It is relevant to note that empirical research (see generally Halliday 2004) and doctrine affirm that 
clearer and more consistent law has proportionally greater impact on the behaviour of public 
functionaries (Cane 2004, 452).  
190 See for example Poulsen/Bonnitcha/Yackee 2015, 23-24 and Koskenniemi 2017, 351. See also 
Schreuer et al. 2009, para. 30. For a cautious assessment, see Wälde 2007, 62. 
191 Bonnitcha 2014, 297. 
192 See for more on legal risks and IIL Stephan 2014, 357-358 and on the inconsistent ISDS jurisprudence 
as a threat to risk assessment by investors Schill 2011c, 66. 
193 See in that sense remarks by several contributors in Orr 2007, 2 and similarly Muchlinski 2013, 438. 
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venture rarely anticipate that a dispute will arise.194 It is also doubtful that more ex ante 
interest and research will be put by an investor into a potentially applicable IIA and 
accompanying ISDS jurisprudence than into numerous other issues such as the 
expediency of administration, simplicity of procedures and general effectiveness of 
courts.195 As Mairal observed, ‘between a government and private parties, respect for 
the expectations that arise from [IIAs] is but the ‘‘last step’’. In international investment 
cases this ‘‘last step’’ has been taken with great emphasis’.196 
 
The complementarity of the FET and other provisions of the domestic rule of law 
processes197 thus needs to be taken seriously in normative and practical terms. As 
recognized in the ICSID Convention preamble, investment disputes ‘would usually be 
subject to national legal processes’ – and ISDS is to be seen as appropriate only in some 
cases.198 Properly understood complementarity is what ought to feature in the legal 
reasoning process of the tribunals. As Paul Stephen argues, States committed to ISDS 
‘should be presumed to expect and desire an objective and informed review of municipal 
law’.199 This expectation should be followed through, with a caveat that municipal law 
can and should be understood in a holistic manner. 
 
There is however another, broader, expectation which underlies the IIL regime 
and should thus guide the FET standard interpretation and application as well. As the 
following section argues, the host State expectation of economic development lies at the core 
of the IIL regime. This expectation should be given fuller effect through the emphasis 
on strengthening the national rule of law in the FET standard decision-making. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
194 Similarly Schneider 2015, 4 noting that if the investors knew of the likely dispute they would most 
likely not invest at all. See also similarly Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 465 and the remark of Metalclad owner, Mr 
Heller, that he would not have gone to law if he had known the meagre outcome (Orr 2007, 12). See also 
Yackee 2011, 435 and particularly highly illustrative text in fn 150. 
195 See in that sense Salacuse 2000, 386-387 and also Orr 2007, 2 and 10. 
196 Mairal 2010, 450. 
197 See in that sense UNCTAD 2012b, 133-136; UNCTAD 2015, 125-126. 
198 See also Schreuer et al. 2009, para. 17. 
199 Stephen 2014, 371. 
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3.6. Economic development as the goal of investment protection 
 
The final normative reason for according due consideration to the NROL 
paradigm is that it more profoundly realizes the underlying IIL goal of economic 
development.200 There is a strong argument that the ultimate goal of States when 
entering into IIAs is to achieve economic development, and to realize this goal the 
focus on the national rule of law is at least as important as the international version.201 In 
that context, focus will first be on the economic development as the arguable telos of the 
IIL regime, and then on why the concurrent emphasis on national rule of law 
strengthening is a normatively desirable path to achieve it.  
 
Some preliminary remarks are in order. This section looks at the broader 
normative underpinnings of the IIL regime, and its effect on the FET decision-making. 
However, even from a more formal perspective that is focused on the object and 
purpose of IIAs, it is at least plausible to insist on the goal of economic development. 
Furthermore, for the present purposes economic development is defined as a process by 
which a nation improves the economic, political, and social well-being of its people. While 
the definition of economic development is certainly open to differing interpretations,202 
the crucial point (following Amartya Sen) is that economic development is different from 
economic activity or growth and encompasses efforts to improve the general well-being as 
opposed to strictly business interests.203 
  
3.6.1. Economic development as the ultimate goal of IIL 
 
The relationship between IIL, FDI and economic development can be 
approached from different legal, empirical and policy angles.204 Looking specifically at 
the economic development as the overall telos of IIL, however, relevant normative and 
																																																						
200 For a similar argument concerning the FET and the rule of law, see Schill 2010b, 176-181. 
201 As Kurtz (2014, 269) notes, the type of authority delegated to arbitral tribunals - ‘constrained agent 
function’ – supports the view that states expect arbitrators to exercise authority closely in line with state 
preferences and objectives, which would arguably in this case be the economic development objective. 
202 See for example Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 602-605. 
203 For a relatively brief overview, see above all Sen 1983. For a longer discussion, see Sen 2001. See 
similarly Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 588 and 604. 
204 See, for example, contributions in Cordonier Segger/Gehring/Newcombe 2011.  
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legal points have been put forward relatively recently by Garcia-Bolivar, Ortino, and 
Kleinheisterkamp.205  
 
In many ways, the quid pro quo question lies at the core – why should the host 
States accept potentially considerable sovereignty limitations in favour of foreign 
investors?206 Answering this question reaches critical importance in the light of the 
open-textured provisions such as those in the FET standard and the need to have 
recourse to teleological considerations of ‘object and purpose’.207 While these have been 
touched upon in the context of interpretation in the previous Chapter, they will here be 
revisited also in the context of the broader normative orientation of the IIL regime. To 
briefly reiterate, as per VCLT Article 31 (1), the object and purpose of an international 
treaty is one of the primary guides for interpreting its provisions – and that object and 
purpose is usually sought within the preambles of IIAs.208 
 
However, the preambles do not necessarily provide a clear answer for the IIL 
regime overall. Generalizing over roughly 3000 IIAs is not a simple task.209 Still, the 
texts of the preambles do tend to exhibit broad similarities that make at least some 
general conclusions possible.210 A recurring feature is the simultaneous emphasis on a) 
protection of foreign investors; b) enhancement of FDI flows and c) broader economic 
development and prosperity. A typical modern IIA preamble includes both the 
reference to ‘favourable conditions for greater investment’ and a recognition that ‘reciprocal 
protection […] of such investments will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business 
initiative and will increase prosperity in both States.’211 The treaties thus generally refer to 
both the desire to encourage economic cooperation and the role that protecting 
investments has in that regard, with some newer model BITs also including a specific 
aim to improve living standards.212  
 
																																																						
205 See also similarly Radi 2013, 7. 
206 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 807; Ortino 2013a, 439-440; Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 587. 
207 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 803-804. See also Garcia-Bolivar 2009b, 482. 
208 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 29-30; Bonnitcha 2014, 40; Ortino 2013a, 439-440. For some examples in the 
ISDS jurisprudence see Noble Ventures v Romania, para 52; Saluka v Czech Republic, para. 299; Kardassopoulos 
v Georgia, paras 178–81; Austrian Airlines v Slovakia, paras. 101-104. 
209 See in that sense Ortino 2013a, 440. 
210 See generally Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 30 and McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, 2.10-2.13. 
211 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 29 (emphasis added). See similarly Behrens 2007, 171; Van Harten 2007, 140; 
Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 594-595. 
212 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, 2.10 and 2.13. 
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Summarizing broadly the IIA landscape, Federico Ortino argues that: 
the object and purpose of a standard bilateral investment treaty […] is to ensure 
the protection of foreign investments (object of the BIT) in order to intensify 
economic cooperation, encourage/promote international capital flows and increase 
the prosperity of both contracting parties (purpose of the BIT).213 
 
The simultaneous existence (or lack) of different imperatives in the preambles 
thus limits their usefulness for decisively ascertaining the telos of IIL and applying it in 
interpretation. As Kleinheisterkamp notes, ‘the basic principles of how to determine the 
‘‘object and purpose’’ are far from clear, and even more so what the actual telos 
eventually is’.214 Critically, the application of the IIA provisions requires a ‘much clearer 
picture of the normative foundations for developing investment treaty law’.215 
 
The consequences of the lack of clarity in this area are visible in case law.216 A 
number of awards (not necessarily in the FET context, but instructive nevertheless) 
focused primarily on the investment protection objective.217 These share a view that 
foreign investments’ protection is such a dominant object of IIAs that it requires 
interpreting their provisions (and ambiguities) in a way most favourable to the 
investor.218 However, a number of awards suggest restraint for practical and legitimacy 
reasons as overly pro-investor interpretations can fuel the ‘backlash’ against IIL.219 
Going further, there are also calls for putting more emphasis in decision-making on 
encouraging the foreign investments in general.220 Finally, a number of cases exhibit the 
purpose-oriented view where foreign investment promotion is not ‘an end in itself’, but 
rather an instrument for economic growth and development.221 
 
																																																						
213 Ortino 2013a, 441-442. See similarly Paparinskis 2015a, 667. 
214 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 810. As is also noted, the blame for this is sometimes put on the governments 
and their inability to make preambles more instructive (ibid.) Yet, this is indeed hard to square with the 
empirically suggested lack of awareness as to how IIAs will actually perform in practice (ibid), an issue 
that has been discussed in Chapter 1. 
215 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 802. Similarly Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 587 and 595. 
216 See also for a short overview Hepburn 2017, 64-65. 
217 For a particularly poignant argument in favour of such an approach, see Alvarez/Khamsi 2009. 
218 See Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 803-804; van Aaken 2009a, 528-529; Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 601. Some 
prominent examples in jurisprudence include SGS v. Philippines, para. 116; Azurix v. Argentina, para. 307 
and Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine – Jurisdiction, para. 85. 
219 See generally in this sense Waibel/Kaushal/Chung 2010, Vagts 2010 and Van Harten 2010b. See also 
Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 30. 
220 See in that sense SGS v. Philippines para. 116 and in doctrine Salacuse 2015, 215-217 and Claussen 
2009, 1554. 
221 See for a summary Bonnitcha 2014, 40 and in particular Saluka v. Czech Republic, para. 300; Plama v. 
Bulgaria – Award, para. 167. For an early award in that sense see Amco v. Indonesia, para 249. 
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The often vague nature of both the preambles and the substantive provisions of 
IIAs such as the FET standard largely allow the broader normative arguments to 
ultimately determine where the focus of the arbitrators should be. Arguably, the primary 
focus on the investor protection or just the FDI attraction (without further 
developmental goals) becomes less appealing when all the normative considerations are 
weighed in. As Kleinheisterkamp notes, ‘teleological interpretation cannot follow a 
simplistic ‘‘more [in favour of the protected party] is better’’ logic, as the much more 
comprehensive understanding of the telos is required by the broader context of IIL.222 
 
This more comprehensive understanding leads toward the goal of economic 
development. As is sometimes noted, ‘[s]tates seek to attract foreign investments 
because they are a means to promote, foster and finance the welfare of their people and 
their development’.223 Even if sometimes unarticulated, economic development remains 
the central rationale behind participating in the IIL regime, and is as such indispensable 
for a fair solution of investor-State disputes.224 
 
The importance of development also becomes clearer in light of the broader 
context in which IIAs came into being. The crucial role of the World Bank – institution 
dedicated to fostering global development – provides indications in that sense.225 The 
goal of development has been ‘essential for the efforts to justify the creation of the 
modern system of investment protection through arbitral tribunals’.226 For example, the 
ICSID Convention preamble opens with the Contracting States ‘[c]onsidering the need 
for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private international 
investment therein’.227 The leading ICSID Convention commentary makes it clear in no 
uncertain terms that ‘[t]he Convention’s primary aim is the promotion of economic 
development.’228 A link to economic growth and development can also be found in the 
																																																						
222 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 805 and 807. 
223 Garcia-Bolivar 2009b, 473. See similarly Hepburn 2017, 64 for whom the objectives of IIL extend to 
‘encouraging the development of the host state, promoting respect for the rule of law, and increasing 
general welfare’. See also Mitchell/Sheargold/Voon 2016, 27-28. 
224 Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 587. 
225 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 808; Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 591-592. See on the World Bank development and 
rule of law objectives Krever 2011. 
226 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 809. See also similarly Landau 2009, 200-201; Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 20-21 
and Wälde 2007, 72-73. 
227 See also the Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 809-810 for the words of Aron Broches, a key figure in the 
Convention adoption, on the crucial importance of international investment for economic development 
and the role of World Bank in impartially removing the obstacles to these investments. 
228 Schreuer et al. 2009, para. 11. See similarly Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 590-591. 
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Energy Charter Treaty preamble and Article 2.229 Similar conclusions can also be drawn 
from the preamble of NAFTA.230 
 
The emphasis on the role of FDI found in the ICSID Convention preamble 
indicates its instrumental nature. This also suggests that, normatively, it is also not the 
FDI per se that should be the ultimate goal. As noted above, economic activity itself 
(here manifesting itself in foreign investment) does not necessarily equal development 
or prosperity – it needs to be regulated and channelled to improve welfare.231 This 
regulation, as is sometimes claimed, is the very raison d’etre of the existence of the State – 
and cannot be ignored in the ISDS context either.232 That FDI does not equal 
development is suggested also by the voluminous literature on how to translate foreign 
investments into measurable improvements of different developmental aspects.233 
 
Concluding on these issues, Kleinheisterkamp states that: 
[i]t is therefore arguable that international investment law derives its normative 
legitimacy from the logic that investment should be protected, not for the sake of 
individual economic interests but for the purpose of contributing to enhancing 
social welfare. Translated into normative terms, this would mean that the ideal 
aimed at by the relevant telos is that of an investment protection system that grants 
privileges (restrictions to the exercise of state sovereignty) to the degree necessary 
to obtain that goal – but not more. […] investment treaty law must serve an 
objective beyond the optimisation of investment flows and profits […]234 
 
Along similar lines, Federico Ortino notes that:  
the fundamental point here is that the purpose of the treaty is the contracting 
parties’ prosperity rather than the protection of foreign investors. This approach is 
in principle neutral with regard to the pro-investor or pro-State outcome of the 
interpretative exercise carried out by investment tribunals.235  
 
 
																																																						
229 See for a comment also Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 592. 
230 ibid, 592-593. 
231 See Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 810 and in particular fn 82. See also Halle/Peterson 2005, 17-18. 
232 Garcia-Bolivar 2012, 588. See also Kurtz 2014, 263-264. 
233 See in the IIL context above all De Schutter/Swinnen/Wouters 2013; Colen/Maertens/Swinnen 2013; 
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To the extent that the economic development is indeed the telos of IIL, this can 
suggest manifold potential insights for ISDS decision-making that go beyond just 
substantive deliberations and the FET standard.236 But for the purposes of this chapter 
the important question is what does it mean in terms of the rule of law sub-principles of 
the FET standard? Or more specifically, is it warranted to put an equally strong focus 
on the national rule of law paradigm so to achieve economic development? 
  
3.6.2. The national rule of law as a preferable path to economic development 
 
Preliminary remarks 
 
Few further remarks are in order. Firstly, it is not within the scope of this thesis 
to examine whether FDI itself is conducive to economic development.237 The 
assumption adopted is that the host States, by signing IIAs, do see FDI as desirable and 
do consider it significant for their economic development, however that development is 
understood.238  
Secondly, it is widely held that the rule of law generally benefits economic 
development, and that is the assumption adopted here. While there are certainly 
important caveats to be borne in mind,239 the importance of the rule of law for 
economic development more generally is almost axiomatic in most economic circles, 
followed closely by the legal ones.240 Theoretical and empirical economic studies tend to 
support similar conclusions.241  
Thirdly, however, it is important to note that literature discussing the rule of law 
																																																						
236 See, for example, the effect on defining a protected investment Garcia-Bolivar 2009b, 482-483. 
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4-5; Guthrie 2013, 1159 and in particular authors cited in fn 33. 
 
165 
and FDI attraction/economic development does not generally differentiate between the 
international or national concepts of the rule of law, but rather considers the rule of law 
in a particular State, regardless of how it is ‘provided’ to business entities. What matters 
for most authors are the particular rule of law elements that need to be present. 
Whether or not these elements are achieved through more ‘international’ or ‘purely 
domestic’ institutions does not seem to be a key distinction. Simply put, whether the 
host State (e.g.) fully respects and efficiently enforces contractual rights due to a special 
regime for foreign investors and out of fear of ISDS, or because it is simply due to their 
domestic tradition is ultimately of secondary importance. It is the outcome that matters 
in the end. 
But for the ISDS decision-makers this is not a secondary consideration. 
Arbitrators can put their efforts into examining if and how the domestic rule of law 
mechanisms failed a foreign investor. They can alternatively apply/further develop an 
international ‘set’ of rule of law precepts not in the least because the domestic ones are 
a priori perceived as insufficient or simply legally irrelevant. These are substantively 
different processes, and a general choice needs to be made - whether exclusive or 
complementary paths are to be taken. There are at least three normative reasons why in 
the ‘rule of law for economic development’ context the NROL paradigm should be 
pursued in complementarity with the IROL one. 
The national rule of law, FET and economic development 
The first reason overlaps to an extent with the discussion in section 3.5. Namely, 
to provide the elements of the rule of law that foreign investors tend to expect, focusing 
on the national rule of law is a strongly desirable option. What do the foreign investors 
expect in that sense? In addition to the findings already discussed, the BIICL/Hogan 
Lovells report indicates that the rule of law was found to be ‘essential’ or ‘very 
important’ for investing for 88% of participants, topped only by ‘ease of doing business’ 
(a factor potentially also related to the rule of law) and ‘stable political environment’.242 
Summarizing these and many other findings, the survey offers an important lesson to 
host States: 
For states seeking to attract FDI, one of the key messages that emerges from the 
survey is that the Rule of Law matters, acting not only to pull investment in, but 
also to push it away when Rule of Law conditions are not satisfactory. […] There 
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is a clear need for states to take steps to improve their domestic Rule of Law 
institutions, not only by establishing clear rules and policies, but also by improving 
the efficacy with which state officials enforce them.243  
 
As Salacuse has noted in a somewhat Weberian vein, it is the predictability and 
stability that is primarily sought by the foreign investors when it comes to the rule of 
law – ‘[i]nvestors who know the law can plan’.244 As has been elaborated in both this 
and the previous chapter, if ‘knowing the law’ is sought, focusing on the national (rule 
of) law is a normatively important path. 
Secondly, focusing too much on only building the substantive content of IIA 
provisions such as the FET standard should be tempered by the fact that IIAs 
themselves have not been empirically proven to actually increase FDI (and 
consequently economic development). Decades of empirical research on the specific 
link between the IIAs and the FDI increase have simply failed to provide a 
consensus.245 The existing research cannot sufficiently persuasively prove the correlation 
between IIAs and increased FDI flows.246 Studies finding such correlation,247 are 
countered by those that find no248 or weak correlation,249 those that indicate that IIAs 
simply form one part of the overall environment250 or that specificities of a particular 
economic sector actually play a more important role in FDI attraction.251 Increase in the 
‘strength’ of IIA provisions also does not seem to be associated with increased 
investment.252 Anecdotal evidence, at least the one from an early stage of the ISDS rise, 
hardly provides clearer results.253 
In other words, there is a risk to focus too much on an unproven method – and 
too little on the national rule of law. IIAs and their standards are on their own at best just 
																																																						
243 ibid, 11 (emphasis added). 
244 Salacuse 2000, 398-399. 
245 Guthrie 2013, 1156-1157; UNCTAD 2009, xiii. 
246 For a good overview of numerous positions, see generally Sauvant/Sachs 2009. See also Van Harten 
2010d, 30-32; Muchlinski 2011, 14; Baetens 2015, 2. 
247 Büthe/Milner 2009; Neumayer/Spess 2005; Salacuse/Sullivan 2005. It is worth noting, however, that 
in normative terms Büthe and Milner do not support IIAs as a policy measure due to sovereignty costs 
(2009, 213-214). 
248 Hallward-Driemeier 2003. 
249 Tobin/Rose-Ackerman 2003. Similarly Yackee 2008b. 
250 UNCTAD 2009, xi-xii; Rose-Ackerman/Tobin 2009. 
251 Aisbett 2009; Colen/Persyn/Guariso 2014. 
252 Yackee 2008a, 807. 
253 Franck 2007, 347-348. Some empirical research from 1970’s and 80’s tends to confirm a degree of 
ignorance about IIL in general, but its age might urge caution in drawing broader conclusions. See Yackee 
2008a, 810. 
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one part of the FDI/economic development equation and, at worst, even a potentially 
rather irrelevant one.254 The more recent UNCTAD publications on the topic display a 
similar view, where the IIAs are seen as the complements to general rule of law 
improvement. In summary, ‘[w]ith or without TNC participation, countries need to 
develop strong legal and regulatory systems [...] The creation of participatory, 
transparent and accountable governance systems that promote and enforce the rule of 
law is critical […]’.255  
Third and final reason is that the focus on the national rule of law allows to 
strengthen it for the benefit of all the relevant actors in the host State, domestic and 
foreign, and therefore to create preconditions for economic development in a more 
holistic and wider-reaching way.256 The examination, application and potential criticism 
of domestic law can be relevant for all those subject to it. This issue, also termed the 
‘spill-over’ effect, warrants a closer look as it is sometimes questioned in the doctrine.257  
The ‘spill-over’ effect 
 
Put briefly, if the ISDS awards finding the FET breach would incentivize the 
domestic officials to also fully follow the domestic rule of law framework, this reflects 
upon all the entities in the host State and should help promote development. A 
legitimate concern might be that the host State officials, primarily interested in avoiding 
costly liability, exhibit heightened levels of care and diligence only in dealing with the 
foreign investors. After all, it is not uncommon to see references to IIL and ISDS as 
isolated ‘enclaves of justice’,258 and opinions that ‘[t]he treaties address the treatment of 
foreign investors alone and are inherently indifferent to issues of the legal system that relate 
to the nationals of the host state.’259 As noted, the primary concern for IIL advocates 
was not the improvement of the host State governance – but the spill-over effects are 
now increasingly put forward as justifying its continued existence.260 
 
																																																						
254 See similarly Halle/Peterson 2005, 15-17 and Garcia-Bolivar 2009b, 474. 
255 UNCTAD 2008, 150. An early study in that sense is UNCTAD 1998; See similarly UNCTAD 2001, 5-
6 and 131-132; UNCTAD 2003c, 86. As UNCTAD 2009, xv makes clear - ‘IIAs alone cannot do the job’. 
256 Guthrie 2013, 1159-1160. 
257 ibid, 1180. See also recently for a somewhat cautious outlook Schneiderman 2017, 20. 
258 See in particular Paulsson 2007. 
259 Dolzer 2005, 954 (emphasis added). See similarly Carvalho 2016, 15. See also Schultz/Dupont 2015, 
1161. 
260 Sattorova 2015, 167-168. See Guthrie 2013, 1159-1160 and authors cited therein, in particular in fn 34; 
as well as Echandi 2011, 14-15 and Carvalho 2016, 15. 
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In addition to the discussion in section 3.5., it is warranted to make at least two 
remarks specifically on the ‘spill-over’ concerns. These would suggest that it is unlikely 
that potential rule of law benefits can be somehow isolated for foreign investors only, 
even if the host State would for any reason specifically aim for that scenario.261 
 
Firstly, as also exemplified by Genin, the factual matrix of the FET cases usually 
involves a legally domestic entity (even if foreign-owned) that is subject to domestic legal 
framework which is the same as for other domestic entities.262 While the host States 
might enact foreign investment protection laws, these laws are hardly in themselves 
autonomous ‘legal systems’ for the foreign investors – in substance they usually 
replicate IIA provisions, and are primarily relevant for the ISDS options they provide.263 
It seems that there yet needs to arise a case where a tribunal was to deal with, e.g., 
separate insolvency,264 or banking265 regulation for foreign investors – with the resulting 
hypothetical ruling being relevant just for this class of entities. While the decisions might 
be for the foreign investors’ ‘immediate benefit’266, there seems to be a recognition that 
‘clinical’ isolation of ISDS decision from domestic rule of law issues is hardly 
possible,267 and that the reform and modernization incentives coming out of these 
decisions relate to the domestic legal system in general.268 
 
Secondly, there is also a more jurisdiction-oriented consideration. Simply put, at a 
given point in time, a domestic decision-maker might not actually know if it is dealing 
with an IIA-protected foreign investor or not. Particularly in the more liberal 
investment regimes, ownership of domestic entities can change hands relatively easily.269 
It might be unrealistic to expect that a government official is always aware of the 
domestic/foreign status of a specific entity, and furthermore if that foreign status also 
grants specific protection. The intricacies of forum-shopping and the nationality 
requirements in ISDS jurisprudence reinforce this point further.270 It seems thus that 
																																																						
261 See similarly Schill 2015, 88-89. 
262 See in that sense Viñuales 2016, 4. 
263 See on this more in the Introduction to this thesis. 
264 As in Dan Cake v. Hungary, discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.7.2. 
265 As in Genin v. Estonia, discussed above. 
266 Ortino 2013a, 439. 
267 Schneiderman 2016, 151. 
268 Dolzer 2005, 971; Muchlinski/Ortino/Schreuer 2008, vi-vii. 
269 See on this Van Harten 2010d, 28-29. 
270 ibid; see also on these issues generally Schlemmer 2008; Schreuer 2009 and Thorn/Doucleff 2010. 
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the most prudent course would be to fully and diligently fulfil the national rule of law 
requirements in each case. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
The goal of providing the rule of law to foreign investors opens multiple paths to 
investment arbitrators, paths left open by the open-textured wording of the FET 
provisions and by the features of ISDS that have been discussed in previous chapters. A 
normatively appealing and so far largely followed path has been to pursue developing 
and applying a uniform set of substantive international rule of law sub-principles. These 
should, ideally, create a common ‘playing field’ for foreign investors across the globe. 
This, however, almost inevitably leads to keeping the principles considerably open-
textured and results in consequent extensive discretion of arbitrators. The concerns of 
vagueness and discretion have not so far seriously undermined the IROL paradigm in 
both practice or doctrine. They have rather led to multifarious reform proposals on 
how to keep the discretion and unpredictability within manageable limits, and/or how 
to effectuate further substantive development for the FET and other standards. 
 
Building upon the discussion in previous chapters, this Chapter has offered a 
normative case for further benefits that arise from complementation of the IROL 
paradigm with an NROL one. Whilst recognizing that the extensive discretion of 
arbitrators will likely remain present in the future, the legal reasoning process in 
exercising this discretion should be complemented with national rule of law concerns. 
While retaining the international rule of law and substantive system-building 
considerations, efforts of arbitrators should in parallel be aimed at strengthening the 
national rule of law in the host State.  
 
Four main reasons have been put forward for this complementation. First is the 
substantive richness of domestic law in comparison to open-textured and often still 
fledgling sphere of the FET standard. This developed nature can help a desirable ex ante 
discoverability of rules (as opposed to standards/principles) for both foreign investors 
and host State officials. Second reason is that giving due weight to a substantively rich 
constellation of national choices on how the rule of law should look like is further 
supported by the considerations of sovereignty, plurality and subsidiarity in 
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international law. It is a demonstration of respect for the right of the State to (within 
limits) opt for a particular vision of social and economic life on its territory. It is also a 
check on the too Western-centric understandings of what the rule of law should be.  
 
The third reason is that the primary importance of the domestic legal framework 
for regulating the normal (i.e. dispute-free) life of an investment should be seen as 
reasonably expected by both foreign investors and host State officials. This makes this 
framework a normatively justified reference point for examining the behaviour of the 
parties and limits the appearance of applying ex post facto derived standards. The final 
reason goes to the underlying telos of IIL and the expectations of host States in this 
sense. If, as it is strongly arguable, the ultimate goal of IIL should be effectuating the 
economic development in the participating States, then the focus on strengthening the 
national rule of law is a recommended path. Enhancing the national rule of law, among 
other advantages, helps achieve the goal of economic development more profoundly by 
making its benefits available to both foreign and domestic actors. 
 
This Chapter has thus sought to answer why the normative focus on the national 
rule of law is desirable. The chapters that follow will focus further on the more practical 
implications of translating these normative arguments into the FET standard decision-
making. Chapter 4 will focus on the creation and elaboration of the ideal-type model of the 
domestic rule of law as a basis for the NROL paradigm inclusion. Chapter 5 focuses on 
further elements of relevance for the legal reasoning process, namely the comparative 
benchmarks and the corrective good faith factors. Overall, the goal is therefore to elaborate the 
path that the complementary strengthening of the national rule of law can take in 
practice. 
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Chapter 4 – The ideal-type model of the domestic rule of law 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has laid out some of the key normative arguments for 
providing due emphasis on strengthening the national rule of law in decision-making 
under FET claims. This and the following chapter further explore the implications and 
the potential translation of this normative position into the practicalities of the legal 
reasoning process, building at the same time on the legal feasibility of such endeavour 
that was also discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
There is certainly a multitude of paths through which the investment tribunals 
can focus on strengthening the national rule of law, no less so in jurisdictional matters 
than on the merits.1 Even on substance, a comprehensive discussion would hardly be 
achievable within the scope of this thesis.2 With these caveats in mind, and without 
attempting to provide an exhaustive account of application to individual cases, this and 
the following Chapter will argue for three elements that should be present in the legal 
reasoning process of the tribunals deciding the FET claims through complementary 
IROL and NROL paradigms. These elements should help reaching persuasive decisions 
aimed at both protecting the foreign investor under international law, strengthening the 
national rule of law, and preserving an amount of flexibility necessary to provide fair 
outcomes in individual cases. Likewise, they should, depending to an extent on the 
specific factual matrix, be present regardless of the standard or method of review used 
by the tribunal in assessing the claim. 
 
The three elements proposed are a) the relating of the FET sub-principles to the 
ideal-type model of host State’s domestic rule of law; b) the use of comparative benchmarks to 
enhance persuasiveness and potentially provide additional guidelines for reform; c) the 
use of corrective good faith factors to secure the fairness of outcome in situations so 
																																																						
1 A prominent example in that sense would be the issues of corruption arising at the stage of establishing 
the investment. See for an overview primarily Llamzon 2014, as well as World Duty Free v. Kenya and Metal-
Tech v. Uzbekistan. 
2 Particular rule of law transgressions can also feature as relevant at the stage of compensation and costs 
determination. See Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan, para. 422. 
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requiring. The first element is the main topic of the present chapter, while the latter two 
will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Relating the FET sub-principles to the ideal-type model recognises their open-
textured substance and puts emphasis on the assessment whether host State decision-
makers respected their own pre-existing international and municipal law obligations. Section 4.1. 
lays out the foundation for such an approach as an implication of the normative 
arguments set out in the previous chapter. Section 4.2. deals with the method of 
constructing the ideal-type model and its potential elements, while the sections that 
follow examine different potential concerns, namely the relationship with the 
refinement of IIA standards through new treaty-making (4.3.), relationship with the 
applicable law in ISDS (4.4.), and with the standards and methods of review (4.5.). 
Section 4.6. will examine certain challenges in ascertaining the content of the ideal-type 
model, while section 4.7. will offer a case study (Dan Cake v. Hungary) as a support to 
the plausibility of the creation and elaboration of ideal-type models. Section 4.8. will 
offer some concluding remarks. 
 
 
4.2. The ideal-type model of the domestic rule of law – a foundation 
 
 
To reiterate, the jurisprudence-developed sub-principles of FET that see it as an 
embodiment of the international rule of law present the worthy starting point in 
assessing host State behaviour. In many ways, the IROL paradigm is necessary because 
its wholesale replacement with mere assessment under national law would likely be an 
unwise trade-off. While national law rules might be more predictable, it would still be 
normatively questionable to sacrifice the quality of the rule of law provided to foreign 
investors in order to realise the advantages of predictability. If the host State in question 
adopts (e.g.) the least demanding understanding of the rule of law – everything a State 
does is acceptable so long as it has a legal form3 - the possibility of constraining that 
State through IIAs would be severely limited, if not completely excluded.4 However, as 
the previous Chapter has touched upon, the national laws at least nominally exhibit rich 
																																																						
3 As sometimes termed the ‘Rule-by-Law’ – where everything that government does is consistent with the 
rule of law if given a legal form (Tamanaha 2004, 92).  
4 As Tamanaha observes, ‘understood in this way, the rule of law has no real meaning’ and excludes any 
sort of potential for external review and assessment (2004, 92; see similarly Reynolds 1989, 3 and Raz 
1979, 212-213). 
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substance and mechanisms to protect the rule of law.5 This is even more so if national 
legal frameworks are understood as encompassing the international obligations of the 
host State. Systematically relating to these frameworks and mechanism can limit the 
actual of apparent ex post imposition of rules, and allow the host State and investors 
firmer guidance for their mutual relations. Such a focus also limits the IROL paradigm 
challenge of generating consistent substantive rules in an unfavourable (decentralised) 
setting. 
 
The host States usually already have extensive international commitments to 
secure the rule of law domestically.6 IIAs, and FET in particular, essentially and 
substantially overlap with these protections.7 For example, they ‘overlap substantially 
with the rights protected in human rights treaties’,8 have cognates in other international 
commitments of the State,9 as well as in constitutional obligations.10 In practical terms, 
the chances are that a host State in dispute will be democratic,11 and will likely have a 
sufficiently advanced legal system where true lacunae rarely occur.12 There is arguably 
little that can be a priori put against juxtaposing, examining and utilizing the existing host 
State commitments in substantive decision-making.13  
 
These commitments would remain of little relevance if the host State’s behaviour 
was examined exclusively through the self-sufficient prism of FET sub-principles. 
																																																						
5 See Chapter 3, section 3.3. Also, in some cases, the deficiencies of the legal framework predating the 
IIAs are rectified through subsequent pinpointed reform (Guthrie 2013, 1192-1193). For the example of 
Algeria, see Mohammedi 2010, 401-405. 
6 Apart from the previous chapters, see also Guthrie 2013, 1165; Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 10; 
Krommendijk/Morijn 2009, 423 and 447. 
7 Brower/Schill 2009, 489. 
8 Brower/Blanchard 2014, 758. 
9 Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 10 and 18. 
10 See in particular Boisson de Chazournes and McGarry 2014, who note that the recourse to national 
constitutions ‘may be particularly helpful in, for example, determining whether the fair and equitable 
treatment standard has been breached by the denial of constitutional due process’ (865). For potential 
importance of constitutional provisions, see also Schill 2015b, 5; Schill 2016b, 314; Pérez Loose 2010, 
384; Mahmood 2013, 106 and Krommendijk/Morijn 2009, 423. 
11 Yackee 2012, 420 and materials cited therein (‘In most investment disputes, at least one directly 
interested state will be a full-fledged democracy, while the other state is likely to be at least partially 
democratic.’) 
12 Kjos 2013, 193-195. 
13 As Petersmann has noted, international adjudicative bodies facing competing private and public 
interests need to show respect for the ‘reality of constitutional pluralism’ that manifests itself in 
competing sources of commitments for the host State (2009b, 532). Kleinheisterkamp and Poulsen 
somewhat similarly advocate (in the TTIP context) a ‘fundamental principle’ that the ‘treaty will not 
include greater substantive investor rights than those enshrined in domestic laws’ so to prevent the 
arbitrators from re-striking the nationally determined balance between the private and public interests 
(Kleinheisterkamp/Poulsen 2014, 1-3). See also Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 14-15. 
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There are sometimes suggestions that the establishment of a protected investment 
creates an ‘enclave’ of law just for the foreign investor.14 This could either imply a freeze 
of the host State law or require that the application of existing/promulgation of new 
laws comply with the requirements set by this ‘enclave’ – requirements which would not 
necessarily need to relate to the general rule of law commitments mentioned above. An 
unqualified realisation of either of these understandings would normatively not be in 
line with the expectations of investors and host States about the applicability of national 
law more broadly, as discussed in the previous Chapter.15 However, as also touched 
upon before, such an unqualified position is also not prevailing in the existing 
jurisprudence either. 
 
There is a strong consensus that the investor is generally bound to accept the host 
State law as existing at the moment of investment,16 meaning that the focus of 
examination (with some exceptions)17 is on how that law is applied rather than on its 
substance.18 Leaving aside the explicit stabilization clauses, there is also a consensus that 
the State generally retains the right to amend its legal framework through new 
regulation and thereby affect (usually among others) foreign investors.19 Combined, 
these positions generally provide that the investor should accept the law as it stood 
when it entered the host State, and should also not expect that law to never change.20 
 
The focus then shifts to the manner of application and/or change of the domestic 
legal framework. As illustratively summarized by the Parkerings tribunal: 
A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its own discretion. Save for 
the existence of an agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause or otherwise, 
there is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the regulatory 
framework existing at the time an investor made its investment. As a matter of fact, 
any businessman or investor knows that laws will evolve over time. What is 
																																																						
14 In this vein see Dolzer 2005, 953-955. 
15 See Chapter 3, section 3.5. 
16 See for example Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 115-116; Behrens 2007, 159; AES v. Hungary – Award, para. 
9.3.34; White Industries v. India, para. 10.3.15. 
17 Such as the situation where a specific legislative act would per se be below the international law 
minimum standard of treatment. See on this Montt 2012, 316-317. 
18 See in that sense TECO v. Guatemala - Award, paras. 617 and 621. 
19 See Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 11 and Brower/Schill 2009, 484. Especially regarding the amendment 
situation, this accords with the position put forward in particular by Jeremy Waldron, that the changes of 
legislation affecting property rights are not in themselves against the rule of law (Waldron 2012). Likewise, it 
helps avoid the conflict with the basic democratic principle that choices of a previous government cannot 
fundamentally restrict the policy options of the subsequent one (Van Harten 2010d, 56; Kurtz 2014, 263). 
20 See also in that sense Draguiev 2014, 283; Kriebaum 2011, 404. 
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prohibited however is for a State to act unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the 
exercise of its legislative power.21 
 
Therefore, the ‘normal’,22 non-‘drastic’23 changes in the overall regulatory 
framework remain possible.24  
 
The critical question thus boils down to what will determine ‘normality’, ‘fairness’ 
and ‘reasonableness’? The IROL paradigm discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 seeks to 
provide, as much as possible, the substantively uniform answers across the board. These 
answers, perhaps inevitably, remain at a considerable level of generality – as illustrated 
by the FET sub-principles. The normative focus on complementary strengthening of 
the national rule of law would suggest the due recognition to pre-existing rule of law 
commitments in the host State as a way to tackle that generality. What is often at stake 
in ISDS are ‘[…] intricate questions that can go to the heart of a state's public policymaking. 
[…] the way host states govern, legislate, and adjudicate and […] a profound impact on local 
populations.’25 In many ways, as much as war is too important to be left to generals, these 
issues are far too important to be simply and unquestioningly left to the open-textured 
and still forming IROL precepts. 
 
The answer to the critical question of ‘what determines normality?’ should at least 
in part thus combine the two key aspects set out above – the nominal acceptability of 
the host State (rule of) law framework beyond the IIA and its FET obligation and the 
general requirement for the investor to accept the application and potential change of 
domestic law. This should create at least a working presumption that the holistically 
examined host State law could itself provide an adequate determination of ‘normality’ 
and ‘fairness’ – determination justified in the context of the host State where the 
investor is operating.26  
 
																																																						
21 Parkerings v. Lithuania, para. 332. See very similarly Electrabel v. Hungary – Liability, para. 7.77. 
22 EDF v. Romania, para. 217. 
23 Toto v. Lebanon, para. 244. 
24 See also Brower/Schill 2009, 484 and 489. 
25 ibid, 497. 
26 As Hepburn notes, rule of law concerns about domestic law are more likely to materialize in ex post 
actions than regarding ex ante legislation (Hepburn 2017, 152). See also Stephan, noting that ‘to determine 
whether a host sovereign behaved in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion, one must know how it 
normally behaves. If its conduct […] corresponds to its well-established past practice […] the case for 
finding a violation […] diminishes’ (2014, 359). 
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Therefore, in interpreting and applying the concepts such as ‘fair’, ‘equitable’, 
‘non-arbitrary’, ‘transparent’, a regular and thoroughly conducted exercise should be 
assessing the State behaviour under what can be termed the ideal-type model of the domestic 
rule of law  - an overview of the constellation of obligations stemming from the 
international (non-IIA) and municipal law sources, that relate to these specific rule of 
law requirements in the FET standard and in combination provide the parameters 
which the host State decision-makers should have had in mind when acting, and which 
the investor could have expected the host State to obey. In examining if the host State 
acted arbitrarily concerning a specific legal matter, it would then be necessary to 
carefully examine and take into account the constellation of legal obligations (beyond 
the FET obligation) that the State had concerning that specific legal matter, and State’s 
compliance with these obligations. While this would not be determinative in itself – as 
the autonomous international character of the FET provision provides them with 
residual discretion for the final assessment– it should form a strong indicator of the 
(non-) existence of a breach. 
 
Ideal-type does not at the same time imply the need for perfection of the host 
State behaviour.27 As discussed in section 4.5. below, the required level to which the 
host State should have lived up to this model would effectively be determined by the 
standard of review. Regardless, the very act of creation of such a model by investment 
tribunals can alter the decision-making paradigm and ex ante orient the behaviour and 
expectations of host State officials and foreign investors.  
 
4.3. The ideal-type model – method and elements 
 
The FET standard and its sub-principles remain the starting point of examination, 
as they provide ‘the […] norm that forms the basis of the review carried out by a […] 
tribunal.’28 Instead of somehow ‘replacing’ the FET and its developed sub-principles, 
the ideal-type model would be an overview or a summary of existing international and 
municipal obligations of the host State relating to the specific legal situation that is 
																																																						
27 The term ideal-type is rather inspired by Max Webber’s Idealtypus, or an abstract construction from 
elements of the given phenomena, but not meaning to correspond to all the characteristics of any one 
particular case. The word ‘ideal’ refers to the world of ideas (German: Gedankenbilder, ‘mental images’) and 
not to perfection. On the ideal type see, for example, Cahnman 1965. 
28 Ortino 2013a, 459. 
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being assessed. Therefore, in interpreting and applying the relevant sub-principle, the 
investment tribunal should refer to this ideal-type model to justify its deliberations – 
while still retaining the power to take into account other facts and circumstances 
relating to the case at hand. The strong emphasis on the ideal-type model, however, 
would be a desirable normative recognition of the limited substantive content inherently 
provided the standards such as FET.29 As Yannick Radi has noted specifically regarding 
the relationship with human rights obligations: 
on the face of the drafting of most of the provisions […] and the vagueness they 
mirror,
 
it proves to be impossible to demonstrate that these norms provide for 
conducts that clash with the conducts required from host states by the norms of 
international human rights law they are bound by. Indeed, what is the normative 
substance of the reference to ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ that would allow one to argue a 
priori that it is in conflict with international human rights norms […]?30 
 
The limited guidance offered by these standards makes problematic the 
suggestions that other host State obligations are to be balanced completely 
independently from them. For example, as noted in Chapter 2, the Suez v. Argentina – 
Liability tribunal suggested that investment and human rights protections are ‘not 
mutually exclusive’ and could be fulfilled simultaneously.31 This presupposes a sufficiently 
defined core meaning of investment obligations that would allow attempting a balanced, 
simultaneous attainment of both. If the open-ended nature of IIA standards such as the 
FET standard is truly recognized, this would seem to be a very uncertain ex ante 
endeavour. 
 
Thus, in those and other situations, instead of necessarily attempting to imbue a 
distinct ‘global’ meaning, the tribunals should also see the FET and its sub-principles as 
being gateways towards other existing sources.32 This also recognises and gives 
																																																						
29 On the scarcity of substantive IIA content see also, for example, Kalderimis - ‘[p]ublic international law 
is inherently […] not about the rights of individuals against States. The investment treaty framework […] 
is […] a new development which requires new thinking.’ (2012, 154) and Viñuales 2016, 4 and 17 (‘[there 
is] a debatable assumption according to which investment treaties are self-contained or self-sufficient 
[…]). See also similarly Schill 2011c, 73-74; Douglas 2003, 204 and Wälde 2007, 49-50 and 118; Alvarez 
2016, 174; for an example in practice, see Perenco v. Ecuador - Liability, para. 522.  
30 Radi 2013, 4 (references omitted). 
31 Suez v. Argentina – Liability, para. 262. 
32 For a somewhat analogous example (in the EU context) of ‘filling’ of a broad supranational norm with 
national law content, see Von Bogdandy/Schill 2011, 1429. A contrasting position is expressed, for 
example, in Alpha Projektholding v. Ukraine, para 233: ‘[t]he Tribunal finds that the question of whether the 
[BIT] has been breached can only be answered by reference to the [BIT]’s own terms.’ 
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normative weight to the usual position of the host State officials faced with making 
decisions which can affect the foreign investors. As Neil McCormick has noted: 
[…] argument-makers and decision-makers do not approach problems of decision 
and justification in a vacuum, but rather in the context of a plethora of materials that 
serves to guide and justify decisions, and to restrict the range within which the decisions of 
public agencies can legitimately be made.33  
 
 
A guiding notion should thus be to present a persuasive account34 of these 
materials so to construct the ideal-type model as an important element in examining the 
host State behaviour. The relevant sources for this model can, depending on the 
individual legal and factual matrixes, encompass both primary and secondary sources of 
international and municipal law.35 Such an effort also presents a recognition of the 
interdependence and complementarity of national and international law and is aimed at 
the enforcement of rights and obligations regardless of their national or international 
origin.36 This interdependence, as is sometimes noted, has critical importance for the 
national rule of law more generally.37  
 
A hypothetical example 
 
In broad terms, and leaving some possible illustrations from practice for section 
4.7, the decision-making process could thus unfold as follows. A hypothetical tax has 
been imposed on all large (non-SME) enterprises in the host State. The proceeds are to 
be used for ameliorating the labour conditions in the country in various ways such as 
training programmes, awareness campaigns and donations for improvement of work 
safety. The affected foreign investor could (as is often the case) attack this measure 
																																																						
33 MacCormick 1999, 172 (emphasis added). 
34 As is sometimes noted, the legitimacy of ISDS depends at least in part on ‘the technical quality and 
persuasiveness of the reasons tribunals give’ (Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 41). See also Hepburn 2017, 125. 
35 Regarding domestic law more specifically, Michael Reisman argued that ‘[t]he law of the State [...] must 
be understood broadly to include its statutory as well as judicially illuminated law.[...] If the host State's 
law provides a general analytical framework, it is up to the Tribunal to apply that framework to the 
statutes, judicial precedents, and general principles of that system […] (2000, 371). 
36 Kjos 2013, 302. See along similar lines Nollkaemper 2011, 3 and 13; Alvarez 2016, 181; and Schreuer 
2016, 731 (‘Under wide jurisdictional treaty clauses that refer to all disputes concerning investments […] 
the claimant may pursue claims based on sources of international law beyond the treaty that provides for 
jurisdiction.). See also in this general sense Enron v. Argentina – Award, para. 207. 
37 Bingham 2011, 110 and 119 and similarly Nollkaemper 2011, 302. 
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through claiming a simultaneous breach of various IIA provisions, most likely including 
the FET standard.38  
 
For the purposes of this example, it can be assumed that the claimant investor, a 
large multinational company operating in the host State, is claiming that this particular 
measure was in breach of the FET standard by being 1) arbitrary; 2) discriminatory; 3) 
non-transparently enacted; 4) against legitimate expectations of the investor. 
 
From the IROL perspective only, the tribunal could make its assessment of these 
claims without necessarily engaging intensively (or at all) with extraneous sources of 
rules. Assessment of arbitrariness can be based on the tribunal’s understanding if the 
measure was so divested from any legal ground and/or the purported goal as to be, in 
the words of ELSI judgment, ‘opposed to the rule of law’.39 Likewise, the assessment of 
the discriminatory nature of the measure can also rest on a completely autonomous 
judgment if there existed a discriminatory intent and regardless of any violation of 
domestic law.40 Assessment of how transparently the host State acted in relation to 
enacting the measure could, as mentioned in Chapter 2, focus on an autonomous 
Tecmed-style determination if host State acted ‘free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently’.41 Finally, as also discussed in Chapter 2, the ascertainment of the 
legitimate expectations of the investor can be based on any of the number of espoused 
understandings of this doctrine in FET jurisprudence – both including and excluding 
the relevance of relying on the domestic legal framework which was in force when the 
investment was made.42  
 
While using the said rule of law sub-principles as starting points, what could a 
complementary inclusion of an NROL paradigm mean for the decision-making 
process? Broadly put, in making their assessment, the investment tribunal should 
systematically and thoroughly take into account the international and domestic 
																																																						
38 The claimants’ arguments for the breach of different standards and the existence of expropriation are 
often essentially the same, suggesting a strong overlap (Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 101 and 132-134). 
39 ELSI, para. 128; this definition of arbitrariness has been supported and applied, inter alia, by Azurix v. 
Argentina (para. 392-393); Duke v. Ecuador (para. 378); and El Paso v. Argentina – Award (para. 319). 
40 Dolzer/Schreuer 2012, 196-197. 
41 Tecmed v. Mexico, para. 154. 
42 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
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obligations of the host State relating to labour rights, taxation and administrative law.43 
IROL paradigm can provide the initial starting point that a decision manifestly without 
legal ground will be considered arbitrary – but the scope of the examined legal grounds 
can be determined in line with the NROL paradigm and its focus on the more holistic 
assessment of the domestic rule of law framework. 
 
Staying with the issue of arbitrary behaviour and legal grounds, this would mean 
that the tribunal should take into account (either through interpretation or fact 
assessment) the full scope of sources which impacted on this specific situation. 
Recognising the specificities of each individual framework,44 and keeping for the 
purposes of brevity the focus on labour protection instruments, a holistic framework 
could include the relevant provisions of the ICESCR,45 the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) conventions,46 or in some cases the ECHR.47 Equally importantly, 
such an approach allows recourse to a plethora of secondary materials clarifying the 
obligations arising under these instruments. This arguably considerably surpasses the 
guidance that can be obtained from the IIL-related sources. In this specific scenario, 
Commentaries on ICESCR,48 ILO Recommendations,49 and the ECHR Guides 
(including summaries of relevant ECtHR jurisprudence)50 can all serve to further clarify 
																																																						
43 To note, some tribunals have mentioned the implementation of international obligations as relevant in 
assessing host State behaviour, but these arguments were generally of ancillary and supportive nature, 
instead of being a main focus of investigation. See for example SD Myers v. Canada – First Partial Award, 
para. 255 (Basel Convention); Parkerings v. Lithuania, para. 385 (Convention Concerning the Protection of 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage); UPS v. Canada, para. 118 (Universal Postal Convention and 
International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures); see also 
Henckels 2015, 134-135. 
44 As Ian Hurd has observed ‘[…] one cannot ask what international law is on a given topic and expect an 
answer that is generalizable across states. Instead, one must ask what the law is for a given state […]’ 
(2015, 380). See also Glashausser 2005, 30 and 34. 
45 In particular Article 2 (1) which requires ‘achieving progressively the full realization of the rights’ ‘to the 
maximum of its available resources’; Article 6 recognising the right to work and requiring steps such as 
training programmes; and especially Article 7 recognising the right to just and favourable employment 
conditions including safe and healthy working conditions. 
46 For example, the 1981 Occupational Safety and Health Convention or one of the branch-specific 
conventions such as the 1995 Safety and Health in Mines Convention. 
47 For example, Article 4 prohibition of slavery and forced labour can be relevant in the context of 
programmes aimed at tackling exploitation of forced labour or at raising awareness about these issues. 
48 For example, a recent General Comment No. 24 on State Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities, suggesting, inter 
alia, the need for progressive taxation schemes to fulfil ICESCR obligations and business cooperation and 
support (para. 23) (available at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx). 
49 For example the recommendations supplementing the conventions mentioned above, such as the 1981 
Occupational Safety and Health Recommendation. 
50 See, for example, the Guide on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edition, 
2014), available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_4_ENG.pdf, accessed 18 May 
2017. 
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the range of legitimate decisions that could have been taken. The ideal-type model would 
be completed by similar recourse to municipal sources, such as constitutional rights, 
statutory obligations and the relevant domestic jurisprudence.51 
 
The ascertained ideal-type model relating to arbitrariness could also help with 
assessing the existence of discrimination. Again, the IROL paradigm can provide for 
starting premises – but the primary provisions of and secondary materials on the 
sources mentioned above can play a very important, if not critical role, in illuminating to 
what extent a particular measure would be considered discriminatory under them or 
outside the IIL context more generally. Similarly, the determination on the breach of 
investor’s legitimate expectations (as will also be touched upon in Chapter 5) can largely 
benefit from identifying if, for example, the domestic administrative law framework 
itself has a same or similar doctrine and if the facts of the case would lead to its 
application in the domestic context. Arguably, this could lead to an enhanced 
expectation from the host State decision-makers to make sure that in enacting the said 
measure they were not breaching their own administrative law – with a potential 
consequence of international liability under the FET. 
 
Related to this last point, and to reiterate, the ultimate decision on the breach of 
the FET standard remains separate from the outcome of the ideal-type model 
assessment. Ultimately, the fact that the host State did everything in accordance with its 
domestic law might simply not be enough, because the domestic legal framework itself 
does not provide (in the eyes of the tribunal) the requisite level of rule of law guarantee 
– although such a conclusion would have to presumably be well-elaborated upon. 
Likewise, the identified breaches of international and domestic obligations might simply 
not be of sufficient gravity to establish an FET breach. A lot will, of course, depend on 
the standard and method of review employed by the tribunal (as further discussed in 
section 4.6.) and potentially will be enhanced by the recourse to comparative 
																																																						
51 In this context, the suggestion in Continental Casualty v. Argentina - Award, para. 281 seems pertinent:  
 
[…] breaches of a treaty standard and breach of similar protection in domestic law are not 
necessarily interconnected. […] On the other hand, if some of the Measures at issue here had been 
found finally unconstitutional by the highest judicial authority of Argentina […] it would appear 
awkward that the same measure would not be in breach of the BIT standards. 
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benchmarks and corrective good faith factors discussed in the next chapter. Ultimately, 
the IROL paradigm remains supreme. 
 
But the decision-making process that incorporates the NROL paradigm in the 
way suggested above is no less valuable because of that. The creation of the ideal-type 
model should be an effort to incentivise a ‘positivistic essence’ of the rule of law - 
whether State institutions abided by the positive (and sufficiently broadly understood) 
law in force.52 It should be an attempt to realize the requirement that ‘public power 
derive its authority from a legal basis and be exercised along the lines of pre-established 
procedural and substantive rules’.53 Not only could the tribunals benefit from anchoring 
their deliberations in often rich available materials dealing with specific sub-fields, but 
they would be sending a clear and important message to domestic decision-makers 
when it comes to rule of law.  
 
That message would be that the existing obligations truly and effectively matter for 
domestic decision-making through the FET prism. There might be no absolute 
certainty that there will be no finding of liability even if sincere best efforts are made to 
be compliant with these obligations. However, the knowledge that examining this 
compliance will be a regular feature of decision-making would make such compliance 
perhaps the best available ex ante path to avoiding liability. The corresponding 
enhancement of the national rule of law, as the previous Chapter also focused upon, 
would then in itself lead to important further benefits. 
 
It is, of course, possible that the actual host State decision-maker might not be 
aware of all the obligations under the ideal-type model. Likewise, it might not be in a 
position to take them into account when applying a directly relevant instrument (e.g. a 
statute) that might not be in accordance with hierarchically superior elements of the 
model. This, however, is not a flaw but rather the opportunity to use the considerable 
power of investment tribunals which are unconstrained by the domestic institutional 
considerations. The insistence on the holistic approach to the legal framework has the 
potential to strongly incentivise the host States to take care ex ante of the whole gamut 
																																																						
52 See for ‘positivistic essence’ of the rule of law Nollkaemper 2009, 77. 
53 Kingsbury/Schill 2009a, 14. Interestingly, for a (very) early suggestion in this sense in an ISDS award 
see AGIP v. Congo, para. 78: ‘If it wished to protect its interests as a shareholder, the Government should 
have respected the legal procedures available to it […]’.  
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of their legal obligations, and to justify their measures in accordance with them. The 
inability or lack of awareness of the decision-maker to act in accordance with the ideal-
type model can ultimately lead to liability. But this can pay off with dividends in the 
avoidance of future claims, and in particular by the rule of law spill-over effects for all 
entities under the host State jurisdiction.  
 
4.4. Refinement of the FET standard in IIAs 
 
As noted above, the FET standard certainly remains the starting point for 
assessing host State actions. The IIAs are the basis of the tribunals’ jurisdiction and the 
claims in ISDS necessarily have to be framed as claiming a breach of a particular 
provision. This also implies that increasing the specificity of the FET provisions can 
improve the clarity of the rule of law requirements and make the IROL paradigm 
exclusivity more feasible. It would certainly not be formally or normatively justified to 
go against the sufficiently explicit wording of these provisions by having recourse to the other 
elements of the host State legal framework. In that sense the efforts to re-calibrate the 
content of IIAs and in particular of the FET provisions continue to be an important 
avenue of reform. 
 
However, the extent of such refinement is, as it stands, still relatively modest. 
Generally, the innovations in ‘new generation’ IIAs do not negate the possibility or a 
need for NROL paradigm complementation more generally, and the ideal-type model 
more specifically. The new wording in some of these treaties arguably encourages it.   
 
The recent IIA practice seems rather disappointing if increasing levels of clarity 
and predictability is used as a benchmark.54 The efforts to clarify the content of the 
FET standard are often in effect codifications of the still broad sub-principles arising 
out of ISDS jurisprudence, and the provisions aimed at protecting the regulatory sphere 
of the host State can arguably both allow and invite the use of the ideal-type model. For 
example, a recent 2017 Argentina-Qatar BIT (AQBIT),55 provides relatively briefly that 
																																																						
54 See generally Alschner 2016 and Ortino 2013b, 158-160, and some examples in fn 48. See also 
Paparinskis 2015a, 668-670; Miles 2013, 305-307 and Kläger 2011, 87-88. Some of the new model IIAs 
are still just drafts (Stern 2011, 190-191; Usynin 2015) or have not attracted any signatories (Ray 2016; 
Patnaik 2016).  
55 Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5383 (accessed 18 May 
2017). 
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‘[i]nvestments […] shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall 
enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party’56 as 
well as that FET ‘is to be interpreted and applied as the treatment provided to aliens in 
accordance with the principles of customary international law’.57 Importantly, Article 10 
affirms that none of the provisions affects ‘measures necessary to achieve legitimate 
policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, the environment, 
public morals, social and consumer protection.’  
 
Such FET provisions hardly make the content of the standard any more definite 
than in what are usually considered the ‘old generation’ BITs. The provisions in Article 
10 on protecting the State’s regulatory sphere, on the other hand, open the possibilities 
for an ideal-type model approach. In particular, this invites arguments to what extent a 
particular measure has grounding in the existing holistically understood legal framework 
of the host State. At the same time, the still open-ended language of ‘legitimate policy 
objectives’ would arguably also leave room for the IROL paradigm attempts to create a 
more uniform IIL understanding of ‘legitimate’. For reasons discussed in the previous 
chapters this should be complemented by the ideal-type model framework for assessing 
the legitimacy of these measures. The fact that the same measure might potentially be 
regarded differently if occurring in Argentina than in Qatar is the expression of the 
realities of the (still?) pluralistic global arena, realities that should not be ignored in the 
decision-making process. 
 
4.5. Applicable law and the NROL paradigm – a short reiteration 
 
It is useful at this point to reiterate that the non-IIA international obligations of 
the host State and its domestic legal framework can be taken into account whilst fully 
accepting the autonomous international law nature of the FET standard as the cause of 
action. As has been elaborated in Chapter 2 there are two main ways through which the 
relevant sources can be given due weight while staying within the limits of provisions 
on applicable law.58 The international commitments of the host State can be given due 
role through further interpretation of the FET standard and its sub-principles in line 
																																																						
56 AQBIT, Article 3(3). 
57 AQBIT, Article 3(4). See similarly Article 4 of the 2017 Japan-Israel BIT (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5575, accessed 18 May 2017). 
58 See generally Chapter 2, section 2.3. 
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with VCLT Article 31(3)(c).59 Additionally, opting for another path, international 
commitments can also be taken into account as a part of ‘factual background’ of the 
case, as was done for example in Micula v. Romania.60 
 
This second path is also the primary one for taking domestic legal framework into 
account, excluding perhaps the relatively rare situations where domestic law is explicitly 
chosen as applicable even for a clearly international cause of action.61 As has been noted 
in Chapter 2,62 the explicit exclusive applicability of international law does not limit the 
importance of municipal law for the proper resolution of a dispute. The qualitatively 
different character of municipal law in comparison to other facts is both supported in 
doctrine63 and exemplified in practice.64 As is argued, the traditional moulds of 
national/international cease to play a crucial role in investor-state disputes,65 and the 
‘mélange’66 of existing national/international commitments of the host State becomes 
fully relevant. The choice of applicable law can thus be of less impact than it initially 
appears.67 
	
The different sources of international law, national legislation, sub-legislative 
instruments, constitutions, jurisprudence and commentaries have, in various forms and 
with varying degrees of relevance, already found their place in the reasoning process of 
investment tribunals.68 Rather than the formal constraints of the provisions on 
																																																						
59 Chapter 2, section 2.3.2. See also generally Van Aaken 2009b. 
60 Chapter 2, 2.4.2. and specifically Micula v. Romania – Award, paras. 326-328 and commentary in 
Ascensio 2016, 382. 
61 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.1. 
62 Chapter 2, section 2.4.2. 
63 To reiterate, ‘treating domestic law as fact seems particularly inapt in relation to contemporary 
investment treaty arbitration.’ (Hepburn 2017, 105). Regardless of explicit recognition as applicable law, 
‘tribunals usually inescapably have to apply domestic law anyway’ (ibid, 106 and materials cited therein). 
64 See for example Chapter 2, section 2.4.2. and in particular Al Warraq v. Indonesia, paras. 584-588. 
65 See also Kulick 2012, 49; Sureda 2012, 36 and Hepburn 2017, 105 (commenting on a similar approach 
by ICJ in ELSI). As Kjos has noted, in light of the concurrent relevance of the national and international 
law for investor-State relationship, any vetoing of the possibility to have recourse to both would be 
‘under-inclusive’ (2013, 296).  
66 See for the ‘mélange’ or ‘integrated legal process’ of national and international law Kulick 2012, 48 and 
Alvik 2010, 91. 
67 See Guzman/Dalhuisen 2013, 14-15, as well as Fraport v. Philippines – Fraport II, para. 298, with the 
tribunal deciding to apply domestic law regardless of the lack of BIT reference to it. 
68 Examples are too numerous to list comprehensively, but in addition to the discussion in Chapters 2 
and 3 see illustratively CMS v. Argentina – Award, Sempra v. Argentina – Award and Continental Casualty v. 
Argentina - Award (on discussing constitution, domestic civil and administrative law); Grand River v. United 
States and Glamis Gold v. United States (on interplay with constitutionally recognized rights); Nykomb v. 
Latvia and Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe (on, among others, relationship with national jurisprudence); Saluka v. 
Czech Republic (on customary international law). 
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applicable law, the crucial aspect would rather be the readiness to bring all these sources 
together so to strengthen the national rule of law. 
 
4.6. Relationship with standards and methods of review 
 
The importance of standards and methods of review  
 
As has been noted in previous chapters, as well as in section 4.3. above, regardless 
of the desirable inclusion of the ideal-type model, the ultimate determination on the 
existence of a breach of the FET standard will ultimately also depend on the standard 
and method of review chosen by the tribunal. In addition to providing a basis for 
review of State actions, the FET standard should also indicate the intensity of that 
review. This is the level of scrutiny that the reviewing body will employ, and can involve 
the concepts such as ‘full review, de novo review, anxious scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, light touch review, minimum review, and total deference’.69 The intensity of 
review determines, in this context, the deference or leeway that tribunals are ready to 
grant to the host State decision-makers in fulfilling their obligations stemming from the 
FET standard.  
 
‘Deference’ is a term that is understood differently, but in the IIL context is 
perhaps best described as ‘margin of appreciation, a space for maneuver, within which 
host state conduct is exempt from fully fledged review by an international court or 
tribunal’.70 As is also argued in doctrine, the standard of review should also be kept 
distinct from the method of review. As Henckels notes ‘[m]ethods of review are 
techniques used to determine the permissibility of interference with the primary norm, 
whereas standards of review refer to the intensity with which the method of review is 
applied.’71 
 
The standards and methods of review employed by tribunals are one of the 
critical questions in investment arbitration.72 In the context of legitimacy concerns, and 
																																																						
69 Ortino 2013a, 459. 
70 Schill 2012d, 582. See similarly and more generally Shany 2005. 
71 Henckels 2013, 199 fn 8. 
72 See for example, as part of the voluminous literature, Henckels 2015; Kjos 2016; Shirlow 2014; Schill 
2012d; Stone Sweet 2010b; Kingsbury/Schill 2010; Krommendijk/Morijn 2009. 
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serious potential consequences to the host States, the level of deference is an issue of 
considerable importance.73 Put in the context of the ideal-type model, the importance of 
assessing how the host-State decision maker navigated the holistic legal framework, and 
the level of deference shown to a decision with which the tribunal would disagree,74 
cannot be overestimated.  
 
This is especially so as the obligations of the host State arising out of international 
and domestic instruments are often not clear-cut. While ‘a national system of law will, in 
principle, be a known and existing system, capable of reasonably accurate interpretation 
by experienced practitioners’75 the challenges in this respect are still considerable. As 
also briefly mentioned in Chapter 2,76 the sources of international law – including 
custom,77 general principles78 and treaty law79 – often exhibit a considerable level of 
indeterminacy.80 The same situation often occurs in municipal law. Both constitutional81 
and hierarchically lower sources82 often leave considerable vagueness and discretion 
regarding the fulfilment of their provisions.83 This indeterminacy in both international 
and domestic aspects can and should be tackled through secondary sources (including 
jurisprudence of courts and tribunals,84 institutional85 and academic86 commentaries, and 
																																																						
73 Henckels 2013, 200. 
74 As Stephan Schill notes, deference would here mean that ‘the adjudicator respects the reasons for a 
state’s decision or conduct even if its own assessment was different’ (2012d, 582). See for a similar 
understanding SD Myers v. Canada – First Partial Award, para. 261. 
75 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides 2015, para 3.111. See similarly Hepburn 2017, 135. 
76 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2. 
77 D’Aspremont 2012, 16. 
78 Fauchald 2008, 312; Gazzini 2009, 104. 
79 Allot 1999, 43. See generally contributions to Liivoja/Petman 2014 (in particular 
Pauwelyn/Wessel/Wouters 2014 and Creutz 2014). See also in that sense Calamita 2013, 182 and 
materials cited therein. See in particular Dupuy 2009, 54-55 in the context of human rights and investor 
protection. 
80 See also Kalderimis 2012, 149-153. 
81 Sunstein 2007, 1-2. See also Goldsworthy 2012, 691 and in the IIL context Boisson de 
Chazournes/McGarry 2014, 876-877 who note that, on the topic of emergency powers, ‘domestic 
constitutions vary widely […] and may not provide substantive clarity to the tribunal concerning a 
government’s conformity or non-conformity with its own laws defining states of emergency’. 
82 Hepburn 2017, 133-134. 
83 It may be beneficial or simply necessary to leave a considerable sphere of discretion to decision-makers 
in complying with/achieving the goals of relevant instruments (Jowell 2015, 5; Bradley/Ewing 2006, 726 
and similarly Richardson 1999, 318). This purposive-oriented discretion seems to be ‘inevitably’ gaining in 
prominence (Craig 1997, 476 and Shklar 1987, 9-10). See also seminal work of Diver 1984, as well as 
Braithwaite 2002 and Pérez Loose 2010. 
84 For the importance of case law in the international law context see generally Guillaume 2011. For the 
ISDS context see Montt 2012, 371-372; Vadi 2016, 76 as well as some examples in Fauchald 2008, 341-
342. As for municipal law relevance see Hepburn 2017, 109-110; Dupuy 2009, 60-61; Boisson de 
Chazournes/McGarry 2014, 869 and Montt 2012, 336, and materials cited therein. 
85 See Dupuy 2009, 55; Simma 2011, 587-591. 
86 See Cole 2013, 42-43 and Fauchald 2008, 311, 315, 351-353. 
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potentially soft law87) as has already been suggested above.88 Even with these efforts, the 
arbitrators will often be faced with situations where the decision-makers themselves had 
considerable room for discretion. In many areas of relevance to foreign investment, the 
considerable discretion of decision-makers is an almost necessary feature of the modern 
State.89 This requires special efforts to persuasively justify why or why not a certain 
measure represented a (sufficiently severe)90 departure from the ideal-type model, so as 
to also potentially warrant a finding of an FET breach. 
 
The distinct nature of the ideal-type model and the standards and methods of review 
 
While acknowledging their importance, the choice of the specific standard and 
method of review is not the topic of this or the following chapter. It is well-recognized 
that IIA provisions, including the FET standard, themselves offer limited guidance as to 
the level of scrutiny to be employed.91 This allows for various viewpoints,92 and 
essentially leaves the ultimate decision on the appropriate level of deference to the 
international tribunal.93 The factors influencing this level of scrutiny can inter alia involve 
the ‘perennial’94 question if the FET standard uses as a nature of review basis is 
connected to the international minimum standard,95 as well as if the text of the IIA 
might provide other insights.96 
 
																																																						
87 On soft law instruments and their potential importance for IIL see Jacob/Schill 2014, Schill 2017b, 16-
18 and (extensively) Miles 2013, 212-287. 
88 See also similarly Hepburn 2017, 118-119 and 183-184 and Radi 2013, 4 fn 8. On the efforts of 
tribunals in this context see Sureda 2012, 123. 
89 See for example Orrego Vicuña 2003, 192 and McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger 2007, para. 7.171. This is 
broadly in accordance with the position, expressed for example by Rubin (1989, 399-402), that legislative 
vagueness and accompanying administrative discretion are not per se contrary to the (formal) rule of law. 
See similarly McCorquodale 2016, 281-282. 
90 See for example Urbaser v. Argentina, para. 629 (‘The threshold for a treatment not being fair and equal 
also results from its intensity or gravity […]). 
91 Urueña 2016, 104; Ortino 2013a, 462-463; Schill 2012a, 9; Henckels 2013, 197-198 and 200. 
92 See for a brief overview Urueña 2016, 118 and also 113-114; see also Alvarez 2016, 203. 
Alvarez/Khamsi 2009, 446 suggest that the ISDS tribunals must second-guess the domestic courts in 
order to preserve the investment ‘bargain’.  
93 Ortino 2013a, 463-463. See also for the WTO context Bockhanes/Lockhart 2009, 386 and more 
generally Shany 2005, 910-911 and 919. 
94 Schill 2017b, 5. See also for an overview of approaches Henckels 2013, 201-203. 
95 See for discussion of relevant issues primarily Paparinskis 2013a, as well as classic writings of Root 
1910, 21; See also Calamita 2015, 109; Paulsson/Petrochilos 2007; Tudor 2008, 158; Schill 2010b, 153; 
Vandervelde 2010, 46-47; Aust/Nolte 2014, 60-61. 
96 See for example S.D. Myers v. Canada – First Partial Award, para. 263. For a somewhat opaque 
suggestion towards the importance of deference see Sempra v. Argentina - Award, para. 301 and 
commentary in Schneiderman 2011, 13.
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The ideal-type model is a decision-making element which is independent from the 
eventual standard and method of review adopted by the tribunal. As Stephan Schill 
notes, ‘[d]eference […] concerns the institutional relationship between the decision-
making body and the reviewing body and has to be distinguished from the normative 
flexibility, or content, given to the substantive obligations at stake.’97 While there is an inevitable 
intertwinement between the obligations and the standard of review – with both 
stemming from the same provision98 - the level of scrutiny or the intensity of review is 
analytically a question ‘apart from the question of how substantive investment law 
should be interpreted and concretized’.99 As Jansen Calamita noted specifically in the 
context of proportionality: ‘[p]roportionality by its terms therefore requires a balancing. 
But […] this balancing requires ab initio an identification and qualification of that which is 
to be balanced, that is, the rights and interests at stake.’100 Similarly, ‘absent an infusion of 
normative content from external sources, proportionality simply functions as a scale 
without weights’.101 
 
In a way, the ideal-type model as a manifestation of the NROL paradigm is thus 
there to help provide the ‘weights’ to the tribunal, regardless of the eventual choice of 
the scale. Whether there are specific standards or methods of review which are more 
conducive to strengthening the national rule of law,102 or if there exists a case for 
deriving them from the ideal-type model,103 are questions that can be answered that 
invite further research. In that sense, this thesis will be limited to arguing (in Chapter 5) 
for further elements that should be present in every exercise of scrutiny by the tribunals 
so to give further relevance to the NROL paradigm, as arguably complementary to the 
standards and methods already present. 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
97 Schill 2012d, 582 (references omitted, emphasis added). See similarly Henckels 2013, 199. 
98 See generally Ortino 2013a, 457-464. 
99 Schill 2012d, 579. 
100 Calamita 2013, 175 (emphasis added). 
101 Calamita 2013, 180 (emphasis added); see also similarly Spiermann 2007, 802. 
102 For example, as mentioned above, complete deference to decisions of host State decision-makers 
might render the rule of law mission meaningless. Still, completely non-deferential standards would, as 
Schill notes, certainly be problematic due to the intense second-guessing of decision-making choices 
(2016b, 332). See also generally Kjos 2016 and Henckels 2013, 200 and 209. 
103 See in this sense Montt 2012, 336. 
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4.7. Reaching the elements of the ideal-type model  
 
The readiness of an investment tribunal to construct an ideal-type model might 
be potentially hampered by two additional sets of considerations. The first is the extent 
to which the tribunal is dependent on the parties’ submissions in incorporating the 
relevant sources in its analysis. The second, and somewhat related, is the practical 
possibility of sufficiently ascertaining the content of the potentially relevant sources. 
While important to bear in mind, neither of these considerations necessarily hamper the 
construction of ideal-type models as important elements of the tribunal’s scrutiny. 
 
The (lack of) dependence on the parties’ submissions 
 
Can the tribunal holistically examine the legal framework if this is not advocated 
by at least one of the parties? If the parties do not engage, e.g., in the discussion of the 
intricacies of domestic law, is the tribunal in a position to do so?104 The general answer 
would be a (qualified) yes. As De Brabandere explains in his examination of the 
procedural aspects of ISDS: 
[…] international investment tribunals operating under the ICSID Convention are 
not bound by the sole legal arguments presented by the parties, in the sense that 
they are not under an obligation to base their award on the arguments presented 
by the parties. This principle, however, does not permit a deviation from the 
applicable law as defined by the parties to the dispute.105 
 
In international arbitration more generally, including arbitrations under national 
laws and arbitral rules of direct relevance for ISDS, there is also a wide consensus that 
arbitrators are in principle allowed to pursue the examination of arguments not 
suggested by the parties.106 This is sometimes seen in line with the iura novit curia 
presumption in international arbitration,107 as also recognised in international dispute 
settlement more generally.108 This would indicate that the party submissions are not a 
crucial obstacle for a more proactive course by a tribunal.109 As Hepburn notes in this 
																																																						
104 For a cautious treatment of this issue regarding the legitimacy of decision-making by international 
courts, see Von Bogdandy/Venzke 2012, 25-26. 
105 De Brabandere 2014, 106. See also ibid, 110 and similarly Enron v. Argentina – Annulment, paras. 72 and 
110. 
106 Capper 2014, 39-54. 
107 Redfern/Hunter/Blackaby/Partasides 2015, para 5.73; also generally Jemielniak/Pfisterer 2015 and 
Alberti/Bigge 2015. For investment arbitrations, see Hepburn 2017, 120-125. 
108 Brown 2007, 54 and 89. 
109 See also in that sense Landolt 2012, 192. 
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context, ‘[i]t is largely agreed that an investment tribunal has at least a power to take […] 
proactive steps.’110  
This proactivity certainly has its limits.111 It should not result in confronting the 
parties with a legal assessment they were completely unable to foresee – which calls for 
disclosing the reasoning to the parties and allowing their comments.112 As Brigitte Stern 
summed up in assessing whether arbitrators were restricted to a ‘tunnel’ constructed by 
the lawyers:113  
Of course, the research and legal expertise that lawyers bring to the table are 
invaluable to arbitrators. However, I have seen numerous cases in which arbitrators 
devised ideas that none of the parties presented, and then, of course, the tribunal 
asked the parties to further comment on these ideas to protect procedural due 
process.114 
 
Initial pleadings of the parties aimed towards elaborating an ideal-type model 
would certainly considerably facilitate the tribunal’s efforts.115 Parties’ counsels are 
certainly capable of producing very elaborate submissions on relevant issues.116 
Channelling these efforts towards a narrative of the national rule of law could go a long 
way in addressing the potential practical complexities. 
 
Ascertaining the content of the ideal-type model elements 
	
Can the arbitrators be expected to know the holistic legal framework sufficiently 
so as to produce persuasive accounts, or would a sometimes-required deep interaction 
be too Herculean a task? Andreas Kulick, for example, argues that it might:  
[…] require the arbitrators to be experts in the domestic law of the host State, for 
without thorough knowledge of the domestic legal system and all its specific 
instruments - general principles, case law methodology and interpretative tools - 
																																																						
110 Hepburn 2017, 120 (emphasis in the original).   
111 One suggestion is that iura novit curia principle should be limited to individual legal research within 
international law sources, and that independent fact-finding powers should be limited to more exceptional 
cases (Schill 2010d, 422-424). 
112 ibid, 423. See for similar arguments also Cordero-Moss 2008, 1241-1242; Jemielniak/Pfisterer 2015, 
79-80; Alberti/Bigge 2015, 20. 
113 As argued, for example, in Wälde 2007, 52-53. 
114 Stern 2011, 186. See on this also Friedman 2010 and Halle/Peterson 2005, 22-23. 
115 As Kingsbury and Schill note, tribunals are inevitably constrained at least to a degree by the quality of 
legal submissions, as well as costs (2009a, 48). See similarly Laird 2009, 153 and Landolt 2012, 185. 
Kaufmann-Kohler (2005b, 637) suggests that the (encouraged) parties’ submissions are the best way to 
obtain information on the domestic legal framework. 
116 Wälde 2007, 47; Kotuby/Sobota 2013, 455-457. 
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they would never be able to discern whether there is a lacuna or whether the law 
provides for a solution.117  
 
A warning about the complexity of the task is justified, as systematic engagement 
with, for example, municipal law can indeed be demanding.118 One aspect of the 
problem is coming to grips with the potential indeterminacy and conflicting demands 
put by the legal framework, as addressed in the previous section. But a more mundane 
(yet no less important) aspect is the possibility of obtaining information about a 
particular legal system.119 The potentially crucial role of the parties’ submissions has 
been mentioned,120 but even in the case of tribunal’s own efforts there are certainly 
various routes in gathering the relevant information.121 
 
There are certainly significant discrepancies in the availability of information on 
over 180 potentially relevant legal systems. Language and accessibility barriers can 
hamper tribunals’ independent examination. While this is sometimes a genuine 
obstacle,122 it should not, however, be overestimated. Discriminating among the host 
State legal systems should not be acceptable in principle.123 Avoiding interaction or 
simplifying analysis of the domestic legal system should not be generally justified by 
practical concerns.124 Nor is the ISDS jurisprudence lacking examples of tribunals 
obtaining sufficient information about the legal systems which are certainly not usually 
in the spotlight.125 Whether the relevant information is deemed to be a fact or law, the 
investment tribunals can appoint experts,126 request information from the parties, 
																																																						
117 Kulick 2012, 28-29. See for similar concerns Hepburn 2017, 108-109 and generally Kaufmann-Kohler 
2005b. 
118 For some examples, see Igbokwe 2006, 293-295 and Hepburn 2017, 113. 
119 See also in particular Hepburn 2017, 112-119. 
120 As noted by Zachary Douglas concerning the CME v. Czech Republic tribunal’s lack of engagement with 
Czech law – ‘[a]ny criticism of this omission must be tempered by the observation that the Czech 
Republic, inexplicably, did not tender any expert evidence on Czech law during the liability phase of the 
arbitration proceedings.’ (2004, 203). 
121 See for the similar dichotomy between the parties’ submissions and independent research Brazilian 
Loans, 124. For international commercial arbitration, see similarly de Ly/Friedman/Radicati di Brozolo 
2010. 
122 See for an argument in that sense Lew 2010, 11. 
123 For a similar criticism of over-reliance on English-language materials in comparative law, see Siems 
2007, 137. 
124 See similarly Hepburn 2017, 167-169. 
125 For example, information about Congolese (AGIP v. Congo, para. 45-47 and 72-73), Liberian (LETCO 
v. Liberia, p. 33-37) and Yemeni law (Desert Line v. Yemen, paras. 197-198, 202 and 205-207) were all 
obtained by the tribunals. Some of these cases, such as AGIP, date back to the 1970s, with a reasonable 
assumption of less information availability than today. 
126 See in this sense Hepburn 2017, 105 and materials cited therein. For some potential problems, see also 
ibid, 135-137. 
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examine witnesses without parties’ request, and (as is increasingly common) use the 
potential of amicus briefs.127 With these tools, and a generally increasing wealth of 
materials publicly available, one can fittingly conclude with Michael Reisman's crisp 
wording: 
Since […] exploration of the law may involve substantial investigation into a legal 
system with which the arbitrators have no training, first-hand experience, or even 
basic language facility, the burden may be great. But the difficulty of the task is no excuse 
for avoiding it.128 
 
 
4.8. Feasibility of the ideal-type model in practice – a case study 
 
The previous sections have discussed several relevant issues connected to the 
construction and use of the ideal-type model. In addition to the hypothetical example in 
section 4.3., this section will present a case study from the existing ISDS jurisprudence 
– Dan Cake v. Hungary - that demonstrates a number of features in line with the idea of 
the ideal-type model. Considering the challenges discussed in the previous sections, this 
example can also serve as an indicator of the practical feasibility of the proposals made 
above.  
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no tribunal has so far explicitly 
constructed an ideal-type model in the holistic manner argued here. The case discussed 
below, demonstrates however the possible ideal-type model construction, thoroughness 
of engagement with the national legal framework, and the potential for enhancing the 
national rule of law. Similarly to some cases discussed previously, such as Genin in the 
previous Chapter, Dan Cake is not representative of ISDS jurisprudence as a whole, but 
it is a useful illustration of a strand of jurisprudence in which engagement with the 
national legal framework, along the NROL paradigm complementation lines, has bee  
approached thoroughly and in a normatively desirable fashion. To this strand, it is 
certainly possible to add the examples of Urbaser v. Argentina – Award and Al Warraq v. 
Indonesia as discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.2.3. as well as Maffezini v. Spain – Award, 
which demonstrates a strong engagement with both international and domestic 
commitments of Spain in the sphere of environmental protection. Maffezini award, 
																																																						
127 Schill 2010d, 424. See also Hepburn 2017, 119 and 167 (the latter point criticizing the Grand River v. 
United States tribunal for failing to utilize these instruments). 
128 Reisman 2000, 369 (emphasis added). See similarly Igbokwe 2006, 279. 
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however, does not specifically relate to the FET standard and will as such not be 
examined in detail here. In any case, the Dan Cake award below should be seen as a 
representative of a strand of jurisprudence that demonstrates the potential of investment 
tribunals and their FET decision-making – and that should be one of the indicators of 
how it should unfold in the future. Certain different and contrasting examples certainly 
exist, such as a far more cursory assessment of the national rule of law issues in a similar 
denial of justice context in Jetoil v. Albania.129 This indicates that opting for an NROL 
paradigm complementation ultimately remains a normative choice. 
 
Dan Cake v. Hungary exhibits a focus on the procedural, denial of justice claim, 
and thus a relatively narrower ideal-type model that focuses on domestic sources. At the 
same time, it demonstrates a thorough and persuasive elaboration which is, as just 
noted, not always present in the FET jurisprudence. Regardless of the lenient standard 
of review used, the examination incorporating this elaborate overview of the domestic 
legal framework resulted both in the host State liability and arguably very palpable 
guidelines for potential rule of law enhancement.  
 
4.8.1. Dan Cake v. Hungary 
The facts 
The case arose out of the insolvency proceedings instituted against Danesita, a 
Hungarian confectionery manufacturer predominantly owned by a Portuguese company 
Dan Cake since 1996.130 Danesita experienced fluctuating business fortunes, eventually 
resulting in a request for liquidation by its creditors on 7 August 2006.131 After Danesita 
failed to respond to the request in 8 days, its insolvency was presumed in accordance 
with the Hungarian insolvency law, and liquidation proceedings (including appointment 
of a liquidator) were put into motion.132 An appeal process against this initial decision 
(itself with some potential procedural misgivings) was unsuccessful on formal 
grounds.133 
 
																																																						
129 Jetoil v. Albania, paras. 764-771. 
130 Dan Cake v. Hungary, para. 2. 
131 ibid, paras. 38-39. 
132 ibid, paras. 40-41. 
133 ibid, paras. 42-44. 
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The key events occurred when Danesita attempted to exercise its right to convene 
a composition meeting of creditors in order to approve an agreement with the debtor.134 
Despite the apparent inclusion of all the necessary documents, the Metropolitan Court 
of Budapest preliminarily denied Danesita’s request as ‘in its current form’ it was not 
suitable for distribution to the creditors and the convening of the meeting.135 Danesita 
was ordered to make several supplementary filings and the liquidator was encouraged to 
continue with the liquidation process.136 No appeal against this decision was possible.137 
For a number of reasons, Danesita found it impossible to comply with the ordered 
filings and its assets were eventually sold, thus ending the existence of Dan Cake’s 
investment protected under the 1992 Portugal-Hungary BIT.138 
 
Tribunal’s analysis 
  
While the Dan Cake’s claims – based on protection against expropriation, 
provision of full protection and security, FET and prohibition of unjust and 
discriminatory measures - were lodged against both the Court’s and liquidator’s 
behaviour, the latter’s actions were declared as not attributable to Hungary.139 This put 
the focus on the decision of the Metropolitan Court to order additional filings. In brief, 
Dan Cake argued that the court’s decision was without legal basis in Hungarian law, as 
Danesita provided the required documents and the meeting should have thus been 
convened.140 The eventual finding of liability resulted from the breach of the FET 
standard (through denial of justice) and due to a finding of unjust and discriminatory 
measures.141 The key interest here is the manner in which the Tribunal reached its 
conclusion, in particular the extensive engagement with the Metropolitan Court 
decision, Hungarian statutes, jurisprudence and academic commentary. Unlike the 
Argentina-Spain BIT, the Portugal-Hungary BIT has no specific provisions on 
applicable law for the investor-State disputes, and simply provides for arbitration under 
the Washington Convention (thus implicating Article 42 of the said Convention).142 
																																																						
134 ibid, paras. 46-49. 
135 ibid, para. 54. 
136 ibid. 
137 ibid, para. 55. 
138 ibid, paras. 59-62. The text of the BIT can be found at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1542, accessed 12 April 2017. 
139 ibid, paras. 158-160. 
140 ibid, paras. 82-84. 
141 ibid, paras. 146 and 161-162. 
142 See Article 8 of the Portugal-Hungary BIT. 
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As the Tribunal observed, the prompt convening of the composition meeting, 
provided all the statutory conditions were met, was of essence for Danesita.143 In order 
to ascertain the relevant sources in the domestic legal framework, the Tribunal 
examined the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, its commentary and an opinion 
expressed in the Hungarian case law.144 In particular, while the tribunal explicitly refused 
to pass judgment on the quality of the Hungarian insolvency law per se,145 it did (unlike 
the Genin tribunal) discuss the potential justifications and implications of a particular 
Court practice.146  
  
The most important aspect from the rule of law viewpoint is the Tribunals’ 
systematic and rigorous examination of the decision of the Metropolitan court. The 
Tribunal reiterated the oft-repeated position of ISDS tribunals that they are not to be 
seen as appellate tribunals, even in situations where the appeal to a particular decision 
was not possible.147 It then opted to examine if the decision was unfair or unequitable 
by establishing if ‘some of the requirements were obviously unnecessary or impossible to 
satisfy, or in breach of a fundamental right’148 and especially bearing in mind the complexity 
and urgency of the situation which involves the ongoing liquidation proceedings. This 
decision illustrates the preservation of the right to deduce the required intensity of 
review from the IIA provision itself (as discussed above). The paragraphs of the award 
that follow, however, also show that the selection of a particular standard of review is 
not incompatible with a thorough reasoning process that can strengthen the national 
rule of law. 
The tribunal started by quoting the decision of the Metropolitan court in its 
entirety,149 before again engaging with the Hungarian legislation (including the Civil 
Procedure Act) jurisprudence and doctrine to establish what sort of discretion the Court 
might have in ordering the additional documents.150 After recognizing that the Court 
might have a power to order additional, non-statutory mandated documents which are 
																																																						
143 ibid, paras. 92-93. 
144 ibid, paras. 94-98. 
145 ibid, para. 82. 
146 ibid, para. 97. 
147 ibid, para. 117. 
148 ibid (emphasis in the original). 
149 ibid, para. 99. 
150 ibid, paras. 108-116. 
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truly ‘necessary’,151 the heart of the award then dissects in considerable detail each of the 
7 requests for filing that have been ordered in the light of their necessity. This is done 
with references to the legal framework, reasonableness and actual commercial and 
business reality – and with a conclusion that all these requests were unnecessary.152  
While it is not warranted within the scope of this chapter to examine every 
paragraph, it is illustrative to quote a part of the Tribunal’s reasoning: 
If the legislator had meant to grant the Court the power to refuse to convene the 
composition hearing on the basis of its assessment of the likelihood that the 
required percentages of favourable votes will be met, it would certainly have said 
so. On the contrary, it stated that upon the debtor’s request, the Court shall convene 
a composition hearing within 60 days. The Explanation on insolvency law makes it clear 
that “the settlement petition cannot be refused with a view to 
foreseeable/predictable shortcomings on the merit even if the experienced judge is 
well aware that the submitted material will not surely be suitable for concluding a 
composition agreement.” In addition, first, the time between the convening and 
the hearing may be used to convince some creditors to accept a proposal and 
second, a composition agreement is not the mere gathering of consents previously 
given: it involves a process of negotiations during the hearing and a vote at the end 
of it (see Section 41(5) of the Bankruptcy Act). The Court’s opinion as to the 
likelihood of success would therefore, at the stage of convening the hearing, be 
premature.153 
Many similar paragraphs form a persuasive and thorough build-up to a conclusion 
that ‘the Court simply did not want, for whatever reason, to do what was mandatory.’154 
Such a conclusion led to host State liability for breaching the FET standard and the 
prohibition of unjust and discriminatory measures, with the damages to be determined 
subsequently.155 
The relevant aspects in the ideal-type model context 
																																																						
151 ibid, paras. 113 and 116. 
152 ibid, paras. 118-142. 
153 ibid, para. 127 (emphasis in the original, references omitted). 
154 ibid, para. 142 (emphasis in the original). See similarly in the Sempra v. Argentina award, para. 268: 
 
[...]the obligations and commitments which the Argentine Republic owed […] were not observed. 
Whether the question is examined from the point of view of the Constitution, the Civil Code or Argentine 
administrative law, the conclusion is no different. Liability is the consequence of such a breach, and there 
is no legal excuse under the legislation that could justify the Government’s non-compliance since 
the very conditions set out by the legislation and the decisions of courts have not been met. (emphasis added) 
155 Dan Cake v. Hungary, paras. 160-161. As of 20 September 2017, no decision on damages is publicly 
available. 
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The decision makes very clear the perceived deficiencies of the Metropolitan 
Court’s actions, with thorough support by references to numerous domestic sources.156 
The decision did not engage with the international commitments or constitutional 
norms in Hungary, as some awards did.157 However, it is questionable if there was a 
need to do so – illustrating how the shape of an ideal-type model can be adjusted to the 
specific facts. The key aspect in this sense is the openness towards examining the 
relevant sources, rather than the checklist-style clearance through all of them. Arguably, 
an even more rule of law engaged tribunal could have (very likely obiter dicta) suggest 
other potential deficiencies in the Hungarian framework – for example the fact that the 
decision of the Metropolitan Court could not be appealed. Criticizing this aspect could, 
hypothetically, find its support in international commitments of Hungary regarding 
access to justice and due process. There is certainly much that can be said about the 
plausibility and potential persuasiveness of such an effort, but at this point it should just 
be noted as a possibility. 
 
Be that as it may, the thorough reasoning can already provide the guidelines on 
how to reform the relevant aspects of the legislation and/or practice so to avoid further 
claims. In the context of the rule of law spill-over effects,158 a potential reform is 
unlikely to be limited just to foreign investors – a modification of the relevant aspects of 
insolvency law and practice is likely to be applied across the board and to benefit 
domestic actors as well. Bearing in mind the importance and frequency of insolvency 
proceedings generally, this potential enhancement would not be a niche improvement. 
 
4.9. Conclusion 
 
Constructing the ideal-type model of the domestic rule of law as a regular feature 
of examining if particular FET sub-principles were breached would be a critical element 
in complementing the IROL paradigm with an NROL one. A persuasive elaboration of 
this model through taking into account international and municipal commitments of the 
host State recognises and respects both the rule of law mission of the FET standard and 
the realities of State-investor relationships. The insistence on examining the whole 
																																																						
156 A similarly through engagement with the domestic legal framework has been praised in the context of 
the Yukos decision by Stephan 2014, 361-365. 
157 Notably Maffezini v. Spain – Award, mentioned above. 
158 See Chapter 3, section 3.6.2. 
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spectrum of host State obligations can send a strong ex ante signal to domestic officials 
about the need to take cognisance of the State’s rule of law commitments more broadly. 
It can also guide foreign investors by suggesting that the basic and primary rule of law 
expectation they should have lies in the holistically understood domestic legal 
framework.  
 
Understanding the FET standard sub-principles also as gateways of sorts toward 
other existing sources does not go necessarily go against further clarification of the 
content of these sub-principles, nor is it in conflict with the provisions on applicable 
law. As argued in Chapter 2, there are sufficient possibilities for the tribunal to have 
recourse to a multitude of sources. Likewise, as the case study in this Chapter has 
sought to demonstrate, the in-depth engagement with various primary and secondary 
sources is certainly not beyond the reach of tribunals. What remains crucial is rather the 
readiness to perceive the tribunal’s role as the one aimed at enhancing the national rule 
of law. 
 
The construction of the ideal-type framework should be an important, but not 
determinative, step in the actual examination of host State liability. The task of 
scrutinising the actual behaviour is further shaped by the employed standards and 
methods of review. These are in themselves distinct from concretising the normative 
content of relevant standards such as the FET, and the IIL jurisprudence and doctrine 
manifests different understandings of the appropriate level and method of scrutiny. The 
attempt to answer what the most appropriate standard or method might be for 
strengthening the national rule of law is not undertaken here. 
 
Rather, it is important to recognise that regardless of the constructed ideal-type 
model the element of subjectivity or arbitrators’ own imprint on a dispute cannot and 
should not be eliminated from ISDS, as it can hardly be eliminated from other forms of 
dispute settlement.159 Retaining a degree of flexibility in dealing with the potential 
breaches of the ideal-type model recognises also what has been termed the ‘aspirational 
nature of the rule of law ideal’160 and the fact that the perfect adherence to the rule of 
																																																						
159 See, for example, Hutchinson 1999, 211-215; Goldsworthy 2012, 691; Bingham 2011, 51-54; Maupin 
2014a, 497 fn 130. 
160 Fuller 1969, 43. 
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law remains practically hardly achievable.161 In the ISDS today, the arbitrators can 
ultimately determine how much this ‘aspirational nature’ can translate into reality. In 
doing so, they can also be assisted by the additional elements of the reasoning process – 
comparative benchmarks and the corrective good faith factors – which form the topic 
of the following chapter. 
 
																																																						
161 See generally Loughlin 2010, 312-341. See also McCorquodale 2016, 291; Krygier 2012, 234; Schill 
2015, 93-94 and Carvalho 2016, 23. For a recognition that investor cannot expect perfection from the 
host State, see the very first BIT arbitration AAPL. v. Sri Lanka, para 77, and similarly, for example, Gami 
v. Mexico, para. 97. See more generally Wälde 2007, 106; Newcombe 2005, 19; Montt 2012, 321; Behrens 
2007, 178. 
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Chapter 5 – Comparative benchmarks and corrective good faith factors 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter has set out the proposal for the ideal-type model of the domestic 
rule of law as a way to concretise the requirements of the national rule of law framework, 
which is in itself a critical aspect of the NROL paradigm complementation. The ideal-
type model should thus feature as a regularly occurring and thoroughly elaborated 
element of the tribunal’s scrutiny of the host State behaviour under the FET standard. 
However, as was also discussed,1 determining the standard and method of that scrutiny, 
including the level of deference to be granted to the host State, remains a separate issue. 
The elaboration of the ideal-type model remains both distinct from and compatible with 
the standards and methods of review currently employed in FET decision-making, but 
the model itself is not (necessarily) determinative for their selection. 
 
However, the parallel focus on the national rule of law can suggest additional 
decision-making elements as a part of the NROL paradigm complementation. This 
chapter addresses two such elements - comparative benchmarks and the corrective good faith 
factors. Respectively, these suggest the roles for the comparative recourse and good faith 
considerations that potentially enhance the persuasiveness of the tribunal’s reasoning, 
offer firmer guidelines for the future conduct of the host State and/or ultimately secure 
a fairness of outcome that perhaps cannot be achieved otherwise. 
 
The recourse to comparative benchmarks – law, policy and practice – would 
primarily serve to add persuasiveness and gravitas to the tribunals deliberations of how 
the host State fared under the combination of the FET sub-principle requirements and 
the ideal-type model. This should help enhance the tribunal’s assessment if (e.g.) a 
particular measure was necessary or suitable, or if a delay was ‘undue’. The benchmarks, 
ideally derived from comparable States or other regimes, would thus both serve to limit 
the appearance of impressionistic determinations in issues with serious consequences at 
																																																						
1 See Chapter 4, section 4.5. 
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stake, and to potentially provide the host State with (comparative) guidelines as to how 
to avoid similar problems in the future.2 
 
The discussion in section 5.2. first distinguishes the comparative benchmarks 
from certain other potential uses of the comparative exercise, such as the determination 
of general principles of law (5.2.1). The discussion then turns to jurisprudence, so to 
highlight examples where the use of the comparative benchmarks would have 
benefitted the persuasiveness of findings, as well as some examples where the attempt 
to provide comparative support was not fully followed through (5.2.2.). Finally, section 
5.2.3 deals with some of the potential conceptual and practical challenges of using 
comparative benchmarks. 
 
Section 5.3. deals with the corrective good faith factors which have a different, 
but potentially important role. These factors would represent specific circumstances or 
fact-patterns existing on either the host State’s or the investor’s side. Their existence 
and intensity could lead to a different conclusion about the existence of a breach of the 
FET standard than the one tentatively reached through the scrutiny which involved the 
combination of the FET sub-principles and the ideal-type model scrutiny.3 While 
reserving a special role for the clear instances of bad faith behaviour (mala fides) and the 
concretisations of good faith existing within the ideal-type model, this element should 
represent a shift of the role of good faith in IIL from a rule-generative to a corrective 
one. Corrective good faith factors could thus be one of the main manifestations of the 
residual power of arbitrators under the FET sub-principles to achieve the fairness of 
outcome and to potentially counter-balance overemphasis on considerations relating to 
specific national law. 
 
Section 5.3.1. deals more generally with the role of good faith in international law 
and IIL, before suggesting the above-mentioned shift of its role in the FET context. 
Section 5.3.2. examines the situations in which good faith would retain a more directly 
determinative role, such as the existence of clear mala fides, before turning in section 
5.3.3. to the specific corrective good faith factors. Section 5.4. will offer some 
concluding thoughts on the role of both elements proposed in this Chapter. 
																																																						
2 See also for importance of policy and practice in comparative examinations Bell 2006, 1274-1275. 
3 Of course, they could equally further support the tribunal’s findings reached at that stage. 
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5.2. Comparative benchmarks 
 
5.2.1. Comparative benchmarks and the other uses of the comparative exercise 
In combination with the ideal-type model, comparative benchmarks - law, policy 
and practice - should primarily serve as a corollary support to the tribunal’s reasoning. 
They should help avoid the (impression of) ‘I know it when I see it’ decision-making. 
As has been observed, ‘[w]hile the 'I know it when I see it' standard has obvious 
practical advantages, it has an equally obvious Kafkaesque undertone’.4 In general, many 
issues on which the tribunals might be called upon to decide are hardly truly novel. The 
comparative national and, to an increasing extent, supranational/international law and 
practice offer a remarkable ‘reservoir of human experience that had accumulated over 
many decades’5 in different fields of State activity. The decision of the tribunal is more 
likely to be understood and accepted if it appeals for support to a broad range of 
conduct by States, than simply to the reasoning of its constituent members who were 
appointed in an adversarial context.6 As observed more generally by Tom Bingham, 
when it comes to the rule of law issues, comparative, ‘world-wide perspective’ can add 
‘immeasurable strength’ to the reasoning of dispute-settlers.7 Potentially, comparative 
benchmarks can also go beyond the case-specific assistance to arbitrators. They can 
provide guidance and inspiration to the host State so as to enhance the relevant aspects 
of its legal framework and/or decision-making - hopefully helping avoid future ISDS 
claims in the same subject matter. This can result in legislative changes, increases in the 
administrative capacity in targeted areas and in developing international cooperation so 
to facilitate reform.8  
																																																						
4 King 2008, 411. See similarly for the need to avoid heavy-handed ‘legal chauvinism’ Picker 2013, 42. 
5 Montt 2012, xi-xii. 
6 Cole 2013, 51. See also similarly Boisson de Chazournes/McGarry 2014, 883; Smits 2012, 77-79. As 
Henckels notes, ‘[i]t is arguable that the greater the degree of international harmonization or consensus 
with respect to the subject matter of the measure, the lesser the degree of normative or empirical 
uncertainty in relation to the appropriateness of the measure itself’ (2015, 145). 
7 Bingham 2010, 10. See for the similar understanding of the Canadian Supeme Court Hardin 2003, 459 
and materials cited therein. See similarly in the ICJ context Ford 1994, 78-80 and in the EU context 
Chalmers/Davies/Monti 2014, 266. 
8 See in that sense Vadi 2016, 23. 
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Generally, comparative law has been finding its place in many different dispute 
settlement contexts.9 To be clear, the use of the comparative benchmarks here 
advocated is distinct from the efforts to ascertain new general principles of law as a 
source of international law or from calls to use comparative law to fashion an 
autonomous meaning of the IIL concepts. In recent years, these proposals have been 
perhaps the main area of doctrinal interaction between comparative law and IIL.10 Most 
prominently, the scholars in the comparative public law approach suggest that using 
comparative constitutional and administrative law can provide the inspiration to 
arbitrators in interpreting and concretising the autonomous meaning of IIA concepts.11 
This includes the recourse to other international regimes such as human rights courts 
jurisprudence, while keeping in mind the relevant differences between the regimes.12  
 
Apart from using comparative public law to determine suitable standards and 
methods of review, using comparative law to concretise the meaning of IIA standards 
such as FET can, but does not necessarily coincide with the NROL paradigm approach 
advocated here. However, the comparative examination of (e.g.) practice of other 
international regimes in which the host State participates would be an integral part of 
delineating the contours of the ideal-type model, as also suggested by Chapter 4.13  
 
																																																						
9 Comparative exercises are common in ECtHR decision-making, so to relativise ‘universal’ standards by 
showing their contingent nature (Carozza 1998, 1221 and 1236). Many national legal systems display 
increased reliance on comparative law for interpretation and reform. The Swiss Federal Tribunal has a 
long-standing practice in that regard (Kulick 2012, 23), and the US Supreme Court, while stopping short 
of formal deference, is increasingly sprinkling its opinions with citations to foreign law (Glasshauser 2005, 
83-84). As for English law, Otto Kahn-Freund and Tom Bingham suggest the unprecedented foreign 
influence on both legislation and precedent-developed case law (Kahn-Freund 1974, 2 and Bingham 
2010, 5-7). See also in the constitutional law context generally Halmai 2012 and Chang/Yeh 2012. 
10 See above all the contributions to Schill 2010f, and for an overview Schill 2010a and Bonnitcha 2014, 
22-24. See also generally Montt 2012, and in particular 241, 298, 344; Vadi 2010 and 2016; Kalderimis 
2012; Schill 2012d. 
11 As Schill has observed, ‘[a] comparative public law approach consists in conceptualizing and applying 
standard concepts of investment law […] by drawing parallels with public law concepts used in domestic 
law and other international regimes’ (2010a, 26). For Santiago Montt, ‘[a]rbitral tribunals always must bear 
in mind that international investment law lacks a fully mature set of rules of global constitutional and 
administrative law that would permit them to resolve investment disputes without any reference to 
domestic law or comparative law.’ (2012, 366).  See also Total. v. Argentina - Liability, para. 111: ‘a 
comparative analysis of what is considered generally fair and unfair conduct by domestic public authorities in 
respect to private investors and firms in domestic law may also be relevant to identify the legal standards 
under BITs.’ (emphasis added).  
12 Schill 2014, 19. See also Kalderimis 2012, 159. 
13 Similarly, many segments of the recent analysis of comparative exercises in ISDS offered by Valentina 
Vadi (Vadi 2016) would here be more fitting for elaborating the requirements of the ideal-type model or 
to the proper standard/method of review. See in this sense references to judicial borrowing (Vadi 2016, 
88-126; 144-163) or to comparative standards of review (ibid, 188-218). 
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Another possibility is for the comparative exercise to lead to determination of 
new general principles of law as a source of international law.14 The topic has been 
touched upon in Chapter 2, so it is warranted to only briefly return to it at this point.15 
For some authors, the dangers of arbitrators’ subjectivity can be tackled by rigorous 
comparative analysis that yields a general principle of law.16 In particular, the argument 
is that there is a great potential of general principles of public law to provide well-
balanced solutions for relations between the States and investors.17  
 
Establishing these new general principles of (public) law within international law 
would potentially lead to considerable enhancement of the FET sub-principles. If a 
tribunal can indeed convincingly establish a new principle with a required level of 
common presence in legal systems, this is to be welcomed.18 With due caution about 
formal obstacles,19 the extensive doctrinal work and jurisprudential developments might 
have charted new paths towards making general principles of law a more pronounced 
source of rules in this sphere.20 
 
With these efforts duly in mind, the possibilities remain open for different uses of 
the comparative exercise as well,21 among others in the sense of the comparative 
benchmarks here discussed. The benefits of a comparative recourse remain even if that 
exercise cannot yield a binding, formally applicable rule. If the goal is not to establish a 
general principle of law, tribunal’s efforts can focus on those legal systems which are the 
																																																						
14 Schill 2010a, 27-34. 
15 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2. 
16 Gazzini 2012, 139. 
17 ibid. See also Schill 2010a, 32. 
18 While the uniform presence in all legal systems is not required (Shaw 2008, 100; Schill 2012b, 148), the 
principle needs to be broadly grounded so to avoid brazen or unrealistic law making (Barcelona Traction, p. 
3., paras, 39-43 and 50; Shaw 2008, 99). The international courts and tribunals have on occasion 
proclaimed general principles without proper comparative analysis (Gazzini 2012, 141; Sornarajah 2010, 
418; see generally also Hanessian 1989). This analysis should at least encompass the principal domestic 
legal orders or international regimes (Schill 2012b, 148; Shaw 2008, 100; Gazzini 2009, 107 and 111 and 
examples referenced there), with a risk that frequently it will simply not be possible to identify a true 
general principle of law (Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 817-818). 
19 Also, insufficiently careful pronouncement of general principles can lead to an annulment of the award 
in the ICSID context – early Klöckner v. Cameroon – Ad Hoc is a prominent example. See also for caution 
Alvarez 2016, 218, fn 175. 
20 General principles of law have been described as ‘[t]he most fertile, but underutilised’ source for 
developing IIL (Douglas 2009, 89; see also in this context Snodgrass 2006; for a warning about avoiding 
selectivity in this exercise, see Sornarajah 2009, 418). More generally, the jurisprudence of PCIJ and ICJ 
generally exhibits a fairly limited importance of general principles (Shaw 2008, 99; Cassese 2005, 188-
193). Situation in ISDS is somewhat similar (Fauchald 2008, 312). 
21 See also in this sense Roberts 2013, 52. 
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most instructive for providing persuasiveness in the specific legal and factual matrix.22 
At the same time, this focus can also increase the level of specificity and determinacy of 
benchmarks, thereby providing more tangible guideposts for all the actors involved. 
 
5.2.2. Comparative benchmarks - potential and actual use in jurisprudence 
 
Without delving into the specific standards and methods of review,23 it is possible 
to say that the tribunals are (in the context of FET decision-making) relatively often put 
in an unenviable position to make sensitive pronouncements with potentially far-
reaching consequences. The degree of deference given to the host State then also 
assumes an important role, but the problem can be illustrated by the Metalpar v. 
Argentina tribunal statement that ‘to try to abstractly determine whether the actions 
carried out by Argentina during the crisis were optimal is a difficult or impossible task’, 
which can have considerable consequences if host State liability is found.24  
 
The tribunals, depending on the adopted standard and method of review,25 often 
have to pronounce if a host State measure was e.g. suitable,26 necessary,27 least-
onerous,28 or simply reasonable;29 as well as if a particular delay was ‘undue’ or not.30 
The need for strong persuasive support to reasoning seems particularly pertinent in 
those situations. As noted more generally by Bingham, comparative law is particularly 
apt to help prevent an inappropriate or unjust resolution of a dispute, or where no clear 
answer seems straightforward.31 Recourse to other comparable States and/or regimes32 
can indeed prove beneficial for the persuasiveness of reasoning in many ways.33  
																																																						
22 See also for supporting a smaller scale comparative exercises in the administrative law context Bell 
2006, 1266. 
23 For recent studies of these issues see generally Henckels 2015 and Bücheler 2015. 
24 Metalpar v. Argentina, paras. 198-199. See also Henckels 2015, 139. 
25 See also on these questions Calamita 2013, 175 suggesting that the tribunals invoking proportionality 
are ought to address suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu; at least the first two questions 
are arguably amenable to comparative insights. 
26 LG&E v. Argentina – Liability, paras. 239–242 and 257; Electrabel v. Hungary – Liability, para. 8.34. 
27 Pope & Talbot v. Canada – Merits, para. 155; SD Myers v. Canada – First Partial Award, para. 195; Glamis 
Gold v. US, paras. 133, 138, and 140. 
28 SD Myers v. Canada – First Partial Award, paras. 195, 215, 221 and 255. 
29 BG v. Argentina, paras. 342-344. See also CME v. Czech Republic – Partial Award, para. 158 and Bonnitcha 
2014, 224. 
30 For example, Chevreon v. Ecuador – Partial Award, para. 250. 
31 Bingham 2010, 8. 
32 For suggestions to go beyond States in comparative law, see Reimann 2001. 
33 See Vadi 2010, 98 for a similar understanding of the non-authoritative use of comparative insights.  
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A strong degree of commonality between the suitably compared legal systems can 
provide support for finding the host State’s regulation or practice either outlying or 
acceptable, and influence the potential level of justification that would be necessary for 
it. Generally, ascertaining that States B, C and D do things the same/differently than the 
host State A can lend legitimacy that goes beyond just the tribunal’s own reasoning.34  
The current jurisprudence broadly exhibits two situations in this regard. One is a 
lack of comparative recourse in situations where it would arguably help the 
persuasiveness of the tribunal’s findings. The second is a recognition of the benefits 
that comparative arguments can bring, but with a rather cavalier approach to the 
comparative exercise, manifested sometimes in broad assertions with little actual 
comparison. 
Situations where comparative benchmarks could have enhanced the persuasiveness of reasoning 
Perhaps a prime example of tribunals having to make sensitive pronouncements 
on host State measures are cases relating to the 2001-2002 Argentine crisis. The cases 
manifest different approaches to the scrutiny of the host State actions, including in 
terms of the standard and method of review, the level of deference granted, as well as 
the perception of the same underlying facts,35 but a common point is their lack of 
comparative insights to support critical findings.  
For example, the InterAgua v. Argentina and Suez v. Argentina - Liability tribunals 
(composed of the same arbitrators) found Argentina liable for the breach of FET due to 
the frustration of foreign investor’s legitimate expectations.36 A crucial finding was the 
‘rigidity’ of behaviour the provincial government, and in particular the assertion that the 
government could have enacted measures other than the tariff freezing in order to 
secure access to services for the broader population.37 Specifically, the tribunal 
suggested social tariffs or subsidies to the poor, noting that this was possible under the 
legal framework.38 As noted by Henckels, it is at least arguable that the tribunal did not 
take into account if this alternative was reasonably available to the government in the 
																																																						
34 See also in this context Henckels 2014, 144-145. 
35 See also on this Maupin 2014b, 471-472. 
36 InterAgua v. Argentina – Liability, paras. 218, 228 and 248; Suez v. Argentina – Liability, paras. 238, 247-248 
and 276. 
37 InterAgua v. Argentina – Liability, paras. 213-218; Suez v. Argentina – Liability, paras. 232-238. 
38 InterAgua v. Argentina – Liability, para. 215; Suez v. Argentina – Liability, para. 235. 
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crisis context, whether in terms the capacity to design and implement the alternative, or 
in terms of financing it.39  
Additionally, however, it is also arguable that the persuasiveness of the findings 
would have benefitted through comparative examples of policies suggested by the 
tribunal as a feasible answer. After all, the Argentine crisis, despite certainly being 
formidable in terms of severity, is not an isolated example.40 Providing relevantly 
comparable examples would lend additional legitimacy to a finding that eventually 
resulted in holding the host State liable. Perhaps equally importantly, potential failure to 
find such comparative examples could also have suggested to the tribunal that its 
tentative findings may be problematic.  
Within that same context, it is possible to take a different look at the decisions in 
CMS v. Argentina - Award, Enron v. Argentina – Award and Sempra v. Argentina – Award. In 
all three awards, the tribunals determined that other measures with less impact on the 
investors were theoretically available to Argentina,41 a key finding in rejecting the 
necessity defence for precluding the wrongfulness of Argentina’s behaviour.42 The 
measures thus asserted as available by the tribunals were not analysed to determine their 
feasibility or likely efficacy in the circumstances.43 However, in both Enron and Sempra 
the parties’ experts and even the tribunal suggested the importance of comparative 
experiences, but the tribunal’s analysis went no further than stating that different 
measures were taken by other countries in crisis situations.44 No actual attempt to relate 
the experience of these other countries to the case at hand was conducted. A mention 
of Uruguay as an example suggested by the Claimant’s expert went no further than 
mere name-dropping in the tribunal’s analysis.45 
While the issues here also go to the proper interpretation of the necessity defence 
in international law, it suffices to mention that it is questionable if a mere assertion of 
																																																						
39 Henckels 2015, 106; see also Henckels 2013, 213. 
40 As suggested, inter alia, by Sempra v. Argentina - Award, para. 350 and Enron v. Argentina – Award, para. 
308. 
41 CMS v. Argentina - Award, para. 323; Sempra v. Argentina - Award, paras. 350-351; Enron v. Argentina - 
Award, paras. 308-309. 
42 CMS v. Argentina - Award, para. 331; Sempra v. Argentina - Award, para. 354; Enron v. Argentina - Award, 
para. 313. 
43 CMS v. Argentina - Award, para. 323; Sempra v. Argentina - Award, para. 351; Enron v. Argentina - Award, 
para. 309. 
44 Sempra v. Argentina - Award, para. 339 and 350; Enron v. Argentina - Award, para. 300 and 308. 
45 Sempra v. Argentina - Award, para. 339; Enron v. Argentina - Award, para. 300. 
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other measures being theoretically possible should suffice to deprive the host State of 
the necessity defence. If indeed there needs to be at least some consideration of 
feasibility of the alternative suggested measures, thoroughly reasoned comparative 
recourse would seem to provide significant assistance for the persuasiveness and 
credibility of reasoning.  
Recourse to comparative practice can also be beneficial in situations of assessing 
the practice of host State courts, or more specifically in qualifying the delays in 
proceedings before them. An example can be found in White Industries v. India, where the 
Tribunal was to assess whether a delay before the Indian courts in recognising and 
enforcing the foreign investors’ arbitral award qualified as either a breach of legitimate 
expectations,46 a denial of justice47 or a breach of the obligation to provide investors 
with the domestic ‘effective means’ to assert their rights.48 The tribunal found no 
legitimate expectations could have existed as the claimant ‘either knew or ought to have 
known at the time in entered into the [investment] Contract that the domestic court 
structure in India was overburdened’49 and received no specific assurances about award 
enforcement.50 The tribunal also offered a Law Commission of India report on the 
Supreme Court from 1988 (around the time the Claimant’s project started) which 
suggested that Supreme Court cases were note disposed for over a decade.51  
 
As for the denial of justice, the tribunal noted that public international law does 
not provide for fixed time limits that should indicate whether a denial of justice exists,52 
and noted that this ‘fact-sensitive’ assessment included factors such as complexity of the 
proceedings, the need for swiftness, behaviour of litigants, the significance of interests 
at stake and the behaviour of the courts.53 To this, importantly, the tribunal also added 
that it is relevant ‘to bear in mind that India is a developing country with a population 
of over 1.2 billion people with a seriously overstretched judiciary.’54 With all these 
factors examined, the tribunal concluded that while the overall and Supreme Court 
																																																						
46 White Industries v. India, section 10.3. 
47 ibid, section 10.4. 
48 ibid, section 11. The provision on ‘effective means’ was imported from the Kuwait-India BIT through 
the MFN clause, as discussed in section 11.2 of the award. 
49 White Industries v. India, para. 10.3.14. 
50 ibid. para. 10.3.15. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid, para. 10.4.9. 
53 ibid, para. 10.4.10. 
54 ibid, para. 10.4.18. 
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delays were ‘certainly unsatisfactory in terms efficient administration of justice, neither 
has yet reached the stage of constituting a denial of justice’55 especially as there was no 
suggestion of bad faith nor there existed a ‘particularly serious’ shortcoming.56 
 
The tribunal’s findings were, however, different when it came to the test if India 
provided ‘effective means’ for the Claimant to assert its rights. Critically, the Tribunal 
noted that: 
The ‘‘effective means’’ standard is different from and less demanding than the 
‘‘denial of justice’’ standard. Moreover, with respect to a forward-looking promise 
by a State to provide ‘‘effective means’’ of enforcing rights and making claims, the 
relevance of the State's population or the current operation of its court system(s) 
(in assessing the undue nature of a delay) is limited. This is because the focus of 
such a lex specialis is whether the system of laws and institutions work effectively at 
the time the promisee seeks to enforce its rights / make its claims.57   
 
Basing itself on the Chevron v. Ecuador – Partial Award, the tribunal assessed many 
of the same factors as concerning the legitimate expectations and denial of justice in this 
somewhat changed light, but also noted that ‘the issue of whether or not ‘‘effective 
means’’ have been provided by the host State is to be measured against an objective, 
international standard’.58 It eventually concluded that Supreme Court’s inability to offer 
an expedited hearing in five and a half years, and the fact that Claimant had no further 
means of expediting the process, amounted to the breach of the ‘effective means’ 
obligation:  
[i]n these circumstances, and even though we have decided that the nine years of 
proceedings in the set aside application do not amount to a denial of justice, the 
Tribunal has no difficulty in concluding the Indian judicial system's inability to deal 
with White's jurisdictional claim in over nine years, and the Supreme Court's 
inability to hear White's jurisdictional appeal for over five years amounts to undue 
delay and constitutes a breach of India's voluntarily assumed obligation of 
providing White with "effective means" of asserting claims and enforcing rights.59  
 
Overall, there is certainly a lot to support the ultimate conclusion of the tribunal 
and the liability of the host State. Nine years to enforce an arbitral award certainly does 
not strike an impartial observer as effective. At the same time, it is questionable to what 
																																																						
55 ibid, para. 10.4.22. 
56 ibid, para. 10.4.23. 
57 ibid, para. 11.4.16 fn 78. 
58 ibid, para. 11.3.2; This was also based on the Claimant’s contention in para. 11.1.5. 
59 ibid, para. 11.4.19. 
 
211 
extent the assessment of an ‘objective, international standard’ for the efficiency of 
proceedings can be determined without at least some comparative recourse. Leaving 
aside for the moment the potentially contentious issue of the degree of influence of the 
host State’s circumstances on the ‘effective means’ test,60 the tribunal’s assessment in 
the end does not itself makes clear what (if anything) the tribunal used as an objective 
and even less so ‘international’ benchmark. 
 
This is particularly pertinent as the tribunal earlier recognised that there are no 
such standards regarding the denial of justice, which would potentially serve as a 
baseline or a ‘floor’ in determining ‘effective means’. The tribunal’s deliberations remain 
very case-specific, apart from noting that the initial delays, before the Supreme Court 
took over, were caused by strenuous defence submissions and that ‘the pleadings 
schedule was not exceptional, either in the Indian context or otherwise.’61 The ‘otherwise’ 
is never followed through, and the tribunal’s analysis of the subsequent Supreme Court 
delay makes no other references to comparable situations in other contexts. 
 
If an objective standard of efficiency is to be suggested, it would arguably seem 
warranted to offer at least an overview of the length of proceedings in comparable 
situations in other legal systems, and to provide an attempt to approximate these into 
some form of benchmarks. It is possible to imagine such an exercise as a completely 
‘global’ one, including therein equally the developing and developed countries and their 
practice. However, it would still seem preferable to distinguish to an extent in this sense 
between legal systems in countries with comparable circumstances.  
 
A recourse to comparative practice, whether for the purpose of ‘global’ or more 
nuanced standards of effective means, might have also given the White Industries tribunal 
some reason for pause. For example, civil court procedures in (developed) country such 
as Italy are notoriously slow, and the length among OECD countries generally varies 
significantly.62 According to the OECD, the average length of a civil dispute in Italy was 
8 years (therefore quite close to the overall delay in White Industries) but for example it 
took a year in Switzerland, indicating a large (eight-fold) deviation.63 Of course, the 
																																																						
60 See also section 5.3.3 below – Circumstances of the host State. 
61 ibid, para. 11.4.8. 
62 See on this also Bingham 2010, 88-89 and Alvarez 2016, 221. 
63 OECD 2013, 2. 
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strong possibility remains that even with this comparative insight the length of the 
proceedings would still be found as unsatisfactory for the ‘effective means’ test (and 
therefore also suggest that Italy might be found liable in a similar situation). Put 
differently, using a developed country example might not necessarily help the host State 
cause.64 However, engaging with the comparative benchmarks and offering a more 
substantiated analysis as to where ‘effective’ ends and ‘ineffective’ begins would be a 
task beneficial for India, foreign investors and potentially (even if not primarily) for the 
wider spectrum of domestic stakeholders.  
 
Situations of recognised benefits of the comparative recourse – and problematic elaboration  
 
In a number of situations, comparative law, policy and practice were employed by 
the tribunals to support their findings. At the same time, the tribunals seem to have 
preferred the idea of comparative support more than its realization – and in some 
instances failed to provide anything more than broad assertions about how things are 
done in other States and regimes.65 
 
The tribunal in Noble Ventures v. Romania, in deciding that the behaviour of 
Romania in initiating insolvency proceedings against the Claimant was not arbitrary, put 
a lot of emphasis on comparative support. The tribunals concluded that ‘[s]uch 
proceedings are provided for in all legal systems and for much the same reasons. […] 
[Claimant] was in a situation that would have justified the initiation of comparable 
proceedings in most other countries. Arbitrariness is therefore excluded.’66 There is, 
however, no indication whatsoever of a single other legal system that would provide 
support for such a statement, nor reference to any other non-national instrument or 
document related to the topic. Similarly, in Roussalis v. Romania and Feldman v. Mexico – 
Award, broad (and arguably broadly correct) assertions about particular policies being 
commonplace were however not substantiated with any examples illustrative for the 
case at hand.67 
																																																						
64 As Bingham 2010, 88, in the UK context some cases reach similar lengths and leave little place for 
complacency. 
65 On the lack of thorough comparative engagement see Vadi 2010, 97. Generally, IIL doctrine mostly 
focuses on comparative procedural insights, largely neglecting the substantive ones (Vadi 2010, 86). 
66 Noble Ventures v. Romania, para. 178. 
67 Roussalis v. Romania, para. 636 (on food and safety policies being commonplace); Feldman v. Mexico – 
Award, para. 115 (on cigarette smuggling policies). See similarly ADF v. United States, para. 188, where the 
comparative effort was substituted with a reference to Claimant’s counter-memorial. 
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The AMTO v. Ukraine award dealt with insolvency in a somewhat different 
context. Claimant in this case argued that the weaknesses of the Ukrainian insolvency 
legislation were so severe as to breach the obligation to provide ‘effective means for the 
assertion of claims and the enforcement of rights’ as found in Article 10 (12) of the 
ECT.68 The tribunal was of the opinion that Ukrainian legislation should indeed meet at 
least minimum international standards in ‘qualitative’ terms, noted that Claimant failed 
to provide any comparative support for its claims, and also said that in its assessment 
will be guided, inter alia, by comparative considerations.69 However, the ultimate finding 
of the tribunal - that Ukrainian legislation was not in breach of the ECT Article 10(12), 
and that is a ‘modern law’ with ‘some problems’ - does not in the end rely on any 
comparative analysis.70 The farthest that the Tribunal went was consulting reports by 
Deloitte and Touche (which helped draft the relevant law), USAid and EBRD which 
discussed the law, with the EBRD report actually highlighting the weaknesses put 
forward by the Claimant.71 None of the reports, however, seem to provide any 
comparative material either, and rather focus on the training programs necessary to 
efficiently implement the law. It remains puzzling what, if any, was the impact of 
Tribunal’s seemingly considerable emphasis on comparative support for finding the 
Ukrainian legislation acceptable. 
 
Other tribunals were more interested in the sphere of comparative policy. For 
example, in adding support to its finding on the behaviour of Moldovan government 
concerning changes of the tax-free zone rules, the Link-Trading v. Moldova tribunal 
concluded: ‘[…] tax measures adopted by the Moldovan government, while unfavorable 
to Claimant, were not dissimilar to the policies of many countries in the world levying 
duties and taxes on imports into their customs territory […]’.72 However, this statement 
is again not followed by any comparative information beyond the tribunal’s assertion. 
Bearing in mind the ample availability of data on tax regimes and tax policy (something 
also touched upon in section 5.2.3. below), lack of at least a nominal effort to 
substantiate this claim does not seem justified.73  
																																																						
68 AMTO v. Ukraine, para. 85. 
69 ibid, paras. 85-88. 
70 ibid, para. 89 
71 ibid, para. 86. 
72 Link-Trading v. Moldova, para. 72. 
73 See, for example, the data available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/, accessed 17 January 2017. 
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Concluding observations 
 
In terms of providing support for sensitive findings, the tribunals in many cases 
recognise the persuasive strength arising from a claim that particular legislation or policy 
is comparatively commonplace. However, the problematic aspect is that these 
comparative observations usually do not go beyond relatively unsubstantiated 
assertions, sometimes reduced to a single phrase or sentence. While the use of 
comparative benchmarks is arguably an excellent tool to assist the tribunals, and should 
have been employed in even more situations, there is little to be gained by a mere 
appearance of a comparative exercise.  
 
At the same time, there are certainly important reasons why the tribunals might 
have been inclined to eschew the more thorough comparative effort. As the next 
section will discuss, the conceptual and practical challenges attached to it are far from 
negligible. At the same time, some suggestions are possible on how to tackle at least 
some of these challenges and therefore enhance the use of comparative benchmarks in 
practice. 
 
5.2.3. The challenges of using comparative benchmarks – finding suitable 
comparators and ascertaining the comparative content 
 
 An investment tribunal aiming to use the comparative benchmarks faces at least 
two significant challenges. One is the adequate selection of comparators that can offer 
the most credibility to the tribunal’s findings. The second, similarly to the ideal-type 
model,74 is the problem of ascertaining the content of relevant laws, policies and 
practice. As the following sections will argue, neither of these issues is unsurmountable 
in the ISDS context, although some new developments (such as soft-law instruments) 
would significantly assist the comparative efforts. 
Suitable comparators  
 
Ideally, what should be sought by the tribunals would be a selection that is 
sufficiently instructive, and yet not liable to make the exercise meaningless through 
																																																						
74 See Chapter 4, section 4.6. 
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unrealistically demanding or unsatisfactorily lax comparators. Of course, comparative 
benchmarks should not present a straightjacket. A particular host State measure can be 
so innovative as not to be present comparatively – an outlier may be an innovator, and 
not a pariah. Proper fact-specific justification of host State efforts can certainly in those 
situations prevail over forced comparative parallels.75 
 
Leaving those situations aside, the importance of careful comparative selection is 
highlighted by Montesquieu’s famous words that: ‘[l]es lois politiques et civiles de 
chaque nation […] doivent être tellement propres au peuple pour lequel elles sont faites, 
que c’est un grand hazard si celles d’une nation peuvent convenir à une autre.’76 This 
was for him equally valid for both private and public law, including the constitutional 
and administrative branches.77 As Otto Kahn-Freund noted in a seminal piece, legalistic 
spirit which ignores the context can be an abuse of comparative law.78 In that sense and in 
normative terms, the proper recognition of the context can be expressed by an effort to 
seek the most suitable comparators.79  
 
The selection of comparators in the subject matter of many FET disputes – 
administrative, constitutional, judicial issues - is certainly not a simple exercise.80 As 
further observed by Kahn-Freund:  
All rules which organise constitutional, legislative, administrative or judicial 
institutions and procedures, are designed to allocate power, rule making, decision 
making, above all, policy making power. These are the rules which […] are the ones 
most resistant to transplantation.81  
 
Comparative persuasiveness cannot thus be based on ‘a head-count of decisions 
and codes adopted in other countries around the world, often against a background of 
																																																						
75 As Henckels notes, ‘divergence from the practice of other states in the area being regulated should not 
be decisive of whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective; there may be good reasons 
why the local context requires a different approach.’ (2015, 145). See similarly Paushok v. Mongolia, para. 
303 noting that a particular measure (windfall profit tax) that went beyond comparative standards was not 
because of that in itself contrary to the FET standard. 
76 Montesquieu 1832, 74. 
77 ibid, 75; Kahn-Freund 1974, 7. 
78 ibid, 27. 
79 There are proposals to use developed countries’ standards as ‘ceilings’ for expectations from the 
developing host States (see for example Montt 2012, 227). While a sensible proposal in itself, the above-
mentioned OECD examples indicate the reasons to be cautious about what ‘developed country 
standards’ actually mean. 
80 See also in this sense Van Harten 2010c, 632-633. 
81 Kahn-Freund, 1974, 17 (emphasis added). 
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different rules and traditions.’82 While the topic certainly merits further research, it is 
possible at least to make certain general suggestions. The two potentially key guideposts 
for the tribunals should be the similarity of the ideal-type framework concerning the 
particular legal situation, and the similarity of the (socio-political, economic, 
developmental) circumstances in the host State and the comparator(s).83 
The similarity of the ideal-type model 
 
A reasonable direction for aiming comparative efforts is the sufficient similarity 
of the domestic instruments and international commitments regarding a particular legal 
situation involving the foreign investor. As for the domestic obligations, the countries 
sharing a common legal heritage would seem as particularly suitable prospects.84 Useful 
examples are provided by the English courts that have, when engaging in comparative 
analysis, accorded a visibly predominant role to other common law and particularly 
Commonwealth legal systems.85 In discussing Arthur J. S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, Lord 
Bingham’s choice of words serves as an excellent example of what the reliance on 
‘linked’ systems is aimed to achieve: ‘[i]f the public policy reasons relied on to support 
the rule did not accord with experience in a country as like our own as Canada, it was 
indeed difficult to see why they should apply here, and that was what a majority of the 
House decided.’86  
 
Of course, the more contemporary transplantations can prove relevant as well. In 
situations where particular legislation was clearly adopted by using foreign law as a 
model, it can be warranted to have recourse to the practice of the ‘source’ State. A 
plausible argument can be made that this practice would be desirable for emulation as 
well by the adopting State,87 thus further justifying the reliance of the tribunal.  
 
The early ISDS cases of Klöckner v. Cameroon and AMCO v. Indonesia can perhaps 
demonstrate the advantages that the use of comparative benchmarks can have in 
opposition to attempts to establish a legally binding general principle. Both awards at 
																																																						
82 Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services, 66. See also Bingham 2010, 14-16. 
83 See also generally Maupin 2014b for the suggestion that investment disputes can be differentiated 
among their socio-legal, territorial and political dimensions. 
84 See also on this Picker 2013, 30. 
85 See Bingham 2010, 9-10, 12, 16, 18 and 22. 
86 Bingham 2010, 12-13 (emphasis added). 
87 See generally on this Berkowitz/Pistor/Richard 2003. 
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certain points dealt with French law and its relevance for the interpretation of existing 
or ascertainment of other rules to resolve the case. In the Klöckner v. Cameroon - Award, 
the tribunal essentially had recourse to French contract law doctrines requiring 
frankness and full disclosure in dealing, while couching them in the language suggesting 
their universal applicability as general principles.88 The annulment committee decision 
focuses well on the cursory nature of the attempt made by the tribunal,89 even without 
highlighting out a rather basic comparative contract law point that common law systems 
would hardly universally endorse such a principle.90 Instead of persuasive strength of 
reasoning that could have been derived by pointing out the common legal heritage of 
Cameroonian and French law, and the accompanying interpretations, an arguably 
misguided comparative exercise eventually led to the annulment of the award. 
 
In AMCO v. Indonesia, when faced with the claims that French legal concepts of 
administrative unilateral acts and administrative contracts were worthy of consideration 
as sources of international law, the tribunal refused to do so despite recognizing the 
importance of practice and provisions common to a number of nations as general 
principles.91 As a matter of comparative grounding, the decision is correct – concept of 
administrative contracts is distinctively and predominantly French, despite certain 
‘transplants’.92 But it is highly questionable if these French concepts would provide 
useful comparative benchmarks either. The legal system of Indonesia is based on a 
rather idiosyncratic mix of Roman-Dutch heritage (mostly reflected in its civil code), 
customary law and new post-independence Indonesian law.93 Unlike Klöckner, there is 
little to indicate the particular relevance of French legal concepts, thus essentially 
eliminating any significant enhancement of the persuasiveness of reasoning. 
 
Beyond these links, a more common scenario in which the ideal-type model 
similarities can arise is the adherence to the same international instruments or finding 
inspiration in the same model laws. In such situations there is an additional justification 
for comparative insights as many of these instruments emphasise the need to promote 
																																																						
88 Klöckner v. Cameroon – Award, 105-106 and 109. 
89 Klöckner v. Cameroon – Ad Hoc, paras. 71-73. 
90 For English law, see the rejection of ‘good faith negotiations’ by the House of Lords in Walford v. Miles. 
91 Amco v. Indonesia, 461. 
92 Brown/Bell 1993, 192-193. 
93 Frederick/Worden 2011, xxxvi; See also Country profile: Indonesia, December 2004, Library of Congress – 
Federal Research Division, available at: https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, accessed 
15 January 2016, 15-16. 
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uniformity of their application.94 The situations in which the tribunals have to an extent 
indicated the compliance with a particular international instruments as relevant in 
assessing host State behaviour have been noted in Chapter 4.95 Particularly in those 
situations, the analysis of legislation and other measures of other States aimed at 
complying with these instruments can be a relatively uncontroversial comparative 
benchmark.96  
 
In the sphere of non-binding instruments such as model laws, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration seems to offer a good example of 
the relevance of common practice. The countries basing their arbitration laws on the 
model law tend to be referred to as a group – ‘Model law countries’ and the analysis of 
particular issues in practice, as exemplified by the digest of the Model Law case law, 
does not deal with individual jurisdictions separately.97 This suggests both the relevance 
of the common practice under same instruments, and the existence of valuable 
resources that investment tribunals could rely on, something also discussed further 
below. 
 
The similarity of circumstances 
 
A second important consideration, preferably combined with the similarity of the 
ideal-type framework, is the similarity of circumstances between the host State and the 
State(s) used for comparison. The relevance of the host State circumstances will also be 
touched upon in the context of corrective good faith factors below (section 5.3.3.), but 
the subject can certainly be influential for selecting comparators as well. Apart from the 
observations made in the context of examples discussed in section 5.2.2. above, the 
importance of considering the relevant context of involved States can be illustrated by 
an example found in Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic. The tribunal concluded in the 
FET context: 
[…] in Jan de Nul and Toto, delays in court proceedings of ten and six years 
respectively did not amount to a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
																																																						
94 See, for example, Bingham 2010, 39-40. 
95 See Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
96 The distinction between analysing secondary materials to ascertain the exact obligations arising under 
specific instruments and using comparative benchmarks would sometimes likely be fluid. See the above 
mentioned White Industries v. India, with several references to the need to ascertain common practice under 
the 1958 New York Convention (paras. 4.3.21, 4.4.6, 10.4.11 fn 69, 11.1.5). 
97 UNCITRAL 2012. 
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standard. Even if this Tribunal were to conclude that the entire delay was 
attributable to Respondent, it does not find that a delay of just over 3 years 
amounts to a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard of the BIT in 
the present circumstances.98   
The reasoning of the tribunal would seem to suggest that since in Egypt (Jan de 
Nul) and war-torn Lebanon (Toto) proceedings that took much longer were acceptable 
in the FET context, three years would a fortiori not be problematic. With due respect to 
the tribunal’s attempts to achieve consistency in applying the FET standard, the 
investor did not choose to invest in those countries or even in those regions, nor should 
it expect arguments based on such comparisons to be relevant.99 At the time the 
relevant events occurred, Czech Republic was close to becoming an EU member, one 
of the leading examples of the successful Central European transition, and solidly 
ranked in rule of law terms.100 The persuasiveness of the comparisons offered by the 
tribunal, even if framed in the context of uniformity of the FET standard, is thus open 
to question.  
The similarity of circumstances can be approached from different angles. As 
suggested by Julie Maupin, there is a need to give effect to ‘the degree to which the 
basic features of the dispute itself and the circumstances in which it arises are likely to 
be viewed as mundane, ordinary, or commonplace—as opposed to radical, surprising, 
or contested[…]’.101 As further suggested, the circumstances can be roughly grouped 
into ‘ordinary times, times of economic crisis, and times of political crisis or 
transition.’102 As suggested above in the context of the Argentinian crisis cases, aiming 
to derive comparative benchmarks from States in as approximate position as possible 
would arguably significantly contribute to the tribunal’s findings.103 
The specificities encountered in post-conflict or transitional countries are also 
recognised in other fields of legal research, and this can prove instructive for ISDS 
																																																						
98 Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic, para. 334 (footnotes omitted).  
99 Interestingly, some authors explicitly note a 10 year backlog of cases as an unacceptable situation,  
making ISDS preferable for dispute settlement (Salacuse 2000, 387). 
100 See, for example, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/2010_government_1.pdf, 23. 
101 Maupin 2014b, 477.  
102 ibid, 479. The relevance of the circumstances is inherent in the doctrines such as necessity, force majeure, 
and changed circumstances in international and contract law (ibid, fn 37). 
103 Another potential example is Toto v. Lebanon - Award, where there were no attempts to offer 
comparative arguments on the functioning of administration in post-conflict states when deciding upon 
the amount of time it took domestic administration to perform certain acts (see paras. 182, 189-194). 
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tribunals. Post-conflict countries are often grouped together when examining their 
various legal aspects,104 and so are the countries exhibiting various other forms of 
transition.105 While the transition towards a market-driven economy has sometimes 
featured as relevant in certain awards (see section 5.3.3 below), there is certainly a lot 
more potential to make these circumstances significant in supporting the conclusions 
reached by the tribunals. 
Ascertaining the content of comparative benchmarks 
 
A different set of questions arises if and when the suitable comparators are 
chosen by the tribunal. The actual comparative research is often a complex effort that 
can be marred by both conceptual and practical obstacles.106 It is not surprising that it is 
often geared towards the main legal systems of the world. As indicated by Schill: 
[a]s a matter of practical convention, and in view of difficulties comparative lawyers 
face in terms of availability of foreign law sources and scholarship, the legal orders 
most often analysed are German, French, English and U.S.-American law. The 
reason for this choice is not one of legal hegemony, but rather the fact that these 
legal orders are easily accessible and, above all, have influenced the legal systems of 
many other countries.107  
 
The considerations of influence are relevant and can justify relying on particular 
well-known legal systems, as also touched upon above. The distinction in accordance 
with the accessibility of materials would generally be less justifiable in normative terms, 
even if understandable in terms of practicality. 
 
More generally, the proper use of the comparative method is a highly 
sophisticated task, prone to negligence and manipulation – and experience suggests that 
arbitrators can sometimes be overwhelmed and resort to superficiality and 
simplifications.108 Lack of the required depth, rigour and transparency can result, as 
stated in the ECtHR context, in ‘[…]haphazard and overly casual assertions of 
similarities or divergences in national laws [that] constitute a serious weakness that 
																																																						
104 See, for example, Grenfell 2013; Dam-de Jong 2015; and a series of UN OHCHR publications on rule 
of law tools for post conflict countries at www.ohchr.org. 
105 See for example Buchanan/Zumbansen 2014 and Murell 2001. 
106 See more generally Smits 2012, 26-27 and Zweigert/Kötz 1998, 4-13. 
107 Schill 2012b, 148. See similarly Bingham 2010, 4. For criticism of Western-centric approach, see also 
Alvarez 2016, 220-221. 
108 Kleinheisterkamp 2015, 817-818. 
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undermines the legitimacy of the Court […].109 These inherent risks, particularly in the 
investment context and regardless of the used comparative methodology, indicate a 
need for reliable sources.110 
 
Still, several factors support the plausibility of the recourse to comparative 
benchmarks. To a considerable extent, even without de lege ferenda improvements, the 
persuasive and sufficiently rigorous use of the comparative benchmarks is far from 
impossible. However, certain further instruments would arguably facilitate the 
comparative efforts of arbitrators, regardless for which purposes they are undertaken. 
These suggestions will be briefly elaborated in turn.   
 
Existing methods and resources 
 
In the comparative benchmarks context here suggested, the tribunals are not 
aiming at either grand contributions to the comparative law field, establishment of 
general principles or the imposition of legal transplants. The use of comparative 
benchmarks would be case-specific, and with a relatively narrow sphere of interest. In 
that sense, the considerable difficulties of applying the comparative law method 
properly are of a more limited impact, especially if what is sought is data on policy and 
practice.  
  
If the focus is put more on the actual comparative content than on 
methodological issues, arguably most (if not all) arguments put forward within the 
context of ascertaining the content of the ideal-type model stand here as well.111 To the 
extent that the tribunal would be open to comparative arguments, it is arguable that the 
parties themselves would be in a position to provide a sufficient wealth of materials to 
form a reasonably good comparative picture.112 Likewise, the considerable possibilities 
remain open for the tribunals to ascertain the potentially relevant facts themselves.113 
 
																																																						
109 Carozza 1998, 1225. 
110 Montt 2012, 166. 
111 See generally Chapter 4, section 4.6. 
112 A hint of this is also the expert report touched upon in Sempra v. Argentina - Award, paras. 339 and 350 
and Enron v. Argentina - Award, paras. 300 and 308, as discussed above. 
113 See Chapter 4, 4.6 - The (lack of) dependence on the parties’ submissions. 
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Particularly in the sphere of ascertaining the comparative policy and practice, 
there already exists a wealth of available information. A large portion of the activity of 
numerous organizations, including the United Nations, World Bank Group and OECD 
is dedicated to the type of comparative research that can be of considerable relevance. 
For example, the World Bank hosts a wealth of information in the World DataBank – 
specifically in its Worldwide Governance Indicators that can provide information on 
issues such as government effectiveness, corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law 
for 215 jurisdictions globally.114 Similarly, World Justice Project activities dedicated 
specifically to rule of law in countries around the world offer much needed insights into 
the overall state in a particular jurisdiction.115  
 
OECD publications provide an excellent overview of the functioning of civil 
justice in member countries, including length of trials at various instances, pertinent 
issues and proposals for reform.116 As for administrative efficiency and the functioning 
of public administration in general, it is possible to gather a plethora of information 
from the EU.117 For discussing the particular industries it is possible, for example, to 
find comprehensive information on health services in OECD with problems, different 
models and best practices.118 Furthermore, the UN work on the rule of law provides 
numerous documents in the area of governance, private sector, land and property in 
different regions of the world.119 Research by the Bingham Centre on the Rule of Law 
offers, inter alia, the analysis of judicial independence issues in 53 Commonwealth 
countries,120 and a specially dedicated selection of papers on the rule of law, 
development and international investment law.121 
 
																																																						
114 See http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators, 
accessed 17 January 2017. 
115 See http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index, accessed 17 January 2017. 
116 OECD 2013. 
117 See, for one example among numerous others, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/34_quality_of_public_administration_02.pdf, accessed 17 
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118 OECD 2010. 
119 See https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/, accessed 17 January 2017. 
120 http://www.biicl.org/documents/689_bingham_centre_compendium.pdf, accessed 17 January 2017. 
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http://www.biicl.org/documents/654_the_importance_of_the_rule_of_law_in_promoting_developmen
t.pdf, accessed 17 January 2017. 
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To conclude, obtaining information is already not an insurmountable obstacle for 
comparative forays. The issue, rather, is the readiness of the tribunals to make them a 
more regular occurrence in their reasoning. 
 
Comparative law and a soft-law instrument 
 
Regardless of the above, there is still room for making the comparative research 
tasks of the tribunals easier. This is especially so as gaining deeper understanding of the 
functioning of a particular system of law in order to be able to gain comparative insights 
can be a far more complex task than obtaining factual or statistical data.122 There is thus 
still a lot to be said in favour of a focused, dedicated instrument that would serve the 
needs of substantive decision-making, both in the FET context and elsewhere.123   
 
Bearing in mind the specificities of the field, a potential development could be a 
soft-law instrument providing an authoritative, systematic and accessible overview of 
comparative law and jurisprudence in (at least) the key areas of relevance – 
constitutional, administrative and contract law. The idea of a soft-law codification in the 
sphere of IIL has been recently brought up in different contexts, although the focus 
seems to be on concretising the IIA obligations rather than on offering source material 
for ancillary support.124 However, a lot of the suggested elements can also be relevant 
for facilitating the use of comparative benchmarks. The idea of a re-statement or a pre-
statement of principles of IIL based on comparative law has been recently presented in 
some detail by Jan Kleinheisterkamp in the context of the comparative public law 
approach.125 This can serve as a good basis to emphasise the similarities and the 
potential modifications which would make such an instrument useful in several 
different contexts which involve comparative examinations. 
 
																																																						
122 See in particular Legrand 1996 and Legrand 1997, as well as Carozza 1998, 1233, as well as Goff 2000, 
240-241. 
123 See, for a similar tone in a somewhat different context, the opinion of Lord Goff in White v. Jones, 263 
B, suggesting that accessible comparative material can greatly assist the readiness to embark on a 
comparative law examination.  
124 See in that sense Chapter 3, section 3.1. as well as Bjorklund/Reinisch 2012 and Bjorklund 2012; and 
on the ultimately abandoned International Law Association attempt see http://www.ila-
hq.org/download.cfm/docid/058DBA5E-310B-44F9-AF9A0F0CBDB887CF, accessed 1 February 2017. 
125 See generally Kleinheisterkamp 2015. 
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The instrument proposed by Kleinheisterkamp would be ‘a code-like, detailed and 
richly commented set of rules that embody a re-statement and, probably more so, a pre-
statement of Principles of Investment Protection[…]’.126 Comparative research should 
provide the common core of constitutional and administrative standards of countries 
with the most stable traditions, yet with due considerations for flexibility required for 
the developed countries.127 When this is not possible, at least insights into the best 
practices and experiences should be provided, and ultimately result in a code with 
solutions which have a sound balance between the private and public interests of the 
host States.128  
 
While this would not necessarily coincide with the elements of the ideal-type 
model and the comparative benchmarks, there are a number of other points that can be 
fully supported. What is indeed needed ‘is a vehicle that will provide practice with a 
ready-to-use elaborate final product of the comparative approach’ 129 and a ‘practical 
tool for navigating the rough sea of comparative law’.130 Furthermore, it is also the case 
that a lack of central authoritative organ in IIL strongly advocates the creation of the 
instrument by a group combining legal experts and government officials, sufficiently 
representative in terms of legal backgrounds and ideally under the auspices of an 
recognized and authoritative international organization.131  
 
Considering the previous discussions, a three-component instrument might 
present a more complete answer. The first component would contain a set of basic 
prescriptions for conducting a sufficiently rigorous comparative exercise and 
ascertainment of rules, to an extent similarly to the ILA Recommendations on 
Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration.132 This methodological component should provide general guidelines for a 
case-specific comparative analysis. The second component would contain an accessible 
presentation of the relevant substantive rules in different jurisdictions (with a list of 
jurisdictions as comprehensive as possible, or at least containing representative of each 
																																																						
126 ibid, 821-822. 
127 ibid, 820. 
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131 ibid, 819-820. 
132 ILA Resolution 6/2008, available at: www.ila-hq.org, accessed 17 January 2017. 
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legal ‘family’),133 and would greatly assist the tribunal in its search for the content of 
legal regimes used as comparators. Finally, a third component could indeed be a 
codification-like set of rules based on the common or best solutions found in the 
second component.  
 
Such an instrument would have different potential uses. The third component 
could promote the further development of IIL along the comparative public law lines, 
the second one the use of comparative benchmarks, but both can also be used by 
interested States for other goals. Having such an instrument could serve as an 
inspiration to States to ‘harden’ its rules, i.e. reform their existing or future IIAs, issue 
interpretive statements, further influence the development of arbitral practice through 
their argumentation, or even reform domestic law in accordance with what is identified 
as best practice. In the meantime, the exposition of the comparative methodology and 
sources would also largely facilitate the potential use of comparative benchmarks as set 
out in this Chapter. 
 
5.2.4. Comparative benchmarks – some concluding remarks 
 
The interplay of the variety of potential issues in dispute between investors and 
States and the vast existing reservoir of ways in which these issues have been regulated 
by other States and regimes, opens large possibilities for the comparative insights in the 
decision-making of arbitrators. Even with considerable efforts to elaborate a thorough 
ideal-type framework, the chances are that the room will remain open for sensitive and 
often discretion-laden determinations. Depending on the particular standard and 
method of review, the tribunals will find themselves in the position to pronounce on 
the suitability, necessity and reasonableness of various State measures, sometimes 
enacted under the circumstances of crisis and urgency. Apart from shaping the IIA 
interpretation and general principles of law as a source of international law, it stands to 
reason that comparative efforts can also be employed to offer very concrete support for 
specific conclusions of tribunals. Even if not binding or determinative per se, a 
persuasive finding that the host State did or did not do something in accordance with 
																																																						
133 For discussion on delineation of legal families and a common systematisation see Zweigert/Kötz 
1998, 63-321. 
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comparative law, policy or practice can provide significant legitimacy and credibility for 
the tribunal’s ultimate conclusions. 
 
The recourse to comparative benchmarks is certainly not an easy endeavour, but 
the potential benefits of persuasiveness, legitimacy and even offering guidance for the 
host State reform arguably make the exercise worthwhile. In any case, there is already a 
plethora of available comparative materials that can be employed for these purposes as 
well as possibility to use the parties’ and tribunals’ own research. Furthermore, a 
possibility remains open for a soft-law instrument that would ideally combine different 
descriptive and prescriptive comparative elements and further facilitate the task of 
tribunals. The rich treasure chest of comparative benchmarks lays available to 
investment tribunals - ignoring it would be a needlessly missed opportunity for worthy 
additions to the legal reasoning process. 
 
5.3. Corrective good faith factors 
 
The second element here discussed is the role of the good faith considerations in 
the FET decision-making. The focus on the NROL paradigm and the ideal-type model 
arguably limits the role good faith should play in deliberations. The evolution of FET 
jurisprudence shows that the principle of good faith often became the explicit or 
implicit foundation for defining host State obligations. Usually, it served as a basis for 
more specific concepts and doctrines. Instead, as the rule of law ‘core’ of the FET has 
sufficiently stabilized, the use of the principle should shifted towards a corrective, ultima 
ratio role of securing a fair outcome in an individual case. As is sometimes noted, at least 
regarding the civil law countries, the functions of the good faith principle can be seen in 
interpretation/concretisation, supplementation and correction.134 If the ideal-type model 
would be relied on more in interpretation and application of the FET and its sub-
principles, the good faith should thus be increasingly confined to the corrective role.135 
 
																																																						
134 Hesselink 2011, 626-627; Lenaerts 2010, 1146. 
135 To reiterate, good faith considerations can also play their corrective role at the stage of potential 
determination of compensation due to the foreign investor. This is, however, not the focus of the 
discussion here. See for example Viñuales 2017, 364-366 for an overview of good faith and the quantum 
phase. 
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This section thus outlines the corrective good faith factors as another corollary to the 
tribunals decision-making in FET claims, that also aims to contribute to the balancing 
of the IROL and NROL considerations. It argues that doctrines and factors based on 
good faith in existing jurisprudence should generally (with certain exceptions) be 
reimagined as coming sequentially after the steps outlined in the previous Chapter and 
in the previous section. After a brief overview of good faith in international law and 
IIL, and a suggestion for a shift in its role (5.3.1.), the sections below will examine the 
situations in which good faith remains of determinative importance more directly 
(5.3.2.) and finally the specific suggested corrective factors which can be taken into 
account on the side of both the host State and the investor (5.3.3.). 
  
5.3.1. A brief overview of good faith in international law and IIL 
 
The role of the principle of good faith in international law can hardly be 
overstated.136 As is sometimes noted, it ‘permeates virtually every legal relationship’137 
and is often considered simultaneously both a general principle of law within the ICJ 
Statute 38(1)(c) and the general principle of international law,138 as well as a part of 
customary international law.139 It is featured perhaps most prominently in the UN 
Charter Article 2(2) requirement that all UN members ‘shall fulfil in good faith’ all 
obligations assumed under the Charter. The principle of good faith plays different 
important roles.140 As indicated by the VCLT,141 there exist the good faith obligation not 
to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force;142 to perform 
treaty obligations in good faith;143 and to interpret treaties in good faith.144 More 
generally, negotiating and settling the disputes should be performed in good faith as 
																																																						
136 The situation is similar in national private laws (Hesselink 2011, 620) although its importance can 
reach far into the public law sphere as well (ibid, 634-635). 
137 Ziegler/Baumgartner 2015, 9. See similarly Paparinskis 2015b, 143; Reinhold 2013, 40. For a similar 
appreciation in ISDS jurisprudence see Phoenix v. Czech Republic, para. 107. 
138 Brownlie/Crawford 2012, 37-38; Shaw 2008, 103-104; Cheng 1953, 105; Pellet 2012, paras. 250 and 
260. As Kotzur notes, ‘[g]ood faith belongs to the very few legal principles which do find resemblance in 
more or less all legal systems and legal cultures’ (2009, para. 5). 
139 Mitchell 2006, 445; Kotzur 2009, para. 22. 
140 See also Goodwin-Gill 2004, 88. 
141 See on this generally Reinhold 2013, 59-63. 
142 VCLT Article 18. 
143 VCLT Article 26. 
144 VCLT Article 31(1). For an overview of numerous other international law instruments referring to 
good faith see Kotzur 2009, paras. 7-14. 
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well as the exercise of rights.145  
Regardless of its undisputed importance, the notion of good faith is notoriously 
hard to define.146 In a somewhat tautological circle, the definitions suggest that acting in 
good faith entails the need to respect equally abstract concepts such as honesty, 
reasonableness, fairness and openness.147 Particularly in the international sphere, cultural 
differences makes ‘universal good faith’ criteria difficult to achieve.148 As Kolb suggests, 
the notion ‘cannot be entirely grasped by abstract definitions’.149 
 
Bearing in mind this open-textured nature, and focusing for the purposes of this 
discussion on the principle of good faith as a source of substantive obligations, it is 
possible to distinguish between its autonomous sphere of operation and its more 
common role of serving as a basis for more concrete doctrines.150  
 
The autonomous role for good faith as a source of obligation, whether stemming 
from its status as a general principle or part of customary international law, remains 
contentious.151 Importantly, the ICJ has held that good faith is ‘not in itself a source of 
obligation where none would otherwise exist’152 and is only relevant for the ‘fulfilment 
of existing obligations’.153 While this position is certainly open to criticism,154 it arguably 
reflects the justified general reluctance to impose binding and potentially justiciable 
obligations based on the abstract notions which are usually associated with defining 
good faith. The proximity of good faith to perhaps the broadest legal concept in 
existence, that of justice,155 would seem to warrant such caution. 
 
																																																						
145 See above all the seminal work of Cheng 1953, 106-120, as well as Kotzur 2009, para. 15-17; Reinhold 
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para. 87. 
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International courts and tribunals rather refer to the particular concretisations of 
good faith.156 The autonomous use of the principle would thus usually be restricted to 
situations in which a dispute cannot be settled on the grounds of its particular 
concretisations in treaty or customary law form.157 The process of particularising the 
general principle of good faith is well-observed in national laws as well, and in that 
sense straddles the common/civil law divide.158 In international law more generally, the 
principle of good faith has more or less directly served as the basis for doctrines159 such 
as legitimate expectations,160 pacta sunt servanda,161 estoppel,162 acquiescence,163 equity,164 
and abus de droit.165 Such a trend, to bring the discussion into the FET and IIL sphere 
more specifically, has certainly been prominent in ISDS.  
 
As touched upon in the previous chapters, and perhaps even more than elsewhere 
in international law,166 the ISDS tribunals have explicitly or implicitly taken the principle 
of good faith as a rule-generative tool, not the least in the FET context.167 This was 
certainly in no small part inspired by both the language such as ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ and 
by the wording of VCLT Article 31(1) rule on interpretation.168 A number of important 
concepts essentially stem from the principle of good faith.169 Perhaps most prominently, 
																																																						
156 Reinhold 2013, 47. 
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it serves as the origin of the ubiquitous doctrine of legitimate expectations as a 
concretisation of the FET standard.170 As previously noted, the Tecmed v. Mexico tribunal 
found support for its vision of what the investor can expect from the host State in the 
principle of good faith in international law.171 The principle has also, for example, 
served as a basis for a particular estoppel-like concept of non-arbitrariness in Micula v. 
Romania.172  
 
There is, however, also support for the more autonomous obligation of good 
faith. Although not discussed completely outside the context of the IIA standards,173 
certain tribunals have suggested an autonomous scope of application for good faith. For 
example, the tribunal in TECO suggested that good faith was rather an independent 
obligation of the host State that had to be taken into account to assess the breach of the 
relevant standard.174 Somewhat similarly, in response to the Respondent’s assertion that 
good faith imposed no independent obligations, the tribunal in Merill & Ring v. Canada 
stated that good faith was a general principle that generates obligations which cannot be 
ignored, and which in particular circumstances might be closely related to securing 
stable legal environment and transparency.175 Indeed, as is sometimes noted, the 
investment tribunals are at least theoretically in a position to explore the autonomous 
good faith obligation much more elaborately than some other fora (such as the WTO 
DSB) due to broad applicable law clauses and limited annulment grounds.176 
 
The obligation to behave in good faith has also been bestowed on foreign 
investors as a result of their partial international legal personality stemming from the 
IIA-granted rights.177 While also of considerable importance regarding the legality of 
investment as a jurisdictional issue,178 and the potential abuses of the ISDS as a 
procedural mechanism,179 the obligation of investors’ good faith behaviour is also 
																																																						
170 More generally, Kotzur suggests that the legitimate expectations of parties are what good faith is 
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concretised in examining the merits of the case, again often not the least in the FET 
context.180  
 
Notwithstanding the refinements that the particular doctrines experienced in 
jurisprudence, as well as their interplay with other sources of international and national 
law, it could still be questionable if the principle of good faith is generally a good 
primary choice for concretising the FET standard. Standing alone, good faith is 
inherently abstract and leaves a broad margin of discretion to the decision-maker,181 
something which is not necessarily beneficial in interpreting the equally abstract notions 
such as ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’. This can lead to situations in which the process of certain 
good faith-based doctrines becoming the part of the IIL acquis is ‘not straightforward or 
obvious’.182   
 
The principle of good faith in essence allows retaining flexibility for dispute-
settlers, and while fleshing out particular doctrines certainly helps, it remains open to 
discussion if even these should be the first port of call when decisions are not rendered 
ex aequo et bono. As is sometimes noted, what the FET now requires is less generality of 
principles and standards, are more detailed rules of technical law.183 In a system aiming 
to secure the precepts of the rule of law, and already under at least a suspicion of a 
‘legitimacy crisis’, the overly broad use of good faith should be viewed with caution.184 
 
With a parallel focus on the holistic examination of the national rule of law 
commitments, as exemplified by the ideal-type model, there is arguably a diminished 
need for good faith and its manifestations to (continue) to be the primary purveyors of 
meaning or preferable tools for decision-making. Excluding the situations that will be 
addressed in section 5.3.2. below, their role should be limited to a residual and carefully 
used power of arbitrators to secure the fairness of ultimate outcome.185 This would 
																																																						
180 See generally Muchlinski 2006 and Viñuales 2017. 
181 As sometimes argued, good faith ‘is merely the mouthpiece through which new rules speak, or the 
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therefore be a move towards the corrective or limitative function of good faith.186 It 
should, among others, serve as a final check that ‘mere’ or ‘blind’ formalism187 
(insufficiently addressed through the ideal-type model) does not prevent what the 
tribunal would perceive as a fair outcome. As Paparinskis has observed:  
[…] one should not rush to employ good faith as a ubiquitous shortcut to the 
conclusion of the legal argument, merely because the mundane exercise of 
competently identifying and applying the small print of international law turns out 
to be more vexing than expected.188 
 
Instead of a shortcut towards a conclusion, good faith can thus be perceived 
rather as a potential and hopefully seldom needed modifier to it. Yet, before examining 
good faith factors in this context, it is warranted to briefly address the situations where 
good faith considerations and concretisations should still play a different role than just a 
corrective one.  
 
5.3.2. Clear mala fides and good faith considerations within the ideal-type model 
 
There are at least two exceptions to good faith coming into play only as an 
ultimate corrective. One is where there is sufficiently clear evidence of bad faith (mala 
fides) aimed against the investor. The second, and perhaps more likely, is the situation in 
which the ideal-type model sufficiently clearly contains specific good faith 
requirements/concretisations and can therefore already then be taken into account by 
the tribunal during its exercise of scrutiny. 
 
As for the first situation, there would seem to be little point in constructing and 
using an overly elaborate ideal-type model as a reference if the evidence clearly indicates 
bad faith (mala fides) aimed against the investor or the investment. That, as is sometimes 
argued, would ‘be an automatic per se breach of the FET standard’.189 This would be 
‘intentionally harmful conduct, a pattern of behaviour consciously undertaken to 
procure damage’.190 Such is, for example, a malicious or fictitious exercise of an existing 
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188 Paparinskis 2015b, 146. 
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right, ‘for the sole purpose of causing injury to another’.191 Such is also the case where 
the modifications of laws were made specifically to prejudice a particular investment192 
or when legal instruments are clearly used for purposes other than those for which they 
were created.193 A recently proposed systematization194 has grouped such mala fides 
situations as established or hypothetically mentioned in case law as those of ‘political 
engineering’,195 ‘conspiracy’,196 ‘abuse of powers’,197 ‘coercion and harassment’198 and in 
some situations ‘denial of justice and similar phenomena’.199 
 
While these instances can often be intertwined and are sometimes difficult to 
discern,200 the sufficiently persuasive indication of an action motivated by the specific 
desire to harm the investor or investment, for whatever reason, would make the holistic 
examination of the ideal-type model rather redundant.201 The use of the already existing 
doctrines in international law dealing with such situations, such as abuse of rights, 
would arguably suffice to offer a persuasive resolution to the dispute. At the same time, 
care should be taken not to conflate a political motive with a motive to harm. A new 
government might have a legitimate political agenda to pursue (which might have 
gotten the government elected in the first place), and that agenda usually involves 
specific economic and social measures.202 The fact that the motive for such measures 
can be broadly characterised as ‘political’ should not lead to automatic mala fides. Rather, 
the recourse to (e.g.) conspiracy and harassment in order to pursue those goals would 
lead into the territory of an automatic breach of both FET and other related standards, 
such as arbitrariness. Pursuing those goals in line with the ideal-type model should 
generally not. 
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However, there are a number of reasons why this particular mala fides ‘trump card’ 
may be of more limited importance. It is not only that bad faith is not considered 
necessary for the breach of FET,203 but also that the threshold for establishing its 
existence is high.204 As is noted, ‘[n]o arbitral award has based its reasoning and 
conclusions entirely and exclusively on findings of bad faith in order to recognize 
breach of the FET’.205 Arguably, the realities of the investor-State disputes only on 
occasion show a clear scenario where the host State actions are primarily motivated by 
the desire to harm the foreign investor. A much more realistic scenario can involve 
negligent behaviour that might have no underlying ulterior motive,206 but should 
regardless be considered as relevant – in particular if the goal is to strengthen the 
national rule of law and good governance more generally. Opaqueness of the legal 
framework and deficiency in the work of the administrative and judicial apparatus is still 
capable of breaching the FET standard, even without mala fides.207  
 
Leaving this sphere, the second and potentially more common situation would be 
where some of the instruments forming the host State ideal-model contain explicit 
requirements for the decision-makers to act in good faith or in accordance with one of 
the (national) doctrines concretising the general principle.208 The tribunal could then rely 
on the domestic statutory, jurisprudential and doctrinal elaboration so as to offer a 
persuasive application in a particular case, along the lines of the Dan Cake award 
examined in the previous chapter. 
 
A good example in that sense is the doctrine of legitimate expectations. Apart 
from its importance in the current FET standard context, the doctrine can be examined 
in a national law context.209 To the extent that a tribunal does not persuasively 
determine that the doctrine has become a general principle of law as a source of 
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international law, it can and should focus on the doctrine as a part of the ideal-type 
model in situations so deserving.  
 
While there are certainly countries where the existence and/or scope of the 
doctrine is doubtful,210 there are legal systems (including the EU law) where the ‘the 
protection of the expectations of individuals defeated by unforeseen decisions of the 
public authorities has developed into an important chapter of administrative law.’211 In 
systems where the specific doctrine is not known, similar results can and are achieved 
by estoppel of venire contra factum proprium.212 As suggested, with certain differences duly 
taken into account, the doctrine is known in various civil and common law systems, in 
Europe, US and also to an extent in Latin America.213 While the level of development of 
the doctrine varies, and it might not be of help in a particular situation, due account of 
it by a the tribunal can put its reasoning on a firmer ground than when having to 
navigate the existing ISDS jurisprudence. 
 
To briefly summarise, the possibility for using good faith and its particularisations 
would remain considerable even with the normative shift towards the NROL paradigm 
complementation. However, in the cases not covered above, the role should be a far 
more limited one. 
 
5.3.3. Specific corrective factors and their potential use 
 
To the extent that clear mala fides cannot be identified, and that specific good faith 
concretisations were not considered as a part of the ideal-type model, it is possible to 
suggest a non-exhaustive list of factors to potentially secure the case-specific fairness of 
outcome. These factors, or recurring fact-patterns, can relate to both the host State and 
the foreign investors. They can indicate whether a breach of the FET standard occurred 
regardless of the potentially different tentative conclusion coming from the scrutiny that 
involved the ideal-type model. Isolating recurring fact-patterns, as suggested above, has 
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been present in doctrine to systematise the bad faith behaviour of States,214 but it is 
possible to offer a (certainly non-exhaustive) systematisation of a different nature.  
 
An illustrative starting point can be found in the Lemire v. Ukraine – Jurisdiction v. 
Liability award. The Tribunal suggested that the FET breach was to be established on a 
fact-specific, case-by-case basis and suggested that the relevant factors for the exercise 
include: 
- whether the State has failed to offer a stable and predictable legal framework; 
- whether the State made specific representations to the investor; 
- whether due process has been denied to the investor; 
- whether there is an absence of transparency in the legal procedure or in 
the actions of the State; 
- whether there has been harassment, coercion, abuse of power or other 
bad faith conduct by the host State; 
- whether any of the actions of the State can be labeled [sic] as arbitrary, 
discriminatory or inconsistent.215 
 
In the following paragraph, the tribunal suggested some countervailing factors 
that also need to be taken into account before an FET breach is established: 
- the State’s sovereign right to pass legislation and to adopt decisions for the   
protection of its public interests, especially if they do not provoke a     
disproportionate impact on foreign investors; 
- the legitimate expectations of the investor, at the time he made his investment; 
- the investor’s duty to perform an investigation before effecting the investment; 
- the investor’s conduct in the host country.216 
 
To bring this into relation with the main arguments of this thesis, a number of 
these factors – namely the stable legal framework, due process, transparency of 
procedures, arbitrariness of actions, sovereign right to regulate, legitimate expectations – 
would be starting points to delve into an identification and examination of the host 
State’s ideal-type model. Open bad faith, as suggested above, would remain a form of a 
‘trump card’.  
 
But the remaining factors – specific representations to the investor, transparency 
of the overall legal framework (as opposed to the procedural one), investor’s duty to 
investigate and the investor’s own conduct – to the extent that they do not give rise to 
particular effects under the ideal-type model, can remain as separate and potentially 
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mutually offsetting correctives to the scrutiny of the tribunal.217 Another factor that 
should arguably be added to the side of the host State are circumstances (socio-political, 
historical, economic) that could influence its realisation of the ideal-type model 
obligations. The following sections will first touch upon the factors relating to the host 
State and then on those relating to the foreign investor. 
 
Factors relating to the host State 
 
Specific representations  
 
The representations provided to the foreign investor are fairly commonly 
discussed in the FET context, particularly in the context of legitimate expectations.218 
As noted before, the reliance on the ideal-type model can in a way enhance the 
particular doctrine of legitimate expectations by creating a general presumed 
expectation that host State will act in accordance with that model. The focus would 
then turn on specific representations given to the foreign investor about the functioning 
of the domestic legal system/and or the manner in which the investment process would 
unfold. To the extent that these representations do not create legally protected 
expectations within the ideal-type model itself, they can become relevant at this ultimate 
stage. 
 
This would include the situations in which the subsequent behaviour of the host 
State officials was in accordance with the ideal-type model, but with different and 
reliance-worthy representations about this behaviour being previously given to the 
investor. Such representations could be given at either the pre-investment or the post-
investment stage. The potential difference between these situations can be the level of 
knowledge that the investor can be expected to have about the domestic legal 
framework when already settled and operating in the host State. 
 
Specific representations given to the foreign investor could (depending also on 
interplay with other factors discussed below) trigger the breach of the FET standard. 
For example, representations of the sufficiently highly ranked or well-positioned host 
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State officials, in situations where there exists an opaqueness of the legal framework (as 
discussed below) and the investor proactively sought to clarify the legal situation (as also 
discussed below) could lead to a breach. At the same time, where sufficient possibility 
existed for the foreign investor (through its own investigation) to bring into question 
the specific given assurances, the impact of this factor is more limited. In the end, the 
representations provided should not be seen as an excuse not to partake in due 
diligence that can be expected from professional entities such as foreign investors.219 
This factor can also be brought in relation with the broader circumstances of the host 
State. As Viñuales suggests, ‘it would not be reasonable for an investor investing in a 
highly volatile political environment, whatever the assurances received, that the 
investment will no longer be affected by further disruptions.’220 
 
The recent Bilcon v. Canada award can offer some illustration of the above 
considerations. The Claimant investor in the said case was interested in pursuing mining 
operations in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia.221 Canadian officials at different 
levels of government expressed the support for this project and conviction in its 
beneficial realisation.222 However, the licence for the project was eventually denied after 
a report of an environmental Joint Review Panel, that also took account of ‘community 
core values’.223 This concept, the Claimant suggested, was not mentioned in the 
applicable legal framework for the JRP determinations.224 The tribunal agreed, and 
determined that JRP report was fundamentally at variance with the applicable Canadian 
laws.225 This was to such an extent that it warranted a finding of the breach of the 
Article 1105 of NAFTA, i.e. the minimum standard of treatment including the FET.226  
 
Such findings on their own are reconcilable with an elaboration of the ideal-type 
model (applicable Canadian laws) followed by a scrutiny of the behaviour in accordance 
with the adopted standard of review (as derived from Article 1105 of NAFTA). 
However, the tribunal insisted that the integral part of finding the breach was the fact 
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that representations of Canadian officials at various points in time created legitimate 
expectation about the project. As the tribunal noted: 
The basis of liability under [NAFTA] Chapter Eleven is that, after all the specific 
encouragement the Investors and their investment had received from government 
to pursue the project, and after all the resources placed in preparing and presenting 
their environmental assessment case, the Investors and their investment were not 
afforded a fair opportunity to have the specifics of that case considered, assessed 
and decided in accordance with applicable laws.227 
 
Arguably, it seems hard to see what would be the particular role of specific 
representations that were made by Canadian officials. The general expectation that the 
investor will be treated in accordance with applicable laws should not depend on any 
specific assurances by the officials, which makes their role at best ancillary and at worst 
redundant. But if the focus is on some hypothetical assurances that the project will go 
through, giving these such an important role can rather be detrimental for the rule of 
law. Would the investor then legitimately expect that Canadian officials would ‘make 
sure’ that the investment went through even if it meant contravening the law? Such a 
rule of law-adverse expectation could hardly be protected.  
 
However, as a corrective factor, the specific representations can relevant in a 
different way. Provided that the JRP report was hypothetically eventually found to be in 
accordance with the ideal-type model, the investor could potentially still claim a breach 
if: a) the intensity of representations about how the investment will unfold was 
sufficient (coming from well-positioned officials and not being a marketing puff) and b) 
that the examination of countervailing factors, such as investor’s own proactive due 
diligence, shows that the representations given by the officials were sufficiently 
plausible. But from a rule of law point, there is little to be said against the primary 
relevance of whether the domestic authorities applied the law properly, and not what 
various officials in different contexts said about the unfolding of the investment 
process.  
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Transparency of the legal framework 
 
The requirement of ‘transparency’ of the host State behaviour can have at least 
two meanings. One is the actual transparency of operation of the host State organs 
applying the domestic legal framework, and the other is the broader transparency of the 
legal framework itself. As Martins Paparinskis has suggested in a somewhat different 
context, ‘the ‘‘complete lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process’’ 
of Waste Management II, and the expectation that a state acts ‘‘totally transparently in its 
relations with the foreign investor’’ of TECMED are not quite the same thing.’228 
Within the context of the discussion here, the transparency of the administrative 
process would be something that should initially requires an elaboration of the ideal-
type model – i.e. assessing what ‘transparent’ means in the host State.  
 
The meaning suggested here is different. The transparency of the legal framework 
would essentially represent the possibility of the foreign investor to be clear about the 
regulatory surrounding in which its investment operates.229 Apart from the more 
practical aspects, such as the physical possibility of garnering information about the 
legal framework,230 this would include the potentially more problematic situations where 
the relevant instruments are available but their interpretation and future application in 
practice remains contentious.231   
 
An example of such a problematic situation can be found in the Parkerings v. 
Lithuania award. A particular legal issue - legality of hybrid fees for parking -  was both 
important for the resolution of the dispute232 and objectively quite unclear at the 
moment when the investment was made. The issue resulted in conflicting opinions of 
the government representatives and the Vilnius City council, before eventually being 
settled by the courts.233 Importantly, the investor itself invested efforts in obtaining 
professional legal advice, resulting in two conflicting legal opinions of Lithuanian law 
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firms.234 In such a vexed situation, there might exist an obligation on behalf of the host 
State to provide extra efforts so that a (proactive) investor is not at loss for the 
opaqueness of the legal framework. 
 
Whether the sufficiently grave lack of transparency should lead to the breach of 
the FET standard would however also depend on the interplay the extent of the 
investor’s own attempts to clarify its legal position. Provided that the investor put 
genuine efforts, as was the case in Parkerings, the ball would in that sense be in the host 
State’s yard. More generally, insistence on this factor has considerable rule of law 
strengthening potential, bearing in mind the requirement of clear and prospective rules 
that form the essence of the formal understanding of the term.  
 
Circumstances of the host State 
 
A question arising particularly in the context of application of FET and full 
protection and security standards in crisis situations is if and how the particular 
circumstances of the host State should affect the application of these standards. 
Although perhaps not so obviously, this factor has also been seen as related to good 
faith and justice, as it could be unfairly harsh to ignore the potentially dire 
circumstances in which the host State finds itself.235 The approach towards this issue in 
ISDS jurisprudence has been rather heterogeneous.236 Leaving aside the situations in 
which the host State circumstances were considered only relevant for the quantum stage 
of the proceedings,237 there are examples of the tribunals considering these 
circumstances as relevant for the existence of an FET breach,238 irrelevant, or only 
relevant for particular manifestations of the FET but not the others.239 
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A particularly clear expression of the need to examine a wide array of 
circumstances, in the context of assessing the ‘legitimacy’ of investor’s expectations,240 
can be found in Bayindir v. Pakistan:  
A second question concerns the circumstances that the Tribunal must take into 
account in analyzing the reasonableness or legitimacy of Bayindir’s expectations 
[…]. In so doing, it finds guidance in prior decisions including Saluka, Generation 
Ukraine and Duke Energy […] which relied on ‘all circumstances, including not only 
the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural 
and historical conditions prevailing in the host State.’241 
 
As has been suggested, what is ‘reasonable’ should be influenced by the 
circumstances prevailing in the host State, and allow for IIL to take account of different 
developmental stages.242 Such an approach can be generally welcomed, as it is a form of 
a complement to the position that the investor should be expecting the national rule of 
law vision as primarily relevant.243  
 
There are certainly some reasonable limits in that sense. As suggested, some 
aspects of the prohibition of the denial of justice, such as right to be heard or to have 
an impartial tribunal should not depend on the economic or political situation.244 Yet, 
even in denial of justice situations there is some possibility for taking the circumstances 
into account. Undue delay in the provision of justice is certainly a part of the denial of 
justice considerations, but whether a delay is ‘undue’ seems to be at least potentially 
open to influence of the host State circumstances.245 Therefore, the finding that the 
procedural deadlines set out by the host State legal frameworks have been breached (a 
tentative breach of the ideal-type model) can be offset, depending on the intensity, by 
the consideration that host State courts are sorely lacking in resources. 
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An oft-mentioned and legitimate concern in this regard is the fear that overly 
lenient attitude towards the host State can be a disincentive for improvements,246 or that 
treating States in better circumstances more harshly than others would be a sort of 
punishment for their level of development.247 The former concern is justified and the 
level of lenience shown towards the host State (to the extent that it also does not 
feature within the scrutiny under the ideal-type model) should be carefully thought-out 
so not to unduly further problems in the State’s government apparatus. After all, the 
best efforts of the host State to optimally fulfil its adopted obligations under the ideal-
type model should be presumed. Potential disturbances in those efforts should be given 
recognition, but should not make the adopted obligations purely aspirational. The 
foreign investor might not be entitled to perfection, but it would be unreasonable to 
justify whatever comes its way by arguing that the host State simply does not have the 
capacity to do better. 
 
In that light, the latter concern about ‘punishing’ the host States in objectively 
better circumstances arguably has less foundation. As touched upon in Chapter 3, the 
concept of the ideal-type model of a particular host State almost necessarily implies 
higher expectations from the State that usually performs well when it comes to the rule 
of law. The investor can and should expect that it will experience the proper operation 
of the apparatus of that particular State.248 Having less consideration for the constraints 
of those States (again, depending on particular facts) is justified in that sense. 
Strengthening of the national rule of law would remain a rather empty goal if the host 
State was not held up at least to the standard that it usually exhibits, but some lower 
one. Taken to the extreme, such treatment would rather be conducive to weakening the 
rule of law. 
 
Factors relating to the investor 
 
As a preliminary remark, the topic of obligations imposed on the investor de lege 
lata and de lege ferenda (such as human rights/business interplay) is an increasingly 
important one in IIL.249 It is not within the scope of this discussion to examine these 
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obligations in a broader sense.250 Rather, what is examined here is the investor’s 
behaviour ‘as part of a State’s defence against allegations for breach of an investment 
treaty,’251 and in the context of the ideal-type model correctives. Two primary and 
somewhat intertwined factors in that context are the due diligence of the investor in 
connection to the legal framework, and the investor’s contribution to the dynamic of 
the dispute. 
 
 
Due diligence of the investor 
 
In general, the foreign investor should bear its share of responsibility for being 
informed about the legal framework governing its investment. Failure to do so can limit 
or offset the potentially problematic above-mentioned factors in an individual case. 
There should be an expectation of a prudent businessperson to collect sufficient 
information before entering into business ventures, as well as to remain informed 
throughout.252 As noted by Peter Muchlinski, investors ‘must be aware of the regulatory 
environment in which they operate, ensure compliance with any applicable regulatory 
requirements and take relevant professional advice’.253 Initiating operations abroad 
might militate an even higher expectation of careful due diligence.254 While particular 
features of the legal and administrative environment might be problematic, the fact that 
investor knew (or should have reasonably known) about them and still proceeded 
without receiving specific assurances,255 should not be ignored. 
 
However, it is important to distinguish between the due diligence regarding the 
existing legal framework and regarding its potential changes. As argued in the previous 
chapters, the investor should always expect amendments to the legal framework, but 
should also expect these to be made in accordance with the legal framework existing at 
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the time of its investment. It is questionable how much prospective due diligence can 
and should be expected from the investor,256 and the tribunals might have on occasion 
been rather too strict in this sense. To illustrate, in discussing the pre-investment phase, 
the Parkerings v. Lithuania tribunal observed that: 
[i]n 1998, at the time of the Agreement, the political environment in Lithuania was 
characteristic of a country in transition from its past being part of the Soviet Union 
to candidate for the European Union membership. Thus, legislative changes, far 
from being unpredictable, were in fact to be regarded as likely. As any businessman 
would, the Claimant was aware of the risk that changes of laws would probably 
occur after the conclusion of the Agreement. The circumstances surrounding the 
decision to invest in Lithuania were certainly not an indication of stability of the 
legal environment. Therefore, in such a situation, no expectation that the laws 
would remain unchanged was legitimate.257  
 
As the saying goes - it is hard to make predictions, particularly about the future. 
In this particular case, one of the changes that the investor was meant to predict 
included prohibition of agreements on joint activity (essentially a form of private-public 
partnerships) between self-governments and private entities.258 In an equally persuasive 
yet counter-factual manner, it could be said that the investor could have expected more 
liberalisation from EU ascension - not less. On this point, an investigation into what 
changes could have been expected in connection with the EU context, with a potential 
recourse to comparative benchmarks, would arguably be more persuasive. A useful 
illustration can be found in the Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic – Partial Award discussion 
of the EU regulation of the sugar market and the ways in which the investor could have 
expected the host State to adapt to it.259  
 
In any case, investors lack of diligence and effort in finding out about not only 
the basic regulations applicable to its transaction, but also the totality of the legal 
framework,260 can be a strong countervailing factor to, among others, the potential 
opaqueness of the legal framework. The investors, more broadly, can hardly be treated 
as consumers requiring transparency for which the obligation lies only on the other 
party. 
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Investor’s behaviour and contribution to the dynamic of the dispute 
 
It appears almost intuitively clear that the behaviour of the investor can be 
relevant for assessing whether the State acted fairly, equitably or arbitrarily. However, 
this factor can be perceived in a broader (currently common) sense and a narrower 
sense that would better correspond to the paradigm focused on strengthening the 
national rule of law.  
 
This broader understanding that puts considerable emphasis on investor’s 
behaviour is expressed well by Muchlinski – ‘a central question in any defence to a claim 
of unfair and/or inequitable treatment on the part of the investor must be: what was the 
investor doing to engage the allegedly unfair administrative response?261 In a number of 
cases, the behaviour of the investor (negligent, reckless, or otherwise problematic) was 
an important factor as it was deemed to have caused the response by the host State.262 
This is certainly important in order to identify e.g. the naked arbitrariness of the host 
State behaviour. Adverse measures against the foreign investor which provided no 
reason for them (or under the flimsiest of pretexts) would arguably offer good grounds 
for establishing mala fides and automatic host State liability (as discussed above).263 
 
However, the existing jurisprudence would also suggest that conduct of the 
investor in the host State can itself be a direct counterbalance to the behaviour of the 
State within the preliminary determination if the FET was breached.264 If the focus is 
put on the strengthening of the national rule of law and the ideal-type model, this would 
not seem adequate. It would mean that the problematic behaviour of the foreign 
investor can per se offset the fact that the host State has breached its rule of law 
framework. Simply put, the very fact that an investor caused a reaction by the host State 
could potentially make the illegality of such an action justifiable. 
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This is arguably not what the investor should expect. Generally, the fact that the 
investor’s behaviour may contravene the domestic legal framework is nothing so 
exceptional that it should justify leniency towards the host State. The legal frameworks 
are put in place, among other reasons, exactly to deal with these situations. And it is just 
the manner in which the host State has dealt with the problematic behaviour of the 
investor that should be assessed with the help of the ideal-type model. Normatively 
speaking, when the investor enters the host State, it should not only expect that it will 
have to obey the domestic legal framework, but that in the case that it does not, it will 
be sanctioned in accordance with it. Therefore, the fact that the investor caused the 
reaction of the host State should not per se be of particular relevance. It is simply a fact 
that triggered the application of other relevant norms of the domestic legal framework, 
application that is now to be assessed by the tribunal, hopefully through both the IROL 
and NROL paradigm lens. 
 
The importance of the investor’s behaviour as a corrective factor would be 
something more limited in scope. The focus should be on determining whether 
investor’s behaviour after the outset of the dispute hampered or prevented the host 
State in acting in accordance with the ideal-type model. For example, as noted by 
Muchlinski, ‘should a dispute arise with the local administrative authorities, the investor 
is bound to take advantage of any available local remedies that are capable of correcting 
the alleged administrative wrong.’265 More generally, the investor should be responsible 
for the choices made in pursuing the resolution of a dispute with the host State. It 
should not be automatically expected that the host State will go above, beyond or 
outside its legal framework for the investor’s benefit, without the accompanying care of 
the investor in pursuing the potentially available remedies. This does not equal the re-
introduction of the need to exhaust all available local remedies in order to obtain 
protection. It is rather a demand for reasonableness so to make possible the proper 
operation of the host State’s rule of law framework. 
 
A rather straightforward example is provided by the GEA v. Ukraine award. The 
Claimant based its claim for the breach of the full protection and security standard by 
arguing that the host State should have initiated proceedings to inquire into a theft of 
the claimant’s property. However, the Claimant itself did not bring a criminal 
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complaint, causing the Tribunal to reject the claim.266 Otherwise, the suggestion would 
be that the State had to ex officio investigate a claim in situation not so deserving, just 
because it involved a foreign investor. This would arguably be going too far, except 
perhaps in very specific situations where the investor itself could not for some reason 
avail itself of the possibility to lodge a complaint. 
 
A more nuanced example can be found in White Industries v. India, already 
mentioned above. As discussed, a key determination to be made by the tribunal was 
whether court proceedings lasting for 9 years were to be considered either a denial of 
justice or a failure to provide ‘effective means’ of asserting claims.267 One line of 
argumentation offered by the Respondent, partially based on an allegedly a contrario 
situation to a determination made in Chevron v. Ecuador – Partial Award, was that the 
Claimant’s litigation strategy, which involved raising a number of legally complex issues, 
was the principal contributing factor to any delay.268 In the end, the tribunal was not 
convinced that the delay was indeed ‘entirely’ attributable to the Claimant, and rather 
concluded that ‘White cannot properly be criticised for seeking to be treated by India's 
courts in accordance with what it reasonably believed were India's New York Convention 
obligations.’269  
 
Therefore, the existence of the delay could be assessed under the ideal-type 
model, including here for sure both the New York Convention and the relevant Indian 
statutes dealing with court proceedings. The tentative breach of the FET standard could 
then potentially be offset by the investor’s own contribution to this breach, in this 
particular case by an unreasonable litigation strategy that led to unwarranted delays. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
The broad focus on strengthening the national rule of law through substantive-
decision making does not end with an elaboration of the ideal-type model. That element 
is perhaps the most considerable addition to the IROL paradigm of the autonomous 
meaning of the FET standard, but other potential implications for the legal reasoning 
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process can be suggested as well. This Chapter has focused on two elements in that 
sense. 
 
Apart from other roles suggested in practice and doctrine, this Chapter has 
argued that comparative law, policy and practice (here dubbed comparative 
benchmarks) can serve as an important tool for the tribunals in adding persuasiveness 
to their reasoning. While the ideal-type model can provide one additional set of 
coordinates under which the host State should have acted, how it actually performed is 
a matter upon which the tribunal might have to make sensitive pronouncements. The 
parameters themselves can leave considerable discretion to the host State decision-
makers, and complicate the task of pronouncing how that discretion was exercised. The 
standards and methods of review can involve complex determinations such as what 
represents suitable, necessary or reasonable measures by a State. In that sense, pointing 
towards the examples from comparable States and regimes that support the tribunal’s 
findings can help in this task and also limit the appearance of discretionary, ‘I know it 
when I see it’ decision-making. These benchmarks, provided that they are well chosen 
and elaborated upon, can also help the host State alter its future behaviour and avoid 
new claims in a particular sphere of activity. 
 
The focus on the ideal-type model also implies that the rule-generative role for 
the principle of good faith should be increasingly limited in the FET context. Barring 
clear instances of mala fides and leaving aside the concretisations of good faith within the 
ideal-type model itself, good faith considerations should primarily perform a corrective 
role. The corrective good faith factors would thus be safety valve for (hopefully not 
common) situations where the examination of the ideal-type model and other relevant 
factors does not secure what the tribunal perceives as a fair outcome of a dispute. This 
chapter has thus touched upon a non-exhaustive account of some of the key factors 
that in one form or another make an appearance in the existing ISDS jurisprudence, and 
which relate to both the host State and the foreign investor. These (potentially mutually 
offsetting) factors include on the side of the host State the specific representations 
given to the investor, the overall transparency of the domestic legal framework, and the 
broader circumstances of the host State. On the side of the foreign investor, these 
would primarily include the level of the investor’s due diligence and its behaviour and 
contribution to the dynamic of the dispute. 
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Taken together, comparative benchmarks and corrective good faith factors 
should complement the efforts towards strengthening the national rule of law as 
grounded in the elaboration of the ideal-type model. They should allow the recourse to 
the vast comparative experience, and at the same time seek to limit the good faith 
considerations outside the ideal-type model to serious and hopefully exceptional 
instances. Even if considerable discretion is allowed by the applied methods of scrutiny, 
these elements should help assure both the investor and the host State that the 
determinations made by the tribunal are grounded in more than just the subjective 
impressions. The national rule of law and the legitimacy of IIL more broadly can only 
fare better in that case. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
The story of international investment law is remarkable in many ways. Arising out 
of the sometimes-alleged thousands of years of efforts to secure the property and 
peaceful operation of business people abroad, it has towards the end of the XX century 
become one of the fastest growing and most controversial spheres of international law. 
It exhibits a peculiar mixture of features that attracts attention from different quarters – 
from legal ones with direct involvement in the process of investor-State dispute 
settlement (ISDS), through development agencies and political economists, to civil 
society NGOs and the wider public.  
 
IIL is today overwhelmingly seen as a single regime, even if the agreement on its 
exact contours sometimes remains elusive. Regardless, certain important features stand 
out. The extensive power of investment tribunals to sanction the unacceptable 
behaviour of host States towards foreign investors is coupled with remarkably open-
textured norms serving as a basis for such an exercise. The limited possibility to review 
these decisions is coupled with a strong enforcement regime. And the possibility of 
issuing awards containing some of the highest compensations in the history of 
international adjudication is coupled with a clear possibility that subsequent awards can 
reach opposite conclusions on the same or similar set of facts. The potential for such a 
regime to influence the participating host States is in some ways unprecedented – but 
the guidance for exerting such influence remains open to further development and 
contestation.  
 
It is thus hardly surprising that the assessments of the IIL regime and the ISDS 
vary from them being ‘one of the most progressive developments in international law 
and relations in the history of international law’1 to accusations that IIL ‘has ensnared 
hundreds of countries and put corporate profit before human rights and the 
environment.’2 Nor is the variety of reform proposals – aimed at structural, procedural 
and substantive aspects – surprising in that sense. It remains to be seen what is the 
future of the proposals aimed (e.g.) at centralising the dispute settlement mechanism or 
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re-calibrating international investment agreements (IIAs) towards a new balance 
between States’ and investors’ interests. The outcome, as uncertain as it seems now, can 
substantially change some of the basic tenets of IIL. 
 
However, both irrespective and potentially complementary to such proposed 
reforms, there is considerable space to think about reforming the substantive decision-
making process and practice of arbitrators.3 In particular, the most ubiquitous standard 
of protection of foreign investors, the fair and equitable treatment standard, can be seen 
as a main focal point for such an exercise. The focus of this thesis has in that sense 
been on normative paradigms that should guide the substantive decision-making in 
resolving claims launched under this standard. Amongst the different potential 
perspectives, the one suggested here as particularly potent in orienting the power of 
investment tribunals is securing the provision of the rule of law to foreign investors in the host 
State. This would in itself seem to be a largely uncontroversial staring position, and one 
that has found support in existing FET jurisprudence. The requirements or sub-
principles of the FET have so far been elaborated in such a way that resembles 
commonly accepted requirements for the existence of the rule of law. Furthermore, the 
notion of the ‘rule of law’ is almost universally appealing and its provision seen as 
desirable.  
 
The generally acceptable view of FET’s ‘mission’ to secure the rule of law to 
foreign investors thus offers a relatively uncontroversial starting point, with both 
description and prescription in mind. In that sense, this thesis has suggested that the 
currently dominant paradigm of the FET being there to secure the international rule of 
law (IROL) for foreign investors should for a number of normative reasons be 
complemented with the NROL paradigm – and FET standard as a tool to strengthen 
the national rule of law. In brief, the attempts to create and consistently enforce 
supranational rule of law tenets aimed at regulating host States’ behaviour (the IROL 
paradigm) should be complemented with an effort to systematically examine if the 
foreign investor has been treated in accordance with the vision of the rule of law that 
the host State itself (at least formally) adopts.  
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The IIL regime and the IROL paradigm in the FET standard 
 
As a background for suggesting the complementing of the IROL paradigm with 
an NROL one, Chapters 1 and 2 have respectively provided an overview of first the 
foundations and then the operation of the IROL paradigm and the legal feasibility of its 
complementation. Chapter 1 dealt with the normative positions and developments in 
the practice and doctrine of IIL more generally that have eventually critically 
contributed to the constitution of the IROL paradigm regarding the FET standard. 
These revolve around the basic idea of establishing and consistently applying a set of 
supranational rule of law benchmarks through the vehicle of ISDS. These benchmarks, 
for the purposes of assessing host State compliance, do not have to incorporate or 
relate to the domestic (rule of) law protections and provisions. As sometimes suggested, 
the ‘[a]rbitrators have developed a supranational rule of law that has helped to create 
uniform standards for acceptable sovereign behavior.’4  
 
At the same time, Chapter 1 also suggested that there are at least two factors 
relating to the foundations of IIL that question such a normative vision. One is the 
predominantly bilateral nature of the network of IIAs, coupled with a prominent failure 
of formal multilateralization efforts. This at least normatively raises the question if 
regime-building multilateralization is acceptable or whether the specificities of particular 
State-State IIA dyads should have been given more recognition regarding the operation 
of individual standards such as the FET. Secondly, the reality of the IIA conclusion for 
a considerable number of countries suggests that the level of awareness about what IIL 
obligations (will) entail was questionable, further making the normative case for 
inevitability of the IROL paradigm problematic. Simply put, both factors are indications 
that States did not necessarily intend for a de facto multilateral and IROL-inducing 
regime of IIL.  
 
These problematic factors were initially made relatively unimportant by the long 
dormancy of ISDS. Still, the sudden (re-)‘discovery’ and rise of investment arbitration 
towards the end of the XX century necessitated answers about the dominant paradigm. 
The explosive ISDS-led development of IIL in the post-Cold War setting, coupled with 
a relatively small epistemic arbitral community and de facto precedent as a master regime-
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building tool crucially contributed to the dominance of the IROL paradigm in FET 
decision-making. Still, the normative conclusion that can be derived is that there is 
nothing necessarily inevitable in the way IIL came to its present form. The potential for 
different normative visions of its operation, particularly regarding substantive decision-
making, still exists. 
 
The broader normative possibility of adding complementing paradigms to 
decision-making does not necessarily imply a need for them. Chapter 2 therefore further 
examined and problematized certain aspects of the IROL paradigm as operating in 
practice, and also illustrated that NROL paradigm complementation is a possibility 
under the formal legal framework. In particular, this Chapter set out three important 
propositions as a relevant background for the normative discussion in Chapter 3. 
 
Firstly, the FET jurisprudence does indicate an unequal and divergent approach 
to the interpretation and application of the FET sub-principles, both in terms of the 
autonomous understanding what the FET standard specifically entails and in terms of 
the relationship towards national law and international obligations of the host State. 
Secondly, and relatedly, there are examples in jurisprudence that clearly demonstrate the 
readiness of tribunals to duly take into account the parallel obligations of the host State 
and incorporate them into the FET decision-making. This shows that the NROL 
paradigm as such is not a groundless proposal even when considering the existing 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, and thirdly, this Chapter argued that both in terms of rules 
of interpretation and through choice and weighing of relevant facts, investment 
tribunals do have at their disposal the necessary formal tools to make the suggested 
NROL paradigm a regular complementary feature of deciding the FET claims.  
 
Conclusion to this chapter also offered an overview of certain common points 
arising from the first two chapters, which sketched a normative way forward towards a 
complementary NROL paradigm. The general normative desirability and further 
potential benefits of introducing a focus on the national rule of law were then 
elaborated upon in Chapter 3. 
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A potential normative shift – strengthening the national rule of law 
 
The discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 sought thus to show that there is a possibility 
and a need for a normative orientation that retains the focus on securing the rule of law 
for foreign investors, but while also aiming to tackle the problematic aspects of the 
IROL paradigm. Chapter 3 thus set out a normative case for introducing a 
complementary paradigm aimed at strengthening the national rule of law in the host 
State. Instead of only focusing on building a supranational set of rule of law precepts, 
the power of ISDS through the FET standard should likewise be used to secure (to the 
extent possible) that the host State acted in accordance with its own vision of the rule of 
law. This vision should be seen as expressed in the constellation of international and 
municipal instruments beyond the IIA that regulate and constrain the behaviour of the 
host State in a particular legal situation involving the foreign investor. While the IROL 
paradigm as a starting point – and the international character of the FET standard – are 
a necessary safety valve for unacceptable national idiosyncrasies, a careful and holistic 
examination of how the host State fared under the constraints imposed by its 
international and domestic obligations should be a regular and thoroughly approached 
feature for assessing the compliance with the FET standard. Chapters 4 and 5 dealt with 
the more practical implications, but the core of Chapter 3 sets out the four main 
normative reasons why the focus on the national rule of law should be seen as a 
desirable complement to the IROL paradigm. 
 
The first reason is the substantive richness of domestic law. This allows enhanced 
ex ante discoverability of rules (as opposed to standards/principles) for both foreign 
investors and host State officials. The second is that the focus on ‘national choice’ on 
how rule of law should look like is supported by the considerations of sovereignty, 
plurality and subsidiarity in international law. It demonstrates respect for the States’ 
right to opt for a particular vision of social and economic life on its territory. It is also a 
perhaps welcome check on overly Western-centric understandings of how the rule of 
law should look like.  
 
The third reason is that the unavoidable importance of the domestic legal 
framework for regulating the life of an investment should be seen as reasonably 
expected by both foreign investors and host State officials. This makes it a normatively 
 
256 
desirable reference point for examining the behaviour of the parties and limits the 
appearance ex post facto standards. The final reason goes to the underlying telos of IIL and 
the expectations of host States in this sense. If, as it is strongly arguable, the ultimate 
goal of IIL should be effectuating economic development in the participating States, 
then the focus on strengthening the national rule of law through one of its critical 
standards (FET) is a desirable path. Enhancing the national rule of law, among other 
advantages, helps achieve the goal of economic development more profoundly by 
making its benefits available to both foreign and domestic actors. Taken together, these 
reasons suggest that the careful focus on the national rule of law can be a way for ISDS 
to sustain and enhance its legitimacy and further the interests of host States beyond just 
the attraction of foreign investment.  
 
To realise this, the focus on the national rule of law should result in practical 
implications for the decision-making process. Different potential ways of translating 
this focus into practice certainly remain open for further research. With this in mind, 
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on three important elements that should be the part of the 
decision-making process of investment tribunals. 
 
Chapter 4 dealt with the elaboration of the ideal-type model of the national rule of law 
(ideal-type model). This model is an overview of all international and domestic 
obligations of the host State (beyond the IIA) which are relevant for a particular legal 
situation involving the foreign investor. In addition to establishing universally applicable 
meanings of concepts such as ‘fair’, ‘equitable’ and (non-)‘arbitrary’, the approach to 
interpreting and applying these requirements in a particular case should regularly include 
the assessment of the State behaviour under this ideal-type model. It provides the 
parameters which the host State decision-makers should have had in mind when acting, 
and which the investor could have expected the host State to obey – before and regardless 
of any FET dispute taking place. 
 
Depending on a specific legal situation involving the foreign investor, the ideal-
type model could be constructed from the treaty obligations of the host State, 
constitutional provisions and statutory provisions, all further clarified through recourse 
to secondary sources such as jurisprudence and doctrine. This ideal-type model thus 
represents the set of parameters within which the foreign investor could have expected 
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the host State decision-makers to operate. Its regular examination as an important 
factor in the FET decision-making should also indicate to the host State organs the 
need to holistically and prospectively account for their obligations, and therefore 
promote the respect for the rule of law beyond the focus on (e.g.) just the directly 
applicable statute. 
 
The scrutiny of how well the host State actors lived up to the ideal-type model 
and if there thus exists a breach of the FET standard ultimately remains a distinct issue. 
It depends on the standard and method of review, including the level of deference to be 
granted to host State decision-makers. Aside from matters discussed in Chapter 5, the 
issue of choosing the most appropriate standard and method remains an issue requiring 
a separate interpretation and is not addressed within the scope of this thesis. The 
inquiries into whether certain standards or methods are more suitable for promoting the 
national rule of law than others, or whether the ideal-type model itself could influence 
the choice, remain open for further research. What is important to note, however, is 
that the elaboration of the ideal-type model is compatible with the dominant existing 
approaches. It simply provides a more holistic understanding of the context in which 
the scrutiny is to be conducted.  
 
As further touched upon in Chapter 4, the holistic approach to the relevant legal 
framework and/or persuasive engagement with primary and secondary sources is 
certainly not alien to ISDS jurisprudence. The example of Dan Cake v. Hungary (with due 
regard to other examples in previous chapters) serves as a useful indicator. Tribunals 
can and sometimes do systematically and persuasively expound on the failings of the 
domestic actors to obey the relevant domestic legal framework in the rule of law 
context. The examples like these thus both support the practical feasibility of 
constructing a persuasive ideal-type model, and also arguably show how to properly 
send ‘good governance signals’5 to the host State.  
 
While not thus suggesting a particular method or review, Chapter 5 dealt with two 
further elements - recourse to comparative benchmarks and the use of corrective good faith 
factors – which relate to the employed legal reasoning process. These elements support 
the strengthening of the national rule of law in different ways. Comparative benchmarks 
																																																						
5 International Thunderbird v. Mexico – Separate Opinion Wälde, para. 125 (emphasis added). 
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are aimed at enhancing the persuasiveness of the tribunals’ reasoning and at offering 
further potential guidance for the host States. Corrective good faith factors aim to leave 
sufficient leeway for good faith considerations, but without over-relying on this 
discretion-laden principle as a way to concretise the FET obligations. 
 
Comparative benchmarks – consisting of comparative law, policy and practice – 
should be utilized to provide support for tribunals’ scrutiny in situations when it has to 
decide if particular measures of the host State were (e.g.) a ‘least onerous way’ of 
achieving a goal generally in accordance with the ideal-type model, or if there existed an 
‘undue delay’ in behaviour of judiciary and/or administration. The matters before an 
investment tribunal are often not novel in comparative terms. ‘I know it when I see it’ 
type of reasoning in identifying problems with the host State legislation, policies and 
practice can thus be supplemented or replaced by a recourse to carefully chosen 
comparators. This can and should considerably enhance the persuasiveness of tribunals’ 
findings. Care should be taken to, e.g., use benchmarks from States with sufficiently 
similar ideal-type models and socio-economic circumstances. If this is so, this element 
can also potentially lead to ‘best practice’ guidance for the host State in future 
legislation, policy and practice that would accord better with its own ideal-type model. 
 
Finally, the normative emphasis on the national rule of law and the holistic legal 
framework would suggest a shift for the role of good faith in concretising obligations 
stemming from the FET standard. Currently, the principle of good faith and its 
different emanations such as the doctrine of legitimate expectations play a critical role in 
attempting to refine the obligations stemming from it. If the focus is shifted more 
towards the ideal-type model and the NROL paradigm, the need for this role arguably 
diminishes. At the same time, there is little doubt that the clearly apparent bad faith 
towards the foreign investor would sometimes largely negate the need to go through an 
extensive inquiry into the ideal-type model. Likewise, the principle of good faith and 
specific related doctrines remain important to the extent that they can be persuasively 
shown to form a part of the host State’s ideal-type model itself. In that sense, they can 
be duly accounted for in the tribunal’s scrutiny. 
 
But beyond these situations, the role of the principle of good faith should be 
reimagined as an ultima ratio one, in the form of (what was here dubbed) corrective good 
 
259 
faith factors. These would be specific circumstances or fact patterns occurring on the 
side of both the host State and the foreign investor. They can (depending on their 
intensity and context) lead to a potentially different conclusion on the existence of an 
FET breach than would be tentatively reached through the scrutiny under the ideal-type 
model. On the side of the host State, relevant factors can include the specific 
representations and assurances given to the foreign investor, the social, economic and 
political circumstances of the host State which might influence the fulfilment of the 
ideal-type model, and the transparency or possibility to gain knowledge about relevant 
law which forms that model. On the side of the foreign investor, factors to take into 
account can comprise the level of due diligence prior to and during the investment 
operation, and the behaviour of the investor in terms of contributing to the dynamic of 
the dispute. 
 
All these factors, to reiterate, might also be given relevance for assessment under 
the ideal-type model - e.g. specific representations can give rise to the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations in form which is specific to the particular national law. But to 
the extent that this is not (sufficiently) the case in tribunal’s view, they can then be 
employed as a corrective and a manifestation of the residual power of tribunals to 
secure a fairness of outcome. The examination of these factors almost certainly involves 
their interplay. Finding an unacceptable opaqueness of the host State’s legal framework 
should hardly be determinative without at the same time examining the investor’s due 
diligence efforts to clarify the legal issues relating to its operation. Problematic 
behaviour on both sides should be seen as mutually offsetting, and the threshold for 
these factors to affect the ultimate outcome of the tribunal’s assessment should in any 
case be relatively high. 
 
Taken together, the ideal-type model, comparative benchmarks and corrective 
good faith factors should allow for awards that recognise the reality of the national rule 
of law being one of the primary concerns for foreign investors, while at the same time 
clearly and persuasively pointing out what (if anything) went wrong in host State 
compliance with these rule of law requirements. In their ultimate effect, these elements 
should help that the benefits of ISDS scrutiny reach other domestic business entities, 
and ultimately the public at large.  
 
 
260 
 
IIL and strengthening the national rule of law – themes for the future 
 
The proposed complementation of decision-making with an NROL paradigm can 
be relevant beyond the decisions on liability in the FET context. It is a call to use the 
extensive power that has been, somewhat ‘accidental[ly]’,6 put into the hand of 
arbitrators in a way that not only accords better with the realities of the investment 
processes, but also aims to help realise the more fundamental interests of the host 
States as the ultimate masters of the IIL regime.  
 
The opportunities for focusing on the national rule of law arise at other junctions 
in the decision-making process. For example, the jurisdictional issues such as the 
illegality of the investor’s conduct – in particular the existence of corruption – as well as 
determining the quantum of compensation can all be such opportunities. The illegality 
of the investor’s conduct opens the possibilities for elaborating relevant ideal-type 
models of the domestic rule of law. The determinations on quantum can also be 
influenced, especially bearing in mind the actual and potential role for domestic in this 
sphere.7 Even if host State liability is found to exist, the degree to which the State acted 
in accordance with its own rule of law vision could thus also be reflected in quantum of 
damages. 
 
But perhaps the most interesting sphere for future research is how the 
jurisdictional, substantive and procedural issues can all be mutually affected by the 
normative orientation towards the national rule of law. The important issue of 
corruption in the State-investor dealings can be a good example in this sense. The 
currently predominant trend in jurisprudence is to decline jurisdiction in cases where 
the investment has been obtained by the investor through corrupt means.8 On its own, 
such an approach (aimed at preventing the investor from capitalising on its own 
misbehaviour) also helps the national rule of law by serving as a disincentive on the side 
of investor to engage in corrupt practices. On the other hand, the extent to which this 
disincentive exist for the host State officials is more questionable. Knowledge that the 
jurisdiction will be declined can arguably cause a form of moral hazard, where the lack 
																																																						
6 Pauwelyn 2014, 416. 
7 See on this in particular Hepburn 2017, 69-99. 
8 See for example Douglas 2014, 155-157 and materials cited therein. 
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of consequences (apart from potential legal costs) does little to prevent officials for 
(e.g.) demanding bribes.  
 
If the normative focus is put on the strengthening of the national rule of law, 
there are different potential paths for jurisdictional, procedural and substantive 
developments. For example, there can be a case for accepting jurisdiction over a 
dispute, for the reason of preventing the jurisdictional ‘shield’ incentivising corruption 
and also so to illuminate more thoroughly all the circumstances of a particular 
transaction. Even if, ultimately, the award of compensation might be denied due to the 
lack of clean hands on investor’s behalf, the possibility of closer scrutiny over 
potentially glaring failings of the rule of law should be taken. There can also be a case 
for the introduction of innovative remedies aimed at tackling corruption,9 including 
potentially the need for the host State to make sure that the relevant parts of the award 
identifying corruption are made available to the wider public. Finally, a strong argument 
can be made that both the national rule of law considerations and the international 
public policy may warrant the tribunals to override parties’ attempts to keep the 
decisions and awards identifying corruption confidential. To what extent all these paths 
are possible de lege lata and which would require de lege ferenda reform is also a topic 
requiring further examination.  
 
The international investment law is a manifestation of a new type of international 
law that deeply intertwines with the national regulatory spheres. It can affect both the 
host State government apparatus and the individual entities to a largely unprecedented 
extent. It should thus require innovative thinking so its power can be harnessed in a way 
which is the most beneficial for the widest range of actors. This thesis has presented 
one such normative path. Other paths remain possible and worthy of exploration. But 
what inspired the proposals made here, and should steer the decision making of 
investment tribunals, is the recognition that ‘[i]ndeed it is not too much to say that […] 
																																																						
9 There are signs of this already occurring in practice. The prime example seems to be the still 
confidential Spentex v. Uzbekistan award (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/26). As reported, the dismissal of 
claimant’s claim due to existence of corruption was accompanied by the tribunal ‘urging’ Uzbekistan to 
contribute to a UN anti-corruption project to be conducted in the host State at the threat of an adverse 
cost award. Uzbekistan reportedly complied with this so far ‘unprecedented’ anti-corruption measure. See 
IAReporter story (http://tinyurl.com/y9334ayy, accessed 20 July 2017) for more details.   
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the role of international law is to reinforce, and on occasions to institute, the rule of law 
internally.’10 The possibilities for doing so lay open. 
 
  
																																																						
10 Crawford 2003, 8. 
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